Turretin - Institutes of Elenctic Theology

NINTH TOPIC

SIN IN GENERAL AND IN PARTICULAR

	Question I.	Whether the formal reason of sin may rightly be said to consist in illegality (anomia). We affirm.
	Question II.	Whether the hekousion or voluntary (inasmuch as it is of him who knowlingly and willingly does anything) is of the essence of sin? We deny against the papists and Socinians.
	Question III.	Whether guilt is the formal of sin, or its inseparable adjunct, or only its effect. And whether it may well be distinguished into guilt of culpability and of punishment.

VENIAL AND MORTAL SINS
	Question IV.	Whether all sins are of themselves and in their own nature mortal. Or whether any venial sin can be granted. The former we affirm; the latter we deny against the papists.

THE FALL OF THE ANGELS
	Question V.	What was the sin of the angels by which they are said to have rebelled against God?

THE FALL OF ADAM
	Question VI.	What was the first sin of man - unbelief or pride?
	Question VII.	How could a holy man fall, and what was the true cause of his fall?
	Question VIII.	Whether Adam by his fall lost the image of God. We affirm.
	Question IX.	Whether the actual disobedience of Adam is imputed by an immediate and antecedent imputation to all his posterity springing from him by natural generation. We affirm.

ORIGINAL SIN
	Question X.	Whether any original sin or inherent stain and depravity may be granted, propagated to us by generation. We affirm against the Pelagians and Socinians.
	Question XI.	Whether original sin has corrupted the very essence of the soul. Also whether it is a mere privation or a certain positive quality too.

THE PROPAGATION OF SIN
	Question XII.	How is original sin propagated from parents to their children?
	Question XIII.	Actual sin and its various divisions.
	Question XIV.	In what consists the formal reason of the sin against the Holy Spirit? Also why is it unpardonable?
	Question XV.	Whether sin can be the punishment of sin. We affirm.

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FIRST QUESTION - Whether the formal reason of sin may rightly be said to consist in illegality (anomia). We affirm.

We proceed to the state of sin into which man (by his voluntary defection from the highest good) precipitated himself and became, at the same time, wicked and miserable.

Peccatum is commonly called in Hebrew hajx, which properly means "deflection" from a design. It is applied to slingers and archers who do not hit the mark.

a`marti,a in Greek answers to it - as if a`marpti,a ("a not reaching) as `amarta,nein means "to miss a mark"
in Latin peccatum (cf. pecuatum, "from cattle") as peccare is to act irrationally like beasts

Sin may be viewed in two aspects:

in the concrete and materially (with the subject in which inheres) - it is called an inclination, action or omission at variance with the law of God, or lacking the legal rectitude which ought to be in it
in the abstract and formally for depravity itself - it is nothing other and anomia or "discrepancy from the law"

By law here is meant the law of God alone by way of eminence, whether natural and implanted or revealed and inwritten.

The formal reason of sin consists in anomia and privation, denoting the want of the rectitude or goodness which ought to be in the rational creature according to the prescription of the law.

this privation is not pure or simple, but corrupting; not idle, but energetic; not of pure negation, but of depraved disposition, by which not only is the due rectitude taken away, but also an undue unrectitude and a depraved quality laid down, infecting all the faculties
sin is not only the negation of a good, but the position of a corrupt disposition

Some attribute a certain positive being to sin, not absolutely and physically, but both logically and ethically.

What properly and in every way is positive (especially substantial) and which in its own conception does not imply privation or defect, such also alone is from God and is desirable. Yet there is not the same relation of that which is called positive only relatively or logically or ethically, as is the case with sin.

Although sin in its conception involves privation, yet there does not cease to be a distinction between sins of omission and commission.

sins of omission
1. assail the affirming precepts
2. privation takes away the whole substance of the act and its objective goodness
3. the privation of omission immediately exists in the power by which man was bound to have acted
sins of commission
1. assail the denying precepts
2. the substance of the act is not taken away, but only it actual goodness
3. the privation of commission is immediately in the action which is destitute of the due morality

Original sin is rightly said to be against the law because it is a privation of the original rectitude which the law demands in man.

The virtues of the heathen can be according to the law with regard to the substance of work; although against the law with regard to mode of operating (which in many ways wanders from it).

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SECOND QUESTION - Whether the hekousion or voluntary (inasmuch as it is of him who knowingly and willingly does anything) is of the essence of sin. We deny against the papists and Socinians.

The papists and Socinians wish nothing to have the relation of sin except what is equally voluntary (viz. what is done knowingly and from choice).

We clear the question by a twofold distinction:

voluntary may be taken either strictly or broadly
1. strictly - that which is done by an actual movement of the will
2. broadly - that which in any manner either affects the will and inheres in it or depends upon it
3. we treat of voluntary strictly, which involves an act of choice and will; in this sense, we deny that every sin is voluntary

1. involuntary may be taken in two ways: either positively or negatively
  1. positively - the same as unwilling which is such by a positive notion; in this sense, we grant that no sin can be involuntary
  2. negatively - what is done when the will ought to have acted; in this sense, every sin is not necessarily voluntary

This requisite does not belong to every sin -

not to it alone, nor always
not to all because it cannot be said of original sin
not to "sins of ignorance and imprudence"

The very first motions of concupiscence do not cease to be sins, although they are neither wholly voluntary nor in our power (cf. Rom. 7:7).

Desire is contradistinguished from sin; not simply, but from a certain species of it which is carried out by the external members (James 1:14-15).

Ignorance can indeed excuse from so much, but not from the whole.

Augustine: "In vain do you suppose that on this account there is no fault in little children because it cannot be without will, which they have not. For this is properly said on account of each one's proper sin, not on account of the original contagion of the first sin." (Against Julian 3.5).

The voluntary is twofold:

either radically in the signified act
or actually in the exercised act
sin is not always voluntary actually and in the exercised act because original sin is granted; but it can be called voluntary radically because the proper seat of sin is the will in every sin

What is necessary by a physical necessity (or of coaction) cannot have the relation of sin; but what is necessary by a hypothetical and rational necessity does not forthwith take away sin.

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THIRD QUESTION - Whether guilt is the formal of sin, or its inseparable adjunct, or only its effect. And whether it may well be distinguished into guilt of culpability and of punishment.

The effects of sin are commonly said to be two:

pollution
1. the spiritual and moral pollution with which the soul of man is tainted
2. inheres in man
3. makes man wicked
4. called "impurities," "diseases," "wounds"
5. answers to the grace of sanctification by which pollution is washed away through the efficacy of the Holy Spirit
guilt
1. obligation to punishment from previous sin
2. adheres to him in the sight of God
3. makes man miserable
4. called "crimes," "offenses," "debts"
5. answers to the blessing of justification by which Christ takes away our guilt by the imputation of his own righteousness

Guilt:

politically, it is nothing else than the state and condition in which the accused are until they are either acquitted or condemned
theologically, it is called "the obligation to punishment arising from sin"
hence a twofold guilt arises:
1. potential
  1. denoting the intrinsic desert of punishment inseparable from sin
  2. and belongs to the demerit of sin and its condemnability
2. actual
  1. separable from it by the mercy of God, which is properly the actual removal of guilt
  2. belongs to the judgment of demerit or the condemnation which is taken away from those who sins are pardoned

Illegality (anomia) is one thing, but the condemnation attending it is another.

the former constitutes the nature of sin
the latter follows it and necessarily depends upon it

Guilt follows sin -

partly from the natural and indispensable right of God
partly from the sanction of the divine law threatening sin with punishment.

Although the sanction of the law ought necessarily to be fulfilled, yet because a surety can be substituted in the place of the sinner (who takes his guilt upon himself), it happens that it can be separated from the person sinning (through the grace from the gospel).

Falsely is guilt distinguished by the papists into guilt of culpability and of punishment.

the guilt of culpability (reatus culpae) according to them is that by which the sinner is of himself unworthy of the grace of God and worthy of his wrath and condemnation
the guilt of punishment (reatus poenae) is that by which he is subject to condemnation and obliged to it
the emptiness of the distinction appears from the nature of both: since culpability and punishment are related and guilt is nothing else than the obligation to punishment arising from culpability

Some punishments are still visited by God upon believers after the remission of culpability because they are only improperly so called (i.e., they are medicinal and castigatory - for their correction); not indeed properly so called and satisfactory - for their punishment. Yet it does not follow that, the culpability being remitted or its guilt removed, there still remains any guilt of punishment.

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FOURTH QUESTION - Whether all sins are of themselves and in their own nature mortal. Or whether any venial sins can be granted. The former we affirma; the latter we deny against the papists.

Among the various divisions of sin, the papists distribute sin into mortal and venial.

their design in this is to curry favor for the perfection of righteousness, supererogatory works, the merit of works and purgatory
this is confirmed in Session 6 of the Council of Trent.

According to them:

mortal sins are those which turn man entirely away from God to which eternal punishment is due
venial sins
1. are those which do not indeed wholly turn away from God, yet hinder progress to him and are easily expiated
2. or they are those which of themselves and in their own nature are so light and minute as not be sufficient to deprive anyone of divine grace or make him an enemy of God or render him worthy of eternal death
3. those which are judged to be venial on account of imperfection of work are twofold:
  1. from subreption, which are not perfectly voluntary (such as the sudden motions of desire, anger, vengeance, etc. arising in the mind before the reason can fully deliberate whether they are to be entertained or not)
  2. from the smallness of the matter, which are committed in a small thing (for instance, the theft of a penny, which neither sensibly injuries one's neighbor, nor is of such a kind as to take away friendship among generous men)

The question does not concern the equality of sin or gradual inequality, but their essential demerit; the question is not whether all sins are equal to each other, but the question is only whether they are equally mortal.

The question is not whether sins can be called mortal or venial from the event, but the question is whether they are such per se and in their own nature, so that some are mortal (deserving death), other venial (of themselves deserving pardon).

The question is not whether a distinction relative to the administration of divine providence in the covenant of grace in punishing the sins of believers can be admitted, but the question simply concerns the nature of sins in themselves according to the strictness of the law. We think all are mortal, none truly venial.

The question comes back to this - whether all sins per se and in their own nature are mortal (not that they are always actually punished with death, but are worthy of it and can justly be so punished); whether some are mortal and some venial (not from the event and through grace, but in their own nature and according to the law). The latter our opponents hold; we maintain the former.

The reasons are:

"the wages of sin is death" (Rom. 6:23) and "the soul that sinneth, it shall die" (Ezek. 18:20)
1. mention is made of sin indefinitely to mark sin of any kind
2. thus either venial sin is not sin or it deserves death and so is not venial

1. "cursed be he that confirmeth not all that words of this law to do them" (Deut. 27:26; Gal. 3:10)
  1. if every deviation from the law deserves a curse
  2. and every sin is illegality
  3. therefore no sin can be granted (even the smallest) which does not bring upon it the curse
1. "whosoever offends in one precept, he is guilty of all" (Jam. 2:10)
  1. the apostle treats here not only of crimes, but of any sins indefinitely
  2. a multiple reason can be given why man by violating one precept becomes guilty of all:
    1. from the author, because there is the same author of all the precepts, so that in the violation of one the majesty of the lawgiver is offended against
    2. from the connection of sins, because all the precepts are summed up in the one of love; this being violated the whole law is violated
    3. from the end of the law which demands an obedience, not partial, but universal; so that he who violates one precept is guilty of the violation of the whole law and can no more obtain life from the law
1. in the day of judgment account must be given even of the idle word (Matt. 12:36)
1. every sin is opposed to the glory of God and is injurious to his infinite majesty
1. the very lightest sins cannot be remitted, since indeed pardon of the elect is wholly gratuitous, therefore they can be eternally punished justly
2. Christ died for all sins, even the most trivial: therefore all are mortal

Mortal sin differs from sin producing death.

the former denotes what sin deserves
the latter whither sin leads us if we suffer ourselves to be led away and deceived by it
every sin is mortal in its own nature
yet not every sin really and actually leads to death, on account of the intervention of grace

Sin when it is finished is said "to bring forth death" (Jam. 1:15), not to the exclusion or conceived or inborn sin, but as the proximate cause.

James does not distinguish the various species of sins, but the different degrees of the same sin and the process of temptation in which an advance is made from the first to the second act (from the internal to the external) and so to death itself
The stages are:
1. first stage is placed in the temptation of lust or its first motion
2. second in the conceiving of lust by its imperfect consent
3. third in the bringing forth by a full and perfect consent
4. fourth in the consummation of sin by external work, which brings forth death

The "hay" and "stubble" in 1 Corinthians 3:12, do not denote venial sins, but new, vain and curious doctrines.

although they do not overthrow the foundation, they are not homogeneous with it
although those who build such things upon a solid foundation will not be condemned, it does not therefore follow that their sins are not worthy of death; but that the grace of God pardons them

The sin against the Holy Spirit is said to be unto death (1 John 5:16) by way of eminence, not only because it deserves death, but since it is wholly unpardonable, death necessarily and infallibly follows it. Others are not unto death; not because they are not mortal per se and worthy of death, but because from God's grace they are pardonable and often obtain remission.

Christ says nothing to favor venial sins, although seeming to consign some only to hell fire (Matt. 5:22-23); sin consists in internal passion and irritating insults (but not that any sins are venial, since even the smallest degree of punishment is capital, as the smallest degree of sin is illegality).

Luke 6:41 and Matthew 23:24 do prove that some sins are heavier or lighter than others, but they do not prove that some are venial.

In Ephesians 5:4-5, Paul does not distinguish certain vices from others as mortal from venial, but rather joins all together as homogeneous by the copulative; they also all depend upon the same verb in construction; hence, verse 6 applies to them all.

Although a formal and expressed aversion from God does not occur in every sin, yet there is a virtual and implied aversion even in the lightest.

They who extenuate sin honestly estimate neither the majesty of God, nor the justice of the law, nor the hideousness of sin, nor their own most humble condition in God's sight.

as no small thing is rebellion, no small crime is treason; so sin which is committed against God cannot be considered an insignificant thing
although often it is a small thing about which sin occurs, yet the guilt does not cease to be heavy; the latter is estimated not from the smallness of the object, but from the majesty of the lawgiver

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FIFTH QUESTION - What was the sin of the angels by which they are said to have rebelled against God?

We must speak briefly of the sin of the angels because Scripture tells us very little about it.

To no purpose is it inquired how angels could sin and the time of their fall.

it general it is evident that their fall preceded the fall of man
it is not likely that they fell before the work of creation was finished because then all that God had created was still very good (Gen. 1:31)
if the Devil is said to have sinned "from the beginning" (1 John 3:8), it does not follow that he sinned from the very beginning of creation; for some movement of time does not hinder us from saying a thing was done from the beginning

The question does not concern the manner and order of this sin, rather it concerns the species of this sin.

There are two principal opinions among the learned.

those who think it was envy and hatred of man arising from the decree revealed to them concerning the advancement of the human nature in Christ above the angelic
the other (more common among the Scholastics) is that of those who maintain it was pride (Anselm and Lombard)

However, since Scripture was unwilling to define expressly the species of this sin and only sets forth its genus when it asserts that they sinned, nothing certain can be determined about it.

in Jude 6 they are said to have "kept not their first estate, and to have left their own habitation"; by "estate" is meant God, their Creator, or the original holiness and rectitude in which they were created; falling from this by their own voluntary apostasy, they lost the happy mansions of heaven in which they had been placed
thus being hurled from it, they can never to all eternity return there (Luke 10:18)

We cannot doubt that pride stood out above other things in that sin.

they wished not only to shake off the yoke of God, contemptuously rising against him and his law impressed upon them, but also in affectation of equality with God (1 Tim. 3:6)
since this has always been the special desire of the Devil (who bears himself as God and prince in the world and wished to be regarded and worshiped as such [2 Cor. 4:4; John 12:31]), it is not without reason that he may be said to have fallen into this sin
to this kind of sin he tempted Adam in the beginning and drives men to it every day

Still we think that pride so exercised itself here that a thoughtlessness and decreased attention about the contemplation of God must have preceded it.

That this sin was most heinous, the very severest punishment following it sufficiently proves.

Although that fall did not happen without the intervention of divine providence, still its true cause must be sought in the angels alone and by no means in God.

It must not be sought in God
1. with regard to prescience - which only foresees a thing as future, but does not make it so
2. with regard to decree - which was permissive, not efficient
3. with regard to his actual permission - which is not moral, but physical by not hindering to which he was not bound
4. with regard to a deficiency of sustentation - this grace is entirely undeserved, which he owes to no on, but bestows upon whomsoever he pleases from his good pleasure alone
the sole cause was the proper will of each devil by which individuals of their own accord turned from good to evil
1. they fell because they willed to fall
2. they could fall because they were created mutable and capable of falling

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SIXTH QUESTION - What was the first sin of man - unbelief or pride?

The first sin of man (from which the others flow as from a fountain) is the voluntary apostasy of the first man from God.

Two opinions concerning this are more common than the others:

referring it to pride (papists)
referring it to unbelief (held by us)

We must not regard that fall as any particular sin, such as theft or adultery, but as a general apostasy and defection from God.

The heinousness of this sin is easily gathered against those who assert that it was venial and quite insignificant.

on the part of the object about which he sinned - there was a great iniquity in sinning where it was so easy not to sin
on the part of the law violated - not special but universal
on the part of the act - the symbol of the covenant being trodden under foot and a departure of thought, word and deed from duty
on the part of the place and time - because scarcely having issued from the hands of the Creator and placed in a most delightful paradise, he immediately fell at the onset of temptation
on the part of the most dire effects and punishments following it - under whose weight even now at this day, nature universally groans

As to what the beginning or the first step of this sin theologians do not agree.

some place it in sensuality, others in will, and others in the intellect
we can safely assert that the first stage of this sin is not to be sought in external acts or in the internal acts of appetite or the will
we must rise to the acts of the directive faculty (viz. of the intellect) to which belongs the judgment of the truth and falsity of things and on which the error and unbelief properly fall
although man made that judgment, it does not follow that it was an act of the will and not of the intellect

Hence it is evident that the beginning of sin is better referred to unbelief than to pride, although in it both are joined.

there ought to be the same order in the sin that was in the temptation
1. by his interrogation, the tempter first urges him to doubt the word of God (Gen. 3:1), then to deny it (v. 4)
2. before he incites to pride by the promise of divinity (v. 5)

1. pride could not have place in man except on the positing of unbelief
1. Scripture express the sin man by seduction (2 Cor. 11:3; 1 Tim. 2:14) and mentions the cunning of the serpent, which wholly pertains to deceiving
2. the first man could not believe it to be virtuous and good thing for him not to depend upon God, since this is the basest of all
3. if the Devil first tempted man to pride, he either believed his words or he did not
  1. if he did, he erred by that very fact
  2. if he did not, he could not aim at that which was proposed by the Devil

But unbelief could not have place in man, unless first by thoughtlessness he had ceased from a consideration of God's prohibition and of his truth and goodness.

Although in the fall of Adam pride is included, it does not follow that this was the first stage; for pride never could have entered the heart of man if his faith in the words of God had not before been weakened and overthrown.

As in every motion, the point of commencement is prior to that of termination, so the turning away from the uncreated good (unbelief) ought to precede the turning towards the created good (pride).

Although the act of pride was occupied with the end, it does not follow that unbelief had the relation of means, but rather of cause (from which pride arose). For unless man fluctuated in belief, the desire for deity (an act of pride) could not have entered his heart.

The passage of the Son or Sirach, "the beginning of pride is departure from God" (10:12), besides being apocryphal, is not repugnant to our opinion.

if apostasy is the beginning of pride, unbelief must necessarily have preceded pride
nor does what is added ("pride is the beginning of all sin," v. 13) prove the contrary because it must not be understood simply and absolutely of every sin, but relatively concerning other beginnings which draw their origin for the most part from pride

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SEVENTH QUESTION - How could a holy man fall, and what was the true cause of his fall?

Two questions are involved here:

the possibility of the fall
its true cause

As to the possibility of the fall - it is most difficult to imagine in what way at length man in a state of integrity could fall.

In order to free themselves from this difficulty, the ancient and more modern Pelagians, papists, Socinians, and Remonstrants attribute to innocent man (as created by God) a headlong inclination to vice, from which arose the first sin.

this opinion is manifestly injurious to God and can easily be shown to be false
1. if an inclination to sin was in man by nature, God must be considered its author; thus sin will be cast upon God himself
2. the inclination to love and worship God is incompatible with and inclination to sin
3. all things were very good in man before the fall, since he was made in the image of God
it is evident that the mutability which was in Adam without any stain is not to be confounded with such an inclination to sin

No other suitable method of removing the difficulty can be granted than by returning to the mutability and liberty of the first man, as one who was created just and holy, but mutably: thus he could stand if he wished, but could also if he wished become evil.

Although that mutability indicates the possibility of the fall and is the cause sine qua non, still it cannot be considered its cause proper and of itself.

we must accurately distinguish here between the mutability itself (which is a condition suitable to the creature) and the act of that mutability (by which man inclined to a change)
the former denotes a power which could be inclined to evil, but was not yet inclined; the latter designates the actual inclination to evil itself and the fountain of all sin

The proximate and proper cause of sin therefore is to be sought nowhere else than in the free will of man (who suffered himself to be deceived by the Devil and, Satan persuading though not compelling, freely departed from God).

Although man fell, still he had the ability to stand if he wished. Hence a twofold help or assistance is commonly distinguished:

help without which or the power of not sinning (auxilium sine qua non)
1. by which he had strength sufficient to stand if he wished
2. after the manner of a habit and faculty in man
3. necessary to his ability to persevere
4. never absent from Adam, not even in the very moment in which he sinned
the help by which or efficacious grace (auxilium quo)
1. which gave not only the ability if he wished, but to will what he could
2. after the manner of an action or efficacious motion to good
3. necessary to his actual perseverance
4. God withheld from him freely as he was not bound to give it
notwithstanding, neither can man be excused (because he sinned voluntarily and was impelled by no force) nor God be accused (because as a most free dispenser of his own goods, he was bound to the bestowal of that grace by no law)

Therefore man alone was the cause of his evil.

Besides that internal moving cause, there was also another twofold external assisting cause:

the principal cause - Satan who, envying the glory of God and the happiness of man, instigated the first creatures to apostasy
the instrumental cause - the serpent, used by Satan for this work

That Satan was the author of the temptation, Scripture does not allow us to doubt.

it calls him
1. serpent and dragon (Rev. 12:9; 20:2)
2. a murder, and a liar from the beginning (John 8:44)
3. the tempter (1 Thess. 3:5; 2 Cor. 11:3)
4. he holds the empire of death (Heb. 2:14)
5. Christ came to destroy his works (1 John 3:8)
the punishment inflicted on the tempter, so bears upon the external serpent that far more truly and fully it agrees with the Devil who was trodden under foot by Christ (Heb. 2:14; Col. 2:15; Rom. 16:20)

Now that the Devil was not only present here, but concealed and speaking under the serpent, many things prove:

the simple and unadorned narrative of Moses (which is not rashly to be turned into an allegory)
the description of the serpent as the most cunning of all the beasts of the field
the punishment inflicted upon it as the instrument of seduction, no less than upon Satan

This caution about serpents did not escaped notice by the Gentiles.

However because neither man nor Satan could have done anything without the providence of God, it remains to be seen how it was most holily occupied still without any causality of sin: God only permitted physically by not hindering, not morally by approval and consent.

With permission here is involved the negation of the efficacious grace and help by which man might actually stand.

Some want to express this negation of grace by desertion; not privative (as if internal and habitual grace already given were taken away), but negative (by which that not yet given is suspended).

Here we meet the depth of the wisdom of God - rather to be wondered at than to be pried into, far surpassing the reach of reason (viz., how God willed to deny that grace to man yet undeserving, without which he foresaw he could not avoid that fall).

It is evident that man can well be said to have been able not to sin and yet not to be able not to sin.

the former with respect to the habitual and internal grace of Adam and the powers bestowed upon him by creation
the latter by reason of the decree and the suspension of actual external grace
God did not remove the grace which he had granted, he only did not bestow grace effectual to the avoiding of sin

Let us remember the ways of God are not our ways and that we must here be wise with sobriety, lest searching into his majesty, we be overpowered by his glory. Let it be sufficient to hold together these two things:

that this most dreadful fall did not happen without the providence of God (but its causality, it contributed nothing)
and that man alone, moved by the temptation of Satan, was its true and proper cause

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EIGHTH QUESTION - Whether Adam by his fall lost the image of God. We affirm.

The effects on the faculties of man can be distinguished into moral and physical:

the moral are guilt and pollution by which he incurred the curse and wrath of God with his descendants
the physical are the miseries of all kinds and death itself by which he contracted universal corruption and impurity for himself and his

Among the moral effects is usually placed the loss of the divine image (or original righteousness). Concerning this the Remonstrants (following the Socinians) raise a controversy with us.

By the image of God we do not mean generally whatever gifts upright man received from God or specially certain remains of it existing in the mind and heart of man after the fall; rather, we understand it strictly of the principal part of that image which consisted in holiness and wisdom (usually termed original righteousness).

The Socinians deny that image was lost in any way by the fall of Adam, maintaining it still remains complete; however the Remonstrants confess that by his fall Adam deserved that God should take original righteousness away from him, but they deny that he lost it by the act itself. They assert this in order that they may not be compelled to acknowledge that man lost all original righteousness and that free will no longer remains in him.

We maintain that the loss of the divine image (or of original righteousness) followed the fall of Adam doubly - both meritoriously and morally, and efficiently and really.

The reasons are:

it was a total aversion and apostasy from God as the highest good and ultimate end

1. that sin was not particular but universal, drawing after itself a violation of the whole law, hence it could not but shake off every habit of rectitude and devastate the conscience, so that no residuum was left
1. the nakedness of fallen men denoted the loss or privation of goods in which they before rejoiced - this was not so much a nakedness of body as a nakedness of soul
1. God threatened him with this privation, the death being no less spiritual than temporal
1. as man is not born, so was Adam after the fall; for whatever he has by nature takes its origin from Adam himself (universal corruption)

The proposition "one act cannot destroy an entire habit" cannot be universally admitted

this is the desert of even the least sin - to remove man from communion with God - now man excluded from communion with God, and altogether unenlightened by the Spirit, is by this very thing most corrupt and can perform nothing good
although the axiom my be granted as to other sins, yet there is a peculiar relation of that by which the covenant was broken and all the blessings of the covenant lost
it is confirmed by the parity in angels who by their sin so shook off the habit of holiness and righteousness
the opponents themselves confess that the Holy Spirit can be lost by any very heinous sin

If in the renewed, the habit of holiness is not shaken off by their sins, this does not depend upon the nature of sin, but upon the grace of perseverance. For believers have the promise of perseverance, which Adam did not have.

* * * * * * * * * *

NINTH QUESTION - Whether the actual disobedience of Adam is imputed by an immediate and antecedent imputation to all his posterity springing from him by natural generation. We affirm.

Although all Christians agree in acknowledging the sin of Adam, yet they differ as to its effects; especially as to imputation.

This was the opinion of the old Pelagians who held that Adam's sin injured himself alone and not his posterity.

hence they restricted Romans 5:12 to an example of imitation
they were followed by the Socinians
1. they deny that the whole human race sinned and fell in Adam
2. they deny that God willed that on account of that one fall the whole human race should be guilty of sin

Others follow suit in these denials:

the Anabaptists do not differ from them - they deny that the posterity are guilty on account of the fall of their first parents
the opinion of the Remonstrants is the same
1. they retain the name of imputation, but ignore the thing itself
2. Episcopius: "the sin of Adam is imputed by God to his posterity not as if he really thinks them guilty of the same sin and fault with Adam, but inasmuch as he willed them to be born liable to the same evil to which Adam by sin had made himself liable" (Operum theologicorum [1665], pt. II, p. 151)

Some among our own men impugn imputation (Plancaeus).

The above were opposed by the decree of the National Synod which met at Charenton in 1644, which sanctioned and confirmed the doctrine received in our churches concerning the imputation of Adam's first sin and the hereditary corruption flowing upon all.

In order to escape the force of this Synodical decree, Plancaeus afterwards distinguished imputation into

immediate and antecedent - that by which the action of Adam is imputed to all his poserity proximately (immediately) for the very reason that they are the sons of Adam, as much in reference to the privation of original righteousness as to eternal death
mediate and consequent
1. that which follows the beholding of the hereditary corruption derived to us from Adam and is made through it mediating
2. by participation of the latter corruption, he maintained that we share in the sin of Adam and habitually consent to it and are worthy to be reckoned with Adam
3. he wishes the Synod to assert the latter (his view), but not the former

On the state of the question, it must be observed:

that we do not treat here of any sin of Adam, but of the first actual act by which he violated the law and broke the covenant

1. the question does not concern all his posterity who in any way were to spring from him, but only those who descend from him in the ordinary way of generation (so that Christ may be excluded)
1. it is not inquired whether the sin of Adam may be said to be imputed to us because (on account of original sin inherent in us) we deserve to be viewed as in the same place with him; but it is inquired whether the actual sin of Adam is so in fact imputed to all that on account of it all are reckoned guilty and either suffer punishment or at least are considered worthy of punishment

Imputation is either of something foreign to us or properly ours.

sometimes that is imputed to us which is personally ours
sometimes that is imputed which is without us and not performed by ourselves
1. thus the righteousness of Christ is said to be imputed to us, and our sins are imputed to him (neither has he sin in himself, nor we righteousness)
2. here we speak of the latter kind of imputation, because we are dealing with a sin committed by Adam, not by us

When we say that the sin of another is imputed to anyone, we are not to understand the sin which is simply and in every way another's, but that which in some way belongs to him to whom it is said to be imputed. No imputation of another's sin can be granted, except on the supposition of some peculiar connection of the one with the other.

natural, as between a father and his children
moral and political, as between a king and his subjects
voluntary, as among friends, and between the guilty and his substitute
we here treat of the first two and not the last, for the bond between Adam and his posterity is twofold:
1. natural, as he is the father and we are his children
2. political and forensic, as he was the prince and representative head of the whole human race
3. hence the foundation of imputation is not only the natural connection, but mainly the moral and federal (in virtue of which God entered into covenant with him as our head)
4. hence Adam stood in that sin not as a private person, but as a public and representative person - representing all his posterity in that action and whose demerit equally pertains to all

For Adam to be a public and representative person, it was not necessary that that office should be committed to him by us; it is sufficient that there intervened the ordination of God according to which he willed Adam to be the root and head of the whole human race.

Many arguments prove this to have been the ordination of God:

the covenant made with Adam was not particular with Adam alone, but general and public - entered into with the whole human race
the relation of the divine image and or original righteousness; so that Adam here was like a beneficiary who, receiving from his master, receives it both for himself and his posterity on this condition - that if he rebels against his master, he loses the benefit not only for himself but also for his posterity
the communion of punishments (general as well as special) spreading abroad among his posterity no less than in Adam (which could not justly be inflicted, except on the supposition of a common law and a common guilt)
the comparison between Adam and Christ (Rom. 5:1; 1 Cor. 15) - this cannot be sufficiently carried out, except on the supposition of the imputation of sin answering to the imputation of righteousness

The punishment brought upon us by the sin of Adam is either privative or positive.

privative
1. the want and privation of original righteousness
2. the sin of Adam is imputed to us immediately for privative punishment because it is the cause of the privation of original righteousness and so ought to precede the corruption
positive
1. death both temporal and eternal and in general all the evils visited upon sinners
2. it is imputed mediately as a positive punishment because we are liable to that punishment only after we are born and are corrupt
although the second necessarily follows the first from the nature of the thing (unless the mercy of God intervenes), still it ought not to be confounded with it

The question returns to these limits - whether the sin of Adam (the first actual sin) is imputed to all his posterity naturally springing from him, by and imputation, not mediate and consequent, but immediate and antecedent (this the orthodox maintain)

The reasons are:

Paul clearly builds up this imputation: "as by one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned" (Rom. 5:12ff) and from these words various arguments are drawn
1. from the scope of the apostle, which is to prove by an illustrious type the doctrine of justification by the imputation of Christ's righteousness
  1. it might seem strange for one to be justified by another's righteousness, thus the apostle proves the foundation of that mystery from its opposite
  2. therefore just as Adam was constituted by God the head and root of the human race, and from his sin death was spread through all; even so Christ, the second Adam, was made the head of all the elect
2. he speaks of sin which "entered the word" and "by which death passed upon all men"; this refers to the first actual sin (not inherent sin) by which death pervaded both Adam and his posterity (n.b., "one transgression" v. 18)
3. the word hēmarton cannot properly be drawn to a habit of sin or to habitual and inherent corruption, but properly denotes some actual sin, and that, also past (which can be no other than the sin of Adam itself)
  1. it is one thing to be born a sinner; another actually to sin
  2. since they did not yet exist in the nature of things, they are said to have sinned in another and must be considered to have also themselves committed it
4. why should Paul so often mention the one man sinning (and the offense and disobedience of one is the singular) whose guilt passed upon all men unto condemnation, not once, but five times in a few verses (vv. 17-19), unless this on disobedience was imputed to his posterity
5. the comparison between Adam and Christ for the sake of which he calls "Adam the figure of him that was to come" (v. 14)
  1. we are constituted sinners in Adam in the same way in which we are constituted righteous in Christ
  2. but in Christ we are constituted righteous by the imputation of righteousness; therefore we are made sinners in Adam by the imputation of his sin; otherwise the comparison is destroyed
6. the death which reigned by sin holds in its embrace spiritual death from God's threatening
  1. this is nothing else than a privation of original righteousness together with hereditary corruption
  2. hence besides this, some previous sin ought to be acknowledged as its cause, which can be no other than the actual sin of Adam

1. "in Adam all die" (1 Cor. 15:22), that is, incur the guilt of death and condemnation
  1. therefore in the same one they also sinned and are held in a common blameworthiness with him
  2. no one can in anyone deserve the punishment of death unless he had with him and in him a common sin, the cause of death
  3. thus we are said to have sinned in him not only by reason of efficiency (because he is the cause by which sin is propagated to us), but also by reason of demerit (because his criminality drew guilt upon us)
1. by the just judgment of God, the sins of parents frequently pass over upon children and are imputed to them
  1. therefore much more can be said of the first sin, which was both more serious than all which sprang from it and not particular to the person of Adam, but universal of the whole nature
  2. that such an imputation is granted is not only proved by the threatening of the law (Exod. 20:5), but also various examples give evidence
    1. Achan (Jos. 7:24-25)
    2. the Amalekites (1 Sam. 15:2-3)
    3. the sons of Saul (2 Sam. 21:6-9)
    4. Jeroboam (1 Ki. 14:9-10)
    5. Ahab (1 Ki. 21:21-22)
    6. Lamentations 5:7
    7. Matthew 23:35
1. the immediate imputation of the first sin being denied, the principal foundation of the justice of the propagation of sin is removed
  1. there is no punishment except from sin; for both sin alone is punished and that only which is punished is sin
  2. now it cannot be our proper and personal sin because we were not then actually in existence
  3. therefore it is the sin of Adam which is imputed to us
1. Adam was the germ, root and head of the human race, not only in a physical sense but morally and in a representative sense
  1. he entered into covenant for himself and his posterity who just as he received the gifts which he possessed for himself and his, so he lost them for himself and his
  2. for to whom the benefits pertain, to them also it is most just the burdens and disadvantages should also pertain
1. the denial of the imputation of Adam's sin would not a little weaken the imputation of Christ's righteousness
  1. the descent from the negation of the former to the denial of the latter is most easy
  2. hence there is no one of the heretics who have denied the imputation of sin who have not for the same reason opposed the imputation of Christ's righteousness
1. the posterity of Adam be considered to have sinned in him, since they were in him as branches in the root and the members in the head

Purely personal sins differ from those which are common and public.

the former should not be imputed to posterity, however nothing prevents the latter from being imputed, and such was the sin of Adam
the law imposed upon men differs from the law to which God binds himself; barriers are placed to human vengeance because it might be abused, but not to divine justice

Ezekiel 18:20 is not to be absolutely and simply understood as it sounds, otherwise there would be a contradiction to the law and a denial of the substitution of Christ in our place. Rather it ought to be explained:

of adult suns who depart from the iniquity of parents and do not imitate them
of personal and particular sins, not of common and general, which can involve many, such as the sin of Adam
there is not established here a general rule of providence and justice in accordance with which God either before always acted or will hereafter conform all his judgments

The act of one cannot be and be called that of the whole if it is a merely personal act.

Adam in sinning bore the person of all.

He who was in Adam in no way, neither in power nor in act, cannot be said to have sinned in him.

although we were not in act and personally in him, yet we were in power, both seminally and representatively
although we were not actually in Christ when he died for us, still his death is properly imputed to us on account of the union existing between us and him

It is repugnant to divine justice to punish anyone for another's sin, but not which is yet common in virtue of representation or some bond of union, by which its guilt may involve many.

Although the disobedience of Adam was imputed to us, it does not equally follow that his death also should be imputed to us.

by his death (which was his personal punishment), he holds no charge for us, as by his disobedience
thus it could not be communicated to us morally and by imputation as the latter, but only by a real physical transmission

Although the fist sin was not really voluntary with respect to us, still it can be called voluntary morally because the will of Adam is considered in a measure ours on account of our union with him.

As the righteousness of Christ (which is unique) can still be communicated by imputation to innumerable others; so nothing hinders us from saying that the guilt of Adam's sin is unique and equal, passing upon all by imputation.

God is the author of the covenant made with Adam, in accordance with which the sharing and imputation of Adam's sin follows. On that account he can or ought not to be regarded as the author of sin.

The other sins committed by Adam differ from the first which is imputed to us.

the others were personal sins simply
although after his first sin, Adam did not cease to be the head by way of origin, yet he did cease to be the representative head by of covenant

The want of original righteousness can be viewed:

either passively (inasmuch as it is subjectively in man) or actively (inasmuch as it is judicially sent by God)
either with respect to base evil (which it includes) or with respect to sad evil (which it draws after itself by reason of the deformation of the creature and its separation from God)

Since imputation to punishment is only a moral act, it ought not to seem strange if, as the first act of sinning is imputed to us, so the first act of generating should not in like manner be imputed.

Although the act of Adam's disobedience could be imputed to us for condemnation, it does not immediately follow that the act of his obedience ought to be imputed to us for justification because guilt arises from the one act of disobedience, but righteousness requires a full complement and perseverance of obedience.

This doctrine concerning the imputation of Adam's sin was received in our churches.

Many thing prove that this was the opinion of Calvin. He does not mention imputation whenever he speaks of original sin because it had not yet been called into controversy.

Beza followed and frequently confirmed this opinion of Calvin.

Peter Martyr did not hold a different opinion.

Chamier more clearly establishes this very thing.

Amyrald proves that another's sin can justly be imputed to those connected by some bond with the author, although they have not participated in the criminality; likewise Mestrezat and Testard.

* * * * * * * * * *

TENTH QUESTION - Whether any original sin or inherent stain and depravity may be granted, propagated to us by generation. We affirm against the Pelagians and Socinians.

Original sin is a doctrine of the highest importance to the surer perception of the misery of man and the necessity and efficacy of saving grace.

Original sin is sometimes used more broadly to embrace imputed and inherent sin, sometimes it is used more strictly to denote inherent alone; the imputed, as the cause and foundation. In this sense it is now used here by us.

There are three questions in reference to it:

as to its existence or whether it is
as to its nature or what it is
as to its propagation or how it passes over to us

The term "original sin" was first brought into the church by Augustine (called into a controversy concerning sin by the Pelagians) in order that he might have a certain term to use in his disputes with them.

As to the question of its existence, various heretics err here who follow the negative.

the Pelagians denied original sin as to all its parts, maintaining that Adam's sin hurt no one but himself
the Socinians deny expressly that any original sin can be granted
the Remonstrants hold that God willed to devote to eternal torment no infants of whatever condition or birth, dying without actual and proper sins; or could justly devote them on account of the sin called original; that this opinion is opposed to the divine goodness and right reason
among the papists, Pighius and Catharinus restrict original sin to imputation alone, denying propagation
the Anabaptists call original sin "the figment of Augustine"

The question is whether there is any inherent depravity (called original sin) propagated from Adam to all his posterity springing from him by natural generation. They deny; we affirm.

The reasons are:

Genesis 6:5; 8:21 - here occurs the judgment of God himself concerning his own work

1. Genesis 5:3 - he could not be corrupted in generation in any other way than by contracting original corruption; here we must notice the antithesis between the image of God and the image of Adam
1. Job 14:4 - purity is removed from all men and uncleaness is ascribed to them (not simply external of the body, which can easily be taken away, but internal of the soul)
1. Psalm 51:5 - David confesses before God that he was corrupt even from the womb and inclined to sin
1. John 3:5
1. Ephesian 2:3 - original sin because they are called "children of wrath" (i.e., exposed to divine wrath not by imitation and custom, but by nature to intimate that the evil is inherent from the womb and not only comes upon us after actual sins)
1. Romans 5:12 - here the apostle rises to the first taint of evil and unfolds the origin of sin and of death
1. various reasons prove the same thing:
  1. the universal necessity of death imposed upon all, even upon infants; for it death reigns over all, sin ought necessarily to reign over them because that is its wages
  2. the necessity of redemption for all to be saved
  3. the necessity of regeneration without which no one can see the kingdom of God (John 3:3)
  4. the necessity of the sacrament to be administered to infants recently born, of circumcision in the old and of baptism in the new covenant
  5. the common law that everything begotten is like the begetter
  6. experience which teaches that depravity to be latent in infants themselves, even before the use of reason

What is involuntary by a positive volition cannot be sin; but what is not voluntary by a positive volition does not cease to be sin, provided it is contrary to the law. Although original sin is not voluntary in act,

still it is in origin
in his will from whom it is, although not properly in his will in whom it is
inherently and subjectively because it adheres to the will and impairs it, although not elicitly because it is not drawn out by any act of the will
radically with regard to its principle, although not formally with regard to its exercise

If innocence is at any time attributed to infants in Scripture (cf. Psa. 106:38; Jon. 4:11), this is not to be understood absolutely and in itself, as if they were destitute of all sin; otherwise neither would they be liable to death.

rather it is to be understood relatively as compared with adults who actually sin
the twins in Romans 9:11 had as yet done no good or evil, but still they were both conceived in sin in the mass of corruption

Although the law prohibits no one to born with original sin because it supposes man to be holy, yet it condemns as illegality the hereditary and inherent corruption of man.

When Christ says that the man born blind had not sinned (John 9:3), he does not absolutely assert that he was from all sin, but only comparatively denies that he sinned more than other that he was so afflicted.

Although sin is pardoned in the parents, still it can be transmitted to their posterity because the guilt being remitted, the taint always remains (the circumcised begets the uncircumcised and the regenerated begets the unregenerated).

The children of believers are holy (1 Cor. 7:14), not as to immunity from all sin, but as to communion with the church. This holiness is relative and federal.

Although Mary was "highly favored" by God, still that distinguished position did not hinder her from being conceived and born after the common manner of other mortals - in and with original sin.

that taint is in Scripture predicated of all men universally, no one but Christ excepted
she herself had need of a Savior, whom she celebrates as hers (Luke 1:47)
she is bound to offer the sacrifices of the old law, which could not be done without the confession of sin
the effects of that sin are found in her, as are actual sins (John 2:4; Luke 2:35, 49; 8:18-21)

In the propagation of sin, an accident does not pass over from subject to subject.

the immediate subject of sin is not the person, but human nature
therefore as in Adam, the person corrupted the nature; so in his posterity, the nature corrupts the person

Although the mode of the propagation of sin is obscure and difficult to explain, the propagation itself is not on that account to be denied.

* * * * * * * * * *

ELEVENTH QUESTION - Whether original sin has corrupted the very essence of the soul. Also whether it is a mere privation or a certain positive quality too.

There are two extremes to be equally avoided about the nature of original sin:

in excess, of those who think original sin is placed in the corruption of the very substance of the soul
in defect, of those who wish it to consist in the mere want and privation of righteousness

Flacius Illyricus defended the first error in a former age, the more strongly to oppose Victor Strigelius who extolled the free will of man in conversion and diminished corruption. Illyricus maintained that sin corrupted the very essence of man.

The orthodox constantly maintain that sin is to be distinguished from the substance itself, as an accident and quality from its subject

every substance was created by God and in this sense is good (Gen. 1:31; 1 Tim. 4:4)
Scripture makes a distinction between nature and the sin adhering to it when it call the latter "that which easily besets us," "present with us," and dwelling in us and a garment to be put off
thus it would follow that Christ in assuming our nature assumed also our sin and corruption itself
sin cannot be predicated of man in the question What is it? but only the question What is its quality?

Human nature is called "lawless" (anomos), not that it is sin itself, but because having sin in itself it is well called "sinful."

A "new heart" is said to be made in us by regeneration not physically, but morally.

the same substance which was corrupted by sin must be restored by grace
the same must be said of the other phrases connoting sin or grace - these are taken morally, not physically; not so much in the abstract as in the concrete to express more powerfully the magnitude of our corruption

Original righteousness and sin are mutually opposed to each other, but the image of God is sometimes used more broadly.
The papists sin in defect who restrict the whole nature of original sin to the mere want or privation of original righteousness.

they define corruption of nature by the loss alone of the supernatural gift without the access of any evil quality
their design is to prove that man after the fall differs from man before the fall no more than a weak or sick from a strong and healthy man
they do this in order to establish the will free to good; that there is not so much impotency in it as a difficulty of acting rightly
however we think two things are here necessarily included
1. the privation of original righteousness
2. the positing of the contrary habit of unrighteousness

The reasons are:

Scripture describes that sin not only privatively and by way of negation (Rom. 3:23; 7:18; 1 Cor. 2:14; Eph. 4:18), but also positively and by way of affirmation, when it calls it "flesh," "concupiscence," "the law of the members," "indwelling sin," "body of death," "old man," etc. (John 3:6; Rom. 7:18, 20, 23-24; Eph. 4:22)

1. in act and subjectively, it inheres in man and continually excites evil desires in him, and in fact passes over to posterity by generation, which cannot be said of mere want or privation
1. men are not only destitute of righteousness, but also full of unrighteousness; incapable of good, but also inclined to evil
1. it is not only privatively opposed to original righteousness, but also contrarily as original unrighteousness
1. the effects of original sin are not only sins of omission, but also of commission
1. not a few papists hold this position (Aquinas, Cajetan, Bellarmine)

A positive physically differs from a positive morally and logically. Sin is called positive, not in the former, but in the latter sense.

Original sin is not a vicious habit because it is neither infused nor acquired.

Nothing prevent original sin from being a privation and at the same time a positive quality.

That hereditary taint corrupts not only the inferior part of the soul, but also the superior part (viz., the intellect and the will).

The word "flesh" is sometimes taken strictly for the corruption of sensuality or of the body (2 Cor. 7:1); other times it is taken broadly for the universal corruption of the soul extending to the mind itself (Rom. 8:6; Col. 2:18).

Concupiscence is used either philosophically and means the same as concupiscible appetite; or theologically and popularly, in which sense evil propensities of the will belong to it (Gal 5:17).

This concupiscence is sin not only in the unbelieving and unrenewed, but also in believers and the renewed.

Although by regeneration we hold that the guilt and pollution of original sin is taken away as to dominion, yet we deny that it is absolutely taken away as to existence and whatever hold the relation of sin in it.

Although concupiscence is said to "bring forth sin" (James 1:15), it does not cease to be sin (an evil effect necessarily argues an evil cause).

It is one thing that there should be no condemnation in the renewed; another that they are worthy of condemnation. As long as sin remains in us (as it does until our death), so long does potential guilt remain).

* * * * * * * * * *

TWELFTH QUESTION - How is original sin propagated from parents to their children?

The wickedness of heretics and the eager curiosity of searching into all things started this question.

Things can be brought forward from the word of God as can satisfy the humble mind so that we may firmly hold the thing, although we cannot fully understand the mode. A twofold answer can be given to the proposed question, either general or special.

generally, the mode of this propagation is the impure generation by which we are born corrupt and sinners from those who are corrupt and sinners

1. although this mode of general propagation is evident and is sufficient for establishing the truth of the traduction of sin, let us see what can be said here more particularly to untie the knot

Although all difficulty occurring in the explanation of this mode of propagation may not seem to be removed, still its truth must be retained with no less certainty. Nor is we cannot understand the how, must we on that account deny the fact or call it in question.

* * * * * * * * * *

THIRTEENTH QUESTION - Actual sin and its various divisions.

Actual sin is the aberration from the law of God (in internal and external acts) proceeding from the original sin as the effect from the cause.

or according to others, a desire, word, deed, or omission contrary to the law because it is performed as much by an omission of things to be done, as by a commission of things prohibited: either by the heart through the thoughts and unlawful desires; or by the mouth through impure words; or by works through wicked action
it is called "actual" not so much because it exists in act as because it is in actions and not in habit

As actual sins are manifold, so their divisions are various. In passing, we mark here the principal in which there seems to be any difficulty:

with respect to the object, against God and against our neighbors
1. the former is committed against the first table of the law
2. the latter against the second
3. this, however, must be understood of the object taken materially and not formally because thus God alone is the proper object of sin (Psa. 51:4)

1. with respect to form
  1. sins of commission and sins of omission
    1. by the former
      1. a forbidden evil is committed
      2. the substance of the act is not taken away, but only its actual goodness
      3. immediately in the action (which is without due virtue)
    2. by the latter
      1. the good commanded is omitted
      2. the very substance of the act is taken away
      3. in the faculty itself
      4. although the omission of a prescribed act is not an act, still it is properly so called
        
        directly and univocally, while it is connected with an internal act of the mind and will by which the sinner mediates and wills the omission of an external act (James 2:15-16)
        
        analogically and remotely, inasmuch as it is conducted back to some antecedent act which may be either the cause or the occasion of the impediment of the omitted act (e.g., as excessive drinking is the cause of neglect of divine worship)
        
        if a sin of omission is not an actual sin naturally, still it is such morally inasmuch as on account of that omission man opposes the law and contracts guilt
1. with respect to principle, into sins of ignorance or of knowledge.
  1. ignorance is not to be understood broadly for every sin arises from ignorance, but it is to be understood strictly to denote the special ignorance which prevails in the one sinning (1 Tim. 1:13)
1. with respect to the adjuncts, one is indwelling only; another reigning
  1. the former the sinner resists both in the act itself and beyond it (although he yields to it on account of weakness which does not take place without some struggling)
  2. the latter occurs without struggling, and the sinner in every way serves sin

The kingdom of sin is either absolute and total or partial and comparative.

the former belong to the unregenerate alone
the latter sometimes belongs to believers themselves when they fall into grievous sins and for some time continue in them (e.g., David, Solomon, etc.)

One sin is pardonable; another unpardonable.

the former can be remitted by the grace of God
the latter neither obtains nor can obtain pardon by justice (the sin against the Holy Spirit is described above all other as unpardonable)

* * * * * * * * * *

FOURTEENTH QUESTION - In what consists the formal reason of the sin against the Holy Spirit? Also why is it unpardonable?

The question is not whether there is a sin against the Holy Spirit, but what is its nature.

When the Holy Spirit is said to be the object of this sin, he is not taken so much hypostatically (with regard to person) as energetically (with regard to office and operation).

This sin cannot be said to consist simply in final impenitency because all reprobates die in it, who nevertheless cannot be aid to sin against the Holy Spirit.

it cannot be made to consist of six species (as many papists maintain): presumption, desperation, resistance to recognized truth, hatred of fraternal grace, obstinacy, and impenitency
Scripture makes this sin of one species

We say it is a universal apostasy from true Christianity or of the truth of the gospel; a total and persevering denial, hatred and resistance proceeding not from a common human weakness, but from special and deliberate wickedness and direct, diabolical hatred of it, joined with a contempt for all the means of salvation and final impenitency.

Hence there are various characteristics of this sin.

that it be committed against the knowledge of the truth not only legal, but especially gospel; not only theoretical and historical, but practical and convictive
1. therefore, they who sin from ignorance do not sin against the Holy Spirit because they acted without conviction

1. to constitute this sin is require a total defection from the truth and its wicked rejection and denial
1. this is not only the denial of the recognized truth, but also a pertinacious opposition to it
1. this is stubbornness of mind and perseverance in wickedness even unto the end

Hence unpardonablenss is the inseparable adjunct of this sin (Matt. 12:31-32; 1 John 5:16-17).

This unpardonableness is not only comparative and relative, but absolute and simple, not only what is never pardoned, but what absolutely cannot be pardoned by God.

This unpardonableness does not arise from a defect in either the mercy of God or the merit of Christ, rather it rises from the very nature of sin, which is such that it excludes the very condition requisite to pardon (viz., repentance [Heb. 6:6]) because they have rejected the power of Christ's sacrifice and the efficacy of the Spirit.

This will be made still clearer from the diversity of operations belonging to the particular persons in the economy of salvation.

the Father supports the majesty of offended deity and is the guardian and vindicator of the enacted laws
the Son holds the place of Mediator and Surety (who made satisfaction for our sins)
the Holy Spirit sustains the part of sanctifier (who puts the finishing stroke to the work of salvation by bringing us to Christ, and by Christ to the Father)
but he who despises the Holy Spirit and rejects his operation, for him there remains no more any source of hope because there is no other divine person who can help him (and the operation of the Spirit is the last in the business of salvation, after which no other help of grace can be expected)

Christ heals every disease in the people, but on the basis of all the conditions being complied with (viz., in those who do not impudently reject the physician).

This sin belongs to no one of God's elect, whose salvation is sure, both on account of the immutability of election and the eternity of God's love (Matt. 24:24; 2 Tim. 2:19); and because through the intercession of Christ (John 17:20) and the perpetual protection of God (1 Pet. 1:5) and the Spirit's blessing of regeneration, they are kept free from reigning sin so that they neither commit nor can commit the sin which is unto death (1 John 3:9).

Although this sin belongs to reprobates alone, still not to all, rather it belongs to those only who, from hatred and determined wickedness, reject and oppose the truth of God offered to them. Three degrees of it may be constituted:

those who trample under foot the doctrine of Moses as deadly nd with determined mind reject it (Isa. 63:10)
the Scribes and Pharisees, who although they would not receive the gospel, still with settled malice persecuted Christ and his doctrine and miracles as diabolical (Matt. 12:24)
those who once having professed the gospel, afterwards against the light of the Spirit by which they were convinced of its excellence and sweetness, from hatred and obstinacy despise and designedly proclaim war against it, trampling under foot the Son of God and his blood; and thus reject the whole covenant of God (Heb. 6; 10)

This wickedness is not to be rashly charged upon anyone and can more easily be defined in the abstract than explained in the concrete - both on account of our ignorance of internal principles and acts and on account of the different seasons of calling grace.

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FIFTEENTH QUESTION - Whether sin can be the punishment of sin. We affirm.

The Pelagians, Jesuits, Socinians, Remonstrants, and some of our own men deny sin to be the punishment of sin to contend that inherent original sin is not the punishment of that first sin, as is commonly asserted by the orthodox.

The question is whether sin considered materially and specifically can be punishment. This we affirm.

Sin can be called punishment in three ways:

with respect to itself - a virtue is its own best reward, so sin is the punishment of itself
with respect to the antecedent sin in him who is punished - as the idolatry of the heathen is punished by the abominable lusts to which they are delivered (Rom. 1:24-27)
with respect to another's sin - as the sin of David is punished by the incest of Absalom

That sin is rightly called the punishment of sin is proved:

the incest of Absalom is put forward as a punishment of David sent by God (2 Sam. 12:11-12)

1. as a punishment of the idolatry of the Gentiles it is said that God gave them up to foul lusts and a reprobate mind (Rom. 1:24-27)
1. from the lying spirit in the mouths of the false prophets and the lie which Ahab believed for undertaking an unjust war (1 Ki. 22:ff)
1. from other passages of Scripture which have the relation of sin and punishment: 1 Ki. 11:31-33; Isa. 10:7; 14:3; Jer. 50:6-8; Isa. 7:17-18; 39:6-8; Jer. 1:12-14; Exod. 4:21; 2 Sam. 24:1; Isa. 6:10; John 12:40; 9:39
1. because God (as a punishment for transgression of the law) does not denounce only calamities and troubles which are simple punishments, but also various sins (Deut. 28:28-29; Lev. 26:14-33)
1. because justice and holiness can bear a relation of moral and physical good, therefore nothing hinders these two relations of guilt and punishment from being joined together in sin

Sin can be regarded with reference either to the internal producing cause or to the external ordination or divine judgment.

Sin cannot please God as an honest and moral good by approving complacency, but this does not hinder him from being pleased by a permissive complacency with it (as a good conducive to the manifestation of his justice).

Sin can in a different respect be both action and suffering: action as committed; suffering as inflicted (just as beating is an action as proceeding from the agent and suffering is an action as received by the recipient).

It is of the nature of punishment to be evil in the one punished: either in itself and in the first act; or in the punish so thinking and in the second act.

It is not essential to punishment that it be always voluntary, as it is not of the nature of sin to be always voluntary; it suffices that it be such as the will ought to oppose, if rightly estimated.

It is termed punishment inasmuch as it bespeaks an evil hurtful to the creature according to the sanction of the law (which wishes the creature to be afflicted on account of guilt).

There is nothing to prevent God's avenging the injury done towards him by another injury, which he by a most wise and just judgment permits to be done to the injury of the creature. He is bound by no law to hinder that; rather, he has most weighty reasons for permitting it to the greater manifestation of his own justice.

Although the civil magistrate does not punish sins by sins, ti does not follow that God cannot do so justly. The human court differs far from the divine both with respect to the justice of God and with respect to his power.

It is false that there is any full payment of debt when sins are punished by sins or that guilt is diminished or taken away. This is done only by simple punishment and where there is a perfect satisfaction (which does not occur here).

There are three distinct things in sin:

the physical act, which holds a material relation - proceeds from God the mover
the illegality itself, which holds a formal relation - departs only from the Devil and the sinner
the judgment of God (or punishableness), which attaches to both - depends upon God, the judge

Although Christ was bound to bear in our place all the punishment in general due to us, it does not follow that he was bound to bear all species of punishments.

he was indeed made a curse for us (Gal. 3:13), but he ought not on that account to bear all the species of curse enumerated in Deuteronomy 27 and 28.
he is said to have borne our diseases (Isa. 53:4; Matt. 8:17), still he cannot be said to have either borne or healed all kinds of diseases

Although sin is the punishment of sin, it cannot be inferred that the justice of God demands that it should be violated and that God should be offended for his satisfaction; but only that God can, in accordance with his wisdom and justice, from a violation of that directive justice revealed in the law, elicit against the intention of the sinner and the nature of sin itself, a manifestation of vindicatory justice.