EIGHTH TOPIC

THE STATE OF MAN BEFORE THE FALL AND THE COVENANT OF NATURE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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FIRST QUESTION - What was the liberty of Adam in his state of innocence?

1. Man can be viewed in a fourfold state and we treat here of the first only:
1. the instituted (instituto) of nature
2. the destitute (destituto) of sin
3. the restored (restituto) of grace
4. the appointed (praestituto) of glory
2. By the state of innocence, we mean the first condition of man created after the image of God in internal goodness and external happiness. To it also belonged his liberty, the subject of this question.
3. However, that we may be able to reason more correctly about the liberty of upright Adam, various species of liberty should be distinguished, in order that it may be evident what kind could belong to him and what not.
4. Liberty is fourfold:
1. the liberty of independence which belongs to God as the first being; this is opposed to the necessity of dependence which belongs to all creatures
2. liberty from coaction by which man acts spontaneously and with freedom; this is opposed to the necessity of coaction seen in those who act through force
3. rational liberty from brute and physical necessity by which man acts from choice and not by a brute instinct and blind impulse
4. liberty from slavery by which man is subject to the yoke of no slavery, either of sin or of misery; this is opposed to the necessity of slavery in sinners
5. Not every necessity contends with liberty, nor agrees with it. A certain extrinsic necessity destroys liberty; another agrees with it. A certain intrinsic crushes it and another perfects it.
6. The liberty of Adam was not the liberty of independence because he ought always to be in subjection (as a creature to his Creator).
1. it was not the liberty of a will undetermined by the practical intellect; for this would have changed the will into an irrational appetite
2. but there was in him another threefold liberty:
   1. from coaction
   2. from physical necessity
   3. from slavery (both of sin and of misery)
3. the former two constituted his essential liberty
4. but the latter was accidental because it comes in upon the essential liberty and can be separated from it (since true liberty exist where such freedom from slavery does not exist, as in the state of sin)
7. However, although he was free from the slavery of sin (because created just and upright) still he was not free from mutability.
1. Adam was placed in such a state in which he could stand and fall, sin and not sin
2. although this argues less perfection than the state of grace (which is immutable), still it denotes no fault or imperfection (since immutability is by no means a gift of nature, but of grace)
8. However from this mutability indifference arises. This is commonly attributed to Adam and with regard to it, it is enquired whether his liberty consisted in it. To this we answer negatively:
1. such an equilibrium or equal propensity to good and evil, contends with the nature of the will which necessarily follows a dictate of the intellect
2. such an equilibrium contends with the state of creation in which the created will was very good; it would not have been very good, if it had been disposed to vice equally with virtue
3. it contends with the law given to man, commanding him to love God will all his mind and strength
4. if therefore a certain indifference must be attributed to it, it must not be understood in the second act and as to the power of simultaneity; as if it could at that same time and at once be actually carried to good and to evil (because then man must be supposed to have been at the same time upright and fallen)
9. Although natural liberty agrees in essentials with the liberty of man constituted in other states, still it differs greatly in accidentals.
1. the liberty of glory in blessedness is not to be able to sin (non posse peccare)
2. the liberty of sinners in the state of sin is not to be able not to sin (non posse non peccare)
3. the liberty of believers, in grace, is to able to sin, and not to sin (posse peccare et non peccare)
4. but the liberty of Adam was to be able not to sin (posse non peccare)

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SECOND QUESTION - Did Adam have the power to believe in Christ?

1. This question lies between us and the Arminians who, to defend their hypothesis concerning the necessity of a certain universal sufficient grace, have introduce this opinion - that Adam never had the power of believing in Christ and so could not have lost it by sin. Nor, as a consequence, can God now in the gospel demand faith in Christ from us, unless he had previously bestowed sufficient grace for it because no one is bound to an impossibility.
1. hence the maintain that God either gives or at least is prepared to give all the power of believing if he will
2. thus they endeavor to prove two things at the same time:
   1. that we falsely assert that Adam lost the power of believing in Christ because he never had it
   2. that the grace of faith ought to be universal from the justice and equity of the new covenant
3. Arminius says, "I say and affirm, asseverate, profess and teach that Adam before his fall had not the power to believe in Christ because there was no need of faith in Christ; and therefore that God could not have demanded this faith from him after his fall because Adam had criminally lost that power to believe." ("Apology or Defence . . . Against Certain Theological Articles," 19)
2. The question is not whether Adam had actual faith in Christ, rather the question is whether he could have it, if it had been revealed to him. In creation he received sufficient strength from God to believe every word revealed or to be revealed, consequently even in Christ the future Redeemer, is this had been revealed to him by God.
3. The reasons are:
1. Adam received the power to believe every word of God, therefore he also received the power to believe the word of the gospel, if it had been revealed to him
4. 2. before the fall, he had the power to love God and obey him in all things; for love supposes faith, a part of obedience
5. 3. from the revelation of God the upright angels knew the promised Redeemer to be manifested in his own time and rejoiced in him (1 Pet. 1:11-12; Eph. 3:10)
6. 4. the reason of mercy, repentance (and other virtues) in the state of integrity is the same for faith in the Redeemer also
7. That power is not therefore to be called frustrated which is not occupied about some special object belonging to its sphere.
8. Although upright Adam could not believe in the remission of present sins (which were not), this did not hinder him from having the power of believing that there would be remission, if it pleased God to reveal to him both his future fall and recovery from it.
9. Although faith in Christ is not prescribed specifically and expressly in the law, still it is contained in it generically and implicitly (inasmuch as the law commands us to believe every word of God and all his promises).
10. He who received the power to rise from the fall had no need of new powers for rising, unless he lost that power by the fall. This was the case with Adam, who by sinning lost all that power with original righteousness. Therefore if after the fall, he could not rise by his own strength, ti was not because he had not received it in creation, but because he lost it by the fall.

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THIRD QUESTION - Whether God made any covenant with Adam, and what kind it was.

1. Since a covenant among men is commonly called "a mutual agreement between two or more persons concerning the mutual bestowal of certain goods and offices for the sake of common utility," it principally demands these conditions:
1. the persons must be equal, either simply or at least in certain order
2. they must have in their own power the goods or duties which they should mutually bestow, and that as to them they should be perfectly independent
3. they should not be bound without that agreement to perform those duties
4. hence it is certain that a covenant with God with man strictly speaking cannot exist
   1. there is no equality or proportion between God and man; not between the goods which God promises by his covenant or the duties which man is bound to perform
   2. man is in no respect perfectly independent and is bound even without any agreement to render obedience to God
   3. man can bring nothing to it from himself, but depends wholly upon God
   4. still God though his infinite condescension willed to enter into a covenant with his creatures
2. By his own right, God could have prescribed obedience to man without any promise of reward; but in order to temper that supreme dominion with his goodness, he added a covenant consisting in the promise of a reward and the stipulation of obedience.
3. Covenant is sometimes taken more broadly for a simple promise of God without the stipulation of any obedience on the part of the creature - such as the covenant he made with man and living things of the earth, not to destroy them anymore by a flood (Gen. 9:9-11).
1. yet strictly and properly, covenant denotes the agreement of God with man by which God promises his goods, and by man, in turn, duty and worship are engaged
2. this is called two-sided and mutual because it consists of a mutual obligation of the contracting parties
4. This double covenant is proposed to us in Scripture: of nature and of grace; of works and of faith; legal and evangelical.
1. the foundation of this distinction rest both on the different relation of God contracting and on the diverse condition of man
2. in the former, 
   1. God as creator demands perfect obedience from innocent man with the promise of life and eternal happiness
   2. rests upon the work of man
   3. rests upon a just Creator
   4. was made with innocent man without a mediator
3. in the latter,
   1. God as Father promises salvation in Christ to the fallen man under the condition of faith
   2. rests upon the grace of God alone
   3. rests upon a merciful Redeemer
   4. was made with fallen man by the intervention of a mediator
5. The covenant of nature is that which God the Creator made with innocent man as his creature, concerning the giving of eternal happiness and life under the condition of perfect and personal obedience.
1. it is called "natural" because it is founded on the nature of man (as it was first created by God)
2. it is also called "legal" because the condition on man's part was the observance of the law of nature engraved within him
3. and of "works" because it depended upon works or his proper obedience
6. Episcopius, and with him the Remonstrants, deny that a covenant of nature was made with Adam ("Institutiones theologica," 2.1 in Opera theologica [1678], p. 23); but it can be proved:
1. there are granted the essential parties of the covenant, God and man
7. 2. a law was imposed upon Adam, which necessarily implies a federal agreement and contract
8. 3. the passage in Hosea 6:7 confirms this: the Israelites are said to have "transgressed the covenant like Adam" (cf. Job 31:33)
9. 4. such a covenant was demanded not only by the goodness and philanthropy of God, but also by the state of man and the desire of happiness impressed upon his heart by God
10. In this covenant we consider: (1) the subject or contracting parties, and (2) the pact itself and the things agreed on both sides
1. the contracting parties
   1. God as Creator and Lord promising a blessing
      1. legislatory power - as Creator he cannot but govern the creature suitably to his nature (i.e. rationally by the imposition of fit laws)
      2. goodness in remunerating - because he could not help loving and rewarding the creature doing his duty
11. 2. man in the stipulation of duties and man must be viewed under a double relation
       1. as just  - he had the power to perform the prescribed duty
       2. Adam in a certain manner included the whole human race (Acts 17:26), hence that covenant pertained not only to Adam, but all his posterity in him
          1. one natural, according to which he was the common father of all
          2. the other forensic, by which from the most wise providence of God he was constituted the chief and head of the human race, who should contract for himself and his, and hold or lose the good bestowed upon him, as goods common to the whole of nature
12. 2. the pact consists of two parts:
       1. the exaction of duty on the part of God and a restipulation on the part of man
          1. generally - the knowledge and worship of God (founded on the law of nature and not written in a book, but engraven and stamped upon the heart
          2. specially - founded upon the symbolic and positive law
       2. the promise of blessing on the part of God and the acceptation on the part of man
13. The obedience which the law demanded ought to have these marks:
1. with regard to principle - to be true and sincere from the whole heart, not hypocritical and external of the body only
2. with regard to the object - to extend not to certain things only, but to all the precepts of the law without exception
3. with regard to degrees - intension to be perfect and absolute
4. with regard to duration - to be constant and perpetual even unto the end without interruption
14. Although man was already bound to this obedience by a natural obligation as a rational creature, necessarily subject to the dominion of God and his law, yet he was more strongly bound by a federal obligation which God so stipulated to man.
1. in order that he might actually perform it, he needed the help of God
2. this help did not tend to the infusion of any new power, but only to exercising the efficacy of that power which he had received
3. this did not belong properly to the covenant of nature, but always depended on the most free good pleasure of God
15. The sanction of the covenant consisted both in the promise of reward and in the threatening of punishment.
16. From this pact arises the mutual obligation of the parties, differing according to their condition.
1. with regard to man it was absolute and simple from the nature of the thing
2. with regard to God it was gratuitous
3. therefore there was no debt from which man could derive a right, but only a debt of fidelity, arising out of the promise of God
17. Man has all thing from and owes all to God, he can seek from him nothing as his own by right, nor can God be a debtor to him - not by condignity of work.

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FOURTH QUESTION - Why is it called the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and why did God give Adam a law about not tasting it?

1. The question has two parts. (1) How did the tree of knowledge of good and evil obtain this name? (2) Why God used it for a symbolic law to test man?
2. There is no purpose in question, "What sort of tree was it?", because Scripture tells nothing about it.
3. It would be better to see why it obtained this name.
1. not formally - the tree was not in itself rational knowing good and evil
2. not effectively - which, when eaten, was either the product or assistant of knowledge
3. not putatively - there is no reason Adam would name it such based on the witness of the serpent
4. rather it is so called sacramentally and eventually a posteriori by anticipation (inasmuch as from eating of it, he was really about experience the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience)
4. God selected this tree then, to explore the obedience of Adam (Gen. 2:16-17).
1. this is called "a positive law" because it did not bind man from the nature of the thing, but from the mere will of God
2. this is also called "symbolic" because it was given for a symbol and trial of the obedience of man
   1. by fulfilling it he would have testified his uncorrupted love and obedience towards God
   2. by violating it he professed that he threw off the dominion of god and preferred his own will to the divine will and voice
5. Therefore that exploratory law was necessary in addition to the natural law impressed upon the conscience of men.
1. in order that God might declare himself to be the Lord of man and man might understand himself to be a servant bound to obey and adhere to him
2. that sin might be made more conspicuous by that external symbol
3. to declare that man was created by him with free will
4. that by interdicting the fruit of a beautiful tree, he might teach that his happiness does not consist in the enjoyment of earthly things
5. to teach that God alone and his service must be sought before all things as the highest good and that we should acquiesce in it alone
6. To make this trial of man, God might have enjoined upon him or prohibited something great and difficult; however, he wished to give a law concerning a thing neither great nor difficult in order that obedience might be easy, and man be deprived of every excuse if he should transgress.
7. God gave this precept to man for his trial, partly to make known to man himself his weakness, and partly that God might have an occasion of more distinctly declaring his glory about man, which without this would have remained hidden in its principal part (viz. his exercise of mercy and justice).

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FIFTH QUESTION - Why was it called the tree of life?

1. Another tree was the tree of life. Regarding this name opinions differ.
2. Some maintain that it was so called effectively because it had an innate power of vivifying man and of conferring upon him absolute immortality
1. but a finite power could not have an infinite efficacy of extending life to an infinite time
2. since its fruit was liable to corruption it could not absolutely free man from destruction, unless another cause intervened
3. Far better is the opinion that the tree obtained this name principally by reason of signification.
1. it was a sacrament and symbol of the immortality which would have been bestowed upon Adam if he had persevered in his first state
2. this signification can have a threefold relation
   1. with respect to past life - it was a symbol putting him in mind of the life received from God
   2. with respect to future life - it was a declarative and sealing sign of the happy life to be passed in paradise and to be changed afterwards into a heavenly life, if he had continued upright
   3. with respect to the state of grace - it was an illustrious type of the eternal happiness prepared for us in heaven; also a type of Christ himself (Rev. 2:7; 22:2)
4. Therefore the life which this tree signified and sealed was not properly either the longevity or the immortality of the body alone; rather it was the eternal happiness to be obtained at length in heaven.
5. When God expelled man from paradise (Gen. 3:22), it cannot be rightly inferred that there was a physical power in this tree of so great efficacy that it could rescue even sinful man from mortality.
6. What was interdicted to them in that pristine state is now not only made lawful to us, but also commanded and promised in the state of grace.
7. Hence it is evident that these two trees of paradise are not free from mystery.
1. as the first was a sacrament of trial and the second a symbol of reward, so each shadowed forth to us the mode of God's acting in the church by commands and promises
2. the law and the gospel can be contained under the double symbol
   1. for the law is given to us a a trial of obedience and by sin is made the occasion of death and the minister of condemnation
   2. the gospel, however, is the saving and quickening tree of life
   3. the former exhibits the image of Adam from whom sin and death flowed, the latter exhibits Christ from whom righteousness and life arise (1 Cor. 15:22)

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SIXTH QUESTION - Whether Adam had the promise of eternal and heavenly life so that (his course of obedience being finished) he would have been carried to heaven. We affirm.

1. This question is moved against us by various persons.
1. by the Socinians who, in order to establish the mortality of the first man and prove that death is not the punishment of sin (but a consequence of nature) maintain that the covenant of God with Adam was not spiritual; rather it concerned the goods of the animal and earthly life alone
2. 2. by those who constitute a threefold covenant (natural, legal, and evangelical) so explain the promise annexed to each that the evangelical alone was of eternal life to be passed in heaven
      1. the legal consisted in the most perfect happiness both of soul and body to be enjoyed in the land of Canaan
      2. the promise annexed to the natural covenant had no other reference than to  life enjoyed in the earthly paradise
3. The received opinion among the orthodox is that the promise given to Adam was not only a happy life to be continued in paradise, but of a heavenly and eternal life.
1. the question is not whether Adam had the privilege of immortality in his upright state
2. the question is not whether the promise was given to him of happiness and life perpetually to endure, if he had persisted in integrity
3. rather the question is whether that happiness and life were to be passed in heaven or only upon the earth and in paradise - the latter they affirm; we the former
4. The reasons are:
1. the law of works had the promise of heaven and eternal life; therefore also the law prescribed to Adam
5. 2. it is confirmed by this - Christ acquired the eternal and celestial life which he bestows upon us in no other way than that he fulfilled the righteousness of the law for us (Rom. 8:4; Gal. 4:5)
6. 3. the threatening of death denounced against the transgressor embraces both temporal and eternal death to be suffered in hell; for that death is understood, the empire of which the Devil obtained on account of sin (Heb. 2:14) - Would God take delight in aggravating punishments and lessening rewards; threatening spiritual, eternal and infernal punishments, and bestowing only earthly promises?
7. 4. the state of the highest good of God communicative of itself demands this - the covenant into which he receives him promises the most excellent goods in intimate communion with God (which can be no other than eternal and heavenly)
8. 5. the dignity of man himself demands the same thing - since his noblest part is spirit, he could not obtain on earth his full happiness, but must receive it in heaven where he can enjoy the fullest and most perfect communion with God
9. 6. the earthy paradise was the place of trial and the life enjoyed in it, thus another place ought to be assigned as the place of reward; otherwise it would follow that no good was promised to him for already in paradise he enjoyed a happy life overflowing with all kinds of good
10. The natural covenant is not so called because it conferred nothing above nature and condition, but because it depended on the powers of nature and the obedience he ought to render. It is gratuitously and falsely supposed that the promises of God are regulated according to the proportion of our merit; on the contrary, they depend upon God's will and goodness.
11. Although the Scripture does not make express mention of a heavenly life to be conferred on Adam, it is with sufficient clearness gatherer by legitimate consequence from the opposed threatening of eternal death and from the sacramental seal of this promise by the tree of life.
12. Christ alone gives us promises of eternal life in the state of sin. Yet in the state of nature, Adam might have had them by his own obedience, according to God's pact.
13. The promises of the new covenant are said to be "better" than those of the old (Heb. 8:6), not as to substance (because the same heavenly and eternal life is promised in both), but as to mode inasmuch as there is granted to us not only the help without which we could not persevere, but the help with which we can certainly persevere.
14. Although this covenant of nature was without a mediator, still no less could it promise and confer upon Adam heavenly life.
15. Although nothing was wanting to Adam in paradise for the happiness and perfection suitable to that place (state of the way), still many things could be wanting which are required for the happiness promised (state of the residence).
16. When Paul says the first Adam was made a "living soul," but the second a "quickening spirit" (1 Cor. 15:45-46), he does not wish to indicate what was or was not promised to Adam. He only indicates what was the condition of each Adam, and what they ought to communicate to their posterity.
17. Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God (1 Cor. 15:50), not inasmuch as they are considered simply physically and substantively, but only morally and qualitatively.

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SEVENTH QUESTION - Does the earthly paradise still exist? We deny.

1. The question here is not what or of what nature was the garden of Eden; or what place on earth did it occupy, bur we speak here only of its present existence: whether that garden still exists at this time, in whatever part of the earth it may be.
2. Various papists assert that the garden still exists "in a place indeed unknown to us."
3. We maintain that the garden was long ago ruined and laid waste by the universal deluge that men might not desire a return to it and might know that another far more excellent should be sought.
4. The reasons are:
1. the waters of the flood are said to have so prevailed over the whole world (Gen. 7:19-20) and they must also have destroyed the garden
5. 2. no trace any longer exists of paradise, not can it be ascertained
6. 3. if paradise had been preserved of God by a special privilege and had been unharmed by the waters of the deluge, Noah would have led his family and the animals there for safety from the flood
7. 4. if paradise had been preserved, it must undoubtedly have been preserved for some reason and end, but no reason can be given for it
8. The Son of Sirach indeed asserts that "Enoch pleased the Lord and was translated", but the addition translated "into paradise" does not exist in the Greek manuscript, and was inserted by an ancient interpreter and falsely approved by the Council of Trent.
9. To no purpose, Bellarmine feigns that Enoch and Elijah are kept in paradise and will come forth at the end of the world.
10. The two witnesses mentioned in Revelation 11:3 cannot be referred to Enoch and Elijah.
11. Although not a few of the ancients adopted the comment about the duration of paradise and the residence of Enoch and Elijah in it, it does not follow forthwith that it must be received. It is not supported by the word of God; yea is plainly repugnant to it.
12. The olive branch, which the dove broke off and carried to Noah in the ark, may not necessarily have been obtained in paradise.
13. But not without mystery does God seem to have wished this paradise to be destroyed, to intimate that another far more pleasant is now to be sought by us. It is prepared for believers by God through Christ, not on earth but in heaven (Luke 23:43; Rev. 2:7).