Turretin - Institutes of Elenctic Theology

SIXTH TOPIC

THE ACTUAL PROVIDENCE OF GOD

	Question I.	Is there a providence? We affirm.
	Question II.	Is the providence fo God rightly called "fate," and is a fatal necessity properly ascribed to it? We distinguish.

THE OBJECT OF PROVIDENCE
	Question III.	Do all things come under providence - small as well as great, contingent and free, natural and necessary? We affirm.

THE ACTS OF PROVIDENCE
	Question IV.	Is providence occupied only in the conversation and sustentation of things; or also in their government (through which God himself acts and efficaciously concurs with them by a concourse not general and indifferent, but particular, specific and immediate)? We deny the former and affirm the latter, against the Jesuits, Socinians, and Remonstrants.

THE CONCOURSE OF GOD
	Question V.	Does God concur with second causes not only by a particular and simultaneous, but also by a previous concourse? We affirm.
	Question VI.	How can the concourse of God be reconciled with the contingency and liberty of second causes - especially of the will of man?

THE PROVIDENCE OF GOD IN EVIL
	Question VII.	Do sins fall under providence, and how is it applied to them?
	Question VIII.	Whether it follows and can be elicited by legitimate consequence from our doctrine that we make God the author of sin. We deny against the Romanists, Socinians, Remonstrants, and Lutherans.
	Question IX.	Is there a use and abuse of the doctrine of providence?

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FIRST QUESTION - Is there a providence? We affirm.

As the works of nature are usually distributed into the works of creation and providence, the doctrine of creation is rightly followed by an examination of providence.

The word "providence" embraces three things:

the knowledge of the mind - foresees
the decree of the will - provides
the efficacious administration of the things decreed - procures
hence providence can be viewed either in the antecedent decree or in the subsequent execution
1. the former is the eternal destination of all things to their ends - an immanent act in God
2. the latter is the temporal government of all things according to that decree - a transitive action out of God
3. we here treat principally of the second respect

It is evident that there is a providence in the world by which all things (even the smallest) are not only at the same time most wisely and powerfully directed, but also so connected with the divinity that it cannot be wholly denied without at the same time denying God.

To demonstrate this primary head of faith and religion even the very voice of nature and the consent of nations, and the voice of the wisest among the heathen can suffice.

It is more strongly and clearly established by the testimony of Scripture. (cf. Job 12, 38, 39, 40, 41; Psa. 19, 91, 104, 107; Prov. 16, 20; Jer. 10; Matt. 6, 10; Acts 14, 17; Acts 14:17, 25, 28; Eph. 1:11; Heb. 1:3; Col. 1:17, etc.).

The same thing is proved:

from the nature of God himself: the world cannot consist without him anymore than it can be created because the same reasons which impelled him to create also impel him to govern
from his independency and causality, by which he created things and second causes must depend upon him both in being and operation
from his wisdom, power, and goodness

The same thing is demonstrated a posteriori.

by the nature and condition of created things (Psa. 104:29-30)
the harmony and order observable in the world among so many things
the predictions of future events
the establishment and revolutions of empires and republics
the extraordinary blessings and judgments which God pours out either upon the good or upon the evil
the sense of conscience (conscience is unexplainable if all things are directed by chance and fortune)

All the arguments by which we have already proved the existence of God favor also his providence. Scriptures everywhere separate God from idols by the argument of providence (Isa. 41:22-23; 42:8-9; Job 12:7-9).

The providence of God neither takes away the contingency of things, nor overthrows the liberty of the will, nor does away with the use of means.

Sin cannot be produced by the providence of God effectively, but nothing hinders it from being ordained by his providence permissively and directed efficaciously without any blame upon divine providence.

If some things seem confused and disarranged, they are so only with respect to us (who cannot see the causes of things, their modes and ends), not in themselves and with respect to God (e.g., the selling of Joseph and the crucifixion of Christ).

Although the happiness of the wicked and the calamities of the pious often generate doubts concerning providence, yet this ought not to weaken our belief in providence.

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SECOND QUESTION - Is the providence of God rightly called "fate," and is a fatal necessity properly ascribed to it? We distinguish.

The question is necessary not only that it may be evident what ought to be the use of the word "fate" among Christians, but also that our doctrine may be freed from the calumnies of Romanists and others.

The word fatum is Latin derived from fando (i.e., "speaking" as if the utterance or word, decree, command and will of God).

It is used in many ways by authors, whence a fourfold fate arises:

physical fate - nothing else than the order and series of natural causes defined to their effects

1. mathematical fate - it is the necessity of things and events arising from the position of the heavens and of the stars by which not only the elements and mixed bodies, but also the wills of men are said to be necessarily impelled to their acts
1. Stoical fate - customarily understood to impose a fatal and ineluctable necessity upon all things and an eternal and natural series of causes and thing among themselves (to which God himself is subjected)
1. Christian fate - the series and order of causes depending on divine providence by which it produces its own effects

We think it safer with Calvin (Institutes, 1.16.8) to abstain from the use of the word "fate" in the Christian school.

because it is contaminated by heathenism, superstition, and impiety
because it is too much exposed to the calumnies of opponents

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THIRD QUESTION - Do all things come under providence - small as well as great, contingent and free, natural and necessary? We affirm.

This occasion for this question arises from those who, although seeming to acknowledge the providence of God, still shut it up in too narrow limits. We believe that nothing in the nature of things can be granted or happen which does not depend upon providence.

The reasons are:

God created all things, therefore he also takes care of all things; he never deserts his own work

1. Scripture most clearly establishes this both in general and in particular.
  1. in general - Nehemiah 9:6; Acts 17:25, 28; Hebrews 1:3; Psalm 145:15-16

Although the providence of God is exercised about rational creatures far more illustriously and efficaciously, other things are not therefore to be withdrawn from it, since it extends to both (Psa. 36:6; 145:15-16; Psa. 36:6).

God is said to have preserved the heavens for himself, as a seat of glory and the sanctuary of his majesty, and to have given the earth to men; not for supreme dominion and absolute power, but only for use with dependence on his providence.

It is certain that God wished to exhibit his goodness even in things most mean, often to exercise justice through the smallest animals - frogs, vermin, worms, etc.

Scripture in many places asserts that contingent and fortuitous events fall under providence. (Exo. 21:12-13; Deut. 19:4f; Prov. 16:33; Gen. 22:8, 13; 24:12ff; 27:20; Prov. 21:31; Matt. 10:29-30).

Therefore, nothing in the nature of things can be granted as so fortuitous and casual as not to be governed by the providence of God and so not happening necessarily and infallibly with respect to the divine decrees.

Still it must not on this account be supposed that all contingency is removed from the world.

for God, who works all in all, so governs and rules second causes as not to take away their nature and condition
he keeps, conserves, and permits them also to exercise and act out their own motions
infallibility of the event from the hypothesis does not take away their contingency from the condition of second causes and from their mode of acting

It is evident from the Scriptures that free and voluntary things, which are in our power and are done with purpose, are governed by providence (Prov. 16:1, 9; 21:1; Jer. 10:23; Psa. 33:14-15; Gen. 31:29; 33:4; Exo. 12:36; Num. 22, 23; 1 Sam. 24:15, 18; 26:27).

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FOURTH QUESTION - Is providence occupied only in the conversation and sustentation of things; or also in their government (through which God himself acts and efficaciously concurs with them by a concourse not general and indifferent, but particular, specific and immediate)? We deny the former and affirm the latter, against the Jesuits, Socinians, and Remonstrants.

This question has two parts:

concerning the conservation of things - that by which God conserves all creatures in their own state
concerning the government of things

The question is not whether the providence of God is concerned with the conservation of things, but whether the whole relation of providence consists in that conservation and in this - that God gives and conserves to second causes the power of acting and permits them to act; or whether it consists in government by which God himself acts and efficaciously concurs with his creatures.

The controversy here is with those Romanists who place providence and the concourse of God only in this - that to the creature, previously made capable of acting, he merely conserves the strength and permits actions at pleasure (as if sufficient of itself alone to act).

The Jesuits maintain God's providence to be only general and indifferent, determined by second causes, and the second cause determines itself before the first cause acts (which does not excited the second cause to motion, but the second cause is the occasion of the acting of the first cause). This is the common opinion of the Jesuits, Socinians, and Remonstrants.

Thomists and Dominicans urge that all second causes are predetermined to acting by God, and he not only acts with the second cause in the effect, but also immediately on itself, and so the will is by him determined to will or nill this in particular, not only in good but also in evil actions.

Thomas Aquinas (Summa Theologica, I, Q. 83, Art. 1) "When the free will moves itself, this does not exclude its being moved by another, from whom it receives the very power to move itself."
Aquinas places the concourse of God in these five things: (Summa Theologica, I, Q. 105)
1. inasmuch as he gives to second causes the strength and faculty to act
2. inasmuch as he keeps and sustains them in being and vigor
3. inasmuch as he excites and applies second causes to acting
4. inasmuch as he determines them to acting
5. inasmuch as he rules and directs them that they may accomplish the ends determined by him
the orthodox approach is in this category; as they maintain that the providence of God consists not only in the conservation of things, but also in the concourse of God; not indifferent and general, but particular and specific

There is one universal cause (relatively so called) acting by a physical necessity (as the sun and the stars); another, however, universal absolutely, most wisely and freely operating (such as God is).

Although God conserves the free will (because he created it), it does not follow that he ought to govern it by a general concourse only. The liberty of the will is not absolute and independent, but limited and dependent upon God.

The power which is absolutely and every way indifferent and indeterminate and depends upon no other thing cannot be determined by the providence of God.

The determination made by the manner of efficient cause differs from that made by the manner of a formal and subjective cause.

The particular cause which concurs by a particular influx is denominated from its effect, since it is not only efficient, but also proximate and produces the effect of itself.

The general influx is falsely maintained to be necessary either to preserve the liberty of man or to remove from God the causality of sin.

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FIFTH QUESTION - Does God concur with second causes not only by a particular and simultaneous, but also by a previous concourse? We affirm.

The question concerning the concourse of God is one of the most difficult in theology.

On the state of the question observe:

one concourse is physical by which one concurs and acts after the manner of a physical cause (really flows into the effect by a positive influx), another is moral by which he operates after the manner of moral cause (persuasion); we treat of the former

1. one concourse is mediate, another immediate
  1. a cause acts mediately by the mediation of virtue which operates by a virtue not its own or proper to itself, but received and borrowed from another source (e.g., moonlight)
  2. a cause act immediately by the immediation of virtue which acts by a virtue or power proper to itself and not received from any other source (e.g., fire warms by its own source)
  3. if God uses second causes as means it does not follow that he does not act immediately also, for he uses them not with respect to the action of the creature and consequently of the effect itself, but inasmuch as he subordinates second causes to himself (by flowing into which he also reaches the effect itself immediately)
1. concourse is so called by way of principle or by way of the first act by which God conserves the power of the second act and permits it to act; or by way of action
1. on concourse is called previous and predetermining; another simultaneous or concomitant
  1. the previous is the action of God by which he, flowing into causes and their principles, excites and previously moves creatures to action and directs to the doing of a particular thing
  2. simultaneously is that by which God produces the action of the creature as to its being or substance by which he is supposed to flow together with creatures into their actions and effects, but not into the creatures themselves

Antecedently to all operation of the creature or before the creature operates by nature and reason, God really and efficaciously moves it to act in single actions so that without this premotion the second cause could not operate, but it would be impossible in the compound sense for the second cause not to do that same thing to which it was previously moved by the first cause.

the question about concourse comes to this - whether it is only simultaneous or also previous
the Jesuits, who maintain a middle knowledge recognize only a simultaneous concourse and they deny the previous predetermination
the Dominicans and Thomists hold the predetermination of God to be necessary in all the acts of the creatures, whether natural or free
the Reformed side with the latter

The following favors the Reformed view:

from the nature of the first cause and the subordination of second causes
1. the first cause is the prime mover in every action so that the second cause cannot move unless it is moved
2. otherwise it would be the principle of its own motion and so would no longer be the second cause, but the first

1. what is of itself indifferent to many acts, to act or not act, must necessarily be determined to act by another because what is in potentia cannot be reduced to actuality except by something which is in actu
  1. although second causes have sufficient power to act in the order of second causes and can determine themselves to act in a particular way, yet they do not cease to have need of the previous motion of God in order to obtain the certainty of the event
  2. otherwise no prescience of God could be held certain concerning them, since from their own nature they are indifferent
1. if God does not concur by a previous concourse (by determining the creature antecedently to his act), neither could he be joined in acting with the creature by a simultaneous concourse
1. God by an absolute and efficacious will decree from eternity all acts (even free) antecedently to the foresight of the determination of the free will itself
  1. therefore he ought also in time to predetermine the will to the same acts; otherwise God's eternal decrees would be frustrated
  2. whatever he decreed, that he follows out; and whatever he performs in time, he decreed from eternity

Predetermination does not destroy, but conserves the liberty of the will.

by it, God does not compel rational creatures or make them act by a physical or brute necessity
rather, he only effects this - that they act both consistently with themselves and in accordance with their own nature
the fount of error is measuring of the nature of liberty from equilibrium and making indifference essential to it

The necessity carried into things by predetermination is not destructive of liberty because it is not consequent.

these two thing can at the same time be true: man wills spontaneously, and, with respect to providence or premotion, he cannot help willing
for that premotion of God is such that it takes place in accordance with the nature of things and does not take away from second causes the mode of operation proper to each

Although creatures have sufficient intrinsic power to act, it does not follow that the extrinsic premotion of God is unnecessary by which they may be excited to operation; however, it does not follow from the premotion of God that second causes do nothing, but only do nothing independently.

Although God previously moves second causes, still he cannot be said to produce the actions of second causes (e.g., to make warm or to walk).

Although creatures are the instruments which God uses for the execution of their own works, they do not cease to have a proper influx and to hold the relation of principal causes.

Although the premotion of God is extended to evil actions, ti does not on that account make God guilty of the fault or the author of sin.

moral wickedness does not follow intrinsically and from the nature of the thing to the act, but as it proceeds from a deficient created will (to which moreover the causality of sin must be attributed and not to God)
Aquinas (2 Dist. 37, Q. 2, Art. 2+) "God in an action connected with deformity, does what belongs to the action, does not do what belongs to deformity; for although in any effect there are many things inseparably connected, it does not behoove that whatever may be the cause of it as to one, should also be the cause as to the other."

Since in every moral action we must necessarily distinguish the substance of the act int he genus of being from the goodness and wickedness of the same in the genus of morals - the action of understanding and willing simply from the action of understanding and willing this or that lawful or unlawful object - it is evident that no action can be called essentially good or bad, but only as it is here and now circumstanced in the genus of morals, i.e., with a relation to this or that good or gad moral object.

The predetermination of God in evil acts is not repugnant to his permission because they are not occupied about the same things.

the former regards the substance of the act, the latter, however, its wickedness
the former reaches the material (effecting it), but the latter the formality (leaving it to the free will of man, which alone is the deficient moral cause)
God will the effect, and permits the defect

Since the will of precept and of decree respect diverse objects, nothing prevents God from willing a thing by his will of decree which he does not will (but prohibits) by his will of precept (Gen. 45:7; Acts 4:28).

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SIXTH QUESTION - How can the concourse of God be reconciled with the contingency and liberty of second causes - especially of the will of man?

These two things we derive most clearly from the Scriptures: that the providence of God concurs with all second causes and especially with the human will; yet the contingency and liberty of the will remain unimpaired. But how these two things can consist with each other, no mortal can in this life perfectly understand (Rom. 11:33).

Although ignorant of the mode of a thing, still we ought not on that account to deny the thing itself.

Many attempts at reconciliation have been made, but with little success.

it is falsely supposed that there is no connection of foreknown things with prescience and that it imposes no necessity upon them, yet Scripture teaches the opposite (Matt. 18:7; 26:54; Mark 8:31; Luke 24:7, 46; 1 Cor. 11:19)

1. they who have recourse to permission succeed no better
  1. although permission ought to have its place in explaining the providence of God in evil
  2. yet it is falsely used for reconciliation

The true method of harmonizing them must therefore be sought from some other source (viz., from the order of causes among themselves and the mode of acting proper to them.

the concourse of providence and of the human will is not of collateral and equal causes, but of unequal and subordinate

1. God so concurs with second causes that although he previously move and predetermines them by a motion not general only but also special, still he move them according to their own nature and does not take away from them their own proper mode of operating
1. it follows, since providence does not concur with the human will, either by coaction (compelling the unwilling will) or by determining it physically (as a brute and blind thing without judgment), but rationally (by turning the will in a manner suitable to itself), that it may determine itself as the proximate cause of its own actions by the proper judgment of reason and the spontaneous election of the will so that it does no violence to our will but rather kindly cherishes it
1. God so concurs with the human will as still to determine it differently in good and evil
  1. in the good actions, God so previously moves the will as to be the author of them by determining the will not only as to the thing, but also as to the mode (2 Cor. 3:5; Prov. 16:9; Hag. 1:5; Ezek 36:27; Phil. 2:12-13)
  2. in the evil actions, however, he so concurs as neither to effect, assist, nor approve of them, but to permit and efficaciously direct; not by infusing wickedness, but by so determining rational creatures physically to the substance of the act in the genus of being, that they (when left to themselves) move and determine themselves to bad actions in the genus of morals, performing them freely and voluntarily

Absolute and independent liberty (belonging to God alone) differs from the limited and dependent (proper to creatures).

Although the will while exerting its operation cannot be indifferent to doing or omitting this or that thing, yet this does not prevent it form being indifferent in its own nature and undetermined to many things and from freely determining itself.

It is fitting that we remember that the ways of God are not our ways; they are to be admired, not thoughtlessly searched into, and we ought to be satisfied with firmly retaining the fact, although it is not granted to us now to know fully the way or the how.

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SEVENTH QUESTION - Do sins fall under providence, and how is it applied to them?

Under this difficult question two dangerous extremes occur, which are to be avoided:

one is a useless permission about sins is ascribed to God
1. this clashes with the providence of God
2. herein we find the Pelagians who refer the method of God's providence about evil to a bare and idle permission
the other is when the causality of sin is charged against God
1. this clashes with his justice and holiness
2. herein we find the Manichaeans who made God the cause of wickedness, and is indulged by the Libertines

The orthodox hold the mean between the two extremes, maintaining that the providence of God is so occupied about sin as neither idly to permit it nor efficiently to produce it, but efficaciously to order and direct it.

Three things must be accurately distinguished in sin:

the entity itself of the act which has the relation of material
the disorder and wickedness joined with it which puts on the notion of the formal
the consequent judgment called the adjunct
as to the first - since an act as such is always good as to its entity, God concurs to it effectively and physically, not only by conserving the nature, but by exciting its motions and actions by physical motion, as being good naturally
as to the third- it is joined with sin, not of itself in relation to the sinner, but accidentally in relation to God permitting sins and ordaining them to a good end beyond their own nature

1. as to the second - it is the lawlessness itself and God can be called neither its physical cause nor its ethical cause
2. sin ought not to be removed from the providence of God, for it falls under it in many ways as to its beginning (he freely permits it), as to its progress (he wisely directs it), and as to its end (he powerfully terminates and brings it to a good end)

As to the beginning of sin, God is occupied permissively (Psa 81:12; Acts 14:16)
1. this permission is not ethical or moral
  1. otherwise he would approve it as lawful
  2. it is rather a physical permission
    1. wherein he acts not as legislator and Judge, but as supreme Lord and ruler of the world
    2. he does not exert the strength which could actually prevent this or that from being done
1. this permission must not be conceived negatively, as if it was a mere keeping back or cessation of his will and providence in evil works
  1. but it must be conceived positively and affirmatively; not simply that God does not will to hinder sin, but that he wills not to hinder sin
  2. Beza said, "but is permission is opposed to will, this I reject as false and absurd; its falsity appearing from this, that if God unwillingly permits anything, he is not certainly God, i.e., Almighty ... It remains, therefore, that he willingly permits what he permits. Will then is not opposed to permission."
1. however when we say that permission is occupied positively with sin, this we understand not as if the divine will has sin as an object precisely of itself
  1. since his will can have for its object nothing but good, it cannot will evil as evil, but as terminated on the permission of that which is good
  2. God properly does not will sin to be done, but only wills to permit it
1. however, because it seems strange that God should permit sin, inquiry was made into the causes of that permission
  1. the Arminians think the cause is that God is unwilling to help the free will granted to the creature by himself - falsely supposing that that providence cannot efficaciously concur with the sinning will without doing violence to the free will
  2. therefore the causes of this permission must be sought elsewhere, and they can be various according to the various states of the creatures
    1. if innocent creatures are referred to, Scripture says nothing expressly as to the reason why he permitted angels for men to fall
      1. of this we should be certainly persuaded - that God had done nothing in this business either repugnant to his justice or to his goodness
      2. Augustine: "God knew that it pertained more to his most almighty goodness, even to bring good out of evil, than not to permit evil to be." (Admonition and Grace 10)
      3. if he had not permitted evil, his punitive justice would not have appeared, nor his pardoning mercy, nor the wisdom by which he turns evil into good, nor that wonderful love manifested in sending his Son into the world for the salvation of the church
    2. as to fallen creature, it is easier to assign the causes of the permission of sin because, since he is already corrupt, God can most justly permit sin either as a punishment or for chastisement or for an example
1. although the man is a partaker of the fault who does not turn anyone from sin when he can, it does not follow that God in permitting sin becomes in any way guilty of sin because men are bound to hinder sin, both in themselves and in others (1 Sam. 3:13), but God is bound to this by no law
2. permission bespeaks no influx and causality with respect to the creature sinning as to lawlessness, but a mere suspension of a hindrance
3. permission does not take away the spontaneity and choice of the creature, nor prevent it from acting most freely
4. if sin infallibly follows upon the permission, God cannot be called its cause but only the antecedent

To permission, desertion must be added, by which God, in order not to hinder man from sinning, deserts him by withdrawing the grace opposed to sin or by not giving it so efficaciously as to enable him to overcome the assailing temptation.

this withdrawal is either privative (when he takes away the grace given before) or this withdrawal is negative (when he does not furnish new grace necessary to persist)

1. this desertion can be threefold:
  1. of exploration, when God deserts man to prove him (2 Chron. 32:31 and the case of Adam)
  2. of correction, with respect to the church and believers whom God is said to desert for a time that he may afterwards gather them with his everlasting mercies (Isa. 54:7; Psa. 125:3)
  3. of judgment, such as is denounced against sinners (2 Ki. 21:14; Jer. 7;29; 23:33) and is attributed to the Gentiles, whom he is said to have left in and given over to their own impure desires (Rom. 1:24)
1. the cause of this desertion is always just and holy with God
  1. the causality of sin cannot in any way be ascribed to God because by the desertion he neither compelled man to fall, nor breathed into him the will to fall, nor took away any internal grace given in creation
  2. he only denied the undue grace of confirmation (not given) by the most free good pleasure of his own will
  3. although the necessity of the fall was with a denial of that grace, yet the liberty and spontaneity of man sinning was not destroyed, rather it was shown that God willed that man should certainly fall
  4. but as God willed his certain fall by an eternal decree, so at the same time he willed him to fall most freely; nor did his fall cease to be most free on account of that concourse of God denied to his actual perseverance any more than on account of the most free concourse of God with a necessary cause, the operation of that cause ceases to be necessary or natural

Whether besides God's permission and desertion, there is a certain ulterior operation on his part is not undeservedly questioned.

it is not to be denied that many passages of Scripture, actively enunciating, can and ought to explained passively, so that on may be said to do what he only permits and does not hinder (2 Sam. 8:2; Gen 6:19), thus certain passages which indicate action concerning the providence of God in evil, can be explained of his permission or the simple denial of grace
Scripture, however, speaks too emphatically to allow us to rest in permission alone; and we think something more is signified by those efficacious expressions employed, in which not only a certain withdrawal and not hindering on God's part is marked, but also a certain efficacious action is designated
1. hence the Holy Spirit uses verbs not only in the Hiphil, but also in the Piel, by which the action is strengthened (Exo. 4:21; 7:3; 2 Sam. 12:11; 16:10; 1 Ki. 22:23; Isa. 19:14; Jer. 13:12-13; 2 Thess. 2:11), and innumerable other passages which are too strong to be explained of bare permission
2. otherwise many of God's judgments (executed by the reprobate) would be weakened and be the work of bare permission; and so it would be of the death of Christ itself on which our whole redemption hangs (Acts 4:28)

No mortal can either conceive or sufficiently explain what that efficacy of providence is. The things most especially belong to it:

the offering of occasions which can be procured only by the peculiar providence of God
1. by the concourse of circumstances and the proposition of objects, fitted to move faculties constituted in this or that way (sale of Joseph; Jos. 7:21; David's lust at the sight of Bathsheba)
2. by such things affecting the senses are said and done as that although good in themselves and of a kind by which they ought to be softened, yet the impious falsely abuse them and are hardened by their own fault (the commandments of God; the Egyptian plagues and miracles before Pharaoh; the miracles of Christ)

1. the delivering over to Satan and their own evil desires
  1. although actuated by so great a hatred against God and men as to be spontaneously intent upon all occasions of injuring and thus needing no spur, yet because he cannot attempt or carry out anything against the pleasure of God, he is sometimes sent by God and by his command is said to fulfill his own wicked designs (Rom. 1:24, 26, 28; 1 Sam. 16:14; 1 Ki. 22:22; Eph. 2:2)
  2. Satan can be considered in three ways with respect to man
    1. as a tempter (2 Thess. 2:9, 11; 2 Cor. 4:4)
    2. as an accuser (Job; Zech. 3:1)
    3. as an executioner and tormenter (1 Cor. 5:5; 1 Tim. 1:20)
1. there is also sometimes a certain internal operation of God in man by which he turns the heart of man to the execution of his counsel (Prov. 21:1)
  1. this can be done either by an internal proposition of objects (which can move the mind and will) or by the impression of thoughts (which although good in themselves, are yet accidentally converted into evil by the vice of corrupt man)
  2. God internally works in mean when he cause objects to move him in a particular direction

As to the termination of sin, God places limits to it as to intension, extension, and duration.

this he does either internally (by enlightening the mind to perceive the corruption of sin and the greatness of the punishment due to it or by restraining and curbing the depraved desires)
or externally (by repressing the fury of Satan and the world, removing the occasions of evil and also by calling away from sin by commands and threatenings)

As to the direction of sin, by his wisdom and power God converts the evil into good and directs and draws it to a good end (Gen. 50:20; Isa. 10:5-7; Job 1:20-22, 2:9-10; Acts 3:13-15)
1. this ordination is not be understood a posteriori (as if God, the existence of sin being foreseen, thought concerning its end)
2. but it should be thought of a priori (by which God proposes an end to himself which he wills to bring about by sinners and their sinful actions to which he also directs them by his providence because otherwise that ordination of the end would be only occasional and accidental)

Whatever may be the action of God about sins, still his providence always remains holy and free from all fault.

anytime the same work is ascribed to God, to the Devil, and the wicked, yet it is ascribed to them in different ways
as the concourse of God's providence does not excuse the sinner, so neither can God be made guilty of sin
it is known that impelling and final causes make differences of actions and when there are many causes of the same effect (some good, others evil) such effect is good with respect to the good causes and evil with respect to the evil

God can rightly be called the cause of what he wills and decrees simply and by itself, but he did not decree sins simply, but relatively; nor by themselves, but by accident.

He who impels men to evil (making good wills bad, either drawing them unwilling and nilling or inciting them morally to evil by precept or suasion) is the cause of sin, but God is said to impel wills in themselves evil and spontaneously rushing into evils; not to evils as evils, but as they are his secret judgments.

so that he is here to be regarded not simply as Lord (free permitting the creature to fall), but as a most just Judge (punishing sin by sin) who, therefore, cannot be considered the author of sin, but only the administrator of punishment
therefore there is one impulsion properly so called (of compulsion) by which violence is done to the free will (this notion is faulty); another improper and relative which conspires with liberty and involves only a necessary of consequence; or a conditioned necessity (this God employs toward the wicked)

The common axiom - action and effect belong rather to the principal than the instrumental cause (inferring that God is the cause of sin) - suffers various limitations.

it holds good in homogeneous causes, when both causes (the principal as well as the instrumental) are either positive or privative, physical or moral; but this is not the case in heterogeneous causes when one (the principal) is positive and physical, the other (instrumental) is privative and moral, or when one is subject to law, the other above the law
1. hence the following does not hold good because the causes are heterogeneous: the sword as an instrument killing a man is not the culpable cause of the homicide, therefore neither is the man wielding the sword; or the executioner, as the instrument of a just judge, punishes the guilty animated by revenge, therefore much more the just judge
2. here God is the positive, physical, irresponsible cause; men, however, are the privative and moral cause and obnoxious to the law

1. it holds good in proper, pure and irrational instruments which borrow whatever they are and do from the principal agent and have nothing of their own intermixed
  1. but it does not hold good in metaphorical and mixed instruments which have something of their own mixed (by which they work), and this they do not borrow from the principal cause
  2. thus sinners are not proper and pure instruments, but rational, metaphorical, and mixed (which have wickedness from themselves as the proper and adequate cause of sin)
2. the axiom holds good when the action of the principal cause is morally the same as the action of the instrument
  1. the same physical action can be just or unjust according to the diversity of agents, either of those subject to the law or of those unbound by law
  2. yet here the action of God is not morally the same as the action of the instrument, but only physically; hence the fault in the instrument is not to be attributed to the principal cause

God commanded Shimei to curse David (2 Sam. 16:10) by a command of providence not by a legal command; by a command physically directive, not morally suasive; by a judicial command of the will of good pleasure, as he is a just Judge.

in David's case, this is nothing else than the efficacious motion of God by which he inclined the evil will of Shimei to this sin for the punishment of David
thus when God is said to have sent a lying spirit to deceive Ahab (1 Ki. 22:22), it is not of him approving, but permitting and efficaciously ordaining it for the punishment of the wicked king; he did not give to that lying spirit the license to lie, but loosened the reins to it desirous and and offering its aid

The cause of a cause is also the cause of the thing caused, holds good:

in adequate cases, provided another true and proximate cause of the thing caused itself does not intervene
in causes by themselves, which produced the effect, inasmuch as they are such when they cause and when it is the cause both of the cause and the things caused by itself
in causes subordinated essentially and by necessity of nature and mutually depending on each other
but not in like manner, if it is indeed the cause by itself of the cause, but of the thing caused only accidentally (when the inferior cause produces the effect not simply from its own nature, but from some acceding defect)
1. so this does not hold good:
  1. the human will is the cause of sin
  2. God is the cause of the human will
  3. therefore God is the cause of sin
2. for when the created will sins, it turns aside and fails from the order of the first cause
3. and God who is the cause of the will per se, cannot be called the cause of the evil action, which is from the will not simply in the genus of being (as it is from God), but from the will failing as to the law in the genus of morals

God is said to blind and to harden men

not only negatively (by not enlightening and softening) and privatively (by withdrawing his grace whatever it may have been after men have abused it) and permissively (by not hindering)
but also positively by presenting external objects to them which although ordained to another direction by their own nature, yet he knows will be drawn in a different way by their vice; and judicially by smiting them internally with blindness, and by loosening the reins to their lusts and delivering them up and enslaving them to Satan
yet this does not hinder the wicked also from blinding and hardening themselves by the abuse of those things by which especially they ought to be softened (2 Cor. 2:16; Jer. 5:3)
so one hardening is culpable on the part of men who harden themselves; just and penal on the part of God who hardens them by his righteous judgment for the punishment of precious sins

Temptation may be of trial or of seduction; the former good and belonging to God, the latter evil and belonging to Satan (James 1:13; Gen 22:1; Deut. 8:2, the Lord's Prayer; 1 Cor. 10:13).

What is said in Jeremiah 20:7 is not to be so understood as if God led him into dishonesty and error.

Job 12:16 can be understood in two ways:

either in the dative ("the deceiver and the deceived are to God") to intimate that both the ignorance or deceived man and the wickedness of impostors and deceivers serve God
or it may be understood in the genitive ("the deceiver and the deceived are of God") because each is in his power, so that no one errs or leads into error unless so far forth as it pleases him to permit

In Ezekiel 20:25 it seems that God no only permits but commands sin. The more fit explanation holds that they designate the very law of God, moral as well as ceremonial. Thus it is called "not good" either because it is useless for salvation or because ungrateful and unpleasant and so it is called elsewhere a grevious and intolerable yoke (Acts 15:10), or noxious and deadly on account of the perversity of man (2 Cor. 3:6, 9).

When we say with the Scriptures that the sins of men are permitted by god and efficaciously directed to a good end, we do not mean that the sins and crimes of the wicked are good works.

The rule of Romans 3:8 does not apply here.

it is one thing to do evil, but another to permit it, or to direct it to a good end and turn it into good
it is not lawful for men, who are accountable, either to do evil, or to permit it; nor can such permission be granted in them without fault; but this cannot be said of God, who is not responsible, who has the best and wisest reasons for permitting
if at any time Scripture says that God does evil, it does not mean evil reduplicatively as evil, but inasmuch as it has the relation of judgment and is conducive and ordainable to the manifestation of his own glory

Whatever may be the action of God about sin, no reason for excuse can on that account be brought forward by the sinner: whether because he fulfills the will of God, or because that will cannot be resisted by man.

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EIGHTH QUESTION - Whether it follows and can be elicited by legitimate consequences from our doctrine that we make God the author of sin. We deny against the Romanists, Socinians, Remonstrants and Lutherans.

It is just that we drag this false accusation into the light.

The occasion of the question is this - that the sins of men, Augustine maintained that God is not a bare permitter and idle spectator, but a most holy governor and most just Judge.
The question is whether any such thing can be deduced necessarily and evidently from our doctrine, for they charge us us with really thinking what we do not dare to profess in words.

The public confessions of the Reformed churches, in express, careful and authoritative words condemn and censure this impiety (Augsburg, Art. 19; the French Confession, Art. 8; the Second Helvetic, chap. 8; the Belgic, Art. 13; the Canons of Dort, First Head, Art. 1, 5, 15; including all the catechisms, defenses, and other symbolic writings)

Concerning the public and received opinion of any church, a judgment cannot and ought not to be formed from the writings of private persons.
1. although they sometimes used harsh and not sufficiently accurate and fit phrases in explaining a difficult thing, they are not on that account to be violently attacked or abused - heresy is in things, not in words
2. no expressions are found so harsh in any of them that analogous ones do not exist in Scriptures (e.g., God blinds, hardens, seduces, sends the efficacy of error, gives men over to reprobate minds)
1. nothing is said by our party on this subject which cannot also be culled from our various opponents who speak more harshly and with stronger words
1. our divines so clearly explain their meaning and so expressly condemn this impious dogma in their writings that it cannot be charged upon them without the most gross injustice
1. if the foundation of the charge is examined, it will be evident that it is drawn from no other source than certain truncated words and phrases, twisted by sophistical consequences drawn to a sense most foreign to their intention and scope

Although God may be said from eternity not only to have foreseen and permitted, but also to have willed and predestinated the fall of man, and that all things are done not only with the permission but even with the will of God, it does not follow that God is held to be the author of sin.

God is occupied not only in permitting, but also in governing, terminating, and directing sin to a good end
it is one thing to will sin itself, but another to will its permission and event

The dispensation of God by which crimes are said to be committed is not the efficiency of crimes, but the permission; yet not idle permission, but the governing of them and directing them to certain objects and ends (2 Ki. 2:24; 1 Ki. 13:24; Exo. 9:16; Rom. 9:17).

The secret nod of God, without which men are said to effect nothing, is not the complacency of God in their sins or an impulse to sins as such. Rather it is the motion

physical
judicial (in those whose sins are punished by sins by God as a just Judge)
directive to objects and certain ends

When Calvin says that the devil and all the wicked conceive, attempt and commit no evil deed except as God has permitted, there is nothing to favor the crime charged against him (Institutes, 1.17.11).

because he says here nothing beyond what is written in Scripture
the command is understood not of moral preception, but partly of prophetical prediction, partly of secret motion and direction towards objects
coaction is not involved, but a necessity only of infallibility, depending partly objectively on the natural wickedness of the devil and the impious, partly dispositively on the immutable counsel of God
the passage is adduced in bad faith against the meaning of Calvin, for his design there is to console the pious against the fear and anxiety by which they are disturbed that they may know that the devil and the wicked are not permitted to torment them at pleasure, but are restrained by the powerful rein of providence that in all things they are subject to it, and their fury is turned even into the salvation of believers

If Calvin says that God works in the minds of the wicked and as the first cause does by them as instruments all those things which with respect to men are and are called trues sins (Institutes, 1.17.5), he ought not on that account to be accused of introducing theomartēsian.

he follows Scripture which frequently so speaks
God is said to work evils, but as evils formally and in the abstract, but in the concrete and materially or judicially
that God can use the wicked as instruments, yet without any taint of disgrace in himself, has already been shown
Calvin so explains and vindicates himself that no room for the charge can remain (Institutes, 2.4.5)

When Peter Martyr says, "God is in some way the cause of sin"; and "God in a certain measure willed the sin of Adam, and is it author, so far" (Commentary upon Romans), it must be understood in a sound sense, not that he can be called the cause properly, but improperly, to denote the adjoined antecedent, or the cause sine qua non, or to point out only the cause of action and not of the bad quality connected with it.

When Zwingli says, "Nor can anyone say, the robber is innocent; for he acted, God impelling him; for he sinned against the law. And yet you will say, he was forced to sin. I grant, I reply, that he was forced, but in this, that the one should be translated and the other crucified" (On Providence 6).

although the words may be a little too harsh if pressed closely, still they admit of a sound sense if impulsion and coaction are taken improperly for the efficacious and determinate motion not to the sinning but to the acting
hence he does not say, "the thief sinned, God being the impeller," but only "he acted"; it is one thing to act; another to sin
he does not assert properly that he was compelled, but as if by concession he says, "I grant that he was forced" (which is the expression of one granting, but not always of one approving the hypothesis)

From these it is clearly evident that the reputation of these great men is most unjustly maligned.

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NINTH QUESTION - Is there a use and an abuse of the doctrine of providence?

As they err in many ways theoretically about providence who either entirely deny it or are ignorant of it or corrupt its true nature and mode of operation, no less dangerously do they sin against it practically who are ignorant or neglect the right and lawful use of the doctrine.

A manifold sin can be committed concerning the past

by murmuring, when sinners or impatient pious rave against the providence of God and charge it with injustice (Ezek. 18:29; 33:20; Job 21:7-8; Psa. 73:2-3; Jer. 12:1)
by desperation, when they sink into despair in evils as if it was all over with them and no hope of restoration remained (Cain, Saul, Judas, and others

1. by the excusing of crimes when sinners set the providence of God over against their wickedness

A manifold sin can be committed concerning the future

by security and sloth by those who, wantonly despising the means most wisely instituted by divine providence, seek hiding places for their idleness and torpor in this most holy doctrine and, under the certainty of providentially ordained events give themselves up to carnal security, neglecting the means necessary for their conservation and salvation (as if the certainty of the end could takes away the necessity of means)
by anxiety and distrust when we are concerned unduly about the morrow's food and clothing and necessities of life

1. by a too great reliance upon second causes; for as they who entirely neglect them tempt God, no less do they also sin against him who ascribe too much to them, placing their confidence in them and clinging to them (2 Chron. 16:12)

The use of this doctrine is far more fruitful and excellent, both in asserting the glory of God and in cherishing our faith and increasing our confidence.

this is the first duty of the pious man as to intellect, that he should not only raise his eyes to God as the first and primary cause of all things (being persuaded that nothing happens by chance, but that all things are directed by the most wise providence of God) and also cherish the thought that the singular and special providence of God watches for his safety
this is taught by the clear promises of Scripture (Psa 34, 37, 55, 91; Zech. 2:8; Isa. 26:3; 49:15; Matt. 6, 10; Luke 12; 1 Pet. 5:7)

From this contemplation of God's providence, there ought to arise in the hearts of believers and honest desire

of holiness, that we may be made more cautious in our daily life because we are everywhere acting under the eye of God
of gratitude, that we may in prosperity and favorable circumstances not sacrifice to our net, but tenderly kiss and reverence with a grateful mind the benevolent providence of God (Psa. 115:1), ascribing the glory not to ourselves, but to his name
of patience and humility in adversity
of repentance, for as the blessings of God invited us to gratitude, so adversities are his scourges which call us to repentance (Lam. 3:39; Isa. 45:7; Amos 3:6; Heb. 12:9-10)

From the belief in providence arises the greatest consolation and incredible tranquility of mind for the pious.