FIFTH TOPIC

CREATION

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FIRST QUESTION - What is creation?

1. We intend now to speak of the transient and external acts of God by which he executes his decrees outside of himself. Some of these acts are carried out by a general and common operation in nature, others by a particular and proper action in the church.
1. the works of nature are so called not because God works them by nature, but because they pertain to all creatures and their natural ends
2. the works of grace refer only to men and their supernatural ends
2. The works of nature are twofold:
1. of creation, which God produced by the first creation
2. of conservation and providence, by which created things are conserved in their being and governed and directed in their operation
3. The first work of nature is creation, by which he formed out of nothing as to its whole being this entire universe and all that is in it.
4. Creation here is not taken broadly and improperly. 
1. broadly it is used in the Scriptures for any production of things whatsoever, even by generation (Psa. 51:10; 104:30; Isa 45:7; 65:17; Jer. 31:22; Rev. 21:1)
2. rather here creation is taken strictly for the production of things out of nothing, which is the proper and primary meaning of the Hebrew word arb, the Greek word kti,zein and the Latin creandi.
5. It means "the production of all things out of nothing" (ex nihilo).
1. God is said "to call those thing which are not as though they were" (Rom. 4:17) because by calling he gives being
2. he is said "to have commanded the light to shine out of darkness" (2 Cor. 4:6)
3. when all things are side to "out of nothing", the preposition ex indicates a relation to a terminus, so that no subject existing before the creation is denoted
6. Creation may be either first and immediate (which is simply ex nihilo) or secondary and mediate (which is made indeed from some matter).
7. Nothing can come from nothing:
1. not naturally through a finite and created power
2. not from a subject as the principle and intrinsically constitutive material
3. not by way of generations
4. on the contrary, all things are properly said to be from nothing supernaturally through infinite power
8. It is one thing for visible things to be made from things not appearing positively (i.e., from certain invisible things); another, however, to be made from things not appearing negatively (i.e., from no preexisting things). The apostle speaks of the latter, not the former, in Hebrews 11:3.
9. A thing is said to be the same in origin as in its destruction, not with respect to the terminus of creation, but with respect to the beginnings of generation. Hence the inference would be improper: no thing is resolved into nothing, therefore no thing was produced from nothing.
10. Although creation is sometimes called a "generation" (Gen. 2:4), this must be understood not physically but metaphysically for the origin of things.
11. Creation can be considered in two ways:
1. either actively - as a transient act of God by which he confers being upon created things
2. or passively - as it belongs to the creature passing from a state of nonexistence to existence
3. the creature being made, God always holds the relation of Creator to it, and it in turn depends upon and is related to him as the creature
12. Although creation is not formally a divine volition, still on that account there is not change made in God by it.
1. no new perfection is added to him because it is an external and transient act which if from God, but not in him
2. it is made without any motion and new determination
3. no new will enters into him, but only a new external work proceeds from his eternal will

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SECOND QUESTION - Is the ability to create communicable to any creature either principally or instrumentally? We deny.

1. This question was broached by the Scholastics and the majority of them maintain that creative power can belong to no other than God.
2. The Remonstrants and the Socinians hold that creative power is communicable; we hold that the power to create is peculiar to God alone and incommunicable to any other, .
3. 1. God claims creation for himself alone (Isa. 44:24) to the exclusion of all creatures (Isa. 45:12, 18; 40:28; Job 9:8)
4. 2. by this mark, God is distinguished from idols and the false gods of the heathen (Jer. 10:11-12; Psa 96:5; Isa. 37:16)
5. 3. creation is a work of infinite power, hence it cannot be performed by a finite being
      1. since being and nothing are immediately and contradictorily opposed, they must stand infinitely apart
      2. omnipotence is required to bring a creature forth from nothing
6. 4. every creature acts in dependence upon a subject and requires a subject on which to operate
   5. no creature can be so elevated as to be capable of a work of infinite power, this is so because it is an instantaneous act and because it has not subject upon which its labor can be exercised
7. Although creatures may concur in the working of miracles, it does not follow that they can concur equally in creating.
1. in miracles a subject is always supplied with which the instrument can be occupied, but not in creation
2. in working of miracles, men hold only a moral relation, but not a physical (Acts 3:12)
8. God created all things efficiently and principally by the personal Word, the eternal Son of God, the same in essence with the Father; who, therefore, with the Father and Holy Spirit constituted the one sole total cause of creation.
9. Although God is not able to communicate creative power to the creature, it does not follow that this argues impotency in God because it does not proceed from a defect of power, but from its perfection.
10. It requires the same power to create and recreate. Hence conversion is so often expressed under the name of creation and the exceeding great power of God is celebrated in it (Eph. 1:19-20; 3:16, 20).

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THIRD QUESTION - Was the world from eternity, or at least could it have been? We deny.

1. The question has two parts.
1. one concerns the actual eternity of the world - whether it was really from eternity
   1. this lies between us and the ancient philosophers who asserted the eternity of world as to its matter which they held to be coeternal with God
   2. the pseudo-Christians and atheists of our day agree with this
2. 2. the other concerns the possibility of an eternal world
3. The arguments against the actual eternity of the world are:
1. the voice of the Scriptures which state that "in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth" (Gen. 1:1; cf. John 1:1; Heb. 1:10; 2 Pet. 3:4)
4. 2. the various passage of Scripture which assert the production of the world (Psa. 33:6; John 1:3; Heb. 1:10; Jer. 10:11-12) and they predicate the eternal existence of God from this - that they are said to have been before the foundation of heaven and earth (Psa. 90:2; Prov. 8:22-23; Eph. 1:4; Matt. 25:34; 2 Tim. 1:9)
   3. but as they who contend for the eternity of the world do not acknowledge the Scriptures, we must consult nature herself and sound reason which demonstrate the newness of the world by many arguments
5. 1. from the subordination of causes in which a progress into infinity cannot be granted without necessarily arriving at a first cause which gave beginning to the others (cf. Topic III, Question 1, Section 6)
   2. from the newness of motion and time; for since neither motion nor time could have been from eternity it is evident that the world (which is in perpetual motion and whose duration is measured by time) could not have been from eternity and must have had a beginning
6. 3. from the newness of histories and the science and arts
7. 4. form the consent of nations and of the wise men of the world, many of whom at least have not been ignorant of the production of the world
8. As the world is not eternal so neither could it have been. The impossibility arises both on the part of God, on the part of creation and on the part of the creature.
1. on the part of God
   1. he cannot produce anything coeternal with himself (otherwise there would be two eternals)
   2. a cause should be prior to its own effect; nor can an effect be coeval with its cause
      1. a vain objection - the eternal generation of the Son, because creation differs from that generation (the latter is an internal act of God which makes the Son consubstantial with the Father; the former is an action passing out of God into the creature, producing an entirely different nature)
      2. another vain objection from the emanation of the sun's rays which are coeval with the sun - the rays emanate naturally from and are of the same nature with the sun, but creatures are produced freely by and are altogether different from God
9. 2. on the part of creation - since creation is out of nothing, it necessarily carries with it newness of being because a thing must be conceived not to have been before it could be produced
10. 3. on the part of the creature
       1. because eternity is repugnant to what has a successive and finite being and duration
       2. therefore if the creature is eternal, it ought to have existed wither in the eternity of God or in its own
          1. if the latter, then there are two eternals, two infinites, and the duration of God and of the creature would be equal
          2. if the former, the existence of creatures will be the existence of God
11. An eternal agent, which acts out of itself upon another thing, requires a coeternal object, but God is not an eternal agent in this sense because he began to act out of himself only in time.
12. It is one thing to be sufficient cause actually (actu), but another in action (in actu). God was from eternity a sufficient cause actually because he always existed and always willed to create the world; but he was not from eternity in action because he did not will to create from eternity, but only in time.
13. Although God did not create from eternity, he did not on that account change from potency to act and from leisure to work. Thus a certain change was made in the world, which passed from nonexistence to existence, but not in God who (remaining himself the same) produced by his practical volition a thing from nothing out of himself.
14. As God was never without his omnipotence, so he never was without the power to create the world.
15. The world was possible from eternity, not according to the passive power of the subject, but according to the active power of God.
16. An action (according to its totality) being posited, the effect immediately follows. But creation was not posited from eternity according to its totality.
17. Since before the beginning of time in which the world was created, there was nothing else than eternity, it cannot properly be said that God could have created the world sooner than he did. Sooner and later are marks of time which have no place in eternity.
18. What is begotten never began to be by generation, but could begin to be by creation. Matter is such: not begotten, but created.
19. When we say the world was made in time, we do not understand this accurately (as if time properly so called was before the world in which it was created). Rather this phrase is to be understood popularly as opposed to eternity and means nothing else than that the world is not eternal.
20. Although it is better for the world now to exist than not, yet it was not better for it to have existed from eternity. For we are not to determine what is better or worse by the light of our reason, but by the will of God revealed to us in his word.

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FOURTH QUESTION - In what season of the year was the world created? In the spring, or in autumn?

1. Although this question is more chronological than theological, it has its own use in sacred things.
2. All agree that the sun was created by God in some fixed and definite season, either in one of the equinoxes or in one of the solstices
3. Hence there have been diverse opinions among the learned concerning the time of the year in which the world was created. Many contend for the spring, but more for the autumn.
4. 1. the world seems to have been created at that time of the year in which the Israelites began their civil year while Egypt (Exo. 23:16; 34:22)
5. 2. it is confirmed by the time of the deluge, which is said to have commenced in the second month (Gen. 7:11 - computed from the autumnal equinox and autumn being the rainy season)
6. 3. it ought to have been created in that season of the year in which the Jewish sabbatical year and their year of Jubilee began (which was the autumnal, cf. Lev. 25:9)
7. 4. there are still vestiges of this opinion in the Jewish synagogues, based on the selection of lectionary readings
8. 5. it was fitting that the world should be created at that time of year most useful to man when trees are laden with fruit and plants heavy with seed
9. When we say the world was created in autumn, this must not be understood of every part of the globe, but it must be understood of that part of the world in which Adam was formed.
10. Although spring images a nascent world and sets forth its infancy, it is not thence well inferred that the world was created in the spring, for as the works of God are perfect, it ought to have been created in a perfect state; thus not only as nascent, but as perfect in all its parts.
11. That God commanded the earth to bring forth herbs and grass does not necessarily prove this to have been done in the spring, because fruitbearing trees also were commanded to bring forth fruit.
12. We cannot deny that many of the ancient writers referred the origin of the world to the time of spring, but if we examine the foundations upon which they built, it will be evident that this opinion commends itself rather by the multitude of authors than by the weight of reason.

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FIFTH QUESTION - Was the world created in a moment, or in six days? And, were the particular works of each of the six days created without motion and succession of time, or did God employ a whole day in the production of each thing?

1. Augustine thought that creation took place not during an interval or six days but in a single moment (The Literal Meaning of Genesis 1.15). Many writers followed Augustine in maintaining that the creation account must be taken allegorically.
2. But there are the following objections to this opinion:
1. the simple and historical Mosaic narration, which mentions six days and ascribes a particular work to each day
2. the earth is said to have been without form and void and  darkness rested upon the face of the deep (which could not have been said if all things had been created in one moment)
3. in the fourth commandment, God is said to have been engaged in creation six days, and to have rested on the seventh (this reason would have had no weight, if God had created all things in a single moment)
4. no reason can be given for the order followed by Moses in his narration, if all things were not made successively
3. When the Son of Sirach says that God created all things koinē (18:1), he does not speak of simultaneity of time, rather it must be understood of the gathering together of all creatures which were formed equally and in common by God.
4. Although God was able to create all thing in a moment, yet he willed to interpose some space in finishing his works:
1. to testify his own liberty
2. to set forth his wisdom, power and goodness more distinctly by parts
3. to excite us to the distinct contemplation of the divine works
4. to teach man by his own example that he must labor six days and rest on the seventh and be occupied with divine worship in memory of the creation
5. Although he willed to spend many days in the works of creation, it cannot be inferred from this that God employed a whole day in the works
1. the Scriptures testify that things straightaway stood forth at the command of God and that no delay of time intervened
6. 2. if resurrection takes place "in a moment", "in the twinkling of an eye" (1 Cor. 15:52), why not also creation
7. It is one thing to say that the time in which things were produced was successive: another that the production itself was successive.
8. Although its distinct work is assigned to each day, it does not follow that a whole day was employed in finishing each work; or that God needed that interval of time to perform it.
9. Since God is said to have rested from absolute creation on the seventh day, he could not be said to have rested in this sense on any day of the six.
10. Although various works are referred to the sixth day, this is not an objection against each having been finished in a moment.
11. There is no need of a great interval of time to separate the waters, because God in a moment caused the dry land to stand out of the waters.
12. When things are said to have been created in a moment, we are to understand not so much a mathematical as a physical moment (i.e., the shortest time conceivable).
13. If the immediate creation of the works of the first day was momentary, such ought to have been the mediate production of the works of each day.

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SIXTH QUESTION - In what order were the works of creation produced by God in the six days?

1. The works of creation may be considered:
1. either in general and wont to be expressed by "the world" or "the universe"
2. or in particular with regard to the production of its various parts in the six days of creation
2. In all these, God demonstrates 
1. his power in the production of all things ex nihilo by his word alone
2. his wisdom, in their variety, order and use
3. his goodness, in the communication of himself by which he made all things very good
3. The works of the first day are reckoned as three: the heaven, the earth, and light.
4. 1. by "the heavens" is indicated not only the ethereal heaven, but especially "the highest heaven" (2 Cor. 12:2) and metaphorically "Paradise" (Luke 23:43).
5. 1. under this highest heaven, we think the angels are contained
   2. they are said to have applauded God when he founded the earth (Job 38:6-7)
6. 2. by "earth" is indicated as composing both earth and water together (i.e., all matter)
7. 3. the third work of the first day was the primeval light
8. 1. this light was neither an accident without a subject nor the elements of fire
   2. however it was the fourth day on which God collected and distributed it into the body of sun and stars
9. The works of the second day were:
1. the expanse of that immense distance and most vast space reaching from the surface of the terrestrial globe even the extreme boundary of the visible heaven (the aerial heaven)
10. 2. the division of the waters above (clouds [Psa. 104:3; Job 26:8; Jer. 10:13]) from the waters below
11. 3. the waters above do not refer to a supercelestial water which the Lutherans believe
12. The works of the third day are:
1. the collection of the lower waters into certain beds and the separation of them from the land
13. 2. the germination of the earth and the production of fruit-bearing and seed-bearing plants
14. The work of the fourth day was creation of luminaries in the expanse, i.e., in that part of the expanse which we call ether or the ethereal heavens with a threefold use:
1. dividing between light and darkness
2. in marking and setting bounds to the changes and seasons of the year
3. in the communication of their powers (i.e., light, heat, motion)
15. The work of the fifth day was the production of water animals or fish from the water, of flying animals and birds from the earth.
16. On the sixth day, he gave the finishing stroke to his works by the creation of both land animals and man (a production after the image of God).

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SEVENTH QUESTION - From the use of the luminaries posited by Moses can judiciary astrology be built up? We deny against the astrologers and planetarians.

1. The astrology discussed in this question is not natural (astronomy) but judiciary (by which judgment is made from the stars concerning man).
2. The orthodox constantly reject the notion of astrology.
3. The question is not whether the heavenly bodies have a great power over elementary things by there various motions, light, and heat; rather the question is do they exercise this power equally over the minds of men so that a certain judgment can be formed as to their inclinations, actions, and future course? This we deny.
4. The question is not whether the luminaries can be called natural signs (of the seasons, cold, heat and other natural effect which spring from the different motions and positions of the stars); rather are they necessary and natural signs of future events, so that it may with certainty be known with what fate each one is born and what will happen to him? This we deny.
5. The reasons are:
1. God severely prohibits and condemns such astrology in his word (Lev. 9:31; 20:27; Isa. 44:25; Isa. 47:12-14; Jer. 10:2; 27:9)
6. 2. the Scriptures deny to man the knowledge of future things and transfer it to God alone as the criterion for distinguishing the true God from idols (Isa. 41:21-22; Dan. 2:28)
7. 3. the manners and actions of men are voluntary and free and cannot, therefore, be deduced form a natural cause such as a constellation
   4. if morals and events depend on the stars, the morals and fate of all those whose horoscope and point of nativity are similar would be the same (i.e., Esau and Jacob; or an Egyptian child and an Israelite child born at the same moment in Egypt prior to the Exodus)
8. 5. the time of the conception and birth of man is not exactly ascertainable
9. 6. if the most natural events can be foretold only probably form the stars, how much less can casual, fortuitous, voluntary and free events be known and foretold
10. 7. finally (to omit many other arguments) that juggling art cannot but be rash and impious which strives to break into the secrets of God and presumes with awful daring to define the future known to God alone
11. To be natural signs of seasons, days and years differs from to be signs prognostic of future events.
12. When "the stars" are said to "have fought against Sisera" (Jdg. 5:20), the Holy Spirit wished simply to intimate that it was a heavenly victory; one obtained not by human strength, but by the favor of God alone (to show that all things favored the Israelites for victory, and the very stars are said to have fought, as it were, for them by a poetical exaggeration).
13. The star which indicated to the wise men the birth of Christ (Matt. 2:2) cannot favor the calculation of nativities
1. the example is singular from which a general rule cannot be drawn
2. the star was extraordinary; its rise was not natural, but supernatural
3. that star was accompanied with both an internal and external revelation to declare its meaning
4. although the birth of Christ was pointed out by it, yet no one would infer from that that the point of his nativity was indicated by it or collected from it
14. It is one thing to know the approach of a storm from the appearance of the heavens, or a coming drought, or things which are natural and depend on natural causes; another, however, to know that events of future things and the free movements of the human will.
15. Although the heavens have their powers by which they act upon these lower things by their light, motion and influx, it odes not follow that they act equally upon all things, even upon the will and counsels of men.
16. It is one thing for the heavenly and sublunary bodies to affect the moods but it is another for the stars to influence the will and human actions by a motion either direct or necessary.
17. Joseph and Moses are said to have been instructed in the wisdom of the Egyptians, Daniel in that of the Chaldeans (Acts 7:22; Dan. 1:17), but they are not on that account said to have practiced those vain and impious divinations.
18. Various answers can be given to the arguments usually brought forward.
1. many of them are of slight faith and doubtful authority, recorded by foolish and superstitious writers
2. many rest upon slippery and ambiguous opinions, so that in whatever way the thing happens, they seem to have exactly described it
3. if certain of their predictions are borne out by the event, it does not follow that the knowledge was certain and built upon true foundations
4. the truth of the events is not to be attributed to that worthless art, but either
   1. to the cunning of the prophesiers, 
   2. or to the credulity of their dupes,
   3. or to the help of the Devil
   4. or to the secret and most just judgment of God, who by their mockery often chastises the foolish minds of men by sending the efficacy of error upon those who believe a lie
5. the truth of predictions does not immediately prove the art to be legitimate and approved, not that its professors should be consulted; for the Devil sometimes also predicts the future
6. since then it is plain that this art is woven together of mere delusions and impostures, we say it should be deservedly discarded and proscribed

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EIGHTH QUESTION - Was Adam the first of mortals, or did men exist before him? And is the epoch of the created world and of men's deeds to be referred much farther back than Adam? The former we affirm; the latter we deny, against the Preadamites.

1. The Preadamic fiction is so absurd in itself and foreign to all reason and Scripture as to deserve the contempt and indignation of believers.
2. The question then comes to this - was Adam the first man created by God; or were there many created before him?
1. he, with whom we here treat, pretends that Adam was the father only of the Jew and not of all men
2. that Adam was created in the beginning of the world and was the first man there are many invincible proofs
3. The first is the voice of Scripture itself, which often sets Adam before us as the first of mortals, before whom no man existed and from whom all have sprung (1 Cor. 15:45, 47)
4. Vain is the objection that Adam could be called the first of men (relative to Christ), although not the first of all, as Christ is called the second Adam and the last, although neither the second Adam nor the last.
5. The male and female, said to have been created on the sixth day (Gen. 1:27), are no other than Adam and Eve.
6. Nor is the Preadamite to be listened to when he maintains that the creation of the first chapter differs from that described in chapter 2.
7. He is deservedly reckoned to be the first man from whom sin and death passed upon all men, and yet from Adam sin and death are derived unto all (Rom. 5:12; 1 Cor. 15:22).
8. Men are called "the sons of Adam" (Psa. 49:2; 62:9).
9. If innumerable men had been created before Adam, there would have been no need of a repeated creation of men from the dust.
10. If innumerable men had existed before Adam, a new world, a new church and a new method of salvation would have to be devised for these new men, for the whole economy of human salvation pertains to the posterity of Adam, not to the race of Preadamites.
11. The garments and sheepskins which Adam and Eve wore after their sin, do not prove that there were tanners and furriers, because God is said to have made those coverings for them immediately from the skins of animals (Gen. 3:21).
12. Before Adam (it is said), no man existed to till the earth (Gen. 2:5).
13. Although it is indubitable that agriculture was the first kind of life, it is not to be supposed on this account that there were before Adam various artificers to prepare farming implements.
14. When Cain was made an exile and a wanderer from the face of God, he is said to have feared "that everyone that found him would slay him" (Gen. 4:14), but there is no need to feign Preadamites whom he feared, for there were many children of Adam, also many sons and grandsons of Abel himself.
15. Although Moses intended to give the special origin and history of his own nation and to describe the first beginnings of the church, yet he was unwilling to stop in that, but wished to set forth the origin of the world itself.
16. The expression of Eve at the birth of Seth (Gen. 4:25) does not signify that there were absolutely no other sons of Eve, but only that none existed similar in piety and virtue to Abel recently killed, whom the pious mother hoped and desired to be in some measure restored to life in Seth.
17. Although Paul says "until the law, sin was in the world" (Rom. 5:13), it does not follow that there were sinful men before Adam.

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NINTH QUESTION - Was man created in puris naturalibus, or could he have been so created? We deny against the Pelagians and Scholastics.

1. In order to better understand this question we must ascertain what is meant here by a state of pure nature or by pure naturals.
2. Natural can be taken in three ways
1. for what constituted nature and is its essential or integral part
2. for what immediately and necessarily follows the constituted nature (as its property)
3. for what is born with and agreeable to nature, adorning and perfecting it (such as is the habit born with us)
4. we treat here only of the first two
5. thus man is said to be in pure naturals (puris naturalibus) who consists of his own parts and essential properties without the gift of original righteousness and without any superadded qualities or habits (good or evil)
3. The question is not whether we can conceive of man in pure naturals by thinking of his essence and essential properties and by not thinking of his goodness or depravity, rather the question is whether man, as he came from the hand of God, was created in such a state (or could have been). This we deny.
4. We deal here with the old and new Pelagians.
1. the old Pelagians, in order to destroy original sin and establish free will, pretended that man at the beginning was created (and even everyday is born) in a state of pure nature
2. the new Pelagians agree with the old in this that they may the more easily prove original righteousness to have been a supernatural gift, superadded to nature
   1. hence they hold that a pure and fallen nature differs in no other way than a "naked" from a "despoiled"
   2. these differ only in that the one has lost what the other never had
   3. thus the pure nature has the relation of a negation, but the fallen nature of privation, and so they maintain that Adam was created in pure naturals
5. However, we maintain that man was never created in a state of pure nature so called, nor do we think he could have been so created. The reasons are:
1. because man was made in the image of God (Gen. 1:26) and thus morally good and upright (Ecc. 7:29), hence, since that image consisted principally of original righteousness, he cannot be said to have been created in a state of pure nature who was adorned with this from the beginning
2. he was made to glorify and worship God (Prov. 16:4; Rom. 11:36), duties he could not perform unless endowed with the necessary gifts (viz., wisdom and holiness)
6. 3. where two things immediately opposed belong to any subject, one or other of the two must necessarily be in it
      1. now righteousness and sin are predicated of man as their fit subject and are directly opposed to each other
      2. therefore one or the other must necessarily be in him; nor can there be a man who is not either righteous or a sinner
7. 4. that state of pure nature is a sheer figment; it never was, nor could be
      1. not in man's perfect state because he should be entire and innocent
      2. not in the state of sin because he is born a child of wrath
      3. not in the state of grace because he is born again a child of God
      4. not in the state of glory because then his holiness and happiness will be consummated
8. The state of pure nature is not so called in opposition to an impure, but in opposition to gifts and spiritual habits of righteousness and holiness (which the Romanists hold to be supernatural for the purpose of patronizing the integrity of free will).
9. God could, indeed, have not created man, but it being posited that he willed to create him, he could not have created him without a dependence upon him as creator.
10. Since the very want of original righteousness is sin, man cannot be conceived as destitute of it without being conceived as a sinner.
11. There may be a man who is not righteous or who is not a sinner; but not one who is neither righteous nor a sinner.

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TENTH QUESTION - In what consisted the image of God in which man was created?

1. We will show in what it does not consist and in what it does.
2. The Scriptures mention a fourfold image of God.
1. of the Son of God who is called "the image of the invisible God" (Col 1:15) - essential image of most perfect equity
2. of Adam who made in the image of God - the analogical image of imperfect similitude
3. of the renewed who are said to be "renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created them" (Col. 3:10) - spiritual image
4. of man who in a peculiar manner is called "the image of God" above the woman, who is "the image of man" (1 Cor. 11:7) - authority
3. Image signifies 
1. either the archetype itself (after whose copy something is made) or the things themselves in God (in the likeness of which man was made),
2. or the ectype itself, which is made after the copy of another thing, or the similitude itself (which is in man and the relation to God himself)
4. This image does not consist in a participation of the divine essence, for in this way the Son of God only is "the image of the invisible God".
5. This image does not consist in any figure of body or external bearing in which man resembles God.
6. This image consisted in gifts bestowed upon man by creation. It consists in three things most especially:
1. in his nature - antecedently as to the spirituality and immortality of the soul
2. rectitude of nature - formally in original righteousness
3. the happy state founded upon both - consequently in the dominion and immortality of the whole man
7. The first part of the image pertains to the substance of the soul and that too spiritual and incorruptible. All of these belong eminently and most perfectly to God, hence man even after sin is said to be made in the image of God (James 3:9), and killing of man is called the destruction of the image of God (Gen. 9:6).
8. To it pertains rectitude and integrity, or the gifts bestowed upon man, usually expressed by original righteousness, which was created with man and bestowed upon him at his origin, embracing wisdom in the mind, holiness in the will, and rectitude and good order in the affections.
9. Here the Socinians loudly contradict, the more easily to overthrow the truth and nature of original sin. They are not only willing to acknowledge that this righteousness belongs to the image of God, but absolutely deny that man was created in such righteousness. The Remonstrants follow this; however we think that man was created with that righteousness and the principal part of the image consists in it. We prove our position by the following arguments.
10. 1. because man was created upright and good and so originally righteous (Gen. 1:31; Ecc. 7:29)
11. 2. as is the image restored in us by grace and to be made perfect in us in glory, such ought it to have been as bestowed upon man in nature because he is renewed "after the image of the Creator" (Col. 3:10)
12. 3. God created man perfect, thus with original righteousness because this is the perfection of a rational soul
13. 4. because man was made by God to acknowledge and worship his Creator and to exercise dominion over the other creatures, but he could do neither without original righteousness
14. It is one thing to have original righteousness; another to have it immutably.
1. if he had it in the latter manner, he could neither sin nor be pressed by any temptation
2. therefore original righteousness was neither an absolute impotence of sinning, nor simply sinlessness, but the power not to sin from mutable righteousness
15. Although it may fairly be gathered form Genesis 1:26 that the image of God also consists in dominion, yet this ought not to be understood as exclusive of righteousness, but requires and presupposes righteousness.
16. Adam after his fall had the image still (as also his posterity even now have), since they are said to be made after the image of God, yet this must be understood only relatively (as to certain natural remains of that image) and not absolutely (as to spiritual and supernatural qualities which are evidently lost and must be restored to us by the grace of regeneration).
17. The righteousness of grace and glory in Christ differs from the righteousness of nature; the former is immutable and incapable of being lost, the latter is not.
18. As flesh and spirit are disparates, not contraries, so also are the inclinations and habits of both in themselves. The repugnancy now found in them arises accidentally from sin.
19. If the eyes of our first parents are said to have been "opened" after sin, so that they perceived their nakedness, it does not follow that they did not know this before (Gen. 2:25). They are said to have been opened, not as they were created by God, but as they had been obscured by the Devil.
20. Although Adam knew theoretically  what God had threatened about the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, yet he did not practically apply that threatening of God as he ought to have done, in order to resist the temptation of the devil.
21. The same righteousness which is restored by Christ was given at first to Adam.
22. The third part of the image of God consists in the dominion and immortality of man (Gen. 1:26; Gen. 9:2-3).
23. Immortality is here to be added:
1. not only of the soul itself (which still remain after sin), but of the whole subsisting substance
2. not absolute as that of the saints (which is an inability to die), but conditional (which is the power not to die if he had not sinned)

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ELEVENTH QUESTION - Was original righteousness natural or supernatural? The former we affirm, the latter we deny against the Romanists.

1. Because the Romanists use this controversy to introduce various errors concerning the state of integrity, the truth of original sin, and the condition of free will.
2. Natural is taken in four ways:
1. originally and subjectively, drawn from nature and born together with it and most deeply implanted in it
2. constitutively and consecutively, constituting the nature of the thing or following and flowing from the principles of nature
3. perfectively, agreeing with the nature and adorning and perfecting it
4. transitively, which ought to be propagated with the nature
3. Nature can be considered either as whole or as corrupt.
4. The question is: is original righteousness natural with respect to the entire state, necessary to the perfection of the entire nature and pertaining to the native gifts of entire man? Thus man is not simply physically as man, but theologically and morally as sound and entire.
5. The Romanists hold original righteousness to be a supernatural gift, superadded to the native gifts and power of the entire man. Thus the fall results in "naturals remained untouched, but the supernaturals only were lost."
6. However the orthodox think righteousness may well be called natural originally and perfectively. Thus it is so necessary to the perfection of innocent man that without it he could not have been such.
7. The reasons are:
1. because goodness and rectitude are natural to man in a state of innocence, then original righteousness was also
8. 2. whatever is transmitted to posterity must be natural; righteousness was to have been propagated to posterity if man had remained innocent
   3. original sin, which is derived from parents to their children, is natural; therefore the original righteousness opposed to it must also be natural
   4. the remains of the divine image are called natural because they are the work of the law (which Gentiles do by nature, Rom. 2:14); therefore also the whole image itself
9. 5. if original righteousness were supernatural, then there would have been natural to Adam the privation of righteousness and all that must necessarily be present in a subject, from which righteousness is absent; yet this cannot be said without ascribing the same to the author of nature who consequently must be considered the author of sin.
10. 6. the natural end of man ought to suppose natural means for obtaining it
11. The nature indeed remains mutilated and depraved (since it has lost what perfected it), but is not destroyed as to essence.
12. Although natural righteousness may be said to have been natural to Adam, it does not follow that it is the same with the righteousness of God.
13. That anyone may be called "a natural son of God," it is not sufficient that he has something natural on account of which he may be called a son of God.
14. Fall and liability to fall must be distinguished: the one is to have fall born with him; the other however to be able to fall.
15. The disorder arose which disturbed the order constituted by God.
16. Although God owed nothing to man, yet it being posited that he willed to create man after his own image, he was bound to create him righteous and holy.
17. Besides the habit infused by grace and acquired by practice, there is another connate and bestowed for the perfection of the creature.

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TWELFTH QUESTION - Did the first man before his fall possess immortality, or was he mortal in nature and condition? The former we affirm; the latter we deny against the Socinians.

1. As the Socinians deny that original righteousness was given to Adam, so they are unwilling to acknowledge his immortality and maintain that death was was the result of nature, not the wages of sin, so that man would have died even if he had never sinned.
2. The question concerns comparative and participative immortality .
1. it does not concern the immortality of the soul in the genus of being and as to the state of nature
2. it does not concern the immortality of glory
3. it does not concern a remote mortality, in which sense that is called mortal which has a remote power of death
4. Socinus states, "natural death, so far forth as it is natural and common to all, is not the wages of sin, but the proper result of our nature, which Adam himself received at his creation" (De Iesu Christo Servatore, Pt. III.8)
5. the orthodox deny that Adam, although mortal remotely by reason of his body, was mortal proximately; they think he would never have died if he had persevered in his integrity because the holiness of the soul would have preserved his body from death and corruption
3. The reasons are:
1. man was made in the image of God, which contains these two principal rays: the good and the blessed
4. 2. if Adam was righteous, he ought to have been immortal because there is a necessary connection between righteousness and life
5. 3. because Adam by his sin contracted the death threatened as the punishment of sin (Gen. 2:17; 3:19); he would have been free from this if he had not sinned
6. 4. because what is against nature cannot be a result of nature, since all things in the state of innocence were very good and agreeable to his nature
7. 5. because there were no causes of death in man before the fall: neither internal, such as sin, or external force to act against man.
8. The absolute immortality of the goal differs from the conditional of the way.
1. the former belongs to the likeness to the angels and the negation of procreation and offspring
2. this cannot be said equally of the latter because in it the human race is to be propagated
9. Although the body of Adam was in origin earthy, yet it could have been immortal through the dignity of original righteousness and the power of God's special grace.
10. The tree of life was not given to Adam to prevent death, but it was given partly to seal the immortality of man in that state, to be to him a pledge and a sacrament and partly to preserve his life always in equal vigor.
11. The psychikon ("animal" body) as opposed to the pneumatikon (or "spiritual) can be understood in two ways:
1. either in its physical being only - only a potential corruptibility existed
2. or in its physical and moral being together - actual corruptibility belonged to him
3. when Paul speaks of the animal body (psychikō, 1 Cor. 14:44, 46), he does not speak of Adam's body in his innocent state, but as it was after the fall
12. Although Christ has not freed us from being exposed to death, still he has delivered us from its penalty because it is no more the wages of sin to believers, but the passage to a better life; no more a curse, but a blessing (Rev. 14:13).
13. What is generative is also corruptible by a remote power; this axiom avails in a corrupt, not in a perfect state.

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THIRTEENTH QUESTION - Are souls created by God, or are they propagated? We affirm the former and deny the latter.

1. Although there are various opinions of theologians and philosophers about the origin of the soul, principally there are two to which the others are referred:
1. creation - the opinion of most orthodox and teaches that all souls have been  immediately created by God; thus to be produced from nothing and without preexisting material
2. propagation (traducem) - the opinion of Lutherans
2. Those who believe in propagation do not all think and speak together.
1. some hold the soul to be propagated from the semen of the parents and produced from the potency of matter
2. some hold it to be from the soul of the father by propagation, yet in a manner inscrutable and unknown to us
3. some hold that the soul of the father procreates the soul of the son from a certain spiritual and incorporeal seed
4. some (the more common opinion) hold that the soul is propagated by the soul, not by a decision and partition of the paternal soul, but in a spiritual manner, as light kindled by light
3. However, we endorse the creation of the soul: from the law of creation, from the testimony of Scripture, from reason
1. from the law of creation
   1. the origin of our souls ought to be the same as of the soul of Adam
   2. for as the soul of Adam was created out of nothing, so also are the souls of his posterity
   3. if Adam's soul and our had a different origin, they could not be said to be of the same species
4. 2. from the testimony of Scripture
      1. God is spoken of as the author and Creator of the soul in a peculiar manner distinct from the body (Ecc. 12:7) - since the body return to it origin, so also the soul
5. 2. Zechariah 12:1 - "the Lord . . . formeth the spirit of man within him"
      1. produces it immediately without the intervention of man
      2. the context connects this formation with His omnipotence
6. 3. Hebrews 12:9 - "Father of spirits" and Isaiah 57:16 ". . . the souls which I have made"
7. 3. from reason
      1. the soul is propagated by generation, either from both parents or from one only; either as to it totality or only as to a part
         1. the former cannot be said because thus two souls would coalesce into one and be mingled
         2. the latter cannot be said for if from one (either the father or the mother only) no reason can be given why it should be propagated by the one rather than the other (since both parents are equally the principle of generation)
      2. it cannot be reasonably argued that neither the whole soul nor a part of it is propagated, but a certain substance born of the soul, for then the seed of the soul is material and divisible
8. All modes of propagation are pressed by the most serious difficulties in that they overthrow the spirituality of the rational soul.
9. As to propagation by communication it must be remembered that communication made of one and the same thing and without any alienation occurs only in an infinite and not in a finite essence.
10. Since the opinion of propagation labors under inextricable difficulties, and no reason drawn form any other sources forces us to admit it, we deservedly embrace the option of creation as more consistent with Scripture and right reason.
11. God is said to have rested from all his work (Gen. 2:2), not by retiring from the administration of things, but by ceasing from the creation of new species.
1. thus he works even now (John 5:17) by administering the instituted nature and multiplying whatever was
2. now the souls he creates every day are new individuals of species already created
12. Although the soul is not propagated, the divine blessing given at first (Gen. 1:28) does not cease to exert its power in the generation of men.
13. It is not necessary in order that man may be said to generate man that he should generate all natures or essential parts of the compound.
14. Adam can be said to have begotten man after his own image, although he did not produce the soul.
15. When souls are said to have "gone out of the loins of Jacob" (Gen. 46:26), they are not understood properly, but synecdochically for the "persons" (a most  usual manner of expression with the Scriptures).
16. Although Levi was in Abraham, it does not follow that Levi was in him according to his soul.
17. The propagation of original sin ought not to cause a denial of the creation of souls and the adoption of propagation because it can be sufficiently save without this hypothesis (as will be demonstrated in its place).

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FOURTEENTH QUESTION - Is the soul immortal in virtue of its intrinsic constitution? We affirm.

1. The true origin of the soul having been proved, its immortality must also be demonstrated.
2. There have been different opinions about this question.
1. those denying who hold that the soul is entirely extinguished with the body, including those thing the soul dies with the body and afterwards raised with it (sleep of the soul)
2. those doubting - skeptics
3. those affirming - orthodox
3. Immortality may be either extrinsic or intrinsic - the question here is whether the soul is immortal intrinsically.
4. The question is whether the soul is immortal by natural constitution with no intrinsic principle of destruction.
5. We treat here of immortality in the genus of being and as to the conservation of the soul, not as to immortality in the genus of morals and as to its glory and happiness (the latter applies only to believers).
6. Scripture frequently teaches and reasons that the rational soul is immortal.
1. established most clearly in the passage where Christ argues from the federal promise given to the patriarchs, in which God testified that he is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob (Matt. 22:32; cf. Exo. 3:6) - this establishes these foundations:
   1. the covenant which God made necessarily demands the existence of those with whom the covenant was made
   2. the covenant of God is not temporal, but eternal, remaining even after death
   3. this covenant was made with the whole man and not with soul only
   4. although this passage speaks directly of the happy immortality and resurrection of believers in virtue of the covenant, it is with no less propriety extended to the immortality of nature (because the one necessarily presupposes the other)
   5. if the souls of believers are to live forever that they may enjoy the happiness promised to them, the relation of the justice of God demands that the souls of the wicked should never perish
7. 2. the same thing is proved by the passages which set forth a different exit of the body and soul
      1. Ecclesiastes 12:7 - the soul subsists after the destruction of the body
      2. Psalm 146:4
      3. Matthew 10:28
8. 3. Here belong all those passages which either promise eternal life to believers or threaten the wicked with eternal punishment; and those which treat of the last judgment, because all these would be false if death ended all things in man and nothing remained in him after death
9. 4. if the soul perishes with the body or is sunk in heavy sleep, how does Paul (with believers) after the dissolution of the earthly tabernacle expect a building and house eternal and not made with hands in heaven? (cf. 2 Cor. 5:1, 8; Phil. 1:23; Luke 16:19-31; Rev. 6:9-11; 1 Pet. 3:19)
10. Manifold reason also prove it.
1. the immortality of the soul is demanded by the providence and justice of God to render good to the good and evil to the evil, since this is not always done in the present life
11. 2. its spirituality proves it, for whatever is spiritual and free from the contagion of matter is immortal
12. 3. that its operations are spiritual is gathered certainly from their being independent of the body (whence also follows the independence of the soul itself), and if the soul can act independently of the body, ti can also subsist independently of the body, for the mode of operation follows the mode of being
13. It is one thing for the soul to depend upon the body (as upon a subject and efficient); another to depend upon it as an object and occasion.
14. Although the soul does not use a bodily organ for understanding, it does not follow that the soul can understand in every place (because it does not in every place have the aid of the senses which it must use while in the body, but only in the brain).
15. To the confirmation of the same truth, the consent of nations adds great weight.
16. It is one thing to speak of the truth of a thing; another to speak of the opinion of the carnal man who judges from appearances and external events (which fall under that senses).
17. The dead are said not to praise God (Psa. 30:9; 88:12; 115:17; Isa. 38:18), not absolutely and simply (as if they ceased to exist, for elsewhere the dead in the Lord are called "happy," Rev. 14:13), but relatively and as the church militant.
18. What has an origin can also have an end, in the manner in which it had its origin. What has a natural and material origin, also has destruction, but the soul has a supernatural origin.
19. Faith and love, once produced in the soul by grace, can never be blotted out from it.
20. There is one mode of understanding in the soul united to the body, another in the soul separated.
21. Some operations of man are organic and material, others inorganic and immaterial (or spiritual). The former depend on the body and can be performed only in the body, but the latter are performed even without the body.
22. Although for the most part, nothing is in the understanding which was not before in some sense, yet this is not true absolutely and simply, for God, who is in the intellect, was never in any sense; and the soul, which beholds itself and reflects upon itself, cannot be said to have been in any sense.
23. When men are said to be "a wind that passeth away, and cometh not again" (Psa. 78:39) this does not designate the soul, but denotes the shortness and frailty of human life which, like the wind, quickly passes (cf. Job 7:7).
24. When the dead are said to sleep (John 11:11; 1 Cor. 11:30; 1 Thess. 4:15), this is not to be understood with respect to the soul (which is received into heaven and lives with Christ), but with respect to the body (which must be recalled to life as from a sleep to an awakening).
25. Inchoate blessed differs from consummated blessedness. The passages which promise happiness after the resurrection do not thereby imply that souls sleep or are excluded from the vision of God before that time, rather they treat of the consummation of blessedness which began immediately on the death of the believer.