Turretin - Institutes of Elenctic Theology

FOURTH TOPIC

THE DECREES OF GOD IN GENERAL AND PREDESTINATION IN PARTICULAR

	Question I.	Are decrees in God, and how?
	Question II.	Are the decrees of God eternal? We affirm against Socinus.
	Question III.	Are there conditional decrees? We deny against the Socinians, Remonstrants, and Jesuits.
	Question IV.	Does the decree necessitate future things? We affirm.

THE END OF LIFE
	Question V.	Is the fixed and immovable end of the life of each man with all its circumstances so determined by the decree of God, that he cannot die in another moment of time or by another kind of death than that in which he does die? We affirm against the Socinians and Remonstrants.

PREDESTINATION
	Question VI.	Ought predestination to be publicly taught and preached? We affirm.
	Question VII.	In what sense are the words "predestination," prognōseōs, eklogēs and protheseōs used in this mystery?

THE PREDESTINATION OF ANGELS
	Question VIII.	Was there a predestination of angels, and was it of the same kind and order with the predestination of men? The former we affirm; the latter we deny.

THE OBJECT OF PREDESTINATION
	Question IX.	Whether the object of predestination was man creatable, or capable of falling; or whether as created and fallen. The former we deny; the latter we affirm.

THE CAUSE OF ELECTION
	Question X.	Is Christ the cause and foundation of election? We deny against the Arminians and Lutherans.
	Question XI.	Is election made from the foresight of faith, or works; or from grace of God alone? The former we deny; the latter we affirm.

THE CERTAINTY OF ELECTION
	Question XII.	Is the election of certain men to salvation constant and immutable? We affirm against the Remonstrants.
	Question XIII.	Can the believer be certain of his own election with a certainty not only conjectural and moral, but infallible and of faith? We affirm against the papists and Remonstrants.

REPROBATION
	Question XIV.	Is the decree of reprobation absolute, depending upon the good pleasure (eudokia) of God alone; or is sin its proper cause? We distinguish.
	Question XV.	Is infidelity, or unbelief of the gospel, presupposed as a cause of reprobation? We deny against the Remonstrants.
	Question XVI.	Is the will of God to save persevering believers and condemn the unbelieving, the whole decree of reprobation? We deny against the Remonstrants.
	Question XVII.	Can there be attributed to God any conditional will, or universal purpose of pitying the whole human race fallen in sin, of destinating Christ as Mediator to each and all, and of calling them all to a saving participation of his benefits? We deny.

THE ORDER OF THE DIVINE DECREES IN PREDESTINATION
	Question XVIII.	Is any order to be admitted in the divine decrees, and what is it?

* * * * * * * * * *

FIRST QUESTION - Are decrees in God, and how?

This the discussion of the essential internal acts of God commonly called the decrees - whether they are in God and how they are in him.

That there are decrees in God both Scripture testifies and manifold reason evinces.

from the highest perfection of God
from his omniscience
from the dependence of second causes upon the first

The decree is ascribed to God not inasmuch as it is the effect of previous deliberation and consultation, but by reason of the certain determination concerning the futurition of things.

The divine acts admit of a threefold distinction.

immanent and intrinsic acts having no respect to anything outside of God (to beget, to spirate)
extrinsic and transient acts which are not in God, but from him effectively and in creatures subjectively (to create, to govern)
immanent and intrinsic in God, but connoting a respect and relation to something outside of God (decrees)

The question is How are they in God

essentially - maintained by the orthodox
only inherently and accidentally - maintained by Socinus and Vorstius who to overthrow the simplicity of God and to prove that there is a real composition in him, maintain that they are accidents properly so called

No accident can be granted in God; therefore decrees cannot be in him inherently and accidentally. This is evident:

from his simplicity
from his infinity and perfection
from his immutability

Since decrees cannot belong to God accidentally, we must necessarily say that they are in him essentially, as immanent acts of his will with a relation and termination outside of him. Hence they take on the notion of a double cause.

efficient - because all future things are for this reason future (that God has decreed them)
exemplar - because the decree of God is the idea of all things out of himself

The ideas of all things may not improperly be said to be in the mind of God, implying a notion or exemplar cause, preexisting the things themselves in the mind of God and impressed upon them at their production.

Idea is ascribed to God and to man in different ways.

in man, the idea is first impressed and afterwards expressed in things - the things themselves are the exemplar and our knowledge is the image
in God, it is only expressed properly, not impressed because it does not come from without - the divine knowledge is the exemplar and the things themselves the image or its expressed likeness

We gather that the possibility and futurition of all things depend on God in this sense is all things not formally, but eminently.

There is not granted a similitude between God and creatures because those things which are said concerning God and concerning creatures are not said univocally, but analogically.

It argues imperfection to act after an adventitious idea - one borrowed from without; but not after an essential idea (as God does, having regard to no example out of himself, but to his own essence).

It is free in the exercised act inasmuch as it resides in the liberty of God to decree this or that thing. It is not free in the signified act because to decree anything depends upon the internal constitution of God by which he understands and wills. Therefore three things come to be carefully distinguished in the decree:

the essence of God willing and decreeing after the manner of a principle
its tendency outside himself, without however any internal addition or change
the object itself or the things decreed

What is dependent on another as on a cause properly so called is not God.

God does not act like creatures through something superadded to his nature, but through his own essence determining itself ot this or that thing as a vital principle.

As God is a being absolutely necessary, so the decree is necessary intrinsically on the part of the principle. Notwithstanding this, it is free extrinsically and terminatively.

The decrees of God are not many intrinsically and differently in God (although relating to different things extrinsically).

* * * * * * * * * *

SECOND QUESTION - Are the decrees of God eternal? We affirm against Socinus.

Socinians teach that they are not eternal, but temporal. Hence they maintain that some were made before the creation of the world, while others were temporal. We believe that all the decrees are absolutely eternal.

The reasons are:

Scripture ascribes eternally to them
1. we are said to have been chosen "before the foundation of the world" (Eph. 1:4)
2. grace is said to have been given in Christ "before the world began" (2 Tim. 1:9)
3. Christ is said to have been foreordained by God "before the foundation of the world" (1 Pet. 1:20)

1. the passage where James asserts that "known unto God are all his works from eternity (Acts 15:18)
1. if the decrees were made only in time, he would take counsel as needed just like men
1. Vorstius makes a false distinction between eternity absolute and restricted, simple and relative. But Scripture never hints at such a distinction.

Although some decrees may be said to be prior or posterior to others, this priority and posteriority is to be considered not so much in reference to the decrees as to things decreed.

That is not eternal to which something is prior in the order of time and duration; but that can be called eternal to which something is prior by a priority of order and nature.

A cause is not always prior to its effect in the order of time, not even in creatures. Indeed it often happens that effects are simultaneous with their causes: for instance as the light of the sun.

Although God changes his dispensation towards men in time, either for good or for evil, ti does not follow that the decree itself is changed or is made only in time because this very change was decreed even from eternity. Thus the following passages are understood: Jeremiah 18:10, 31:28; Deut. 38:63.

Although the decrees of God are maintained to be eternal, it does not follow that creatures are eternal. It follows only that God decreed from eternity what would take place concerning them in time.

If the decrees are deemed by some to be eternal a posteriori because they cease with the execution itself, this must be understood only with respect to the divine act.

Although the decrees can be diverse with respect to the things decreed, yet there are none opposed to each other with respect to the same objects.

The eternity of God's decrees does not take away his liberty in decreeing.

* * * * * * * * * *

THIRD QUESTION - Are there conditional decrees? We deny against the Socinians, Remonstrants and Jesuits.

The design of the Socinians and their followers on this subject is to confirm the figment of middle knowledge, to establish election from foreseen faith and to extol the strength of the human will.

The question concerns the decree absolute or conditional a priori and antecedently on the part of the decree itself.

whether the decrees are such as are suspended upon a conditional containing power and of uncertain even outside of God (we deny)
or whether they are absolute, depending upon his good pleasure alone (we affirm)

The reasons are:

every decree of God is eternal
God's decrees depend on his good pleasure (Matt. 11:26; Eph. 1:5; Rom. 9:11)
every decree of God is immutable (Isa. 46:10; Rom. 9:11)
it is repugnant to the wisdom and power of God to make such decrees as depend upon an impossible condition

1. it is absurd for the Creator to depend upon the creature
1. there is no middle knowledge having for its object future conditional things (cf. Third Topic, Question 13)
1. conditional decrees cannot be granted without supposing that he who decreed either was ignorant of the event or that the event was not in the power of the one decreeing, or that he determined nothing certainly or absolutely concerning the event
1. hence the French Synods repeatedly proscribed the conditional decrees as inefficacious acts of willing and deceitful and vain desires

It is one thing to maintain that God has not decreed to save anyone except through legitimate means; another that the decree to save these or those persons through legitimate means is conditional and of uncertain event.

It is one thing for the thing decreed to be conditional (we grant); another for the decree itself (we deny). Thus God wills salvation to have the annexed condition of faith and repentance in the execution, but faith and repentance are not the condition or cause of the act of willing in God, nor of the decree to save in the intention.

He who promises and threatens under an uncertain condition does not predict or decree what will actually happen, but only what may happen by the performance or neglect of the condition.

Although every hypothetical promise or threat ought to be referred mediately to some decree upon with it depends, it ought not to be a conditional, but an absolute decree; not indeed concerning the execution of the thing itself or its certain futurition, but only concerning it infallible connections with another. For example:

the gospel proposition - to save sinners if they believe - is founded on some decree
1. not indeed of the futurition of the thing, but of the connection by which God willed to join faith with salvation
2. so when Paul threatens "death to those who live after the flesh" (Rom. 8:13), it would be improper to infer that God had made a conditional decree concerning the death of all if the live according to the flesh, but only that God has joined together sin and death by the most strict connection
  1. thus it is true that animals would have a sense of humor if the were rational,
  2. yet no one would say from this that God conditionally decreed that animals should have a sense of humor, if they were rational
  3. it sufficient for such a proposition to be founded upon a general decree by which he willed a sense of humor to be a property of reason and that reason should always be attended by a sense of humor
3. in the same sense, I properly infer that all sinners would be saved if they would believe - not from any condition decree, but from this most certain general truth which God has sanctioned by his absolute decree (viz. that faith is the infallible means of salvation)
4. if a sinner believes he will be saved, which denotes only the certainty of consequence, but does not involve the positing of the consequent

1. the counsel which the Pharisees are said to have rejected against themselves (Luke 7:30) does not denote any conditional decree concerning saving the Pharisees under the condition of faith and repentance, but the will of command
1. in 1 Samuel 2:30 and 13:13, the promise was made to Saul on the supposition of his obedience, which was not founded upon any conditional decree concerning a thing which neither ever was, nor would be, but only upon the connection established by God between piety and life
1. the various passages of Scripture which speak of future things, this or that condition being fulfilled (e.g., Gen 20:7; 2 Sam. 17:1-3, 14, 24:13; Jer. 16:3-4, 17:24-26, 38:17-18, 42:9-10), do not favor any conditional decrees, but only denote various promises and threats
  1. they show the certainty of the connection of one with the other
  2. but they do not show futurition of the event either absolute or conditional or what God has particularly decreed concerning these or those things
  3. therefore this is the more true, that since God knows that such a condition will never take place (since he has not decreed it), he cannot be said to have decreed anything under that condition
  4. nothing can be conceived more absurd than to maintain that God decrees something under a condition which at the very moment of decreeing he knows never will take place

Although the decrees often include some condition, they do not cease to be absolute formally and in themselves because the condition and the thing conditioned depend immutably upon God, either as to permission (as to evil) or as to effecting (as to good).

So far is God from changing his decrees to suit the changes of men, that on the contrary every change of human acts proceeds from the eternal and irrevocable decree of God.

The passage in Numbers 14:30 that by Moses the Israelites should not the promised land but under the condition of obedience, but this does not argue that there was a conditional decree concerning their introduction. As the promise had been made to the nation in general, it was not necessary that it should refer to each individual in it and be fulfilled in them.

Although the relative properties of God (e.g,. mercy and justice) suppose for their exercise some quality in their objects, it does not follow that the decree is conditional. Although it is supposed in order for its formation, still it is not suspended on it.

There can be no act of will concerning future things which does not involve the notion of a decree.

* * * * * * * * * *

FOURTH QUESTION - Does the decree necessitate future things? We affirm.

The Pelagians and semi-Pelagians deny the necessity of things from the decree and foreknowledge in order to establish more easily the idol of free will.

On the state of question observe:

that a thing is said to be necessary which cannot be otherwise
1. in God there is a twofold necessity
  1. absolute - the opposite of which is simply impossible (e.g., God denying himself) and is founded on the immutable nature of God
  2. hypothetical - arising from the hypothesis of the divine decree which, being made the effect itself willed, must necessarily take place and is founded on the immutable will of God
    1. one of immutability from the immutable decree
    2. another of infallibility from his infallible foreknowledge
2. in things themselves, there occur various kinds of necessity
  1. physical and internal on the part of second causes which are so determined to one thing that they cannot act otherwise (as in fire the necessity of burning)
  2. of coaction, arising from an external principle acting violently
  3. hypothetical of the event or dependence through which a thing, although naturally mutable and contingent, cannot but be

The question concerns hypothetical and consequential necessity with respect to the certainty of the event and the futurition from the decree. (We affirm)

The reasons are:

all things were decreed of God by an eternal and unchangeable counsel; hence they cannot but take place in the appointed time
Scripture predicts that necessity (Matt. 18:7, 26:54; Luke 22:22; Acts 2:23, 4:28)
the most fortuitous and casual things are said to happen necessarily (Exo. 21:12-13; Prov. 16:33; Matt. 10:29-30; John 19:36; Acts 4:28)

1. all all things are foreseen by an infallible foreknowledge (Acts 15:18; Heb. 4:13), so they must necessarily happen
2. they are certainly predicted as future so that the word of God cannot fail, nor can the Scripture be broken.

That which maintains a determination to one thing by a physical necessity or a necessity of coaction, takes away liberty and contingency; but not that which maintains it only by a hypothetical necessity.

certainty does not arise from the nature of second causes, which are free and contingent, but extrinsically from the immutability of the decree
hence it is evident that the necessity and immutability of the decree takes away contingency with respect to the first cause
the same decree which predetermined also determined the mode of futurition, so that the thing having necessary causes should happen necessarily and those having contingent causes contingently

Although in relation to the first cause, all things are said to be necessary, yet taken according to themselves certain things can be free and contingent because each thing is and may be judged according to proximate and particular causes.

Hence we may say "Adam sinned necessarily and freely": the former with respect to the decree and the futurition of the thing; the latter with respect to his will and as to the mode. For no matter what the necessity of the decree, still Adam sinned voluntarily and consequently most freely.

Although there is a necessity of the event from the decree, nothing is detracted by it from the wisdom and justice of God.
1. this necessity being extrinsic and hypothetical in the highest manner is consistent with the liberty of creatures
2. so far there from these being mutually opposed to each other, they amicably conspire together because through these means the events determined by the decrees of God are promised and produced.

Although all things are said to be necessary from the decree, God cannot on this account be reckoned the author of sin.
1. the decree which is the cause of the futurition of sin is nevertheless neither its physical cause nor its ethical cause
2. although sin necessarily follows the decree, it cannot be said to flow from the decree

As God cannot be charged with sin, so neither can sinners on that account be excused.

such a necessity does not take away their liberty and choice in acting nor hinder them from exercising their acts most freely
therefore although they fulfill the decretive will, they are not be esteemed the less guilty because they sin against the preceptive will

* * * * * * * * * *

FIFTH QUESTION - Is the fixed and immovable end of the life of each man with all its circumstances so determined by the decree of God, that he cannot die in another moment of time or by another kind of death than that in which he does die? We affirm against the Socinians and Remonstrants.

The Socinians and Remonstrants, who establish the mutability of decrees, deny even that the term of life is so fixed and determined by the providence of God that it cannot be either protracted or shortened.

On the state of the question observe:

that the term of life may be common and general (human race) or special (individual). We treat of the second.
1. the question is not whether it is appointed unto men by the decree of God once to die, nor whether there may be granted a certain term of human life
2. rather the question concerns the special term whether a unique and immovable moment of birth and death is fixed by God for each one

1. the term of life can be said to be movable or immovable in different senses, either with respect to the first cause or with respect to second causes
  1. the question is not whether the physical germ of life is immovable (we confess that it can be contracted or protracted on account of good or bad regimen)
  2. rather the question is whether the hyperphysical term (established by the first cause and by divine ordination) is immovable
  3. the distinction of Aquinas applies here, "Fate as in second causes is movable, but as from divine foreknowledge is immovable, not by an absolute but by a conditional necessity."(Summa Theologica , I, Question 116, Art. 3, p. 568)
1. fixing the term of life is either absolute antecedently or consequently so as to exclude all use of second causes and means.
  1. the question does not concern the latter: whether each one's life and death is decreed absolutely without any respect to the necessary means so that whatever men may or may not do, what God has decreed will certainly come to pass
  2. rather the question concerns the absolute fixing antecedently, i.e., depending upon no foreseen condition
  3. thus the question comes to this: whether the term of life is so fixed and immovable that it can in no way either be prolonged or shortened (affirmed by the orthodox); or whether it is so indefinite and movable that it can be cut short by the vices of men or lengthened by the skill of physicians (affirmed by the Remonstrants and Lutherans)

The reasons are:

Job 14:5

1. Psalm 39:4-5
  1. God knew the end of man; therefore he predetermined it because he could neither know nor foretell unless he had predetermined it
  2. God has given a certain measure to the days of man, which would be untrue if he had not fixed beforehand the term of his life
  3. the brevity of life in general is not the point here, but the brevity of the days of David in particular are determined and limited by God (not conditionally, but absolutely)
1. Acts 17:26
  1. this cannot be referred only to the duration of the human race, but also to the duration of each individual
  2. afterwards there is added, "in him we live, and move, and have our being" (Acts 17:28); and "he giveth to all life, and breath, and all things" (Acts 17:25)
1. Matthew 10:28-30
1. the term of life is infallibly predicted, therefore it is immutably predetermined because no other cause of the certainty of the prediction can be given (Gen. 6:3; Deut. 31:14; 2 Sam. 12:14, 24:15; John 21:18, 12:33, 7:30, 13:1, 17:1; Luke 18:32-33; 1 Sam. 2:34; Dan. 5:25-26; 1 Kings 21:22-23)
1. the kind of death which may seem to be most casual and accidental is predetermined by the immutable decree of God; therefore much more other kinds of death (Exo. 21:13-14; 1 Kings 22:28, 34; Isa. 65:12; Acts 12:23)
1. God by a sure and predetermined order regulates the whole life, movements and ages of man from the beginning to the end, therefore he also ought to designate the last end of life (Psalms 106, 107, 144, 121; Psa. 139:16, 68:20)
1. if God did not predetermine each one's term of life, it would follow that the providence of God is concerned only with the whole and not with the particulars; that man is the controller not only of his own fortune, but also of his life and death; that God and his will and knowledge are inferior to second causes and ordains and disposes of all things as contingencies arise, changes his counsel, fixes and refixes terms, forms and bends his decrees to suit the movements of men - and thus God is not God

The days of Hezekiah were not prolonged beyond the term fixed by God, but only beyond that time in which he seemed but a step from death and as about to die actually, unless God would gracious interpose.

therefore the denunciation of death made by the prophet is one of threatening, not one of predestination; not absolute, but conditional
therefore he had decreed not that Hezekiah should die, but only to denounce the sentence of death against him
although the threatening was not to be fulfilled, still it did not cease to be most serious because through it he had determined to carry into effect the decree of preserving the king

Often in Scripture a thing is said to be such as it is regarded in the opinion and fallacious judgment of men.

The wicked dies, not in his time (Ecc. 7:17), both with respect to second causes and natural constitution, because his life might be prolonged further, which God by a just judgment will to break off, and with respect to his wish and hope, because he dies out of season, i.e., unwilling and unprepared. Hence an unprovided for and unexpected death is said to snatch him in an evil time (i.e., not his own).

When Scripture speaks of "the lengthening our" or "the cutting short" of days (Exo. 20;12; Deut. 4:40, 30:19-20; Psa. 91:16; 1 Kings 3:14; Prov. 10:27), it does not mean so much properly a lengthening or cutting short of the term fixed by God.

Although length of days is promised to the pious and brevity of days is denounced upon the wicked, still the term of life is not suspended upon the uncertain condition of man.

Although is might have been possible for this or that man to live longer, in the divided sense and apart from the decree of God, yet in the composite sense, it was necessary for him to die in that particular place, time, and manner. Although Lazarus would not have died if Christ had visited him while sick, yet it was divinely appointed that Christ should be absent that he might die.

So far is the certainty of the end of the event from taking away the necessity and the use of means that it rather supposes them. For by God's decree, such means were instituted to bring about the futurition of the thing.

Although the term of life is fixed, yet prayers for a long life are not improper but because that term is known to no one, and because prayers ought always to go upon the supposition of the divine will.

Suicides cannot on this account be excused because they do not commit this crime in order to fulfill the decree of God, but to carry out the diabolical fury with which they are smitten. Nor are they excused by God on account of the term thus fixed to their life any more than robbers are excused in killing a traveller who has fallen into their hands by the providence of God.

The doctrine concerning the fixed term of life ought to make us brave and undisturbed in all the perils which surround us, while we follow our calling, yet it should not produce in us rashness in tempting God and courting every danger unnecessarily.

Whether anyone dies once or twice (Lazarus and the daughter of Jairus) or does not die at all (Enoch) or is only changed (as the believers on the last day [1 Cor. 15:51]), yet the decree of God remains immovable.

The Sodomites and the like sinners might have prolonged their lives if they had repented; not beyond the bound fixed by God because as he had not decreed to give them repentance, so he did not will to prolong their lives.

Destruction was denounced against the Ninevites under a condition - except they would repent. But tacit and understood (and to bring it about), God employed the terrible threatenings of the prophet.

When Moses says, "The days of our years are seventy and eighty years" (Psa. 90:10), he does not speak of the special term of life assigned to each individual, but both of the general term and of the common term posited for the life of men.

We notice that frequently in the profane philosophers and poets we read of the certainty and unavoidableness of death.

* * * * * * * * * *

SIXTH QUESTION - Ought predestination to be publicly taught and preached? We affirm.

In the time of Augustine some were disturbed by his teaching on predestination, not because they saw it as false, but because they thought the preaching of it was dangerous and invidious.

Many today think that it is best for the peace of the church and the tranquility of conscience to let these questions alone.

We think that this doctrine should be neither wholly suppressed from modesty nor curiously pried into by presumption. Rather it should be taught soberly and prudently from the word of God so that two dangerous rocks may be avoided:

that of "affected ignorance" which wishes to see nothing and blinds itself purposely in thing revealed
that of "unwarranted curiosity" which busies itself to see and understand everything even in mysteries

The reasons are:

Christ and the apostles frequently taught it (Matt. 11:20, 25; 13:11; 25:34; Luke 10:20; 12:32; John 8:47; 15:16; Rom. 9; Rom. 8:29-30; Eph. 1:4-5; 2 Tim 1:9; 1 Thess. 5:9; 2 Thess. 2:13)

1. it is one of the primary gospel doctrines and foundation of faith, for it is
  1. the fountain of our gratitude to God
  2. the root of humility
  3. the foundation and most firm anchor of confidence in all temptations
  4. the fulcrum of the sweetest consolation
  5. the most powerful spur to piety and holiness
1. the importunity of the adversaries imposes upon us the necessity of handling it so that the truth may be fairly exhibited

Although wicked men often abuse this doctrine, its lawful use towards the pious ought not therefore be denied.

If some abuse this doctrine either to licentiousness or to desperation, this happens not per se from the doctrine itself, but from the vice of men who wickedly wrest it to their own destruction.

The mystery of predestination is too sublime to be comprehended by us as to the why, but this does not hinder it from being taught in Scripture as to fact and from being firmly held by us. Two things must be distinguished here:

what God has revealed in his word
what he has concealed

The fathers before Augustine spoke more sparingly concerning this mystery not because they judged it best to ignore it, but because there was no occasion presented for discussing it more largely.

While we think that predestination should be taught, we do not further suppose that human curiosity should be enlarged, but believe there is need here of great sobriety and prudence, so that we may remain within the bounds prescribed by Scripture.

it ought not to be delivered immediately and in the first instance, but gradually and slowly
it ought not to be delivered equally as to all its parts, for some ought to be more frequently inculcated (election) and others handled more sparingly (reprobation)
it ought not to be set forth so much to the people in the church as to the initiated in the school
predestination must be considered not so much a priori as a posteriori, not that we descend from causes to effects, but ascend from effects to causes
our only object should be to increase faith, not to feed curiosity; to labor for edification, not to strive for our glory

* * * * * * * * * *

SEVENTH QUESTION - In what sense are the words "predestination," prognōseōs, eklogēs and protheseōs used in this mystery?

Since the Scriptures use various words in explaining this mystery, we must premise certain things concerning them.

First, the word predestination appears here, and it must not be passed over lightly. To predestinate (proorizein) signifies to determine something concerning things before they take place and to direct them to a certain end.
1. it is understood by authors in three ways
  1. more widely for every decree of God about creatures and most especially about intelligent creatures in order to their ultimate end - often used by the fathers for providence itself
  2. more specially for the counsel of God concerning men as fallen either to be saved by grace or to be damned by justice (election and reprobation)
  3. most specially for the decree of election, which is called "the predestination of the saints" (in both ends and means)
1. it is asked whether this word is to be referred only to election or whether it embraces reprobation also, the papist affirm the former, the orthodox the latter
1. the reasons are:
  1. the Scripture extends the word to the wicked acts of those reprobates who procured the crucifixion of Christ (Luke 22:22; Acts 4:28)
1. if the objects of reprobation and election are opposite as the acts themselves, therefore, on the part of God, mutually opposed to one another; indeed, they can proceed from the same course acting most freely

The second word which occurs more frequently is prognōsis (Rom. 8:29, 11:2; 1 Pet. 1:2)

because the ancient and more modern Pelagians falsely abuse this word to establish the foresight of faith and works, we must observe that prognōsin can be taken in two ways:
1. theoretically - God's simple knowledge of future things, which is called prescience and belongs to the intellect
2. practically - the practical love and decree which God formed concerning the salvation of particular persons and pertains to the will
in this latter sense, knowledge is often put for delight and approbation (Psa. 1:6; John 10:14; 2 Tim. 2:19)
1. thus ginōskein signifies not only to know but also to know and to judge concerning a thing
2. therefore when the Scripture uses the word progneōseōs in the doctrine of predestination, it is not in the sense of the bare knowledge of God by which he foresaw the faith or works of men
  1. because by that, he foreknew those also whom he reprobated, while here it treats of the foreknowledge proper to the effect
  2. bare foreknowledge is not the cause of things, nor does it impose method or order upon them, but finds it out
  3. because nothing could be foreseen by God but what he himself had granted and which would so follow predestination as the effect, not indeed precede it as a cause

1. in that benevolence and practical foreknowledge of God we distinguish:
  1. the love and benevolence with which he pursues us
  2. the decree itself by which he determined to unfold his love to us by the communication of salvation
  3. hence it happens that prognōsis is at one time taken broader for both love and election (Rom 8:29, 11:2); at another, more strictly for love and favor which is the fountain and foundation of election (1 Pet. 1:2 - "according to the foreknowledge" = "according to the love")

Third, we must explain the word eklogēs ("election"), which does not always occur with the same meaning.

sometimes it denotes a call to some political or sacred office (1 Sam. 10:24; John 6:70)
sometimes it designates an external election and separation of a certain people to the covenant of God (Deut. 4:37)
but here it is taken properly for the election to eternal salvation
1. taken objectively for the elect themselves (Rom. 11:7)
2. or formally for the act of God electing (Rom. 9:11)
  1. considered in the antecedent decree (as it was made from eternity)
  2. or in the subsequent execution (as it takes place only in time by calling)

1. election then by the force of the word is stricter than predestination, for all can be predestinated, but all cannot be elected because he who elects does not take all, but chooses some out of many, and the election of some necessarily implies the passing by and rejection of others (Matt. 20:16; Rom. 11:7)

Fourth, prothesis is often used by Paul in the matter of election to denote that this counsel of God is not an empty and inefficacious act of willing, but the constant, determined, and immutable purpose of God (Rom. 8:28; 9:11; Eph. 1:11) - the word is of the highest efficacy

called so distinctly by Paul (Eph. 1:11)
sometimes it is applied to election (Rom. 9:11)
sometimes it is joined with calling (Rom. 8:28), for both election and calling depend and are built upon this purpose of God

Now although these words are often used promiscuously, yet they are frequently distinguished

the decree can be conceived in relation to the principle from which it arises, or to the object about which it is concerned, or to the means by which it is fulfilled
1. with regard to the principle, protheseōs or eudokias is mentioned as the first cause of that work, and refers to the end and the certainty of events
2. with regard to the object, it is called prognōsis or eklogē, which is occupied with the separation of certain persons from others unto salvation, and refers to the objects and the singleness and distinction of persons
3. with regard to the means, the word proorismou is used according to which God prepared the means necessary to the obtainment of salvation, and refers to the means and the order of means
thus election is certain and immutable by prothesin; determinate and definite by prognōsin; and ordinate by proorismon

These three degrees answer to three acts in the temporal execution: calling, justification and glorification.
1. prothesis - redeemed by the Son, called through the Holy Spirit, so the Father determined from eternity to glorify us with himself
2. prognōsis - elected us in his Son
3. proorismos - predestined us to grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit

The words by which the predestination of the members is described are employed also to express the predestination of the head.

* * * * * * * * * *

EIGHTH QUESTION - Was there a predestination of angels, and was it of the same kind and order with the predestination of men? The former we affirm; the latter we deny.

Although the Scripture speaks far more sparingly of the predestination of angels than of men, we should, however, follow it as a guide and learn that which it teaches.

The Scripture expressly testifies to a predestination of angels when it mentions elect angels (1 Tim. 5:21). They are elected by God to be distinguished from the reprobated angels (2 Pet. 2:4; Jude 6).

If understood in the more strict and proper sense, the angels cannot here be considered as pure but liable to fall, but as fallen.

because the creature's liability to fall does not make him reprobable; rather the fall itself does
no one is right adjudged to punishment because he might sin against the law, but because he is supposed to have actually sinned
all reprobation absolutely considered is an act of justice and wrath, since by it they are made vessels of wrath and fitted for destruction (Rom. 9:22)
because the predestination of men supposes sin, therefore the angelic reprobation also presupposes sin; otherwise no satisfactory reason for the diversity can be given

God did not reprobate and devote to eternal punishment those whom he would permit to fall; but those whom he had permitted to fall by their own fault.

The fall in time was not the means of executing reprobation, but it was the condition required in the object on which reprobation followed, both as to desertion in the fall and as to damnation.

Here is the first difference between the predestination of angels and men.

in the former, angels were considered by God as unequal
1. those of them who were elected were regarded as standing in the grace of God
2. the reprobate were regarded as having fallen by their own fault
3. liability to fall was indeed common to all angels, bu they could not be reprobated on account of it
in the latter, men were considered by as equal, the same corrupt mass and as sinners and fallen

Let us say something of both parts of the predestination of angels.

there is the election of the good angels, consisting of two acts:
1. preservation from falling or confirmation in good
2. destination to supernatural life and happiness
since some of them kept their first estate and were confirmed in good, it cannot be doubted that this depended upon election, since it could not arise from that nature which was common to all from the creation
as long as they stood, they stood by that strength which they had received at their creation; but when they were confirmed (not only that they should not fall, but that they should be more capable from falling) this flowed from election, which separated them from the others

Although this election cannot in truth be called gratuitous in the same way as the election of men (which depends on God's mercy alone), yet it does not cease to be gratuitous because God was not bound to it.

Theologians agree that angels cannot be said to have been elected in Christ the Redeemer because where there is no sin, there is no place for redemption.

We think the opinion of those who deny the election of angels to have been made in Christ the Mediator is truer and more in accordance with the words of Scripture.

The reasons are:

the Scripture never says so
1. it calls Christ the Mediator between God and men but never of angels (1 Tim. 2:5),
2. it expressly denies that Christ took on him the nature of angels, but the seed of Abraham (Heb. 2:16)
every mediator supposes discordant parties, but there was no disagreement between God and angels
it behooves a mediator to be connected with both parties, which cannot be said of Christ in relation to angels
Christ is the Mediator of those whose propitiation and advocate he is, but since these acts are concerned only with sinners, they cannot have place with respect to angels

Christ can rightly be called "the head of the angels" in respect to dominion and government because even the angels are under him as their Lord and King.

The mediator is no more required for confirming the creature in the grace of the Creator than he was required for creating and uniting it in the first instance of him (because there is the same reason for both). If then he cannot be said to have been a Mediator at their creation, neither can he be said to have been their Mediator at their confirmation.

The angels are said to be "unclean" and "foolish" before God (Job 4:18; 15;15), not absolutely (as if there was some culpable defect in them, for then they would not be called holy), but relatively in comparison with God's infinite perfection.

The passages where "all things" are said "to be gathered together in one in Christ, both which are in heaven, and which are on earth" (Eph. 1:10), and where "all things" are said "to be reconciled unto God by him, having made peace through his blood" (Col. 1:20) do not prove that an election of good angels was made in Christ.

they can be referred to men to signify that in Christ is gathered together and reconciled unto God the whole church (both of the Old as well as the New Testament)
although the words might be extended to the angels, it would not follow that they were elected and confirmed through Christ

Hence arises a second difference between the predestination of angels and men: men were elected in Christ (Eph. 1:4) to be saved and redeemed, but the angels cannot be said to be elected in Christ.

The election of some being supposed, the preterition of others follows.

by this he not only was unwilling to confirm them in good, but decreed to permit their sin
the fall taking place, he decreed to leave them in and condemn them on account of their sin
their reprobation is contained in two acts:
1. one negative - dereliction in the fall
2. the other affirmative - damnation to eternal punishment
they are not merely passed by, but they are also positively condemned

In preterition we can mark two acts:

the permission of the fall which, we said, precedes reprobation in the sign of reason - an act of good pleasure
desertion in the fall - an act of justice
sparing men, he spared not the devils; if the reason is asked various probabilities are urged
1. that man sinned from weakness, the devil from wickedness
2. that man was seduced by another, but the devil had no one tempting him
3. in the fall of the angels, the whole angelic race did not fall, while in man sinning the whole human race fell, therefore divine mercy provided a remedy that the whole race might not perish

Therefore as God decreed the creation of angels for the manifestation of his goodness, and the permission of their fall for the demonstration of his liberty and absolute dominion; so he constituted the dereliction in the fall for the display of his justice.

The damnation of angels is resolved into two parts:

the casting down from heaven (Luke 10:18; Rev. 12:9-10)
and the hurling into hell (2 Pet. 2:4; Rev. 20:10; Matt. 25:41)

Although in truth, this most just sentence of God against the Devil was immediately passed, yet it was not immediately executed as to all its parts.

From these things it is evident that the fallen angels are now so constituted in the penal state, that their reprobation is known by them and they know that no spark of hope is left for them.

* * * * * * * * * *

NINTH QUESTION - Whether the object of predestination was man creatable, or capable of falling; or whether as created and fallen. The former we deny; the latter we affirm.

This question is in respect to the object of predestination, about which the orthodox themselves vary.

The question is not simply "what" the object was (the human race is agreed upon) but "of what kind" it was.

The opinion of theologians can be reduced to three classes:

some ascend beyond the fall (supra lapsum) and are hence called supralapsarians - they think that the object of predestination was man either not as yet created or at least not yet fallen
others descend below the fall (infra lapsum) and hold that man not only as fallen, but also as redeemed through Christ was the object of predestination
others holding a middle ground, stop in the fall (in lapsu) and maintain that man as fallen was considered by God predestinating
we will treat the first and third, and hold the second for later

At the outset, we must take notice that whatever the disagreement of theologians may be on this subject, yet the foundation of faith remains secure on both sides and they are equally opposed to the deadly error of Pelagians and semi-Pelagians.

In concert with the Synod of Dort (Primum Caput, art. 6 and 7) we take predestination to mean God's counsel concerning the salvation of men from his mercy and their damnation from his justice (in which manner it is resolved into election and reprobation and has for its object man as fallen).

That the state of the question may be perceived better, observe

that it is not inquired whether the creation of man and the permission of the fall come under the decree of God, but the question is whether God in the sign of reason is to be considered as having thought about the salvation and destruction of men before he thought of their creation and fall

1. the question is not whether in predestination the reason of sin comes into consideration, rather whether sin holds itself antecedently to predestination as to its being foreseen, so that man was considered by God predestinating only as fallen (which we affirm)
1. the question is not whether sin holds the relation of the impulsive cause with respect to predestination, but whether it has the relation of quality or preceding condition requisite in the object
  1. these two differ widely
    1. what kind of person was predestined - marks the quality and condition of the object
    2. why or on account of what - indicates the cause
  2. the question returns to this - whether to God predestinating, man was presented not only as creatable or created (but not fallen), but also as fallen; not as to real being, but as to known and intentional being, so that although the fall was not the cause, yet it might have been the condition and quality prerequisite in the object (this we affirm)

The reasons are:

a non-entity cannot be the object of predestination
1. man creatable (or capable of falling) is simply a nonentity because by creation he was brought from non-being to being
2. the decree concerning the creation of man ought to have for its object man creatable, so the decree concerning the salvation or damnation of man ought to regard man as fallen
3. every subject is conceived to be before its adjuncts

1. either all creatable men were the object of predestination or only some of them
  1. yet neither can be said
    1. not the former - there were innumerable possible men who never were to be created and, consequently neither to be saved nor damned
    2. not the latter - if only some from all those creatable, they were not indefinitely foreknown, but definitely as about to be
  2. therefore that a discrimination may be found between those who could be presented to God predestinating or not, we must descend to the decree of creation and suppose them as really to be created and not only as creatable
1. the object of the divine predestination ought to be either one eligible through mercy or reprobatable through justice - this cannot be said of man creatable and liable to fall, but only man as created and fallen
1. if predestination regards man as creatable or apt to fall, then creation and fall were the means of predestination; but this cannot be said with propriety
  1. the Scripture never speaks of them as such, but as the antecedent conditions while it passes from predestination to calling
  2. the mean has a necessary connection with the end, but neither the creation nor the fall has any such connection either with election or with reprobation, for men might be created and fall and yet not be elected
  3. the means ought to be of the same order and dispensation; but the creation and fall belong to the natural order and dispensation of providence while salvation and damnation belong to the supernatural order of predestination
  4. if they were means, God entered into the counsel of saving and destroying man before he had decreed anything about his futurition and fall
1. this opinion is easily misrepresented, as if God reprobated men before they were reprobatable through sin, and destined the innocent to punishment before criminality was foreseen in them
  1. it would mean not that he willed to damn them because they were sinners, but that he permitted them to become sinners in order that they might be punished
  2. it would imply he determined to create that he might destroy them

It appears that they speak far more safely and truly who, in assigning the object of predestination, do not ascend beyond the fall.

the Scripture says that we are chosen out of the world, not as creatable or capable of falling only, but as fallen and in the corrupt mass (John 15:19)

1. the election of men is made in Christ (Eph. 1:4), therefore it regards man as fallen because they cannot be elected in Christ except as to be redeemed and sanctified by him; therefore they are chosen as sinners and miserable
  1. we are said to be chosen in Christ in the same way as we are said to be blessed and redeemed in him (Eph. 1:3, 7), this ought to be understood of Christ as redeemer
  2. it is confirmed by the parallel passage where grace is said to have been given us in Christ before the world began (2 Tim. 1:9), Christ as Mediator
  3. since no on can be elected to the salvation to be obtained by Christ except as lost and miserable, the object of this election must be man as fallen
1. the mass of which Paul speaks (Rom. 9:21) is the object of predestination, however is no other than a "corrupt mass"
  1. that mass is meant from which are made the vessels of mercy and the vessels of wrath (Rom. 9:21-23) - for wrath and mercy suppose sin and misery
  2. that mass is meant from which were taken Isaac and Ishmael, Jacob and Esau who are proposed examples of either gratuitous election or of just and free rejection
  3. that mass is meant lying in which men can be hated of God, as Esau
  4. that mass is meant from which Pharaoh was raised by God to manifest his power in his destruction, but no one would say that Pharaoh was raised from a pure mass
1. the manifestation of God's glory by the demonstration of his mercy in the elect and of his justice in the reprobate was the end of predestination (Rom. 9:22-23)
  1. this requires the condition of sin in the object, for neither mercy can be exercised without previous misery, nor justice without previous sin
  2. if God had predestinated man to glory before the fall, it would have been a work of immense goodness, but could not be properly called mercy
  3. if God had reprobated man free from all sin, it would have been a work of absolute and autocratic power, but not a work of justice
1. thus the end of predestination with respect to man supposes necessarily creation and fall in the object
  1. calling is of sinners, justification of the guilty, sanctification of the unholy
  2. in reprobation the means are the abandonment in sin, separation from Christ, retention of sin, blinding and hardening (which apply only to the sinner)

The creation and fall are not ordered as means by themselves subordinate to the end of predestination, but are presupposed as the condition prerequisite in the object - for unless man were created and fallen, it could not come into execution

Although predestination did not precede the decree to create man and permit his fall, it does not follow that God made man with an uncertain end.
1. the end on account of which God decreed to create man and to permit his fall was not the manifestation of his justice and mercy in their salvation and damnation from the decree of predestination
2. rather it was the communication and the spreading out of the power, wisdom, and goodness of the Creator which shone forth both in the creation of man (Psa. 8:5-6) and in his fall in different ways
  1. after sin had corrupted and disturbed this order entirely, God instituted the work of redemption for no other end than to display more magnificently and in the highest degree in another order of things, the same attributes and together with them hs mercy and justice
  2. to this end the means serve, not creation, not the fall, but the covenant of grace, the mission of the Son and the Holy Spirit, redemption, calling, etc.

The common axiom which supralapsarians like to use here is: "That which is last in execution, ought to be first in intention."
1. God's ways in nature and grace, and his economies of providence and predestination must not be confounded here
2. the axiom can have place in the same order - as what is last in execution in the order of nature or of grace, is also first in intention
3. however it does not hold good concerning disparates where a leap is made form one dispensation to another, from the natural order of providence to the supernatural order of predestination (as is the case here)
1. that subordination is so to be conceived as not to be understood subjectively and on the part of God
  1. since all things are decreed by one and most simple act, which embraces the end and means together, not so much subordination has place here as coordination
  2. by coordination, these various objects are presented together and at once to the divine mind and constitute only one decree
  3. rather that subordination is to be conceived only objectively and on our part, inasmuch as we conceive of them subordinately according to the varied relations and dependence which the things decreed mutually have to do with each other

God did not make the wicked as wicked by a physical production, instilling a bad quality into him; rather, whom he apprehended as wicked by his own fault "he made (ordained)" for "the day of evil."

Although the object of predestination is determined to be man as fallen, it does not follow that predestination is made only in time.
1. fallen man is understood as to his known and foreseen being, not as to his real being
2. the prescience of the fall and its permissive decree is no less eternal than the predestination itself

Although God is said to have raised Pharaoh up for this same purpose that he might show his power in him (Rom. 9:17), it does not follow in his reprobation that he was considered before his creation and fall.

Although the apostle speaks of the absolute power and right of God in the predestination or men by comparison of the potter(Rom. 9:21-22), it does not follow that it preceded the creation and fall of man.

Although the creation and fall come under the decree of God and so can be said to be predestinated, the word "predestination" being taken broadly for every decree of God concerning the creature; yet no less properly does predestination taken strictly begin from the fall because in this sense the decree of creation and the fall belong to providence, not to predestination.

That Calvin followed the opinion received in our churches about the object of predestination can be most clearly gathered from many passages, but most especially from his book Concerning the Eternal Predestination of God (J.K.S. Reid, 1961).

"When the subject of predestination come up, I have always taught and still teach that we should constantly begin with this, that all the reprobate who died and were condemned in Adam are rightly left in death." (p. 121)
"It is fit to treat sparingly of this question not only because it is abstruse and hidden in the more secret recesses of God's sanctuary; but because an idle curiosity is not to be encouraged; of which that too lofty speculation is at the same time the pupil and nurse. The other part, that from the condemned posterity of Adam, God chooses whom he pleases, and reprobate whom he will, as it is far better fitted for the exercise of faith, so it can be handled with the greater fruit. On this doctrine which contains in itself the corruption and guilt of human nature I more willingly insist, as it not only conduces more to piety, but is also more theological." (p. 125; cf. Institutes 3.22.1 and 7)
"If all have been taken from a corrupt mass, it is no wonder that they are subject to condemnation."(Institutes 3.23.3)

Besides these two opinions about the object of predestination, there is a third held by those who maintain that not only man as fallen and corrupted by sin, but men also redeemed by Christ (and either believing or disbelieving in him) was considered by God predestinating.

this is the opinion of the semi-Pelagians and the Arminians maintaining that Christ is the foundation of election and foreseen faith its cause
but neither Christ nor faith precede election, but are included in it as a means and effects but that very thing it will be demonstrated that man as redeemed and, as believing or unbelieving, cannot be the object of redestination

* * * * * * * * * *

TENTH QUESTION - Is Christ the cause and foundation of election? We deny against the Arminians and Lutherans.

The first controversy election refers to its cause: whether besides the mere good pleasure of God another impulsive cause out of himself can be granted, by which he was influenced to form the decree of election.

the orthodox maintain that the good pleasure alone has place and think that no other cause can either be given or rightly sought
the adversaries suppose that others also can come in order: for instance, either Christ and his merit, or the foresight of faith and works
hence a tripartite question arises concerning Christ, faith and works:
1. was election made on account of Christ in consideration of his merit;
2. or from the foresight of faith
3. or from the foresight of works

It is not asked Did Christ enter in to the decree of election? or Was there no consideration of Christ's merit in the destination of salvation. Rather the question is did Christ enter into the decree antecedently as the impulsive and meritorious cause, this we deny.

The question is:

not whether Christ was the meritorious cause and foundation of salvation decreed on the part of the thing, but of the decree of salvation on the part of God
not, was he the cause on the part of the effect willed terminatively, but was he the cause on the part of the act of willing formally
not, was he the foundation of election to be executed a posteriori, but was he the foundation of election to be decreed a priori
not, was the decree of election independent of the consequent means and among them Christ, but was it independent of an impulsive cause and antecedent conditions
the question is reduced to the terms
1. was Christ the foundation and meritorious cause, not of salvation a posteriori, but of election a priori; not on the part of the effect in man, but of the act of willing in God
2. was the decree absolute, not as to means, but as to the antecedent cause
3. this we deny

The Arminians build upon this as the primary foundation of their opinion (they could have drawn this from the papists who urge the foreseen merits of Christ to be the cause of predestination)

the Lutherans agree with the Arminians here in asserting that Christ is the meritorious cause of election
under the pretext of extolling the glory of Christ, their object is to establish universal grace and destroy God's absolute election according to good pleasure
with them some of our divines who defend universal grace agree

The reasons of the orthodox are:

election was made from God's mere good pleasure (Rom. 9:11, 16; Luke 12:32)

1. the effect of election cannot be called its cause; rather Christ is an effect of election since he was himself elected and preordained to be a Mediator (Isa. 42:1; 1 Pet. 1:20; John 3:16)
1. it is confirmed by this, that the object ought to be prior to the act about which it is occupied; but the object of Christ's merit is the elect, therefore election ought to precede both redemption and its decree
1. the intention of the end ought to precede the destination of the means; and salvation is the end, Christ the means

Although Christ is the foundation of salvation, he cannot forthwith be called the foundation of election because many more causes are required for salvation than for election.

for the means of election are made the causes of salvation
nor can election be called salvation since it places nothing as yet in the elect, but is only the principle and cause of salvation

We are said to be "elected in Christ" (Eph. 1:4), not already "existing" in him (as of the participle ontas were to be supplied).

for no one can be in Christ without first being given to him by the Father (John 17:6-7)
Christ is the primary means of election to be executed and the cause of salvation destined to us through him, not the cause of the decree by which it is decreed
many things prove that this is the meaning of Paul
1. he says that we "are elected in Christ," not "on account of him"
2. he says that we are elected in Christ that "we should be holy"; therefore we cannot be regarded as existing in Christ antecedently for then we would be holy already
3. Paul elsewhere interprets himself when he says "God hath appointed us to obtain salvation by Christ" (1 Thess. 5:9)
4. thus to be elected in Christ is nothing else than to be destined to salvation to be obtained in Christ or by him; therefore Christ is the cause of salvation, not of election
5. we are said "to be chosen to salvation through sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth" (2 Thess. 2:13); not that sanctification is the cause of election (since it is its end in this place), but because salvation is a consequence of holiness and faith

We are evidently not elected in Christ in the same manner as we are blessed in him.

2 Timothy 1:9 - it was given "in Christ" (as the foundation of redemption and salvation) because salvation was destined to be conferred by Christ; but it was not given on account of him as the cause of election itself.

The mission of Christ is the effect, not the cause of the decree.

Although we are not elected on account of Christ, yet we are not elected without and apart from him. Therefore election does not exclude but includes Christ; not as already given, but as to be given.

God could be favorably disposed to us antecedently to Christ, although he could not bless us except on account of him.

It is on thing for Christ as Logon to be the efficient cause of election; another for him as God-man and Mediator to be its objective and meritorious cause.

Romans 8:29 - since foreknowledge (which here signifies an election of persons, as we said before) is put before predestination (inasmuch as it signifies a destination to means), it is clearly intimated that they were first elected by God who were to be saved before they were given to Christ and predestinated to be conformed to his image.

What is founded upon the mercy of God effectively considered ought also to be founded upon the merit of Christ because Christ is the channel through which God's mercy passes to us; however what is founded upon God's mercy affectively considered ought not forthwith to be founded upon the merit of Christ; it is sufficient for it to involve that consequently.

Although by some orthodox theologians, the election of Christ is maintained to be prior to the election of men, they are not therefore to be considered as favoring the innovators.

because this is so understood by them as to be a priority only of order, not causality (as the Arminians hold)
and the election of Christ as Mediator should not be extended more widely than the election of men who are saved, so that he was not destined and sent for more than the elect

* * * * * * * * * *

ELEVENTH QUESTION - Is election made from the foresight of faith, or works; or from the grace of God alone? The former we deny; the latter we affirm.

This is the principle hinge of the Pelagian controversy.

On the state of the question observe:

the question is not whether the decree of election is absolute consequently and from the means, but whether it is such antecedently from the motives and preceding condition (by which God may have been influenced to choose this one rather than that one) - the latter we deny

1. the question is not whether there are any causes of that decree with God, but whether these reasons are in man outside of God - the latter we deny
1. the question is not whether faith is the condition or cause of the salvation decreed outside of God, but whether it is the condition or cause of the decree itself in God
2. hence the question returns to this - Is the mere grace and good pleasure of God so the cause of election that it is in no way suspended upon the foresight either of faith or of works, whether that is maintained to be its cause or only the prerequisite condition? - we affirm this

The papists differ from each other on this point. However, the more common opinion among both the Jesuits and many papists is undoubtedly that of those who suspend predestination to life or election upon the foresight of works and the good use of free will. Against these, we here dispute.

The Lutherans here also are split into factions. The more common opinion among them suspended election on foreseen faith.

The Arminians (who bring popery and Pelagianism in by the back door) have struck against the same rock.

the Hague subscribers say, "It is absurd to place the absolute will of God in the decree of election as the first cause, going before the remaining causes, to with, Christ, faith, and all the other" (Collatio scriptio habita Hagae Comitis [1615], p. 127)
Corvinus leaves it doubtful "whether faith ought to be called the cause, or condition" (Petri Molinaei novi anatomici [1632], p. 351)
they make a twofold decree of election
1. the first general, of saving believers
2. the second special, of saving individuals by name whom God foresaw would believe
  1. they hold it supposes the consideration and regard of faith, so that God is moved by it to elect one rather than another
  2. it is this second one of which we treat

The Reformed maintain election to be purely gratuitous and that no foresight can be granted of faith or of works and merit.

No cause, or condition, or reason existed in man, upon the consideration of which God chose this rather than another one, rather election depended upon his sole good pleasure by which, as he selected from the corrupt mass a certain number of men neither more worthy nor better than other to whom he would destine salvation, so in like manner he decreed to give them faith as the means necessary to obtain salvation.

The arguments by which we establish this are principally these:

faith and obedience are the fruit and effect of election, therefore they cannot be the cause or previous condition (Rom. 8:30; Eph. 1:4-5; John 1:12; Acts 13:48; Tit. 1:1)
1. Augustine: "We understand calling by which they become the elect, not who are elected because the believed, but are elected that they might believe. For if on that account they were elected, since they believe, they assuredly had elected him first by believing in him, so that they deserved to be elected." (On the Predestination of the Saints, NPNF 5:514-15)

1. election was made from good pleasure alone and not from any works (Rom. 9:11, 16; 11:5-6; Matt. 11:26; 2 Tim. 1:8-9)
1. if election is from foreseen faith, God must have foreseen it in us: either as an act of nature proceeding from us, or as an act of grace depending on God, or as arising conjointly from both
  1. if as an act of God, he foresaw it therefore as his own gift (thus it would follows and not precede election)
  2. if as an act of nature we therefore elected ourselves (contra 1 Cor. 4:7), and Pelagius gains the victory
  3. if as a conjoint act,
    1. either the act of God takes its form from the act of man (and so man would be the architect of his own salvation)
    2. or the act of man takes its form from the act of God (and so election will be the cause of faith, not the contrary)
  4. either we ascend with the Scriptures to God discriminating among men by his own gift or descend with Pelagius to man discriminating himself by his own free will
1. if election is from foreseen faith, God would not have elected man, but rather man would have elected God, and so predestination should be called postdestination; the first cause would be made the second, and God would depend on man (John 15:16)
1. if election is from foreseen faith, no place will be given for the objections usually urged against it, and nothing would be more easy than to answer the question, why this rather than that one was chosen

There is one reason of the love of benevolence and beneficence; another of the love of complacence and friendship.

the latter indeed goes before faith necessarily because it gives it, while the former supposes it
the former depends on the esteem of the one loving and his sole good pleasure; the latter flows from the worthiness of the thing loved
Hebrews 11:6 does not mean love in the first part but in the second - showing what kind of persons please God in time; not why he elected them from eternity

It is one thing for man to please God; another for it to please God to elect man.

Prognōsis in Romans 8:29 must not be understood speculatively for bare prescience because God can foresee nothing in man except what he himself will give, rather it must be understood practically for his gratuitous election.

it is evident, not why he predestinated this one in preference to another, but to what he predestinated and with what means
therefore prognōsis denotes the decree of the end or destination to salvation; proorismos denotes the decree of the means necessary to attainment of that end (cf. Eph. 1:5)

James 2:5 intimates to what God elected (viz. to faith), but not by what and on account of what. Thus the words "rich in faith" are not to be taken causally but finally.
It is one thing to be unwilling to suspend election upon faith and works (which we hold); another to maintain that salvation is decreed to us without any regard to obedience and faith (which is falsely charged against us). The decree of salvation is not founded on such regard, but yet the decreed salvation itself depends upon the obedience of faith which God works in us.

It is one thing that God willed to save believers; another that he decreed to save them because he foresaw that they would believe.

Although God in executing give faith before salvation, yet it cannot thence be inferred that God in electing considered faith before salvation.

Although God predestinates men to faith as a means by which they may attain salvation, it is not necessary that God equally predestinates the reprobate to unbelief and impenitence. For there are some means which God finds in us, other which he makes. Unbelief and impenitence are not placed by God, but are found in us. On the other hand, faith springs from God alone, not from us.

Although reprobation is made from the consideration of sin, it does not equally follow that election is made form the consideration of faith and good works. Reprobation is an act of justice, necessarily supposing sin. Election is an act of mercy, supposing nothing but misery.

The will to give salvation as a crown and reward to believers presupposes faith and perseverance in the man to be saved (who without them could not be saved); but not in God who saves (as if his will depended upon the foresight of such faith, when this very faith arises from that decree).

In election the better are not elected, but the equally bad that they may be made better.

Although sanctification is a mark of election a posteriori by which it both becomes known to us and is made manifest to others, it cannot, however, for this reason be considered the cause or condition of election.

* * * * * * * * * *

TWELFTH QUESTION - Is the election of certain men to salvation constant and immutable? We affirm against the Remonstrants.

It is not strange that they who suspend election upon an inconstant and mutable condition should maintain its uncertainty and mutability.

The Arminians make election twofold:

one incomplete and not decisive (of those who believe), which can be revoked and made void by the inconstancy of men who can fall from faith
the other complete and decisive (of those persevering and dying in faith), which is immutable

The orthodox deny that the Scripture makes mention either of different degrees or of different kinds of election.
1. they acknowledge one only complete and decisive
2. not indefinite, but definite of a certain number of men destinated from the same corrupt mass to obtain salvation by and on account of Christ; the number is so certain and immutable that it can never be revoked, but infallibly obtains its end at length

On the state of the question observe:
1. it does not concern the sujective certainty of election (on our part) and as to the sense which we may have of it, but it concerns the objective certainty (on the part of the thing)
2. the question is not whether the elect can fall on his part, but whether he can fall on the part of the decree by which he was elected to salvation
1. the question is not - Is election so certain as to render means no more necessary and that no matter what man may do he will be saved necessarily, but Is it certain, the means ordained by God being complied with
2. the question then returns to this - Is the decree of election so sure and immutable that the elect must necessarily and infallibly be brought to salvation at last - this we affirm

The reasons are:

there is the same reason of the decree of election as the other decrees of God (Psa. 33:11; Num. 23:19; Mal. 3:6; Jam. 1:17; Isa. 46:10; Rom. 9:11; 11:29

1. the elect cannot be seduced (Matt. 24:24) - if the seduction is impossible on account of the immutability of election, it does not follow that the exhortations of Christ to watchfulness are useless, because they are the means by which God has determined to carry out his purpose
1. there is an inseparable connection between election and glory, so that as many as have been elected will also be glorified (Rom. 8:29-30)
1. the names of the elect are written in heaven, in the book of life, which admits of no erasure (Phil. 4:3; Rev. 13:8; Heb. 12:23; Luke 10:20)

Our election can be made sure a posteriori with respect to the sense of it in our hearts (2 Pet. 1:10), but not that it ought to be confirmed a priori and with respect to God's counsel itself.

When Paul uses adokimos in 1 Corinthians 9:27 he does not mean that he could from an elect person become a reprobate; he only intimates that he might be rendered unfit to preach the gospel.

The elect can fall in the divided sense (considered in man himself), but not in the compound sense as elected (considered relatively to the immutability of the divine decree and the invincible protection of God).

The book from which Moses wishes to be blotted out (Exo. 32:32) is not the book of eternal life or predestination, but the book of providence or of the present life.

It is one thing to be really and positively blotted out of the book of life, when they are expunged who were before inscribed in it; another to be blotted out only according to expectation when it is declared that anyone is not written in it.

in the former sense, no one can be really blotted out of the book of life; but in the latter sense, hypocrites and temporary professors are said to be blotted out when the mask is torn off from them, and the event declares they never were written in it
Augustine: "How, then, can they be blotted out of that in which they were never written? This is said according to the their hope because they thought they were written in it. What doest 'they were blotted out of the book of life' mean? That it is evident to them that they were never in it, for the following verse explains it, 'and let them not be written with the righteous'" (Psalm 69 [NPNF1, 8:310)

Since the certainty of the end does not exclude the necessity of means, the doctrine of the immutability of election is falsely said to take away the utility of warnings and threatenings and to foster carnal security.

Whence appears the impiety of the reasonings of the wicked who, from the certainty of election, think their salvation to be secure no matter how they may live.

here things are divided which ought to be joined together: the end from the means (viz., salvation from faith and holiness); and things are joined together which ought to be divided (viz., vice with happiness, moral evil with physical good)
God, indeed, decrees the salvation of the elect as certain and sure, but the same God decrees it is certain only in the way of faith and holiness
it is a contradiction in the thing added to say that the elect will be saved even though impenitent because he is elected not only to salvation, but also to holiness

When they sin, believers lose their right to the kingdom as to demerit, but not equally in fact. That is, they deserve to be condemned, but yet they will be acquitted by the firm purpose of God. Before the end of life they will be recalled to repentance, the way of salvation.

The election to salvation differs from that to the apostleship: the former is irrevocable, but the latter (e.g., Judas).

One "grafting into the olive tree" is of external calling by profession, another of internal communion by saving faith. From the former, the Jews could be cut off (Rom. 11:23), but not from the latter (which is peculiar to the elect and is immutable).

* * * * * * * * * *

THIRTEENTH QUESTION - Can the believer be certain of his own election with a certainty not only conjectural and moral, but infallible and of faith? We affirm against the papists and Remonstrants.

The objective certainty of election being proved, we must speak of the subjective, which the papists and Arminians equally impugn.

The opinion of the papists is best gathered from the decree of the Council of Trent which denies "that anyone can know with the certainty of faith, not admitting anything false, that he has obtained the grace of God" (Session 6, chap. 9, and canons 13, 14, 15).

The Arminians deny that there is given any sense of election in this life and consider it praiseworthy and useful to doubt whether they will always be what they now are. One ought to doubt his election because he cannot be certain whether he will persevere even unto the end.

Hence the state of the question is gathered:

the question is not whether election is perceptible to us a priori, but whether it is perceptible a posteriori
1. by consulting our conscience and observing the fruits of election in ourselves
2. ascending from the effects to the cause
3. "whoever truly believes and repents is elected; now I believe, therefore I am elected"

1. the question does not concern an extraordinary revelation, rather whether in an ordinary and common manner
  1. the question does not concern a probable and conjectural certainty, but the certainty of faith
  2. it does not concern the certainty of another's election and salvation, but concerns the certainty of one's own salvation
1. the question does not concern the certainty of every kind
  1. we acknowledge this certainty often is shaken and fluctuates
  2. the question concerns such a certainty so that there is no believer who sometime before his death is not impressed with this persuasion for his consolation
1. the question is can the believer, while he is in the way of holiness and used the means appointed by God, have this persuasion
1. therefore the question is reduced to this: can the adult believer be certain (not as a continuous and uninterrupted act, but as to the foundation and habit that can never be lost) not only of his present, but also of his future state; we affirm

The reasons are:

believers can know that they are sons of God and believe; therefore, they can know that they are elected because adoption and faith are the infallible effects and fruits of election

1. God records the promise of perseverance to confirm our faith in the tables (not stony, but fleshy) of the heart - not with ink, but the Spirit of the living God (2 Cor. 3:3)
1. it is confirmed by the testimony and "sealing of the Holy Spirit," which not only testifies that we are the sons of God (Rom. 8:16), but also "seals us unto the day of redemption" (Eph. 4:30)
  1. 1 John 3:24
1. the practice and example of the saints (who were certain of their own election and salvation) teaches that certainty is not only possible, but necessary
  1. Abraham (Rom. 4:18, 19, 21)
  2. David (Psa. 16:8; 23:6; 31:1)
  3. Paul (Rom. 8:38-39)
1. the effects of faith demand this certainty
  1. confidence (Eph. 3:12)
  2. full assurance (Heb. 10:22)
  3. boasting (Rom. 5:2)
  4. unspeakable joy (1 Pet. 1:8; John 16:22)

The certainty of God's grace cannot be gathered from the external state, whether prosperous or adverse.

Our assurance does not consist in the affection of our disposition, but in the infallible effect of divine grace.

The "fear and trembling" recommended in the Scripture (Prov. 28:14; Phil 2:12; 1 Pet. 1:17) strike a blow only at carnal security, but do not overthrow the certainty of election and justification.

Although the sense of the divine love may for a time slumber and be suppressed in the sons of God as to the second act, yet it is never shaken off as to the first act.

No less is it to be held the certainty of divine faith which does not depend on the uncertain and doubtful principle of human reason, but on the divine and infallible testimony of the word and Spirit.

The certainty of salvation, including three things - the certainty of past election, of present grace and of future glory - can be derived from no other source than the sense of present grace.

Although in truth the certainty of present grace supposes on our part a fulfillment of the conditions prescribed to us by God (viz., of faith and repentance), it must not on that account be considered impossible.

although the compliance with such conditions is, on our part, uncertain, yet it is not so on the part of God who has promised to give to us these very conditions
although we cannot be certain of a perfect and absolute fulfillment, yet we can (with the help of the Holy Spirit) be persuaded of a fulfillment true and sincere

So far is the doctrine of certainty of grace from being the mother of security and the midwife of licentiousness, that there is no greater incentive to true piety than a vivid sense of the love of God and of his benefits.

The state of the believer is either one of wrestling or victory. Although the believer in the struggle cannot elicit an act of certainty, this does not hinder him from coming out stronger and more confirmed.

The examples of the saints who have doubted the love of God towards them prove indeed that the act of certainty is not perpetual in them, but is in different ways interrupted. But this does not prove that it is always absent from then and that they cannot in any state elicit it.

David: Psalm 22:1 and Psalm 31:22 versus Psalm 23:4 and Psalm 118:5
Paul: Romans 7:25 versus Romans 8:35

Since the actual certainty of believers cannot go out into act without the use of means, in vain would it be sought with the continued purpose of sinning and in the grievous lapses of the saints.

Therefore this saving doctrine must be proposed with great caution: for the relief of afflicted consciences, not to foster the security of the wicked; to be a remedy against despair, not a bed of carnal license. Thus this certainty should never be urged without immediately adjoining the desire after sanctification as the necessary condition of obtaining it.

Although this certainty is necessary to the consolation of the believer, still for the verity of faith itself there is not need of its explicit act every moment; nor must he be said to be without faith who is not as yet confirmed in this certainty. If he sometimes is without that sense of it, he is not immediately to reckon himself among the reprobate and to doubt concerning the divine mercy.

* * * * * * * * * *

FOURTEENTH QUESTION - Is the decree of reprobation absolute, depending upon the good pleasure (eudokia) of God alone; or is sin its proper cause? We distinguish.

Reprobation is taken here for the decree itself, sanctioned from eternity and described as eternal, unchangeable and most free purpose of God by which he decreed not to pity some certain men lying in exactly equal corruption and guilt with others, but to damn eternally those left in sin (on account of it) in order to demonstrate his glorious justice, liberty, and power.

Scripture so clearly establishes it that no one (but of blind audacity) can even doubt it.

Clearly taught in these passages: Malachi 1:2-3; Romans 9:11-13, 18, 21,22; 1 Thessalonians 5:9; 1 Peter 2:8; Jude 4; Matthew 7:23; 25:41.

For a better understanding certain distinctions must be premised.

the twofold act of reprobation must be distinguished (although on the part of God, it is performed by one simple act, yet according to our inadequate mode of conception, it is usually divided by theologians into two)
1. negative - preterition - wills to leave them in their guilt and misery
2. positive - predamnation - judgment and punishment

1. we must also accurately distinguish here the twofold relation of God in this matter, answering to the twofold act of reprobation
  1. autocrat and supreme Lord who does with his own what he wills - exerts itself in the negative act of preterition in which, as the most free dispenser of his own goods, he denies to one the grace not owed which he bestows on another (Matt. 11:25-26; 20:15; Rom. 9:11, 18)
  2. Judge who justly determines to inflict the due punishment upon the sinner - exerts itself in a positive act of predamnation by which, as a just Judge, he sentences the guilty to punishment due from the order of justice (Prov. 16:4; Matt. 25:41; Rom. 9:21-