Captive to Reason

by Vincent Cheung

Copyright © 2005 by Vincent Cheung
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Preface 

This book is a collection of short articles that mainly deal with Christian philosophy and apologetics. These articles explain and apply my thinking to particular contexts and questions, and as such, they properly supplement what I have previously written. 

And because this book is best used as a supplement, if it is possible or convenient, I encourage you to first read my previous writings on these subjects before reading the articles in this book. This will help you to better understand the following articles. 

Although I hope that you will read all of them, it is not necessary to read these articles in the order listed; rather, feel free to go directly to the articles that interest you and read them first. 

Many of these articles were written in response to written messages sent to me by readers, and I usually include an edited version of the original question to accompany each of my replies.1 I have withheld the names of the inquirers to protect their privacy. This is not a problem since the quoted statements do not contribute to the actual substance of the articles, but they provide only the contexts for me to present my answers and explanations. 

To clearly distinguish the words of the inquirers, their statements are indented and displayed using a different font. This has eliminated the need for me to always specify that a certain article was written in answer to a question, or to specify that a certain portion of text was a message from a reader, since all of this will be obvious to any reader. 

Finally, I have also included two previously published articles at the end. The topics of these articles are consistent with the overall theme of the book, and therefore I consider it appropriate to put them together with the other articles in this volume. 

1. Starting with the Answer2 

In a previous message to you, I wrote, "We know that the axiom of biblical revelation is true because God revealed it, and we know that God revealed it because the same logically undeniable axiom tells us so. This is presuppositionalism." 

As the Westminster Confession says, "The authority of the Holy Scripture, for which it ought to be believed and obeyed, depends not upon the testimony of any man or church, but wholly upon God (who is Truth itself), the author thereof; and therefore it is to be received, because it is the Word of God." 

Let me make a related point about this. 

I have written an answer to the problem of evil,3 but this answer would not be necessary if there isn't a problem of evil to start with. Evil itself is neither a question nor an objection, so it does not demand an answer, defense, or explanation from us, but a response is needed only when someone makes it into the problem of evil, that is, an objection. 

As a child before conversion, and then for some time after conversion, I had never even considered the problem of evil, although I had reflected on evil itself. It never occurred to me that evil was a problem against Christianity. Of course God could do whatever he wants, I thought, and of course he is righteous in all that he does. Up to that time, I had never considered this positively held belief as a response to any objection against Christianity; nevertheless, this is precisely one of the main biblical answers to the problem of evil. 

You see, I started with the answer, but never considered objections against it, so I never considered it as an answer to anything – to me, it was just the plain truth. But then, as I became aware that there were rebellious souls who challenge God's word,4 I turned this into an answer against the objections; nevertheless, it is the same truth, only that I now express and employ it in a way so that it functions as an answer against particular challenges. 

The Bible is true because God revealed the truth in it – as long as there is no challenge to this, there is no apologetics involved. Thus, apologetics always implies the presence of sin. If we were sinless, we would always immediately recognize God's voice and believe whatever God tells us. There would be no objections against which to defend ourselves, and there would be no false beliefs for us to attack. If there is no rebellion and unbelief, then there is no need for apologetics, although there will still be theology. When we use the biblical or presuppositional approach to apologetics, we are using what we positively affirm in our theology to interact with our opponents in a way such that revelation now functions as a defensive and offensive weapon. 

This is an essential difference between the biblical or presuppositional approach and the classical or evidential approach. 

In biblical or presuppositional apologetics, we start with the answer, so that some of what we say in apologetics depends on the nature of the challenge, since our apologetics is really an adaptation of our theology to a particular situation. 

On the other hand, the classical or evidential approach starts from a point that is very far from the answer, and then it tries to get to the answer from there. It deliberately begins from the sinner's own starting point – from one's subjective intuition, fallible sensation, or a false axiom. Since its own starting point (common with the sinner's) is not the answer, and not a word from God, it must argue even if there were no unbelief, rebellion, or objection. This cannot be heaven's way of thinking, but as Christians, we have the mind of Christ even now. 

If revelation is really the answer, and if it is only through revelation that we can truly understand and interpret anything, then it is self-defeating to put aside this necessary revelation in order to get back to revelation from some non-biblical starting point, which starting point is adopted only because of man's sinfulnes and rebellion in the first place. 

Thus to learn the biblical approach of apologetics,5 we must become familiar with the biblical system – that is, what Scripture has revealed about various subjects and their relationships with one another.6 We must also understand what things are necessary to every intellectual system, so that we may grasp and critique every opposing system as we encounter it.7 

If there is no challenge against revelation, then it continues to stand true on its logical necessity and self-attesting authority – for God cannot swear by anyone higher than himself – and this is the system of truth that we affirm. To the extent that we correctly understand Scripture, there will be no essential modifications to our understanding of this revealed system even when we get to heaven, but only increased understanding of the same revelation, as well as additions to it. 

At the same time, the biblical system also logically excludes all non-biblical systems, so that as long as our system stands true and defensible, all others are false by necessity. Then, when there is a direct challenge against it, we only need to adapt its content to decisively answer it, both to defend our faith, and to crush our opponent. 

In other words, in practicing a biblical or presuppositional approach to apologetics, we are acting as God's instruments to unleash his own revealed wisdom to vindicate himself and to defeat the enemy. Rather than using our intuition, sensation, or fallacious reasonings to testify about God, our apologetic is essentially an expression and application of God's testimony about himself, since God is his own best witness, and he can swear by no one higher.8 

2. Captive to Reason9 

Gordon Stein asked Greg Bahnsen what it would take to convince him that Christianity is false. I do not recall Bahnsen being too sharp on this issue. How would you deal with this question? 

In one sense, this question is difficult to answer. It is difficult because once I have arrived at my current position on the philosophical issues and my current approach to apologetics, any attempt to conceive of how Christianity can be refuted or how I can be convinced that Christianity is false requires a full acceptance of Christianity in the first place. Since it is true that the presuppositions of the biblical worldview are the necessary presuppositions of all thinking and all knowledge, then it is impossible for me to even conceive of how Christianity can be refuted. 

Bahnsen once said that if someone were to really dig up the bones of Jesus, then he would admit that Christianity is false. Yes, if you really find the bones of Jesus, showing that he was never raised from the dead, then we can say that. But this is almost irrelevant, since apart from the full Christian worldview, how can you have an epistemology that can learn the very words and concepts in the expression, "the bones of Jesus," and an epistemology that enables you to actually identify the bones? 

That is, even if we grant that, if we were to find the bones of Jesus, then Christianity is false, given what I have already established elsewhere, we must also grant that, if Christianity is false, then we can never identify the bones of Jesus. In fact, I have established that even given the correct presuppositions by which knowledge is possible, all scientific and empirical methods are in themselves logically fallacious, so that any conclusion derived from the use of such methods is at best an unjustified opinion, not knowledge. Therefore, Christianity can never be refuted by any scientific or empirical method, and a person's bones can never be infallibly identified no matter what. 

Thus the question is difficult only in the sense that I cannot provide the type of answer that an unbeliever would expect. But then, the unbeliever's expectation is based on his irrational epistemology, so that I am not rationally obligated to respect it. Perhaps the simplest and truest answer to the question is, "I will believe that Christianity is false if you can prove it to be false"; or, to be more precise, "I will believe that Christianity is false if you can prove that which is true to be false." 

In other words, I insist that it is logically impossible to refute Christianity, or even to begin to refute Christianity, so that to refute Christianity would be to establish a logical contradiction, which is impossible. Of course, anybody can physically say anything they want, but it does not mean that what he says will make any sense, and I am saying that no argument against Christianity can make any sense at all. 

The most I can do is to listen to an unbeliever when he tries to refute Christianity, because I cannot even imagine how I would do it myself. Again, of course unbelievers will have various ideas, and they can try various arguments, but this is because they are stupid and don't realize that their arguments are complete nonsense until someone who knows better comes along to point it out, and even then, they might still be too blind to realize their mistake. 

In my books, I show that I am aware of the relevant issues and the objections from unbelievers, and how I would answer them. I clearly explain my method of apologetics in my writings, and how this method can defend the biblical worldview and refute its opponents. So I am not coming from the standpoint of a non-rational or irrational fideism. Rather, Christianity is so rationally necessary that I cannot conceive of how to even begin to refute it without letting my own system of apologetics immediately defeat my attempt. So an unbeliever will have to take his best shot without my help. 

Some people assert that if a claim is not logically falsifiable, then neither can it be logically established, or that it is just meaningless. But this depends on what we are talking about and why it is not falsifiable. What if it is not falsifiable because it is necessarily true? If something is necessarily true, then it is not falsifiable; if something is falsifiable, then it is not necessarily true. Our rationally justified claim is that Christianity is necessarily true. 

Now, if someone claims that nothing is necessarily true, then this claim itself is not necessarily true. He must offer an argument showing that it is necessarily true that nothing is necessarily true, but if his argument is sound, then it refutes itself (which means that it is impossible to construct a sound argument for this conclusion), and if his argument is not sound, then he fails to prove his conclusion (that nothing is necessarily true). 

But why must we accept any version of the principle of falsifiability in the first place? It is just a "pretty" excuse for failing to refute Christianity. It is not my fault that unbelievers are intellectual wimps. If they can't compete, they should stay out of the ring, instead of inventing silly principles to excuse themselves. 

My answer to your question is exactly what it should be if Christianity is true and if I am a Christian. That is, my mind is anchored by the Word of God, and held captive by the truth, so that I can't see a way out and I don't want a way out. If I can see a way out or if I want a way out, then either the gospel does not have the power that it claims, or I am not really a Christian. 

If the unbeliever has the truth, then he will have to show me; he will have to make his case without my help. But how can he do it without being prevented at the very beginning by our biblical method of apologetics and by our presuppositional argumentation? 

The truth is that he is also held captive by the Logos of God, and by his innate knowledge of God's attributes and God's laws, so that his mind can only function on God's terms, even as he rebels against Christ the Reason. He is deceived into thinking that he is a "free thinker," but the only thing that he is running free from is Reason – yet he can never escape, for Reason will crush him every time, and grind his futile arguments to powder. 

3. Occasionalism and Empiricism10 

– A – 

What do you think about someone (a materialist) who says that the same concept can be located at two spatiotemporal locations? This happens because the brain is like a computer that copies another computer's program. So, when I speak, the sound waves enter your ears and your brain copies the concept that I had in my head. 

I would expect a materialist to say this – it seems to follow from their view of reality. I can directly challenge him on this point, but I can also demand justification for the logically prior premises. 

For example, I do not believe: (1) that a "concept" is physical, and (2) that brains "think." Say that I choose to first challenge the materialist on (2). If he uses science and empiricism on the way to prove it, then I will challenge science and empiricism. My own position on this topic of thinking and concepts is a version of occasionalism, so I am able to avoid all the problems that I present against the materialist. 

If the main point of your question is about communication in the materialist scheme, then I would quickly challenge empiricism. I would admit that if the materialist can communicate to another person, then there would be two physical copies of the same thought. But I deny that they can communicate, so they will need to first prove that they can communicate by an empirical epistemology – that is, even if we were to ignore for the moment whether materialism is true, whether thoughts are physical, and whether brains can think. 

As for occasionalism, I use the expression "on the occasion" more than the term "occasionalism," since many beginners read my books and they would have no idea what the term means, so I use the explanation or the meaning of the term instead of the term itself. The point is that God's providence includes complete control of everything about everything, which means that he must be the sole power controlling all communication and knowledge acquisition. 

Jonathan Edwards affirmed a form of occasionalism, and also Malebranche, as well as a number of other Christian thinkers. You could see Calvin, Luther, etc., at times saying things that sound like occasionalism. I would just say that it is a necessary implication and a consistent application of the biblical doctrine of providence. 

– B – 

Why would you deny communication for them? Is it because when you communicate, you are communicating propositions, and propositions are not material, so that the same proposition cannot be in more than one spatiotemporal location? 

That would be the logically prior reason - I do deny that propositions are material.

But I am saying the even if we ignore the logically prior issues, they still need to show that they can communicate by speaking and hearing. Whether propositions are material or not, they need to give me a logical proof showing that when one hears a proposition spoken, he actually hears what is spoken. That is, they need a proof for empiricism.

– C –

(1) Now they would probably say that your response is self-refuting, since you had to use your physical mouth to ask the question, and you assumed that my ears would hear your question. At this point you would deny this in favor of your occasionalism, right?

(2) On the other hand, I could say that within my worldview, God made our mouths to communicate and our ears to receive information, but within his worldview and by empiricism, how would he know that he is actually hearing what is spoken? At this point, he would probably reassert his conclusion that he knows this because he answered my question.

(1)

Occasionalism is my positive answer, but I don't need to use that yet.

Rather, at this point I can push the debate into a purely mental world. For example, I could suggest that we might be having the entire debate in a dream. How do we know that we are not? This is just to say that I refuse to presuppose the physical world without justification. It begs the question to say that we know we are in the physical world because we are speaking and hearing, since my point is that we might be doing all of it in a purely mental world, or in a dream. Since the materialist constantly needs the physical world in his philosophy, he cannot proceed until he provides the rational justification that I demand.

On the other hand, my basic principles, and indeed my entire worldview, is completely immune and undamaged, since in my worldview, the physical world is deduced from a non-physical principle. In fact, if not for the fact that Scripture teaches that there is a physical world, I can completely discard it and still have everything else intact. So I can deny that I am necessarily using my physical mouth when I ask or answer anything – the materialist will have to prove it to me.

So I could force everything to pass from the physical to the purely mental just by suggesting it, and this destroys everything that is physical (for the physical world has been assumed without justification up to this point). If the opponent cannot survive in a purely mental world, or if he cannot get back out once forced into a purely mental world, then he loses right then and there.

(2)

You will have to formulate an answer using Van Til's approach.

But note that just because God made the ear does not mean that its abilities and purposes are as you think. Scripture itself shows that the eyes and ears are often mistaken, and people who are supposedly seeing and hearing the same things often come to different conclusions, or disagree on what they are seeing and hearing (2 Kings 3:20–22; John 12:27–29).

So, the problems of empiricism are still as real as ever – even if you begin from biblical presuppositions, there is no way to show in any given instance whether your sensation is correct. Even given biblical presuppositions, you still cannot rescue what is inherently irrational and logically impossible. Even if it was somehow possible for one to receive knowledge through sensation before the Fall (although I affirm that empiricism is irrational and impossible even apart from sin), we must take into account the noetic effects of sin on the reliability of sensation.

With occasionalism, there is no problem. The ears at best provide the occasion upon which God (the Logos) communicates directly to my mind – on the occasion of the sensation but independent of the sensation. In addition, he is the one who controls everything about both the occasion and the communication.

It is unlikely that your opponent will think of this and bring it up – that is, to challenge you on empiricism. I mention this only as a remote possibility, but if it happens, then you must have an answer for it. And it will have to be an exegetical answer, since you claim to base the reliability or possibility of sensation on biblical principles.

– D – 

(1) How do you know you're not dreaming?

(2) It would be fallacious for my opponent to argue that since sensations are sometimes mistaken, therefore they are always mistaken. Or, it would be fallacious to say that if sometimes you cannot know whether your sensations are working properly, therefore you can never know whether they are working properly.

(1)

I might be dreaming, and it does no damage to my worldview, and all my basic principles are intact. That's the point. But I can be dreaming and still affirm that there is a physical world, not because I trust my sensations, but because the Bible reveals this to me. 

On the other hand, my sensations feel the same to me when I think I am dreaming as when I think I am not dreaming, so by my sensations I cannot reliably confirm whether or not I am dreaming. Even if my sensations are different when I think I am dreaming as when I think I am not dreaming, how do I know that I am really dreaming when I think that I am dreaming, and that I am not dreaming when I think that I am not dreaming? Perhaps I have them in reverse, so that when I feel a certain way and I think that I am dreaming, I should really think that I am not dreaming when I feel that way, and vice versa. 

But since I reject empiricism, this poses no problem to my approach. 

(2) 

Yes, but unless you can show how you know at any given instance whether or not that particular sensation is reliable, then you can't show how you could trust any given instance of sensation. 

So, even if some instances of sensation are reliable, and that in these instances, what you sense really corresponds to what is there to be sensed, unless you can show which instances of sensation are reliable and which instances are unreliable, it makes no difference – you still can't trust any of them, since you have no way of knowing when your sensations are right and when they are wrong. 

So your opponent does not need to show that you never sense what you think you sense. As long as your sensations are not infallible, and then as long as you have no nonempirical infallible standard by which to judge each instance of sensation, the effect is that no instance of sensation is reliable. 

– E – 

But could they say that since sometimes your dreams have been false (i.e. a big monster chasing you), how do you know that you're communicating truth? You'd probably say that to deny your worldview, whether in a dream or not, would result in irrationality, and that the laws of logic, necessary inferences, etc., hold in dreams as well. 

Right, I affirm what I affirm not because of what I "see," whether in the physical or the mental world (or a dream), but because of divine revelation and logical necessity. 

Actually, it would be convenient if an empiricist would ask this question about dreams. It would in fact be a challenge against him and not against me – unless he can answer this question, it would mean that we must not trust what we sense whether or not we are in a dream. It provides yet another illustration of the impossibility of gaining any knowledge by sensation. 

In any case, the real contrast is not between the dream state and the non-dream state, but between a purely mental world and a physical world. 

Also, we need to talk about what is meant by "real." If a monster chases me in a purely mental world, or in a dream, then this is what is "real" in the purely mental world or in the dream. That is, it is really true that a monster is chasing me in the dream. 

On the other hand, the question seems to imply that if something does not happen in the physical world, then it is not "real," but this begs the question. 

– F – 

I'd say that (1) God made us this way, and (2) this is how we normally operate. (3) There needs to be a proper environment so that if I were on drugs, in poor lighting, deprived of sleep, etc., then I wouldn't have a hard time saying that I was mistaken about some trivial observation, but sensations are generally reliable. 

(1) 

You need to show from Scripture that God made us "this way." "This way" cannot just mean that God made the eyes and the ears, but you must show that we can reliably derive actual knowledge through them by sensation – through some inherent function in them, and that you would know in any given instance why that instance of sensation is reliable. 

(2) 

That we normally operate a certain way does not prove that we are correct. I can just say that we are normally wrong. 

(3) 

You will have to show that Scripture says that sensation is reliable under certain conditions, and that it is unreliable under these other conditions you listed. And you can't specify these conditions if you "discovered" these conditions from sensation in the first place, since that would beg the question. 

That is, how do you know that drugs affect your sensation? You can't claim to know this by sensation if you have yet to establish the reliability of sensation. And how do you know that the lighting is poor in a room? Maybe the lighting is fine (what is fine?), but you are going blind. 

Also, even if Scripture says that sensation is reliable under certain conditions, and that it is unreliable under other conditions, you must still have a way to discover what kind of condition you are currently under. And if you use sensation to discover what condition you are under in order to determine whether your current sensation is reliable, then this begs the question. 

– G – 

(1) The knife cuts both ways and you need to show from Scripture all the things that you affirm and counter me with. 

(2) Also, I think you'd have to deny some common sense things, so that you don't know that "Vincent is a man." You may be willing to bite that bullet, I don't know. 

(1) 

Yes, I have done that in my books. 

But to say "the knife cuts both ways" is to admit that it cuts your way, and you must still show from Scripture that your view is correct. 

(2) 

I am skeptical against "common sense" altogether, and I think that "common sense" itself is incoherent. In fact, "common sense" is not common and it makes no sense. 

And if I know that "Vincent is a man," I certainly do not know this on an empirical basis12 or by common sense, but by illumination from the Logos, in accordance with my explanation on occasionalism. 

I would certainly deny that "Vincent is a man" is something that I can know by "common sense." Now, if you "know" something, you know something – only opinion can be held by degrees of certainty or rational reliability. Therefore, if I don't know something – if I am only more or less sure, and if it is not rationally undeniable – then I don't know it. 

That said, I would never say, "By common sense, I know that I am a man, and this knowledge that I've received from common sense is just as rationally certain as Scripture, God's revelation. Both common sense and Scripture give me knowledge, or tell me things that I can know; therefore, common sense is just as rationally certain as Scripture, and I believe common sense just as much as I believe Scripture." 

If Scripture gives me knowledge (not mere opinion), and common sense gives me knowledge (not mere opinion), then unless there are degrees of certainty in knowledge (so that you have sure knowledge, less sure knowledge, or even unsure knowledge, which makes no sense), then both Scripture and common sense can give me intellectual content of the same level of rational certainty – namely, knowledge – and it follows that common sense is just as reliable and certain as Scripture, and Scripture is not more reliable and certain than common sense. 

I would never say anything like this, or even imply it. I would never state or imply that what I claim I can discover apart from God's revelation is just as certain as God's revelation. I would never say that "common sense" is just as reliable as divine revelation. To make such a claim would be both irrational and irreverent.  

4. Short Answers to Several Criticisms13 

– A – 

One thing that makes me unable to understand how anyone could hold Clark's belief is that the nerves in the brain are sensory, and thus by making the decision to think specific things and change thought processes in their minds, are they not thus relying on their senses in order to even think, and thus relying on their senses to deduce with logic and attain knowledge? 

This badly begs the question. It already assumes that science is right and/or that any/all thinking occurs in the brain. Who says? 

In fact, I deny that any thinking occurs in the brain; rather, I affirm that whatever coincidentally occurs in the brain while someone thinks, thinking itself occurs only in the incorporeal mind. 

– B – 

Here's something that's problematic: one uses his senses to read the words in the Bible. If the senses allow us to recall what we already know about God, then what of other parts in the Bible? For example, David's adultery. It is hard to imagine that we already knew about this adultery via some innate knowledge. So, we can't know that David committed adultery even though it is recorded in the infallible word of God. 

This entails a very bad misunderstanding of both Gordon Clark and me. We never said that all knowledge is innate, only that all knowledge must come from God apart from sensation, but some knowledge comes from God on the occasion of sensation (but still apart from sensation). 

As for the claim that we must use the senses to read the Bible, I have already answered this in several places. 

And note even if it is true that we need the senses to read the Bible (although I have refuted this), this observation alone does not prove empiricism, so that unless Tom can prove empiricism, we would just end up with skepticism, which means that no one can read the Bible. 

But whereas Tom cannot read the Bible before proving empiricism, I can, and precisely because I reject empiricism. 

– C – 

I don't see how he can deny that we can know anything through sense perception. Surely, we can even know certain things about God through sense perception (Romans 1). 

I have already dealt with Romans 1 in several places my books, showing that it does not entail empiricism.14 

And if Tom thinks that we can argue from sensation to God, then he should write out the proof so that we can consider it. 

– D – 

I'd be interested in seeing if a third man argument would work against this, since it is one of the most devastating argument against Plato's theory of knowledge (recollection), which seems to be, with some modifications, similar to Cheung's. 

If we must compare, I am closer to Augustine, and the Logos doctrine of various Church Fathers, not Plato. 

But I am in fact just applying the necessary implications of the biblical doctrines of divine sovereignty, providence, etc. 

Or is God sovereign over all things, except sensations? 

– E – 

Your critiques are only against one view of sense perception. I don't have the view that facts bear their own meaning. I would tend more towards Quine's "web" program. But nonetheless, you use your senses to obtain knowledge. Tell me, how would you know how many ants were in your backyard? Did you know this previously? 

Note that he never tells us exactly how any knowledge can come from sensation. He just keeps on saying that it must be so. But none of the things that he says necessarily entails that any knowledge can come from sensation. 

He accuses me of following Plato (which I deny) – but is he now following Quine (which he admits)? 

He should give an account of how he can support sensation from Scripture, keeping in mind that to show that somebody saw something does not support sensation. I never deny that we see (that is, the act occurs), but that knowledge does not come from what we see; rather, God must work. 

And who says we know how many ants are in our backyard? Does he know? 

As for knowing "previously," this is again the misunderstanding that we say that all knowledge is innate, which we never taught. 

– F – 

But since, in some cases, our senses are required to obtain knowledge (e.g., how many ants are in my back yard), then I would say that in those cases senses are a necessary feature of gaining knowledge. 

How true! If the senses are necessary, then the senses are necessary. 

But are the senses necessary? And necessary for what? What exactly do they do? How? 

Now if knowledge can be rationally derived from sensation, then it could be written out as a propositional argument or a syllogism. I want him to write out the syllogism so that we can examine its validity. 

– G – 

Sorry, brother, but you just proved too much! If God conveys all things, then he conveys "John's" belief that a heretic is correct, and also "Tim's" belief that he is not correct! God is not the author of confusion. I think this is devastating to what you just argued. 

So are heretics autonomous? As I repeatedly point out, such inconsistent Calvinism results in dualism – two opposing powers of good and evil, instead of one God who reigns supreme. 

As for the denial that God is the "author of confusion," I have addressed this in my article, "The Author of Confusion." 

– H – 

Furthermore, the observations are not dependent on the molecules! The molecules are the same, regardless. It is the way man's brain interprets the collection of molecules that results in hallucination. 

This does not directly attack my position, but it betrays the person's fallacious thinking. 

It begs the question. He is leaning on science again, and he assumes premises that, if empiricism is false, could never be established. 

What are molecules anyway? Do we know that there are such things? Really, we know that? We are sure? How? 

He should first prove empiricism and science before using these premises, since empiricism and science are precisely the things being questioned. 

As for the comment on "the way man's brain interprets the collection of molecules," how does he know that? Does the brain "think" at all? Does it interpret anything at all? 

– I – 

Lastly, if God is in control of everything, and conveys everything to people, then, what about this: John "sees" a bee on a rose, but "Tim" doesn't see it. John believes that his observation was true. Tim believes the converse. So, God conveyed A and not-A? 

Of course. So what? 

There is only a problem if we say that God affirms both A and not-A. 

But note what Tom is thinking. His question implies that God does not really control everything. In fact, if we take his words seriously, he is saying that God is not even "in control" of everything. 

So our problem is not really first about sensation or empiricism, but that Tom does not even affirm the Christian God and His sovereignty, or to speak charitably, he is at least being very inconsistent here. 

Tom speaks as if false information occurs autonomously! But how? By spontaneous generation? By autonomous sensation? By free will? 

If Tom cannot believe that God controls false information, then how can he believe that God is even now directly sustaining Satan himself? Or as Luther affirms, that God even now controls (not only sustains) Satan?15 

– J – 

Now, of course God can tell you how many ants are in your backyard, but is this the normal operation of how things work? Indeed, I'm very interested in exploring this concept and the view that there is no new revelation. 

I do not say that there is "new revelation." I am saying that God's control over all knowledge and all mental acts is the normal operation of things. It is a matter of ordinary providence.  

It is as if Tom is saying that if God controls anything today, then that must be a miracle. And if he controls knowledge, then there must be new revelation (in the same sense as biblical revelation). Is Tom a deist? 

Just as I believe that the death of a sparrow is still controlled by God, without calling that a miracle (since a miracle is special providence, but the death of a sparrow is ordinary providence), I merely include knowledge in the category of ordinary providence, as anyone must who affirms the biblical doctrine. 

But Tom wants to protect sensation and autonomous evil and spontaneous errors, and therefore his position becomes inconsistent. 

– K – 

The whole faculty of man, which God created with eyes and ears in order to learn and know things about his environment, does use his senses to acquire knowledge. But this cannot be separated from his rationality – seeing a tree and coming to a conclusion also involves a chain of reasoning. 

Just because God created something does not mean that it is for the purposes and functions that Tom thinks. Tom's statement begs the question. He says that God created eyes and ears "to learn," but this is precisely the point we are arguing about. Asserting it again does not make it true. 

Then, Tom admits that seeing a tree and coming to a conclusion involves a chain of reasoning. Good! This gets closer to my point: Is the chain of reasoning logically valid? Write it out as a syllogism and let us examine it. 

– L – 

You missed my point about John and Tim. I said that God told one a lie and the other a truth. Does God lie? 

This involves a foolish misunderstanding and a strange confusion. Telling is different from facilitating or controlling. I am talking about metaphysics, and he is talking about (it seems) an interpersonal relationship. Yes, God causes people to believe lies as he wishes (and as Scripture teaches), but that is different from him telling a lie as if he claims that it is the truth. 

– M – 

I would still need that verse refuted for as it stands: the Lord of Glory has told us that "when you see the fig tree you know that summer is near." 

Right, then when you see a mirage of water, you know that there must be water. Errors and hallucinations never happen. This is nonsense. 

It is fallacious to infer from this verse a simplistic "I see, therefore I know" epistemology. Otherwise, it would be impossible to make a mistake, so that when I see water, I know that there is water, and that it must not be a mirage. 

Also, as I have pointed out in Presuppositional Confrontations while refuting Ronald Nash, when the Bible acknowledges that someone saw something, it is not the same as affirming sensation as a means to knowledge. 

For example, if the apostle John writes, "Peter saw the resurrected Christ," I can accept John's statement about what Peter saw without accepting sensation itself as a way to knowledge. The object of my belief is John's divinely inspired statement, not Peter's fallible sensation. In fact, Peter's sensations could be wrong in all instances but this one, and I know that he is right this time only because John infallibly (by divine inspiration) says so. 

In other words, when I think that I am looking at a red car, it is possible that I am indeed looking at a red car, but it is also possible that I am dreaming, or looking at the blue sky. The problem is, how do I know in this instance whether I am indeed looking at a red car? 

Now, if God infallibly affirms that I am indeed looking at a red car, then I know that in this instance what I think I see indeed corresponds to physical reality. But from this, it would be fallacious to infer, "Therefore, sensation yields knowledge." No, it is God's infallible affirmation (that I am looking at a red car) that gives me the knowledge (that I am looking at a red car), and not my act of looking at the red car. That is, the sensation provides the occasion for God's infallible affirmation – it does not provide knowledge itself. 

This is the kind of invalid inference that Tom has made with the statement from Jesus. That is, from an infallible but narrow and particular statement about something related to seeing, Tom incorrectly infers that seeing itself is a reliable way to obtain knowledge. 

Does Tom want to prove that sensations are infallible? His own philosophy denies this. But then how can the verse that he quotes allow for errors in sensation, if Jesus is approving sensation itself instead of making an infallible but narrow and particular judgment about something related to sensation? 

I affirm the words of Jesus in the verse, not the sensation of the Pharisees (of seeing the fig tree). On the other hand, on the basis of this verse, Tom directly affirms the sensations of the Pharisees, infers a general support for empiricism, and then applies it to all of humanity. This is indeed a spectacular display of fallacious reasoning. 

Moreover, how then can he claim that sensations are fallible? On what basis and by what standard does he affirm or reject any instance of sensation, or any inference from sensation? I know that "when you see the fig tree, you know that summer is near" is true only because Jesus said so. The Pharisees could have been wrong about every other instance of sensation. If we are going to be logical and rational, then let's be strictly logical and rational. An inference is valid only if you can write it out as a syllogism and show that the conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. Tom fails to do this in his defense of sensation as a way of knowing. 

5. The Atheistic Argument from Existence16 

The claim being made is that the theist, in asserting the existence of God, automatically (presuppositionally) demonstrates that he accepts the priority of existence. 

Followers of Van Til often state as their presupposition the existence of God, or the "Ontological Trinity." In contrast, I do not say that my first principle is the existence of God, but that it is the entire divine verbal revelation, which we often just call "the Bible." 

Bahnsen has explained that, when he says that his starting point is the existence of God, or the "Ontological Trinity," he means the same thing as saying that his starting point is the whole Bible. However, I am uncertain that this claim is commonly known by followers of Van Til, but it does not appear to be consistently conscious in their thinking and consistently practiced by them. 

In any case, it is better to always say that our first principle is the Bible instead of the existence of God; that is, it is better to altogether avoid implying that our first principle is the existence of God alone. I mention this just to note that the difference in language between the supporters of Clark and the supporters of Van Til on this point is deliberate, and most likely reflects a real difference in thinking. 

The point is that to begin from the whole Bible instead of just "the existence of God" avoids a whole host of problems and difficulties. For example, even if you begin with the existence of God, you still don't have all the other necessary things (propositions) in your biblical worldview, including things that are necessary to assert the existence of God in the first place, such as theories of epistemology, linguistics, and so forth. Unless you start with a complete worldview, and then proceed by deduction, the worldview will always fail. 

For the same reason, even if the atheists can start with "existence," so what?17 What else do they have, including the things that they need to assert this first proposition? 

Let me include something here that I wrote to another person, and then get back to this main topic. Someone asked me how to respond if the non-Christian claims to use "logic" as his first principle. The following is part of my reply: 

I do agree that logic, or let's just say "the law of non-contradiction" to be more specific, is indeed self-justifying in a sense – that is, in a proximate and subsidiary sense, and not an ultimate sense. 

Let me explain. 

The law of non-contradiction is self-justifying at least in the sense that it is undeniable; that is, you must affirm it to even deny it. Because of this, your opponent considers it appropriate to make the law of noncontradiction his starting point, or at least one of his axioms. 

But the law of non-contradiction cannot be a standalone first principle in one's worldview. 

This is because the law itself carries information at all, so that from it, one cannot derive any knowledge by deduction. He must find some way to supply information for the law to process. 

Since the law of non-contradiction is already his first principle, and precisely because of this, knowledge by strict deduction is no longer an option, unless he has some other first axioms, in which case you will have to examine them. 

For example, if his other ultimate axioms involve intuition, then you can attack intuition as a foundation of knowledge. Also, his ultimate axioms must also be self-justifying, consistent with one another, and sufficient to provide an entire worldview.18 

But if he the law of non-contradiction alone as his first principle, and if he does not have other axioms from intuition, etc., then he must supply the content for this first principle to process by induction, and this means that he must affirm some version of empiricism. He might also appeal to science or the "scientific method." 

Here is where the differences between Van Til and me necessarily produce a difference in approach. At this point, I would challenge the opponent to rationally justify induction, empiricism, and science. Of course, he is going to say a lot of things, but since induction, empiricism, science cannot be rationally justified, my opponent can no longer proceed. I don't have to listen to anything else that my opponent has to say unless he gets pass this point, but he will never get pass this point. 

Briefly, Van Til accepted induction, empiricism, and science, but he taught that they are unintelligible without the right presuppositions. I disagree because induction, empiricism, and science are irrational in themselves, and even the right presuppositions cannot rescue that which is inherently wrong. For example, even if I make Scripture my starting point, this does not make "1 + 1 = 99" true. 

You can attack your opponent's appeal to the law of non-contradiction as his first principle from another angle – you can point out that any proposition implies a whole host of philosophical – it implies an entire worldview. 

For example, your opponent says, "Logic (or the law of noncontradiction) is axiomatic; it is self-justifying." But that he can say this demands that he has a theory on epistemology (logic, truth, knowledge, etc.), metaphysics (he must have a theory about the nature of reality to explain the fact that he is speaking, etc.), linguistics (he is using language), and a number of other things. 

This means that he can never rest after claiming "logic" as his axiom, since if you demand it, he must also present his view on every related subject that makes his assertion of this axiom possible in the first place. 

Moreover, his view on each of these areas must be rationally defensible (you should attack him on each), and coherent (e.g. his view on linguistics must not contradict his epistemology). 

No non-Christian can satisfy these requirements. So, if you press him on it, he will never be able to get away with just saying, "Logic is my axiom." 

To summarize, to the claim that logic is axiomatic and self-justifying, you can respond with at least (1) "But logic contains no information. You still need a defensible epistemology to supply it with information, but then, is your epistemology defensible?"; and (2) "But just to say this demands that you already have an entire true and coherent worldview, including theories on epistemology, metaphysics, linguistics, mind, and so forth. So, explain and defend all these areas of your worldview." 

If he fails to satisfy (1) and (2), then that logic is self-evident is irrelevant. It does not help him at all. 

This is different for the Christian. The whole Bible is his first principle from which he deduces all the necessary information for his worldview. Logic is already an integral part of Scripture from the start, but it is not a standalone axiom. 

Without further explanation, I hope that you grasp how the above would equally apply to using "existence" as one's starting point. In short, one needs much more than just the idea of "existence" in his worldview in order to even just assert "existence." 

The only defensible noetic structure is deduction from a self-justifying first principle, and the only way this is possible is if your first principle contains all the necessary information in your worldview. Neither "God exists" nor existence itself can satisfy this. 

If you do not start with the whole divine revelation, your starting point will not have all the information you need to allow you to start at all. Then, you will have to depend on induction, intuition, empiricism, etc., to supply your first principle with information. But then, how did you know your first principle in the first place? If it is by these methods, then how is it first? Also, if these methods themselves fail, then even if you can have your narrow first principle, you are still as good as having nothing at all. 

To repeat, in terms of the structure of a defensible biblical philosophy (we are not talking about what is metaphysically prior within the biblical worldview), God is on the same level with everything else at the top (which is the whole of revelation). Whether it is God, "existence," language, epistemology, etc., they all start at the top with the whole divine revelation as the first principle. The atheistic argument from existence starts from "existence," and I am saying that they can't do that unless they have everything else that makes that possible (so they still need to put together an entire worldview). But I have everything, including logic and "existence" (whatever that means), on the same level at the top, so that my first principle has the content to make such an assertion possible in the first place. All that I need is embedded from the start; otherwise, one cannot start at all. 

Also, I wonder how their argument can refute pantheism. 

When a presuppositionalist fails to be effective, it is often because the opponent's argument derails him from presuppositional thinking. That is, the opponent says something that somehow distracts the believer into seeing things from the unbeliever's false perspective, and if he cannot reason his way back out using the unbeliever's perspective, or if he fails to leap back to his own principles, then he is in trouble. But this is not a failure of presuppositional apologetics, but a failure to consistently apply it. 

6. The Transcendental Argument for Materialism19 

He said that he is going to use the transcendental argument for materialism. That is, I must use my physical mouth to say "logic." I must use my physical body to even be at the debate. 

As stated here, the argument fails to prove materialism as such. At best, it shows that there is a physical world, and that when we speak, we do so through our physical bodies.20 However, materialism affirms that physical matter is the primary or even only reality or substance, that there is no incorporeal mind or spirit. Far from proving this, the argument fails to address this altogether. For example, it does not show that we think with our brains and only with our brains. It offers nothing to contradict (let alone refute) my belief that we think with our incorporeal minds and that brains do not "think" at all. 

We may discuss this in greater detail. 

With me, that there is a physical world is not a conclusion from sensation or intuition, but a conclusion deduced from Scripture. And by "Scripture," I mean the "Word of God," or the verbal revelation from the mind of God. This means that I am not just talking about the physical book, as in paper and ink, but the non-physical intellectual content of the physical book. I am not denying that the Bible is the Word of God – of course it is – but I am saying that, strictly speaking, the Word of God is not physical but intellectual, since we are referring to the portion of God's mind that he has disclosed to us. That is, if you steal my Bible and cut it up into a million pieces, you have destroyed the physical book, but you have not destroyed the Word of God, which is the first principle of my thinking. 

The intellectual content of my worldview, or the Word of God, resides in the divine Logos, and according to God's ordinary providence, it is directly communicated to my mind on the occasion of the visual sensations that occur when reading the Bible, but apart from the visual sensations themselves. The sensations provide the occasion; they do not communicate any information in themselves. 

This is one version of "occasionalism." It is not entirely novel, but overlaps with Augustine's theory of illumination, Malebranche's "vision in God," and various forms of the "logos doctrine." Nevertheless, mine is not identical with theirs – it is more biblical (in that its basis is exegetical, and avoids the unbiblical assumptions in theirs), and it is more "extreme" (that is, coherent) in that I consistently apply it to every aspect of reality in my philosophy. But it is really just the necessary implication of the biblical doctrine of God's providence over every detail of his creation.  

So one of the several ways that I can defeat this sort of argument is by proposing that we might be having the debate in a purely mental world, or in a dream. How can we know otherwise? Since my philosophy does not depend on sensation or induction, it does not damage me at all – I can use the same arguments with the same effect whether or not we are debating in the mental world or in the physical world. However, since my opponent is an empiricist and/or a materialist, he depends on the physical world and a physical epistemology, so that he has to first prove that we are having the debate in a physical world. 

Of course, there is a physical world in my philosophy, but this not because I feel it or sense it, but because the non-physical Word of God communicates to me that there is such a world. 

To summarize, when I face an empirical opponent, I can always push the debate into the purely mental world. This annihilates everything that is physical and empirical that my opponent depends on (since he cannot prove that we are operating in the physical world, or that there is a physical world), but I can function perfectly in the purely mental world while retaining the physical world at the same time. 

7. "But What is Knowledge?" 

As my readers are aware, I deny that induction, sensation, and science can yield any knowledge, and I have provided biblical and rational justification for this denial in my writings. Besides the typical fallacious replies and evasions, one response is to ask, "But what is knowledge?" That is, if we cannot define knowledge, or cannot justify our definition of knowledge, then it would seem meaningless to say that induction, sensation, and science cannot yield any knowledge. 

I have tolerated this sophistry for a while, but since I have been asked about it several times, and since I have been made aware that this point is sometimes brought up in discussions about my writings (as if it totally destroys my arguments!), I will briefly address it here. 

It is true that when we use a word, we should often have a proper and justifiable definition for it. This is especially important when we are using it in the context of precise arguments and syllogisms. 

However, the above objection misses the point. The point is that induction, sensation, and science involve fallacious reasonings such that they can never produce logically valid conclusions from the premises. That is, it is impossible to use induction, sensation, and science to validly reason from premises X and Y to conclusion Q regarding any subject P. Thus our main point stands even if we never define or even mention "knowledge." 

Assuming the premise, "I see a red car," how is it possible to validly reason from this premise to, "There is a red car"? You need another premise to fill in the gap between "I see" and "There is," but how is this premise to be rationally obtained and justified, rather than just stubbornly assumed? This is the point. 

As it stands, there is no rational difference between jumping from "I see a red car" to "There is a red car," and jumping from "I imagine a red car" or "I desire a red car" to "There is a red car." What is the rational difference between sensation, imagination, and expectation? How come one can jump from "I see" to "There is," and cannot jump from "I imagine" or " I desire" to "There is"? What is the additional premise that makes the difference? And how is this premise rationally obtained and justified? The issue is not even the definition of knowledge, but the validity of the reasoning process. 

The objection is sophistical and irrational. Whether or not we define knowledge, and whether or not our opponents define knowledge, the objection has not even started to justify induction, sensation, and science, but it seeks to distract us from the main point. 

But if the challenge is to define "knowledge" in a proposition such as, "Science cannot yield any knowledge," then let our opponents first define "science," and then logically demonstrate how it can validly reach any conclusion about anything, and then we can proceed to examine our denial. For if our science-loving opponents have never claimed that science can reach rational conclusions about anything, or even yield "knowledge" (whatever that is), we would have never needed to make the denial in the first place. 

In other words, I can affirm everything that I have said regarding induction, sensation, and science without ever using the word "knowledge" – I just have to say some things differently. In fact, I have already done this a number of times in my books. For example, I would say that science cannot validly deduce or infer anything about reality. And even "reality" does not need to be defined to make this point, since any X will do – "affirming the consequent" is fallacious regardless of what you are talking about. 

So let's get back to the real issue and press our opponents to show how induction, sensation, and science can validly reason from premises to conclusion about anything at all. 

To those who agree with me, we are right about this. Our position is biblical, rational, irrefutable, and so obviously so that it is laughably easy to defend. Just don't let intellectual tricksters bully or distract you, and don't let them smuggle in their irrational theories by falsely claiming biblical support, as if false assumptions can be founded on true presuppositions, or the lie justified by the truth. Instead, let us continue to crush the man-centered epistemologies of induction and sensation, and to exalt biblical revelation as the sole infallible source of true premises from which we would validly deduce conclusions about the many things that God has chosen to disclose to us. 

8. But Where is the Refutation? 

Mr. H attacked your position on sensation and mentioned you by name, but I think some of the things that he said were already answered by you in your articles. I am not sure if he reads them. 

Here I will just refer you back to my books as my response to all criticisms that you can find anywhere written by anyone on this subject. I have confidence in my products – they are accurate and irrefutable. Yes, people can write all sorts of things against anything (even the Bible), but not every attempted refutation is logically sound or successful. 

Now, an irrefutable position is no good when read by a moron, so it helps that my readers are not stupid. As the above reader writes, "I think some of the things that he said were already answered by you in your articles. I am not sure if he reads them." Bingo! And if there is anything unanswered in these articles, it is because (as I have repeatedly said) they are intended as supplements to my books. 

However, not everyone has at least this much sense. Many people are affected by the most recent thing that they read, and so when they read my writings, they are swayed by them, but then when they read an attempted refutation, they change and think that I am wrong. Then, I offer my response and they seem to be convinced again. Thus they are tossed back and forth between differing positions, and never attain intellectual stability. 

There are at least two reasons for this problem. 

First, my position is widely disliked, and I am able to convince anyone only by the sheer rigorous rationality and precise biblical exegesis of my arguments. On the other hand, most people favor some version of empiricism even without any persuasion by another person, and even if they are initially awakened from their empirical slumber by my writings, it is easy for them to be swayed back to empiricism by even the flimsiest arguments, or even just a rhetorical question. That is, they will take any excuse to stay with what they already prefer to believe. Thus although, objectively, there is nothing against me, subjectively, the deck is stacked against me. 

Second, many readers fail to apply the strict standards of rationality when they examine arguments and refutations. They fail to remember that not just any complaint is a valid refutation. Just like any sound argument, a refutation must have a conclusion validly deduced from true premises, and that contradicts its opponent's position. Nothing that Mr. H wrote against me amounts to this. He gives us assertions, speculations, rhetorical questions, but no argument (refutation) that reasons from true premises to their necessary conclusion. Moreover, nothing that he wrote actually supports empiricism. So even if he successfully refutes me, we would just end up with skepticism at best. 

He has attempted several typical ad hominem points, but I have already dealt with them in my writings – I either refute them as fallacious and irrelevant, or I swallow them down without suffering any damage to the coherence of my position. And again, an ad hominem does not amount to a positive support for empiricism. 

Finally, "But What is Knowledge?" is intended to answer a particular objection against me; it is in itself not a refutation of empiricism – I have already done that elsewhere. However, Mr. H interacts with only this short article as if I have presented my main or even entire case against empiricism there, and that what he says about the article thus undermines my entire position about empiricism. But again, he fails to refute even my short article. 

If you will go back to Mr. H's article, you will see that he has failed on all counts. But I don't want to direct this only against Mr. H, since all of his objections are typical, and will be used again and again by other people. It would be counterproductive for me to write a specific response to every rehash of the typical objections against my position, when I have already answered all of them. 

Again, I have no problem in answering something that is new, something that I have never addressed, and my readers would testify that I never resort to evasive maneuvers, nor do I need to. But slight variations of old and refuted objections do not deserve my attention. Something that forces me to respond will have to be really, really good. Otherwise, there is no point in doing it. 

I am not interested in defending my reputation or my competence, but I am concerned when readers might be misled. The simplest solution is to remind all of you that I have already dealt with all the typical criticisms in my writings, and all you need to do is to read or review them. You should ask, (1) Does the objector give us real arguments and refutations? and (2) Does the objector say anything that is not already answered in Cheung's writings? It is impossible to write a specific reply for every attempted refutation – just don't be taken in by an attempt only because it states old and refuted objections differently. 

As for those of you who are unfamiliar with my writings, I urge you to read my materials, slowly and carefully, and really try to understand what I am saying instead of dismissing me because of your traditions and assumptions, without actual refutations. And remember, an "actual refutation" must be more than an assertion or a rhetorical question, but just like any valid argument, it must be a conclusion validly deduced from true premises; otherwise, it is nothing more than an expression of one's subjective disapproval.

9. "Biblical" Empiricism Incoherent 

One argument alleges that Scripturalism21 is incoherent because the proposition, "All knowledge comes from biblical propositions and their necessary implications," is not itself a biblical proposition, and that it cannot be deduced from biblical propositions; therefore, if one accepts Scripturalism, one should reject Scripturalism. 

However, this argument begs the question. In effect, it is just saying that Scripturalism is false because it is not true, but it says this without showing that it is not true. 

But the principle can indeed be deduced from Scripture. The Bible teaches that God is infallible, that the Bible is his infallible revelation, that God controls all things, that man is fallible, that man's sensations and intuitions are fallible, etc., etc. – put them together, and you have Scripturalism. 

Then, think about empiricism. Yes, it is often assumed that sensation is a generally reliable way to obtain knowledge. But consider just several of the problems connected to empiricism and science: 

1. If empiricism is rational, then it should be possible to demonstrate its rationality by a valid process of reasoning. What is this process of reasoning? And is it really valid? 

2. If empiricism necessarily uses induction, then how can it avoid the logical problems that come with induction? 

3. If empiricism is the very foundation of science, then how can science be considered eminently rational when we have yet to defend empiricism? 

4. Then, how about the fact that the scientific method, by its very own nature, practices the fallacy of affirming the consequent in every experiment? 

Anyone who decries my opposition to empiricism must show how he can know anything by sensation by his partially or totally empirical epistemology. 

He cannot prove it by "pure reason," since logic by itself carries no content from which he can derive a proof for empiricism, and to use intuition as a foundation for sensation would require a proof for intuition as a way to knowledge, as well as a proven standard to determine which instance of intuition is correct. 

Does he then claim that Scripture provides the preconditions for empiricism? It certainly provides the preconditions for us to understand that it is irrational and false, but does it provide rational justification to say that empiricism is true? Matthew 24:32 is not the only verse in the Bible.22 How about John 12:28-29 and 2 Kings 3:16-24? 

If Scripture shows only one instance when sensation is not reliable, then at least we need a reliable standard or method by which we can tell which instance of sensation is reliable. What is this standard or method? And is this standard or method really reliable? 

Or, if they claim that one sensation verifies another one, then this begs the question, since we don't know which one is right, and maybe both are wrong. 

So it doesn't matter how many biblical passages they show, but as long as there is even one in Scripture that suggests the fallibility of sensation, then we are taken right back to the question of a standard and method by which we can tell which instance is reliable. 

But I have already said all of this in my books and articles, so all you need to do is to read or review them. 

It is amusing to me that some presuppositionalists have been so passionately arguing against my opposition to empiricism that it is as if they are now defending empiricism, and in a manner that often contradicts what they would say when they argue against evidentialism in apologetics. 

Just don't forget to ask that, as they attack an opposition to empiricism, have they justified empiricism? How have they done this? And if empiricism (any degree or kind) is part of their epistemology, then they must first justify empiricism before attacking an opposition to empiricism; otherwise, they are just arguing in a circle while standing on thin air. 

Finally, consider this. If they claim that one must use physical sensations to read the Bible, and that, in some sense, the words of the Bible are conveyed to the mind through the physical sensations themselves, and if they also admit that sensations are fallible, then whether or not the Bible is infallible immediately becomes irrelevant to them, since they can never have an infallible Bible in practice. This is because the Bible in effect will only be as reliable to them as their sensations. 

Even if I allow them to believe that sensations are generally reliable, it is still irrelevant until they can show me how reliable they are, and even more importantly, how they know in which instances they are correct. If one cannot show me in which instances sensations are correct, then in effect it is as if none of the instances are reliable, since there is no way to tell one from the other. 

Some of them say that the Bible teaches them that God has created man in a way that man can use his senses to gain some knowledge, even if the sensations are fallible. But there are at least two problems with this: 

1. They just got through saying that you must use the senses to read the Bible in the first place, so how did they find out what the Bible says about sensations without first proving the reliability of sensation? They argue in a circle. 

2. The Bible provides many examples showing that the senses are fallible, that they are often deceived. So even if we forget about the previous point, we are still at a loss as to in which instances sensations are reliable, and we are back to square one again. 

Thus, it is really their view that is incoherent. 

On the other hand, my scheme bypasses all of these difficulties, since I start from the mind of God, and not the senses of man. 

At this point, they sometimes exclaim, "Well, then you can't know anything!" But this is not proof that empiricism is the way out of skepticism! So don't be fooled by arguments like this one. 

In fact, my method overcomes skepticism by starting with the Bible – that is, to really start with the portion of the incorporeal mind of God that has been verbally revealed in Scripture – instead of just saying that we start with the Bible, but then allow our fallible sensations as the only way to know what is in the Bible in the first place. 

10. Fallacies, and Fallacies upon Fallacies23 

I hope everything is going well with you, your family, and ministry. I'm continually blessed by your daily articles and how you strive for Christlikeness in everything, even responding to critics. 

I am disheartened at the criticisms to your method, especially from other Christians. From what I can tell, Mr. M and others fail to note what Scripturalism really is. He assumes that it means propositions found only in the Bible are true and constitute as knowledge – they exclude what is deduced as knowledge because they say that "knowledge by deduction" can't be found in the Bible. Although I still have a weak grasp of Scripturalism, I don't believe that is what this philosophy adheres to. 

I hope that you can continue strong in your ministry of teaching Christians. But a part of me hopes to see a response to such criticisms as well. Maybe in the future I can be able to help. 

Thanks once again for your ministry of teaching. I've learned much and grown much. 

Thank you so much for taking the time to write this message of encouragement. I am glad that I have a reader and a friend like you. 

As I said, if I were to respond to every attempted refutation, then I would probably never be able to do anything else, since there are too many of them. And it is not as if the critics will stop after my initial response – they will keep trying, whether or not they are ever successful.24 

So, unless there is a threat worthy of extra attention, I must move on after making some general remarks; otherwise, the whole ministry would be hijacked by critics and driven by criticisms. I must stay focused on my mission so that I don't get caught in such a trap. 

Also, as I have pointed out, the overall effects of the criticisms have been overwhelmingly positive for this ministry. I have gained many first-time readers and new supporters for my approach. Therefore, do not be dismayed, but rather rejoice. 

Now, Mr. M did send me his essay. And you are right (again, I am glad that my readers are not morons) – a failure to understand my position (or even just "Scripturalism" in general) is truly one of the major problems with it. Some of his criticisms are very fallacious, but probably still a little too subtle for some readers to notice, especially for those who do not have a good understanding of either my position or Scripturalism to begin with. 

Before I continue, I should note that many people, including Mr. M, either practically or really identify my approach with Gordon Clark's Scripturalism. As I have mentioned in several places, this is a mistake. It is true that my approach overlaps with much of Clark's, and probably at no major point do we contradict each other, but the two are nevertheless not identical, so that some of the things that are said about Scripturalism cannot be blindly applied to me, so that although I overlap with him a great deal, I still differ from him enough to warrant separate treatment. 

Many of my critics either fail to realize this or refuse to accept it, so that their criticisms are not only fallacious, but often simply irrelevant. Nevertheless, for the sake of convenience, and to avoid having to constantly remind readers of the distinction, in what follows I will apply the term "Scripturalism" to both Clark and me. But remember that this is not by preference, but by temporary concession. 

To address your example, it has always been the claim of Scripturalists that knowledge consists of all the biblical propositions plus all of their necessary implications. 

Logically speaking, the implications of the biblical propositions are not really additions to the biblical propositions at all, since all the implications of any proposition are already inherent in the proposition, so that if the necessary implications of a proposition are excluded, logically speaking, the proposition itself is also excluded. 

So it is a strange objection to say that Scripturalists cannot be correct or coherent because they also affirm what is necessarily deduced from the biblical propositions. They have never restricted themselves to the biblical propositions apart from their necessary implications, nor do they need to, since all the implications of the biblical propositions are inherent in the biblical propositions. Rather, they rightly affirm that what is validly or necessarily deduced from revealed propositions is equally certain as what is explicitly revealed. 

Then, although I affirm that only the biblical propositions and their implications are infallible, I never said that these are the only propositions by which we function. Instead, I entertain many extra-biblical propositions in my daily thinking and living – nevertheless, only as opinion, not infallible revealed information. This allows me to function and discuss many things just as the non-Scripturalists do, only that I make a clear distinction between fallible opinion and infallible revelation, and I never elevate opinion to the level of revelation. 

And when it comes to apologetics, my opinion is not my religion, so it is not what I defend. Therefore, it is no problem for me to acknowledge that I hold to some things as my fallible opinion, but that when it comes to my biblical faith, I hold to it as infallible revelation. 

On the other hand, the non-Scripturalist standard for considering something as "knowledge" or reliable information is very low and irrational, and so many things are considered knowledge or reliable information even when they lack rational justification, and that are really mere opinion and guesswork. The result is that their belief systems are mixtures of uncertainty and confusion, and their irrational epistemology corrodes almost every part of their noetic structure. 

I will cite another example from Mr. M. In his essay, he criticizes my affirmation that man's innate knowledge has enough content and is specific enough that it corresponds only to the biblical worldview and excludes all others. He thought that this was pure assertion, and that this could not possibly have been derived from Romans 1 and 2. 

But Romans 1 says that this innate knowledge contains information about God's attributes, such as eternity and power, and it is specific enough to condemn all idolatry and even something like homosexuality. Then, Romans 2 says that the moral laws have been written in the minds of men, and this information is full and specific enough to either condemn or excuse many of their daily actions. 

This is a lot of specific information! Since this innate knowledge is full enough to condemn everyone who does not worship the Christian God or the Christian God's moral laws, it necessarily follows that it is full enough to exclude all non-Christian ideas of God, and all non-Christian concepts of morality. 

Of course, this still does not offer any information on how one might receive salvation, but it is enough to condemn all non-Christians. To oppose this is also to say that man's innate knowledge is sufficient to exclude many but not all religions, so that if God condemns the adherents of these religions that are not excluded by man's innate knowledge, it could not be on the basis of man's innate knowledge. However, this view (a necessary implication of denying my position) directly contradicts Paul's very point in Romans 1 and 2. 

Also, Mr. M claims to be a Reformed Christian, but my position on the extent and content of man's innate knowledge as described here is standard Reformed doctrine. So it appears that Mr. M not only lacks an understanding of my position, and an ability to practice valid reasoning, but he also lacks a basic grasp of the Reformed faith that he claims to share with me. This makes his criticisms that much less credible. Thus I would again remind readers that just because a person offers a criticism does not necessarily mean that it is a successful criticism. 

Similar errors pervade every section of his essay, so that it is just one overwhelming series of fallacies, and fallacies upon fallacies. How am I to handle such an essay? Am I expected to refute every single point? But do you notice how long it takes just to barely address several relevant points with adequate clarity? What, do I live to answer my incompetent critics, or do I live to serve God and his people? And what if another person releases another series of fallacies while I am still writing my response to this one? I would indeed be unable to answer them all, but not because I would be intellectually overwhelmed, but rather physically outdone by the combined efforts of my critics.25 

Finally, Mr. M fails to provide and justify his own positive construction, his own positive epistemology and philosophy, only by which he could criticize me in the first place. Always remember this point – this point alone will kill every non-Scripturalist epistemology. 

For example, if he opposes my occasionalism and my anti-empiricism, then what is his epistemology, and how is it rationally justified? How can he read my books and then criticize them, unless he is a scriptural occasionalist like me, or unless he has rationally justified empiricism? If he is the former, then we agree and there is no problem; if he can't do the latter, then he completely fails before he even begins. 

Since our epistemologies are different, he can't just criticize mine without having his own, and he must be able to justify his own before26 he criticizes mine. This is because his criticisms must themselves have their basic presuppositions – while he attacks me, he must have a ground to stand on while he swings at me, and he must have something with which to swing at me. This would not be true if we were to have the same basic presuppositions, but disagree only on the subsidiary details – in that case, he might not have to present a positive construction and be able to defend it, but in this case, he must. 

I could go on, but then this will really become another essay. I just wanted to encourage you in return, that these and other criticisms can indeed be adequately answered. 

I am glad that you said you might be able to help in the future. I also believe this. If all my readers remain intellectual babies, so that I must come to the rescue at every little criticism, then they really haven't learned apologetics at all! And then my writings would not be doing much practical good, even if they are rationally sound. 

Thanks again for your loyalty and appreciation. 

Now, we will return to the question of how we should answer compounded fallacies. Although we have taken so long to get to this point, my main concern for this article is in fact not to defend myself, since the critics' efforts are insignificant, but to help you become better apologists. This section might actually seem a little anticlimactic, since after all that I have said above, I only need to outline a general answer here. 

Non-Christians have written entire books documenting the alleged errors in the Bible, many of which are alleged self-contradictions. We will use this as an example in considering the question of how we are to deal with multiple fallacies, with a focus on the alleged self-contradictions. 

An obvious option, of course, is to write our own books to deal with every alleged selfcontradiction in the Bible, and some Christians have done exactly this. This is certainly not a wrong approach, especially if these books successfully resolve every alleged self-contradiction, but it has its shortcomings. First, it takes much time and energy to write these books. Second, a reader who wishes to understand how to answer every alleged self-contradiction will probably need to first read the books written by the non-Christians to understand the allegations, and then also the books written by the Christians in reply to those allegations. This might require much effort and expense. Third, very soon after the Christians publish their answers to the alleged self-contradictions, the non-Christians will then come back with their replies. And almost every passage in question will be considered as an individual case.27 

Again, I am not against providing an answer to every alleged self-contradiction, but it is indeed inconvenient, the back-and-forth process will never end, and some believers will be left confused and uncertain. Instead, whether or not we immediately provide specific answers to all alleged self-contradictions, we can direct our attention to a more basic problem with these criticisms – almost all of them show that the non-Christians do not really understand the nature of a contradiction, that is, what a contradiction is or means. 

When one proposition is correctly said to contradict another, what is meant is that the one makes the other logically impossible. That one proposition is different from another does not indicate a contradiction, and that one proposition includes information that another one lacks does not indicate a contradiction. For example, "Mary came to my dinner party last night" does not at all contradict, "There were five million people at my dinner party last night." The first proposition does not say that Mary was the only one who came, and the second does not deny that Mary was one of the five million. 

This is a very simple point, but non-Christians appear to be oblivious to it when they accuse the Scripture of containing numerous self-contradictions, when what really happens is that these non-Christian are just showing us numerous times that they have no idea what a contradiction means. 

This answer both helps the Christians and refutes the non-Christians, with relatively little effort. After grasping this point, a Christian can competently address any example that the non-Christian wishes to discuss without having to first read an entire encyclopedia on all the biblical passages in question. 

Applying this back to my situation, although my differences with other people include more than just my views on empiricism, until they (those who affirm any kind and any degree of empiricism) irrefutably justify the use of sensation as a means to knowledge, they cannot even begin to criticize me. They can know nothing – right, they cannot even read the Bible, because they say that one needs the senses to read it (which I deny), but they have yet to justify their senses as means to knowledge. On the other hand, I can read the Bible precisely because I reject any kind and any degree of empiricism, and instead affirm that God rules over all, including man's thinking and knowing. 

It is futile to say that biblical presuppositions provide the sufficient preconditions for knowledge by sensation. Yes, biblical presuppositions are required to render errors intelligible in the first place – I agree with that – but errors are still errors, only now we can intelligibly think of them as errors. And this is also why I can intelligibly think of empiricism as fallacious. Biblical presuppositions cannot change irrationality into rationality; they can only make irrationality intelligible as irrationality. 

Now, unless there is an absolute proof from someone who affirms any kind and any degree of empiricism as to how anyone can know anything (and for the Christian, how anyone can read the Bible) other than on the basis of something like my scripturalism, it would be a waste of my time to review any more attempted refutations. And my time is precious – it is liberally given to edify teachable believers and to evangelize unbelievers, but not to entertain those who are just itching for a fight that they can't win. 

People like these hounded Clark on the same things until the day he died, and yet they have never offered a successful refutation or their own positive construction.28 Now they are trying to do the same to me, but I refuse to let them dictate the direction of this ministry. Yet, I even recommend their writings and support their apologetic efforts. Some of these same people have asked me for pointers when they debated unbelievers, and I answered them with genuine concern and without any condescension. Moreover, knowing their public opposition against me, I keep their names private so as not to embarrass them. 

This is my honor and their shame. May God judge between us. 

11. Invincibility, Irrefutability, and Infallibility 

You always claim that your writings are invincible. I am not even saying I disagree with you, but sometimes you come off kind of strong, maybe a little too strong. Couldn't your writings contain errors? You even said yourself that you have remove some of your past writings from circulation because they were not on target. 

Perhaps there is a misunderstanding as to precisely what I am claiming and about what I am making the claim, and there seems to be some confusion about the meanings and implications of invincibility, irrefutability, and infallibility. But it is good that you asked this, because other people might also have a similar misunderstanding and confusion. 

I do claim that a number of things that I have written are invincible and irrefutable. Many of these things I have said are in fact in agreement with many other theologians, and in those cases, especially when they have also presented similar arguments, I would just as readily affirm that they are also invincible and irrefutable on those points. 

For example, I would affirm that Martin Luther on divine sovereignty, Charles Hodge on justification by faith, Robert Reymond on the deity of Christ, and many other theologians on many other topics, are invincible and irrefutable. They have correctly built their arguments for these doctrines from Scripture, and Scripture is invincible and irrefutable. So when I claim that I am invincible and irrefutable on certain points, I am not claiming something that is exclusive or unique to me. 

This is very different from claiming infallibility. As an example, take my claim that my apologetic method is invincible and irrefutable. Now, to say that a certain apologetic method is invincible and irrefutable is very different from saying that the person is infallible, and that a person is fallible does not mean that he is wrong all the time. It is possible for me to write "1 + 1 = 2" a hundred times in an essay without making a mistake, and this essay would indeed be invincible and irrefutable (even if not very interesting), but this doesn't mean that I am infallible as a person. 

I have stopped making some of my earliest materials available because they "contain errors." This is true, but I never claimed infallibility, and I don't need infallibility to be invincible and irrefutable on some points. Also, I never said that they were full of errors, but only that I have improved and have written better materials to replace them. This also implies that I hold myself to a very high standard, and thus if it is relevant at all, it tends to confirm my credibility rather than to undermine it. 

These old materials contained a number of deficiencies and errors because: (1) When I wrote them, I was practically a kid, and (2) At the time of their writing, I had not yet considered the relevant topics with nearly as much thoughtful and even prolonged agonizing consideration as I have done since. In addition – and this is an important point – I never claimed invincibility or irrefutability for these old materials. 

Also, this goes to show that I am willing to admit my mistakes, even to the point of pulling materials off the shelves and then publicly discussing it. Thus there is no intellectual hypocrisy or double standard here: I am just as ruthless toward the errors in my own works as I am toward those in the works of others. 

Anyway, those materials were produced at the earliest stage of my ministry, not long after my conversion, in fact, and while I was not nearly as well-known as I am now (not that I am very well-known now, only that I was still more obscure then). So I could easily forgo mentioning it and nobody would notice. Yet, I have not tried to hide past errors even though I have no moral obligation to tell everybody about them, including those who have never read them. 

It is with this same mindset, and the same willingness to admit error when I am wrong, that I insist that there is no possibility that my present apologetic method (among other things) can be defeated or refuted, either by reason or by revelation. I would admit it if it is even just possible that I am wrong about it, but I cannot make such an admission, because there is no chance that I am wrong about this. This is the plain truth, and to say otherwise would not be humble, but dishonest. 

In contrast to these earliest materials, all of my beliefs regarding the core issues in my theology and in my writings are conclusions resulting from careful consideration, diligent comparison, and rigorous deductions. For the rest of my life, there is zero possibility that I will change my mind regarding these central points. 

For example, I will never abandon Calvinism to embrace Arminianism. This is not because I have become stuck to my personal preferences or traditions, but because Calvinism has been biblically and rationally established, and Arminianism has been biblically and rationally demolished. The result is conclusive, and I know it. Since I know it, I am going to talk about it with an assurance that matches my certainty. If I am sure, how can I say that I could be wrong? If I say that I could be wrong, then it means that I am not sure. Or should I not be sure about anything? Are you sure about that? 

I come off strong because, at the risk of being misinterpreted as arrogant, I wish to impart my confidence toward the Scripture to people. And I repeatedly remind the readers that I am so sure only because my own confidence is derived from the infallibility of Scripture. So I am not going to undermine my own materials by adopting a false humility, even if it would be more socially acceptable. 

Christians so rarely witness any faith in their leaders that when one comes out and shows it, everybody thinks that he is just being arrogant. But they have been brainwashed by a non-Christian standard. If the Christians cannot claim invincibility and irrefutability because of the Scripture's infallibility, then the non-Christians will always have a place to stand in the intellectual realm. But on the authority of Scripture and in the name of Christ, I allow the unbelievers no such place to stand.29 

If something is true and you affirm it, then you must be right on that point. If you are not sure that something is true, then don't say it, and there is no problem. Too many theologians and preachers say, "This must be true. . .but I could be wrong." This is not humble, just stupid. Don't be fooled by the constant self-abasement practiced by some people. It might be that they are in fact humble individuals, but on the other hand, they might just be spineless losers. They make an uncertain sound, and the people who hear them become confused and hesitant rather than focused and militant.30 

Now, other than my positions on the central issues, I admit that some of the statements in my books could be wrong. But I have never claimed to be infallible, only that my method of apologetics is invincible (it will always defeat the opponent) and irrefutable (it cannot be defeated by any opponent). And it is invincible and irrefutable because it is biblical and rational. This is still true even if certain non-essential statements in my books are mistaken. Again, a general invincibility and irrefutability is very different from infallibility or absolute perfection, and I have never claimed to be infallible or perfect. 

This also applies to other Christians when they speak from Scripture. If you were to write an essay showing from the Bible that Christ is God, then you better claim invincibility and irrefutability (even if your presentation is not the best, and even if not every statement in your essay is correct). Some things are just right, and you ought to know it and claim it, and then pass on this confidence to others. 

That said, there are indeed a number of things – some major and general, some minor and specific – that I am uncertain about. And if you will go through my writings, you will find that I always qualify those statements with words like "maybe," "probably," "it is possible," "it is my opinion," and so forth. 

Sometimes, I am uncertain because I am being consistent with my epistemology, so that I will not claim more certainty than what I can rationally support. At other times, I am uncertain because I have not yet thoroughly studied and considered the relevant issues and arguments, so that I am unwilling to take a definite position. Moreover, there are some things that I refrain from mentioning altogether because I am not yet certain about the correct position; meanwhile, I continue to spend time researching those topics. 

In fact, I qualify many statements regarding things for which other people would claim certainty based on their false epistemology, but my standard is much higher. This also means that when I declare that a given position is invincible and irrefutable, I have already applied a much greater skepticism against the position than any of my critics and opponents could ever muster. 

12. Excluded by Necessity 

My friend has asked one of the most commonly raised objections to Christianity, and I've soberly realized that since I never took the time to read through any critiques of this argument, I find myself unprepared to answer him adequately. 

His simple objection is this: why does the Christian God have to be the one true God, and not the God of any other religion/myth? I realize I could go through and point out the insufficiencies of each major religion's god, but is there also a way to positively demonstrate Christianity's sole claim to truth? 

Your ministry has been an unimaginable blessing for me as I prepare to go off to a nominally conservative Christian university where liberal theology abounds in disguise. I’ve just bought two of your books (Presuppositional Confrontations and Apologetics in Conversation), and am absolutely anxious for them to arrive. I thank God for your writings and pray that your ministry will continue to be blessed. 

For any true proposition, there is literally an infinite number of possible errors related to it or deviations from it. For example, if "1 + 1 = 2" is true, then the possible errors or deviations would include 1 + 1 = 3, 4, 5,….n. 

Therefore, it is impossible to make a specific refutation of every individual possible error or deviation from the truth. Instead, what we need is a positive claim or argument that excludes all errors or deviations by logical necessity. 

In our case, if Christianity (the Bible) is true, and this same Christianity declares that all non-Christian claims and worldviews are false, then all non-Christian claims and worldviews are therefore false by logical necessity. 

Now, to eliminate all non-Christian claims and worldviews by logical necessity would demand that your positive demonstration be correct by logical necessity. Supposing that we have such an apologetic, the situation would become thus: 

1. Christianity is true by logical necessity.
2. Christianity excludes all non-Christian views.
3. Therefore, all non-Christian views are false by logical necessity. 

So the key is (1) – the rest are easy and automatic. And to attain (1), you will have to read my works on apologetics and learn how to skillfully apply the method. I recommend reading Ultimate Questions (at least chapters 1 and 2), Presuppositional Confrontations, and Apologetics in Conversation, probably best in this order. 

Then, this forces your opponent to interact with the Christian's positive construction, rather than allowing him to evade the force of your presentation just by throwing mere possibilities at you – since you have destroyed those possibilities, not by specific refutations, but by logical necessity. 

Now, if you are dealing with someone with a specific non-Christian worldview, you might also perform a refutation of his particular belief system. This would function to show that you are not trying to avoid his own positive arguments, and (since some might be confused about elimination by logical necessity) to show him that you are not hiding behind mere sophism.  

13. "God is Logic" 

I am trying to wade through your different books and documents, so please forgive me if I have not gotten to this issue yet or if I have missed it altogether. 

I am presently having a discussion about God and logic. One premise has been made that "God = logic" and "logic = God." From your viewpoint, is this a valid premise? Or is it better stated, "God is logical"? 

To give a little context, we're discussing the Trinity and how it is logical – the same for the hypostatic union of Christ. 

One person has said, "I would disagree with the statement that God is logic. This is contrary to biblical revelation. Logic has as its target a truth statement. It is important to recognize that logic is a tool, not truth." 

Do you have any thoughts on the matter? 

I have said something about this in my books, but I will give you a brief answer here. 

There are different senses in which we may use the word "logic," and when answering the question, we should specify the meaning. 

It is wrong to flatly say that "God is Logic" is contrary to biblical revelation, because John 1:1 says that Christ is the "Logos," which is just as easily translated "Reason" or "Logic" as "Word." In fact, in the context of this verse, which presents Christ as the true "Logos" of Greek philosophy (the principle of rationality that structures, regulates, and upholds all things) – but in the correct and personified sense – it is probably preferable to translate it "Reason" or "Logic" rather than "Word." 

Therefore, in this sense, it is true that "God is Logic." However, we are using the word in a personal or personified sense – or in the fullest sense. "Logic" or "Reason" in this sense is a person, and includes intellectual content (all that God knows). The emphasis, then, is on the rationality of Christ the Logos – that all things are consistent in his mind and his works, that his wisdom and power structures, regulates, and upholds all things in accordance with his perfect rationality. 

We more often use the word "logic" in a narrower sense – as in the "laws of logic." When we are using the word in this sense, then I would not say that "God is the laws of logic"; rather, the relation between the laws of logic and God is that these laws are descriptions of the way that God thinks and operates. 

When we are using the word in this sense, then "logic" is indeed void of content; however, they are still not mere "tools." When we think logically (in accordance with the laws of logic), we are not using mere "tools" of thought, as if they are detached and independent from the mind of God, but we are imitating the way God thinks and operates. To call the laws of logic mere tools might convey the idea that they are something that God has merely given or even invented for us to use, instead of necessary rules of thought that we must follow in order to imitate God's pattern of thinking and acting. 

The above distinction between the personal and impersonal senses can be expressed simply by capitalizing the words "logic" and "reason" when we are using them in the personal sense. This is why I sometimes use the word "Reason" in my books and articles when referring to Christ the Logos. 

14. Christ the Reason 

I came across today a letter written by Bahnsen regarding some issues he had with John Robbins. 

At one point, Bahnsen says, regarding Clark, "Who can forget his exegetically atrocious rendition of John 1:1 ("In the beginning was Logic")?" Why does he say this? Does he think that "In the beginning was the Logic" is a wrong translation? If so, why? 

I thought you, Clark, Bahnsen, and Robbins were all on the same page with respect to that verse. Any help that you can offer to clear this up would be helpful. 

Bahnsen disagreed with translating "logos" as "Logic" in this verse. Here Clark was right and Bahnsen was wrong. Depending on the context, "logos" can be translated by a number of English words, such as "word," "speech," "proposition," "sentence," "reason," "logic," and several others. 

In John 1:1, the verse is declaring the pre-existence of Christ the Logos and his relation to God (the Father) and to creation. In its historical context, John is declaring that Christ is the fulfillment of the Logos of Greek philosophy – that is, the principle of Reason that structures and regulates the whole universe. Of course, John is not saying that Christ and the Greek Logos are the same thing, but he takes the word or concept and fills it with Christian meaning. 

Given this context, "Word" is in fact probably an inferior translation to "Reason" and "Logic." At the least, we can say that "Reason" and "Logic" are not wrong. Even without the historical context, the immediate context of the passage should also allow this translation. Also consider the relevance of the personified "Wisdom" in Proverbs. 

Sometimes I refer to "Reason" with a capital "R" in my books and articles. This is what I have in mind. I am speaking of Christ, who is Reason personified – and to reject him is to reject all rationality. 

There is no legitimate exegetical reason to forbid translating "logos" as "Reason" or "Logic" in John 1:1. People shrink back from it probably due to an anti-intellectual prejudice. 

Since I will probably never devote an entire article especially on the book, I might as well include a brief statement about Bahnsen's Van Til's Apologetic, in which he made a number of criticisms against Clark. 

I agree with several of Bahnsen's criticisms – he quotes several statements from Clark's writings that I in fact reject. However, in most of those cases, I nevertheless do not adopt Bahnsen's alternatives. In other words, in most of those cases where I think Bahnsen correctly criticizes Clark, I reject both Bahnsen and Clark, and hold my own position on the subject. 

But then, the rest (that is, the majority) of Bahnsen's criticisms against Clark are outrageously wrong. While I expect a follower of Van Til to misunderstand and misrepresent Clark on some points, I was astounded at how poorly Bahnsen had misunderstood and misrepresented Clark in most of his criticisms. Those portions of his book reflect far inferior scholarship than what I believe Bahnsen was capable of. If I were to misrepresent Bahnsen or Van Til in a similar way, I would probably never get away with it. The problem is that most readers of Bahnsen might never look up the corresponding references in Clark's works, and thus they will come away with an impression of Clark that is way, way, way, way off. 

Moreover, even in cases where Bahnsen correctly represents Clark's position in this book, his objections are extraordinarily feeble and irrational. And in many of these instances, it seems that Bahnsen has no logical refutation or rational alternative at all; rather, it appears that he rejects Clark's position just because he doesn't like it. 

These lapses in scholarly judgment and rationality on Bahnsen's part might be due to an inherited anti-Clarkian prejudice – a prejudice that never had received a proper rational justification. But I cannot tell whether this is the true or main reason, or how much it explains. 

My suggestion is that readers should ignore all the criticisms of Clark in Bahnsen's book until they actually look up those quotations from Clark, and read them in their full contexts. 

15. Man's Innate Knowledge31 

I affirm that man has an innate knowledge of God, with enough clarity and content so that he is without excuse in denying or disobeying God. 

However, I deny that a system of theology can be founded on our innate knowledge of God. Or, to say it another way, I deny that our innate knowledge of God can be the first principle of a biblical worldview – there is insufficient content, clarity, and objectivity, among other reasons. 

This is why I never appeal to intuition to justify any part of my theology or to perform apologetics. An accurate understanding of the content and the extent of our own innate knowledge of God comes from verbal revelation in the first place. 

To say this yet another way, although I affirm that we have an innate knowledge of God, we do not base our faith and assurance or our theology and apologetics on this innate knowledge; rather, we must base these things on verbal revelation. 

I do refer to man's innate knowledge in my writings, but I never do this as if the truth of Christianity rests on this as its foundation, or as if this innate knowledge is itself proof that Christianity is true. Otherwise, this would become an appeal to man's intuition, and the argument would become subjective. 

Rather, I appeal to this innate knowledge only to explain why biblical presuppositions are not denied in practice but are implicitly assumed even by unbelievers, and to explain in what sense we have common ground or a point of contact with the unbelievers when preaching the gospel to them. 

So, although I affirm that Scripture is indeed logically undeniable, when I use "undeniable" in the context of discussing man's innate knowledge, the emphasis then is not on the logical undeniability of Scripture, but that some core biblical premises cannot be denied in practice despite the unbelievers' claim to the contrary. 

Thus, we refer to man's innate knowledge not to prove Scripture (rather, it is Scripture that proves the innate knowledge), but only to explain why we can communicate with unbelievers and how to properly relate to them. 

In other words, when we are speaking of the innate knowledge of God, we are considering the strategic aspect of apologetics, and not the strictly rational aspect. That the Scripture is logically undeniable is demonstrated by engaging the contents of Scripture itself, and not man's innate knowledge.  

Some people have failed to note this distinction in my writings (or mistakenly think that I have failed t