The Author of Sin

by Vincent Cheung

Copyright © 2005 by Vincent Cheung
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Preface

The first half of this book is a collection of short articles that mainly deal with divine sovereignty, human freedom, and the doctrines of grace. These articles explain and apply my thinking to particular contexts and questions, and as such, they properly supplement what I have previously written. 

And because this book is best used as a supplement, if it is possible or convenient, I encourage you to first read my previous writings on these subjects before reading the articles in this book. This will help you to better understand the following articles. 

Although I hope that you will read all of them, it is not necessary to read these articles in the order listed; rather, feel free to go directly to the articles that interest you and read them first. 

Several of these articles were written in response to written messages sent to me by readers, and I usually include an edited version of the original question to accompany each of my replies.1 I have withheld the names of the inquirers to protect their privacy. This is not a problem since the quoted statements do not contribute to the actual substance of the articles, but they provide only the contexts for me to present my answers and explanations. 

To clearly distinguish the words of the inquirers, their statements are indented and displayed using a different font. This has eliminated the need for me to always specify that a certain article was written in answer to a question, or to specify that a certain portion of text was a message from a reader, since all of this will be obvious to any reader. 

The second half of this book consists of three previously published articles. The topics of these articles are consistent with the overall theme of the book, and therefore I consider it appropriate to put them together with the other articles in this volume.

1. The Author of Sin

Apologetics is easy, but it is often made difficult by unbiblical traditions and irrational assumptions. 

When Reformed Christians are questioned on whether God is the "author of sin," they are too quick to say, "No, God is not the author of sin." And then they twist and turn and writhe on the floor, trying to give man some power of "self-determination,"2 and some kind of freedom that in their minds would render man culpable,3 and yet still leave God with total sovereignty. 

On the other hand, when someone alleges that my view of divine sovereignty makes God the author of sin, my first reaction tends to be, "So what?" Even Christians who disagree with me stupidly chant, "But he makes God the author of sin, he makes God the author of sin...." However, a description does not amount to an argument or objection, and I have never come across a half-decent explanation as to what's wrong with God being the author of sin in any theological or philosophical work written by anybody from any perspective. 

The truth is that, whether or not God is the author of sin, there is no biblical or rational problem with him being the author of sin. For it to be a problem, it must make some point of Christianity false, or contradict some passage of Scripture. But if God is the author of sin, how does it make Christianity false? One must construct an argument showing this by citing established premises that necessarily lead to the conclusion that Christianity would be false if God is the author of sin. What is this argument? And what passage of Scripture does it contradict? You can cite any passage you want, but you have to show that it necessarily applies to the question and makes it impossible for God to be the author of sin. Where is this passage of Scripture? 

Among the many fallacious replies is the appeal to James 1:13.4 Using this verse to deny that God is the author of sin is one of the worst misapplications of Scripture, and because this error is very popular and influential, it has caused much damage and generated an unnecessary burden for those who would defend the faith. 

Consider the context. James is discussing the practical outworking of the Christian's faith in his letter, and so he often stresses the Christian's direct responsibility, and from the Christian's immediate perspective. James is pointing out what the Christian should consider and address in his struggles as a Christian - ­ he is not dealing with metaphysics. In other words, he is addressing his topics from the standpoint of a Christian relative to his immediate considerations and responsibilities, and not relative to broad metaphysical principles. 

However, when we are discussing divine sovereignty vs. human freedom, cause and effect, etc., we are indeed dealing with metaphysics. Of course, the conclusions reached on this level carry necessary implications for practical living, and what the Bible teaches about metaphysics and practical living are completely consistent with each other. Nevertheless, it is true that as long as the discussion remains on the metaphysical level, the reference point is different, so that one must be careful not to invalidly infer a metaphysical principle from a verse of practical instruction. 

With this in mind, read the passage again. It does not affirm or deny whether God is the author of sin - ­ it does not address the topic at all, but its concerns are completely different. It just tells you that God is not the tempter, which is altogether different from saying that God is not the author of sin. 

That is, if God directly causes you to sin, it does make him the "author" of sin (at least in the sense that people usually use the expression), but the "sinner" or "wrongdoer" is still you. Since sin is the transgression of divine law, for God to be a sinner or wrongdoer in this case, he must decree a moral law that forbids himself to be the author of sin, and then when he acts as the author of sin anyway, he becomes a sinner or wrongdoer. 

But unless this happens, for God to be the author of sin does not make him a sinner or wrongdoer. The terms "author," "sinner," "wrongdoer," and "tempter" are relatively precise ­ at least precise enough to be distinguished from one another, and for God to be the "author" of sin says nothing about whether he is also a "sinner," "wrongdoer," or a "tempter." And for one not to be a wrongdoer by definition means that he has not done wrong. Therefore, even if God is the author of sin, it does not automatically follow that there is anything wrong with it, or that he is a wrongdoer. 

However, this is not to distance God from evil, for to "author" the sin implies far more control over the sinner and the sin than to merely tempt. Whereas the devil (or a person's lust) may be the tempter, and the person might be the sinner, it is God who directly and completely controls both the tempter and the sinner, and the relationship between them. And although God is not himself the tempter, he deliberately and sovereignly sends evil spirits to tempt (1 Kings 22:19­23) and to torment (1 Samuel 16:14­23, 18:10, 19:9). But in all of this, God is righteous by definition. 

The verse is telling you that when you deal with temptation, you must directly address your lust, and not just blame God and then do nothing, or remain in your sin. Read all of James 1 and see if this is not his obvious emphasis. He deals with joy, faith, perseverance, doubt, pride, lust, anger, moral filth, and being a doer of the Word. He is dealing with the Christian's direct responsibilities in practical living, and he does this by relating it to the internal motives and characteristics of the person. 

In verse 13, he is instructing the believer on how to rightly approach a temptation ­ he is not trying to explain the metaphysics behind it. Or, he is considering the believer's responsibility concerning the inner factors in sanctification, and not the metaphysical cause or principle for these. But the metaphysical cause or principle is exactly what we are discussing when we consider whether God is the author of sin. Therefore, James 1:13 is not directly applicable to our topic. If one still wishes to deny that God is the author of sin, he will have to use another verse. 

Those who cite James 1 to assert that God cannot be the author of sin might use verse 175 to reinforce their understanding of verse 13; however, if verse 17 is interpreted in a way that is consistent with their interpretation of verse 13, then this would make verse 17 contradict Isaiah 45:7.6 But if verse 17 is correctly interpreted so that it does not contradict Isaiah 45:7, then it no longer reinforces their false interpretation of verse 13. A more detailed examination of verse 17 will have to wait until another time, but what I have just said already renders their interpretation of verse 17 impossible, so I need not say more for our present purpose. The point is that nothing in this passage from James denies (or affirms) that God is the author of sin. The admitted motive and effect of the popular Reformed answer is to satisfy human standards of fairness and righteousness. Dabney, Shedd, and others admitted that their answer is meant to satisfy human intuition. If not for the fact that God's absolute sovereignty is repugnant to sinful human intuition, made defective by the noetic effects of sin, the "author of sin" question would have no logical entry point into theological discussions at all. In contrast, the biblical approach to this type of questions and objections is not to justify God, but to rebuke man for questioning and objecting in the first place. Our passage from Isaiah 45 is one example: 

I am the LORD, and there is no other; apart from me there is no God....I am the LORD, and there is no other. I form the light and create darkness, I bring prosperity and create disaster; I, the LORD, do all these things.... 

Does the clay say to the potter, "What are you making?" Does your work say, "He has no hands"?

Woe to him who says to his father, "What have you begotten?" or to his mother, "What have you brought to birth?" 

In other words, "I am the only God. Whether it is prosperity or disaster, I am the doer of all these things ­ - there is not another God to do them. Dare you question me about this? Who are you to object?" 

Although this verse might not conclusively settle every detail, unlike James 1:13, it does have something to do with metaphysics. He is the only God, and this is inseparably connected to the fact that it is this one and only God who causes "all these things," including both prosperity and disaster. He is the doer of them all. This is a denial of any type of dualism ­ - there is not another power that can cause prosperity or disaster.7 

Contrary to the traditional explanation, God does not say, "Oh, no, I am not the author of sin. Although I am the ultimate cause of all things, I distance myself from directly causing evil by establishing secondary causes and free agents. So although I create and sustain all things, men freely sin by thinking and acting according to their own dispositions. The evil dispositions come from Adam. As for how Adam got his evil dispositions...well, it will just have to remain a mystery for you." If this is the answer, why not jump right to the mystery and save us all some time? 

The Bible never responds this way to this type of questions and objections. There are many biblical passages saying that God causes all things, and the metaphysics behind it is explained by God's omnipotence ­ - the same omnipotence that created everything. On the other hand, all the passages that people use to deny that God is the author of sin or to prove compatibilism are always just descriptions of events and motives, without dealing with the metaphysical cause of those events and motives. 

Instead of giving the popular answer, which is weak, evasive, incoherent, and confusing, God unashamedly declares, "Yeah, I do all these things. What are you going to do about it? Who are you to even ask me about it?" When it comes to metaphysics, including God's relationship to human decisions, whether for good or for evil, this is how the Bible responds. 

Then, we read from Romans 9:19-­21:

One of you will say to me: "Then why does God still blame us? For who resists his will?" 

But who are you, O man, to talk back to God? "Shall what is formed say to him who formed it, 'Why did you make me like this?'" 

Does not the potter have the right to make out of the same lump of clay some pottery for noble purposes and some for common use? 

Again, this has something to do with metaphysics (determinism, freedom, etc.), since the context has to do with election and reprobation, and the making of the elect and the non- elect, as the potter makes pottery out of clay. 

And contrary to the typical response, Paul does not say, "Oh, no, you don't understand. Although God determines all things, he causes all things only by having you freely make decisions according to your own nature, which came from Adam, whose nature mysteriously turned from holy to evil, so that God is not the author of sin, but so that you are responsible for your own decisions and actions." 

Instead, Paul says that God's control over both the "noble" and the "common" is as the potter's control over a lump of clay.8 And just as a lump of clay cannot question the potter, Paul's response to the objector is not, "But you made yourself evil" or "But you freely perform evil according to your own nature," but instead he says, "Shall the creature say to the Creator, 'Why did you make me like this?'"9 And Paul does not say, "But God is not the author of sin," but instead he says, "God has the right to make one person righteous and another person evil, to save one and damn another. Of course no one can resist his will! But who are you to talk back?" 

This is the Bible's approach. It rebukes the objector and answers the objection at the same time. But the answer does not deny that God is the direct cause of sin; instead, it boldly says that God has a right to make whatever he wants and do whatever he wants. Instead of stepping backward or sideways, it steps toward the objector and slaps him in the face! 

This is God's answer. It is strong, direct, simple, coherent, and irrefutable. It is perfect.

2. The Author of Confusion10 

I learned a lot from the "Author of Sin" article. 

I started reading it and kept thinking, "Yes, but what about that passage that states, 'God is not the author of sin?' Certainly there must be a context for it. I want to see the context and see what the metaphysical-practical connection looks like there." 

Then I thought I would go find it. Wow, talk about being conditioned! The closest thing seems to be where the NKJV renders 1 Corinthians 14:33 as "God is not the author of confusion." Because of reading other people's opinions over the years and seeing the phrase bantered around as fact, I thought it must be a passage somewhere in the Bible, and for some odd reason had never thought that I needed to find it before. 

The bottom line is that it just isn't there. 

Great article and keen insight. I learned a lot. 

Thanks for your comments. 

Yes, this matter about the author of sin is just tradition, nothing more. 

Although we should not focus on affirming or denying whether God is the author of sin (since this is not the Bible's own focus), but should rather positively focus on the sovereignty and majesty of God, there is in fact nothing biblically or rationally wrong with saying that God is the author of sin. 

The expression has been so loaded that it automatically sounds wrong or even blasphemous to people, but we can affirm it in a reverent manner ­ that is, we can affirm that God indeed rules over all, not in some remote or secondary way, but in some powerful and direct way, doing whatever he pleases. 

Even 1 Corinthians 14:33 is easily explained. 

First, we know from many biblical passages that God does cause confusion at times, such as when he acted against Israel's enemies in battle. Right away, this means that "the author of confusion" cannot be superficially understood, but must be truly understood within its context. 

The context is verse 40, which says, "Let all things be done decently and in order." That's the point of the passage and the context for verse 33. Notice that, whether it is order or confusion, Paul is giving instructions to the Corinthians, and not to God. Like James, Paul is talking about how Christians should behave, rather than the metaphysics behind their behavior. The statement, then, has more to do with God's approval or disapproval of the situation than the metaphysical cause. 

But there is also a direct answer to the statement, and that is to point out that the word "author" is not in the text in the first place! If you check your interlinear Bible, the statement reads, "not for is of confusion God but of peace." There is no hint of the word or concept of "author" in there, but it was inserted by the translators. 

Thus, the NIV translates: "For God is not a God of disorder but of peace," and other translations like the NASB and ESV are also similar. Of course, even the words "a God" have been inserted here, but it is better than inserting "author," which implies something that is not actually in the statement. A more literal translation might be, "For God is not of disorder but of peace," which is true regarding the immediate context of church order, and even when God decrees evil (including confusion), he does so according to an orderly and rational plan. 

3. Why God Created Evil 

I've been enjoying the great articles as of late regarding who God is. The clear logic of your articles and the Bible is refreshing. 

One of my friends (who is in seminary) read your article and asked, "Then why did God create sin?" 

I haven't answered him yet, but wanted to think it through. Is his question a bad question? Should it be "cause" and not "create"? 

What are your thoughts? 

Thanks for affirming the Bible as the foundation of all our learning and not traditions that men so often teach. And thanks for your time. 

To say "create" or "cause" would be just about the same thing in our context, and both words are applicable, so I think both are fine. 

We are not using the word "create" in the same sense as God's original creation out of nothing, but we are referring to God's control over things that he has already created. That is, although God must actively cause evil thoughts and inclinations in the creature, and then he must actively cause the corresponding evil actions, he does not create new material or substance when he does this, since he is controlling what he has already created. 

It is true that a person sins according to his evil nature, but as Luther writes, it is God who "creates" this evil nature in each newly conceived person after the pattern of fallen Adam, whose fall God also caused. And then, God must actively cause this evil nature to function and the person to act according to it. Luther writes that God never allows this evil nature to be idle in Satan and in ungodly people, but he continuously causes it to function by his power.11 

Luther perceived the biblical and metaphysical absurdities of affirming anything short of the above; in contrast, the weak view (common to Reformed Christians today) is an unbiblical, unnecessary, irrational, and sophistical evasion. If our position is hyper-Calvinism (it is not), then it would simply mean that hyper-Calvinism is the correct and biblical view. And mislabeling it as fatalism doesn't do anything, either ­ - it is the wimp's way out. 

As for God's purpose for sin and evil, first, in boldly acknowledging the biblical truth that God is the sovereign and righteous "author of sin," we can note that even if we were unable to answer the question as to why he caused sin and evil, it would not pose a problem to Christianity, nor would it undermine what I've said about the "author of sin" issue. That is, even if we do not have an answer to the question, there is no self-contradiction in our view, nor does our view contradict Scripture. It would just be a matter of a lack of information, and rationally speaking, this is all that is at stake. 

That said, we do have an answer to the question, and it is in the very passage that we examined from Romans 9: 

One of you will say to me: "Then why does God still blame us? For who resists his will?" But who are you, O man, to talk back to God? "Shall what is formed say to him who formed it, 'Why did you make me like this?'" Does not the potter have the right to make out of the same lump of clay some pottery for noble purposes and some for common use?

What if God, choosing to show his wrath and make his power known, bore with great patience the objects of his wrath ­ prepared for destruction? What if he did this to make the riches of his glory known to the objects of his mercy, whom he prepared in advance for glory ­ - even us, whom he also called, not only from the Jews but also from the Gentiles? (v. 19-­24)

According to Paul, at least one reason (it doesn't have to be the only reason) God created the reprobates (that is, to "create sin") is to provide a context through which he can reveal his wrath ­ - something that the elect will otherwise never witness or experience. In other words, the reprobates are for the education and edification of the elect. They maintain a world of struggles and temptations for the elect, and at the end the elect will witness the outpouring of divine wrath against them. All of this serves to advance the sanctification of the elect and the declarative glory of God. 

The following is taken from my Systematic Theology: 

One important but neglected benefit that the love of God makes available to Christians is spiritual illumination: 

Whoever has my commands and obeys them, he is the one who loves me. He who loves me will be loved by my Father, and I too will love him and show myself to him. (John 14:21) 

I no longer call you servants, because a servant does not know his master's business. Instead, I have called you friends, for everything that I learned from my Father I have made known to you. (John 15:15) 

Theological knowledge ­ - that is, intellectual knowledge about spiritual things ­ is one of the least prized gifts from God. But to be a friend of God means to have such knowledge. The scorn with which many professing believers regard doctrinal studies shows that they do not truly love God, although they would like to think that they love him. 

Jeremiah 9:23-24 tells us that our priority is to obtain understanding and knowledge about God: 

This is what the LORD says: "Let not the wise man boast of his wisdom or the strong man boast of his strength or the rich man boast of his riches, but let him who boasts boast about this: that he understands and knows me, that I am the LORD, who exercises kindness, justice and righteousness on earth, for in these I delight," declares the LORD. (Jeremiah 9:23-24) 

The knowledge of God is the most valuable treasure, and everything else is "dung" (Philippians 3:8, KJV) in comparison. In offering his elect reliable information about himself, God is giving them one of the greatest gifts that he can give to them.... 

One purpose of the reprobates ­ - "the objects of his wrath" or those who are "prepared for destruction" -­ is that God may reveal this aspect of his nature to "the objects of his mercy, whom he prepared in advance for glory" (Romans 9:22-23). Since Christians have been "saved from God's wrath" (Romans 5:9) through Christ, this is one divine attribute that the elect will never experience, and therefore it must be demonstrated to them in other people. Recall that one benefit God gives to the elect is information or knowledge about himself, and this shows us to what lengths he will go to make himself known to his people. 

Of course, people might not like this explanation, but it is the explicit teaching of Scripture. All that God does is intrinsically good and righteous, so it is also good and righteous for him to create the reprobates for the above purpose. Humanistic thinking will be horrified by this teaching, since it is more concerned about man's dignity and comfort than God's purpose and glory, but those with the mind of Christ will erupt in gratitude and reverence, and affirm that God is righteous, and that he does all things well. 

4. Compatibilist Freedom

- ­ A ­ -

Regarding compatibilist freedom...My understanding of this is that we willingly choose from a God-directed will ­ - whether for good or evil, depending on whether he has hardened or enlightened us. Is there anything in this that you would consider incorrect/unbiblical? 

I agree with what you wrote, but contrary to many Calvinists, I disagree that this should be called "freedom" in any relevant sense. 

When speaking of freedom in our context, I always speak of freedom in relation to God ­ - and that is why the issue immediately becomes clear. I can consistently use the same definition whether I am dealing with the nature of God, the decree of God, the nature of man, the nature of salvation, or determinism from a philosophical perspective. 

Many Calvinists do not speak this way; rather, they say that we always choose what we most desire,12 but when they add that this is "freedom" in a relevant sense, and that we are responsible based on this "freedom," then I disagree. Instead, I deny any sense of human freedom and deny any relationship between freedom and responsibility. 

Moral responsibility (or accountability) has to do with whether God has decided to judge us; it has no direct relationship with whether we are free. In fact, if we were free from God but not judged by God, then we would still not be morally responsible (or accountable). In other words, moral responsibility does not presuppose human freedom, but it presupposes divine sovereignty. We are responsible not because we are free, but we are responsible precisely because we are not free. 

Also, Calvinists often affirm that Adam was free before the Fall. But again, I always speak of freedom relative to God, and from this perspective, I would say that Adam had no freedom whatsoever even before the Fall. To be "free" from sin is irrelevant. The issue is whether Adam was free from God to choose to remain free from sin - he was not. In addition, I would not say that God permitted Adam to fall, but that God caused it. Many Calvinists would also disagree with me on this. 

Compatiblists would hesitate to say that we are free from God, but they would insist that since we always act according to the strongest desire of the moment, that this is a real sense of freedom, and that this "freedom" is the precondition for moral responsibility. 

Let's say that I have committed a murder. I was indeed free from other creatures when I made my decision, and I acted according to my own internal desire. But this desire was caused and controlled by God, and the fact that I would always act on my strongest desire (which is human nature) was also caused by God. But this amounts to saying that we have no freedom from God to abstain from murder, but that we only have an internal freedom from other creatures to abstain from murder. 

Then, if we were to soften this and say that our desires are somehow not determined but merely permitted by God, then, even ignoring for now that this is unbiblical, we must still explain how it is possible for God to permit something without causing it, and yet immutably decree it to happen in a sense that is not merely an expression of prescience. If we can't, then we are Arminians. 

Also, if God merely permits us to do something, then I would also demand a metaphysical explanation on how it is possible for a creature to direct and control its own mind. That is, is it possible for a created thing to function at all under God's bare permission without his constant causative determination? How? 

Calvin himself wrote, "Indeed, not even an abundance of bread would benefit us in the slightest unless it were divinely turned into nourishment." This sounds like my occasionalism. There is no inherent "nature" or power in bread that always works with the body to provide nourishment, but it must be "divinely turned into nourishment" each time it is consumed. 

This is Calvinism ­ - it is a consistent application of divine sovereignty over everything. It is a denial of any form of dualism or deism. Thus I affirm that God controls everything about everything that is anything, including every aspect of every detail of every human decision and action, in such a way that man has no freedom in any meaningful or relevant sense. 

In summary, libertarian freedom is indeed freedom, but it is unbiblical and impossible ­ - there is no such freedom. On the other hand, compatibilist freedom is not "freedom" at all (except from other creatures, which is irrelevant), but it is just a description of what happens when God controls every aspect of our decisions and actions, usually (not always) according to a "nature" that he has also created in us. Both the words "compatiblist" and "freedom" are misleading.

-­ B -  ­

I would consider myself a "Calvinistic" Baptist. According to my understanding, sin entered this world through the disobedience of Adam and not as a result of the determining purpose of God. 

Actually, all Calvinistic and Reformed writers would affirm that sin came as a result of God's decree, so that it was determined at least in this sense. The difference is that many say that this is a "passive" or "permissive" decree, whereas my position is that there is no such thing as a "passive" or a "permissive" decree with God, that it is unbiblical and impossible for a divine decree to be "passive" or "permissive." 

It is correct to say that sin came through the disobedience of Adam, but this is not the debated issue. The issue is what caused this disobedience. To say that before the Fall Adam had "free will" is irrelevant unless by this "free will" is meant freedom from God. If this is what is meant, then this is paganism, not Calvinism or Christianity. If only freedom from sin is meant, then again this is irrelevant, since the relevant question in discussing divine determinism should be whether Adam was free from God to abstain from sin, not whether he was free from sin to abstain from sin. 

5. Augustine and Compatibilism 

Although the quotation below on which our discussion is based comes from an introductory guide to Augustine and his philosophy,13 our main focus here is in fact compatibilism and not Augustine. 

(1) Augustine's later reliance on the concepts of grace and original sin turn him into a determinist of the theological variety. Theological determinists hold that everything we do is caused by antecedent conditions, ultimately traceable to God. Although the later Augustine is clearly a theological determinist, it is more accurate to attribute to him the "soft" version of determinism known as compatibilism. Compatibilism is the view that, although all human actions are caused by antecedent conditions, it is still appropriate to call some of them "free." 

(2) Compatibilists want to distinguish actions that are internally caused from actions that are externally caused. Consider, once again, the case of our patient suddenly kicking her leg. Suppose that what caused her to do this was that her physician tapped her reflex. This would mean that the action was externally caused, and hence should not be considered free. Suppose, on the other hand, that what caused her to kick her leg was a desire for attention. According to the compatibilist, this would still be an antecedent condition that made it impossible for her to refrain from kicking her leg. So, she was not free in the libertarian sense. Nevertheless, the compatibilist would call the action "free" in so far as it was internally caused. Someone else did not cause the patient to kick her leg; she did it of her own accord. 

(3) Compatibilists make this distinction because they want to hold human beings morally responsible only for their "free" (i.e. internally caused) actions. If something outside of the patient caused her to kick her leg, then she cannot take the blame for it; if something inside her caused this, then she must take responsibility for it, even though she could not do otherwise. 

(4) Augustine is most charitably interpreted as a compatibilist. He, like most compatibilists, retains the language of free will because he knows that it is impossible to explain the human condition without it. Nevertheless, he commandeers this language to his own deterministic purposes. He wants to maintain that human beings cannot take credit for being good. The reason is that all good actions are caused by God's grace, an external cause. At the same time, he wants to maintain that human beings must take credit for being bad. The reason is that all bad actions are caused by our own wills. Since the will is an internal cause, we are responsible, even though we cannot do otherwise. 

(5) In his latest works, Augustine devotes himself to disparaging the alleged human dignity of free will and criticizing anyone who takes pride in it. He writes that human beings are "enslaved to sin," and that the best thing that can happen to us is to receive grace and thereby become "enslaved to God" instead. 

(6) Augustine's theodicy therefore makes a dubious contribution to the history of philosophy. On the one hand, it provides us with a personal yet intellectual confrontation with the problem of evil. On the other hand, it introduces the concept of free will, only to generate another set of concepts, grace and original sin, which cancel out any meaningful application of the concept of free will. In this way, Augustine reflects and reinforces the profound ambivalence toward human freedom that is endemic to Western thought.14 

Some of the above statements are questionable or at least imprecise, and what Augustine "knows" is sometimes just his opinion. 

For example, I disagree with the statement, "He, like most compatibilists, retains the language of free will because he knows that it is impossible to explain the human condition without it." Sure, Augustine might have thought that he needed to assign some kind of freedom to man, but that does not mean he was correct. In fact, I affirm the opposite position, that to retain ("the language of") human free will in any meaningful sense would make it impossible to explain the human condition, and not only that, but it would also make the doctrine of man inconsistent with the doctrine of God. 

Nevertheless, the above explanation of compatibilism is still a generally good demonstration of how the tension (self-contradiction) in compatibilism is rather obvious to those who are not biased in favor of it. 

I will offer some comments on each paragraph. Please remember that each numbered portion below corresponds to a paragraph with the same number in the above section: 

(1) 

Theological determinists hold that everything we do is caused by antecedent conditions, ultimately traceable to God. 

This is true of most theological determinists, but it is also finally incoherent. I would change this to say that all conditions are "immediately traceable to God." 

I affirm the meaningfulness of so-called "second causes" only in the sense that these are the means by which God executes his immutable decrees; however, these second causes are not themselves self-existent, self-determined, self-caused, or self-powered. Rather, all so-called "secondary causes" are themselves immediately caused and controlled by God, and the objects on which these secondary causes supposedly act upon react in ways that are also immediately caused and controlled by God. 

This is the only coherent and defensible position. When pressed, theological determinists who differ from this must rather quickly retreat into mystery and paradox. 

Compatibilism is the view that, although all human actions are caused by antecedent conditions, it is still appropriate to call some of them "free." 

Why is the word "free" in quotations here and in other places? It is probably because the writers realize, as I do, that it is a stretch to call compatibilist freedom "free." 

Compatibilist freedom is "free" only in a private sense. The word "free" is inserted and used by force - ­ it is not a natural description of compatibilism, especially when discussed in the context of divine determinism. You can call anything "free," but is it? 

(2) 

Note that freedom is relative ­ - you are free from something. The compatibilist wants to affirm that we are not free from God, but at the same time he wants to make freedom applicable to our action in some sense, so he sets the standard by which freedom is measured down from God to man. That is, instead of measuring freedom by whether our thoughts and actions are free from God, now we are "free" as long as we are free relative to other created things, and then we build moral responsibility on that. They just changed the reference point. 

But this is narrow and arbitrary. I can just as well change the standard or the reference point to whether we are free from a particular particle of dust on Neptune. If that particle of Neptune dust does not determine my thoughts and actions ­ - if I am "free" from it ­ - then in this sense I have "free will," and therefore I am morally responsible. Hooray! 

The compatibilist may answer, "The point is that the cause for an action is within me, so that I am not forced, and therefore I am free and responsible." But this use of "forced" and "free" is misleading, since if God is the cause of the cause of this action (as I affirm, and as many Calvinists admit), if he completely determines every detail of our very thoughts, desires, motives, and willingness...or to use the expressions in our quotation, if God is the external cause of the internal cause of our actions, so that the internal cause itself is not free even in the compatibilist sense, then the action is more than forced. It is so determined, caused, and controlled that it cannot even be described as forced, since to be "forced" at least leaves room for an internal conscious reluctance to perform the action that one is externally caused against his will to perform. But God has such a comprehensive control over all of our thoughts and actions that "forced" would be too weak to describe it. 

Thus, of course our actions are not "forced," because the word suggests that the one doing the forcing lacks complete control over the one being forced, so that there remains some resistance in the one being forced against the one doing the forcing, only that the one doing the forcing exerts greater power. Since "forced" implies such a scenario or relationship, it is far too weak to describe God's control over us; therefore, our actions are not "forced" even though we are not free. In fact, God's control over us is so exhaustive that the compatibilist seems oblivious to it, so he thinks that he is free because he does not feel forced, when the truth is that he is much less free than if he were forced. 

The compatibilist says that we are not free if our actions are externally caused, but that we are free if our actions are internally caused. However, the truth is that all our internal "causes" are themselves externally caused. All our thoughts and actions are in fact externally caused by God, so that our so-called internal causes are merely externally caused effects that lead to other effects (such as our actions). 

Therefore, in this sense, none of our thoughts and actions are free even from the compatibilist perspective, that is, unless they change the reference point to start after God has already externally caused our internal causes. But this is arbitrary ­ - it is cheating ­ - if we are going to permit this, then there is no point in arguing, since it would be clear that the compatibilist is just changing the reference point until he can use the word "free" in some sense. 

It is misleading and dishonest to just change the reference point so that we can affirm some sense of freedom; instead, we should consistently define freedom relative to the broadest metaphysical principle, which is God, since he is the only relevant reference point when we are discussing divine determinism. If we are not free from God in any sense, then we have no "free will" or "freedom" in any sense, that is, in the context of discussing divine determinism. 

(3) 

Note that "free" is illegitimately defined as "internally caused," even if everything about everything that is internal is in fact externally caused and controlled by God. We have just addressed this, so we will move on. 

Again, a main concern is the foundation for moral responsibility; meanwhile, no one seems to notice that the premise "responsibility presupposes freedom" has never been rationally established. But if we will place moral responsibility back on where it belongs ­ - that is, on God's sovereign decree to judge all of mankind ­ - then human freedom becomes irrelevant, and there would be no problem in discarding it altogether. 

(4) 

Note the twisting and turning needed to even explain compatibilism, let alone to defend it. 

Compatibilists say that good is attributed to God's grace and power because sinful man has no ability within himself for any spiritual good, but evil is attributed to man because he is already sinful and to do evil would be to act according to his nature. But then you ask them how that evil nature got there in the first place, and how Adam could have performed evil if he was created positively good, and they again retreat into mystery and paradox, or repeat some sort of argument based on free will, which begs the question. 

On the other hand, I can say, "The Sovereign God causes all things, and he is good and righteous in all that he does. Blessed be the name of the Lord." No objection can touch this. 

(5) 

Again, the question is how man came to be "enslaved to sin" in the first place if he was created positively good. Also, I would say that whereas man has become "enslaved to sin," sin itself has always been "enslaved to God." To say that sin is in any sense free from God would be to affirm dualism. 

If unsaved men are "enslaved to sin," and sin itself is "enslaved to God," and if redeemed man are "enslaved to God" in righteousness, this means that both unsaved and redeemed men are in fact "enslaved to God" ­ - the unsaved through sin, and the redeemed through righteousness. 

(6) 

Note the remarkable restraint that these writers show toward compatibilism. They have everything set up fairly well, enough so that they could blast it to smithereens, but they want to play nice. So they settle for saying that Augustine's is a "dubious contribution," and that the deterministic aspects of his philosophy "cancel out any meaningful application of the concept of free will." 

More clearly, this means that if a compatibilist truly affirms divine determinism, then what he says about human "freedom" or "free will" is meaningless ­ it is nonsense. These writers see this ­ - most Calvinists refuse to see it.

Summary

Here is the way to avoid nonsense: 

1. Affirm absolute divine determinism. 

2. Deny all human freedom. 

3. Base moral responsibility on God's sovereign decree to judge mankind. 

4. Answer almost all related objections just by doing the following: 

a. Affirm that God is just and righteous by definition.15 

b. Deny the unjustified premise, "responsibility presupposes freedom."16 

There is no twisting and turning, no philosophical gymnastics, and no need to redefine this and qualify that. God is sovereign, man is not free ­ - and there is no problem. This is biblical, coherent, simple, and defensible. 

There are no inherent problems with the above, so the above cannot be directly attacked as incoherent. If any of the above points is individually challenged as false, then depending on the angle of the objection, the debate moves to a presuppositional or exegetical level, which should be just about the same thing for the Christian. Then, to prepare for this, the Christian should study the relevant biblical passages and learn how to apply them, which is his spiritual duty in the first place.

Additional Comments

Here I will also briefly address the compatibilist's claim that Scripture itself teaches compatibilism. 

One of the favorite verses used to support compatibilism is Genesis 50:20, in which Joseph says to his brothers, who sold him to Egypt, "You intended to harm me, but God intended it for good to accomplish what is now being done, the saving of many lives." 

Now, for this verse to support compatibilism, it must convey the idea that the brothers' action was in some sense "free"; however, the verse tells us only about their intention ­ it says nothing about whether or not they were free, or whether or not the intention was free. 

Since the verse also tells us about God's intention, and since this intention differs from the brothers' intention, the compatibilist claims that this explains how God could immutably decree a human action, and yet the decreed action (in this case, the brothers' decision and action to sell Joseph) is still "freely" performed by the human person or people involved. 

However, the verse does not even remotely imply this ­ - it is a forced inference. The verse tells us what the humans intended, and it tells us what God intended, but it does not give us the piece of information that is needed to either establish or refute compatibilism, namely, the relationship between the men's intention and God's intention in this event (of selling Joseph). 

As it is, the verse neither establishes nor refutes compatibilism. To understand how this verse applies to compatibilism, one must first discover the relationship between man's will and God's will from the many other verses in Scripture that clearly address this. 

Now, as I have established in my books and articles, many biblical passages teach that it is God's will that directly determines man's will, whether for good or for evil. Therefore, when we apply Genesis 50:20 to our topic, we could paraphrase it to say, "God intended good for your evil intention," or "God caused you to have this evil intention, and he intended good when he did it," or "God intended good (the saving of many lives) when he caused you to intend this evil (the selling of Joseph)." 

To repeat, the verse itself does not state or imply that the brothers "freely" intended evil ­ - it just says that they intended evil. Then, it says that God intended good concerning this same (evil) decision/action performed by the brothers. Adding to this the premise (established by other biblical verses) that God exercises constant and complete control over all human thoughts and actions (whether good or evil), it follows that God intended good when he caused these brothers to intend evil. 

In this manner, God was righteous and the brothers were morally culpable. God was righteous since all that he does is righteous by definition, and it was a good decree that caused the evil intention in the brothers. The brothers were morally culpable since they indeed violated God's moral laws, as caused by God do to so. In all of this, there is no logical entry point for human freedom to come into the discussion at all, although it is often forced into the discussion. 

Apply a similar basic analysis to all the verses used by compatibilists, and you will see that none of them really support compatibilism. It appears that compatibilists are already so convinced of their position apart from Scripture that they easily "see" it taught in these verses even when they do not address the topic at all. 

It is self-defeating to embrace a tradition that really has been a burden to Calvinism rather than a support, making it incoherent and hard to defend, and making its adherents look like fools when they unnecessarily retreat into mystery and paradox. 

Granted, a bold and consistent Calvinism is even more offensive than a half-baked and inconsistent Calvinism, but it is also biblical, coherent, and irrefutable.  

6. "Soft" Determinism 

Let me make an observation about the term "soft determinism." Although I do not completely oppose its use, it does seem to be loaded language, and allows its adherents to appear better than they really should. 

Now, "soft" determinism is used in contrast with "hard" determinism. Using these terms, the popular Reformed/Calvinistic position, which is compatibilism, would be called "soft" determinism, whereas my position would be called "hard" determinism. 

The former is "softer" in quality and/or in quantity regarding the level and/or amount of control (determinism) that God exercises over his creation, whereas "hard" determinism is absolute, affirming that God exercises complete (in level or quality) and comprehensive (in amount or quantity) control over everything. 

But this means that "soft" determinism is really partial determinism - ­ that is, partial (not full) either in quality or in quantity, or both. And if what God does not absolutely determine can still actually happen, then this means that there is another (one or more) determining power in the universe. When we are speaking of God's relation to man, attributing only partial determinism to God necessarily implies attributing partial determinism to man also. So this becomes a version of dualism. 

In other words, one who believes that God absolutely determines everything is a full determinist, since he believes that God fully determines everything, in terms of both quality and quantity, and in terms of both the level (extent) and the amount of control exercised. To believe anything less than this is not full; therefore, it is partial. 

Also, since "soft" determinism really means partial determinism, this also necessarily means that it is partial indeterminism (that is, partial non-determinism). Granted, since Calvinists usually (claim to) affirm greater determining power to God than man, this indeterminism is a very "soft" indeterminism, but it is still partial indeterminism. 

It becomes just a matter of emphasis as to which term one wishes to use. So the term "soft" determinism is at least a little misleading, making its adherents look better than they really should. To some, it has the effect of sounding "softer," kinder, and less extreme. But if we don't let the language deceive us, we see that it is really partial determinism, weak determinism, incomplete determinism, or "soft" indeterminism. And, at least by implication, dualism. 

On the other hand, since we who affirm "hard" determinism in fact affirm just "determinism," there is no need to qualify it if not for a contrast or a challenge from a partial version. I do not need to constantly say that I am a full human unless I am in a discussion involving partial humans ­ - I am just human. And in the context of a contrast,  what we affirm is really full determinism, not "hard." Also, when we flip it around, we can confidently say that we affirm non-indeterminism (zero indeterminism) when it comes to the level and amount of control that God exercises over his creation.

Of course, the above does not directly argue about the merits of the two views, but it is an observation about the loaded language often used.

7. Determinism, Fatalism, and Pantheism17 

Sometimes people ask me about fatalism. Most of these are polite and teachable individuals who would like to know what determinism and fatalism are, how they differ from each other, and how my position differs from fatalism.18 And then, there are some who outright accuse me of teaching fatalism. The following will suffice as my response to both groups of people. 

By some definitions, the terms "determinism" and "fatalism" are similar. Some English dictionaries would define these terms in ways that fail to make a clear distinction between them. Merriam-Webster is too ambiguous for our purpose, and Webster's New World Thesaurus considers the two synonymous. Certainly, even those who affirm "soft" determinism and accuse me of teaching fatalism would not want to accept these ambiguous definitions, since then they would become "soft fatalists" at best. The definitions in theological and philosophical literature might be more precise. 

By "fatalism," I refer to the teaching that all events are predetermined (1) by impersonal forces and (2) effected regardless of means, so that no matter what a person does, the same outcome will result. 

By "determinism," I specially refer to theological or divine determinism. It is the teaching that the personal God of the Bible has intelligently and immutably predetermined all events, including all human thoughts, decisions, and actions, and that by predetermining both the ends and the means to those ends. 

These are not my private definitions, but they are consistent with the common usage in theological and philosophical literature. 

For example, Dr. Alan Cairns is a respected Presbyterian pastor and theologian, whose orthodoxy is generally unquestioned, and who is a "soft" determinist himself.19 He defines "fatalism" as follows: "The theory of inevitable necessity; the heathen oriental philosophy that all things are predetermined by blind, irrational forces and that therefore there is no point in human effort to change anything."20 

Now, before the sight of God, who dares accuse me of teaching that "all things are predetermined by blind, irrational forces"? To do so would be to commit the sin of slander, and some have indeed committed this sin against me by their false accusations. Rather, I affirm that it is the personal and rational God who has predetermined all things. 

And who dares accuse me of teaching that all things occur as predetermined regardless of means? I affirm that God determines all things by immutably foreordaining and directly controlling both the ends and the means. Therefore, it is not that there is "no point in human effort," but that it is God who also controls human efforts as well as the effects of these efforts to produce the predetermined results. 

It is dangerous to speak of things that you do not understand, and it appears that those who accuse me of teaching fatalism are ignorant of what fatalism really means. 

Just as some Arminians falsely accuse the Calvinists of teaching fatalism, these Calvinists who affirm "soft" determinism turn around and accuse me of teaching fatalism, but neither the Arminians nor the Calvinists have any idea what fatalism means. These people do not have the courtesy to even look up the word in a theological dictionary to make sure that the accusation applies. And they certainly don't have the minimal theological background to understand what fatalism means without looking it up. 

As for those of you who are attentive and teachable ­ - unlike those who make ignorant and slanderous accusations, pretending to be scholars when they are not - ­ I do not blame you for asking about this, since there is much false information being circulated. 

Rest assured that what I teach, although it is a stronger version of determinism than the one that you are accustomed to hearing, it is very different from fatalism. In fact, it is as different from fatalism as theism is different from paganism and atheism, since I affirm that all things are determined by the personal and sovereign God, and not by "blind, irrational forces." 

Therefore, do not let ignorant people confuse or deceive you. 

Then, I will also point out something that is commonly misunderstood, namely, some people assume that one has more freedom under "determinism" and that things are more comprehensively determined in "fatalism." But this is false. 

The fact is that things are more determined in divine determinism than in any other scheme. Under "fatalism" (as properly defined above), an event is predetermined in such a way that the same outcome will result "no matter what you do," that is, regardless of means. But under divine determinism, although it "matters" what you do, "what you do" is also immutably predetermined in the first place. And it "matters" because there is a definite relationship between "what you do" and the outcome, although even this relationship is determined and controlled by God.21 

Thus, I affirm divine determinism and not fatalism, but not for the reason that people sometimes shun fatalism. I affirm divine determinism not because things are less controlled in this scheme ­ - they are more controlled ­ - but I affirm it because it is the revealed and rational truth. 

While I am at it, there are those who charge that my determinism and occasionalism amount to pantheism.22 But this is also stupid and ignorant. If pantheism affirms that "all is God," then it means that when God acts on any object, he is always acting only on himself. But this is far from what I affirm. Rather, I affirm that God has created spiritual and material entities that are other than himself, but that he nevertheless completely sustains and controls. To say that God completely controls X is very different from saying that God is X. 

In fact, for my opponents to charge me with pantheism because I affirm God's direct and total control over all things implies that they believe, under theism, God cannot have direct and total control over anything that is not himself.23 But then, since the created universe is not God, by implication they must affirm that God has no direct and total control over anything in the created universe. 

That is, by their accusation against me, they imply that God is identified with anything over which he has direct and total control. Then, since they deny my teaching that God has direct and total control over all things, and since they at the same time deny that God is identified with the universe, it follows that they believe God has no direct and total control over anything in the universe.24 And if this is what they believe, then they are not even Christians. 

This is the implication of what they believe from their accusation against me. Of course, I am not actually accusing them of believing this, but it is the logical implication, and the charitable conclusion is that they are at least inconsistent. 

In any case, as with the charge of fatalism, these people have no idea what pantheism means, and to accuse me of explicitly or implicitly teaching pantheism is nothing but slander. 

In other words, the objection betrays the assumption that God is (identified with) whatever he completely controls. And because Vincent Cheung teaches that God completely controls everything, including all human thoughts and decisions, and including all corporeal and incorporeal objects and the relationships and interactions between them (so that one moving object has no inherent power to move another object when the former strikes the latter, but that it is God who actively and directly controls them both, and that a "secondary cause" can at best be a relative term that cannot attribute any inherent causative power to any created object, etc.), then Vincent Cheung must be teaching pantheism. 

Now, after pointing out the unjustified assumption (that God is whatever he completely controls), and after pointing out that I reject this assumption, it remains that this is their assumption, on the basis of which they formed their accusation against me. It is at this point that the objection backfires. Because their assumption is that God is identified with whatever he completely controls, this means that if they believe that God completely controls anything at all, then God must be identified with that object, and this makes them at least modified or partial pantheists. Holding constant their assumption, the only logical alternative is for them to deny that God completely controls anything in his creation, but then they are not even theists anymore. 

Therefore, logically speaking, those who use this objection affirm either partial pantheism or finite godism, neither of which allows them to consistently call themselves Christians. On the other hand, I affirm that God completely controls everything about everything that is anything, and that this does not imply that he is identified with those things that he controls; rather, his creation is something other than

8. "Apparent" Contradictions 

Many Reformed writers assert that there is an "antinomy," paradox, or so-called apparent contradiction between divine sovereignty and human responsibility. I disagree ­ there is no such apparent contradiction. For example, Packer makes this mistake in his book on evangelism. As Luther also points out in The Bondage of the Will, people make up contradictions where there is none. Calling it an "apparent" contradiction does not make it better, if it's all imaginary in the first place. Reformed writers should be much more careful about this. 

It is indeed possible that two propositions can appear contradictory to a person when they are in fact not logically contradictory. The problem, then, is with the person and not the propositions. Maybe he has made a mistake in reasoning, or maybe he lacks some information that he needs to correctly understand the propositions. 

I contend that (and this is the unpopular point) as long as two propositions appear contradictory to a person (whether or not they are logically contradictory), he cannot truly affirm both propositions. This is because for two propositions to be contradictory (whether in appearance or in reality), it necessarily means that to affirm one is at the same time to deny the other. Therefore, to affirm two contradictory propositions is really to deny both in reverse order. 

That is, if X and Y are contradictory, then X = not-Y and Y = not-X. Then, to affirm both X and Y is the same as affirming not-Y and not-X, which is to deny both X and Y, only in reverse order. Of course, since not-Y = X and not-X = Y, then this means to deny both X and Y is really to affirm both in reverse order. But again, to affirm both is to deny both in reverse order, so on ad infinitum. Therefore, to affirm two contradictory propositions (whether contradictory in appearance or in reality) is to say nothing, or worse than nothing. 

I agree that when a person sees two propositions in Scripture that appear to him to contradict one another, he should believe that the contradiction is only in his own mind, and that the propositions appear to contradict only because of his own lack of understanding or fallacious reasoning, and not because there is a real logical contradiction. But I would insist that as long as the two propositions appear contradictory to him, he still cannot truly affirm both at the same time. 

Since Scripture really does not contradict itself, this is just another way of saying that a person cannot truly affirm a biblical proposition until he truly and correctly understands what the proposition means. Or, a person cannot truly affirm a part of Scripture that he does not truly and correctly understand. If he does not understand what a proposition means, then whatever he is affirming is not really that proposition, but some other proposition in his mind. This point is correct by necessity. To oppose it would be to suggest that one can affirm a proposition that has not even entered his mind, which is nonsense. 

In other words, when a person reads propositions X and Y, but misunderstands at least one of the propositions so that his mind perceives X and A, and if X and A contradict each other even though X and Y do not contradict, then it would appear to the person that X and Y contradict each other even though it is really X and A that contradict each other, since the person thinks that he is thinking about X and Y, when he is really thinking about X and A. 

A biblical proposition misunderstood becomes a non-biblical proposition in one's mind, and a biblical proposition can certainly contradict a non-biblical one, or two non-biblical propositions can certainly contradict each other. This is what really happens when a person sees an "apparent" contradiction in Scripture. One or both sides of the alleged contradiction is really not the biblical proposition, because it has been distorted or misunderstood. 

Or, a person might correctly understand propositions X and Y, but then he also affirms some other false premise Q, which appears to make X and Y contradict each other when by themselves they do not contradict. 

One example is the relationship between divine sovereignty (X) and human responsibility (Y). By themselves, there is no contradiction between the two, whether actual or apparent. However, the two will appear to contradict once you impose the premise "responsibility presupposes freedom" (Q). All of a sudden, it appears that X contradicts Y. In fact, if Q is true, then this would be a real contradition, and not only an apparent one. But once we realize that Q is false, even the appearance of a contradiction disappears. The key, then, is to correctly understand what Scripture says, and to avoid adding to it false ideas that do not come from Scripture at all.

To summarize, if a person understands what the Bible is saying in every instance, then in no instance will two propositions in the Bible even appear contradictory to him. This is because in reality no two propositions in the Bible contradict each other. But if the person does not always correctly understand the Bible, then in some cases two propositions might appear to contradict. In those cases, he can still "know" that the contradiction is only "apparent," since both propositions are found in the Bible. However, he cannot affirm both as long as they still appear contradictory to him. What must he do? He must study to grasp the true meaning of each proposition, and when that happens, he will perceive that the contradiction never really existed in the first place.

Failing to understand and acknowledge the above, Christians are often too quick to scream "Mystery!" and "Paradox!" when confronted with biblical propositions that are obviously non-contradictory unless made contradictory by some spectacular distortion or some strange extra-biblical assumption. This is not a sign of genuine reverence. It is in fact an implicit denial of the clarity and the unity of Scripture, and a tremendous insult to the wisdom and integrity of God, who inspired the Scripture for us to understand, believe, and obey. In the light of this, it appears almost trivial to mention that this illegitimate appeal to mystery and paradox also unnecessarily grants ammunition to the enemies of the faith.

Thus if we wish to truly honor the greatness of God, we should boldly and reverently affirm that Scripture is clear, and clearly non-contradictory in every respect. 

9. The "Sincere Offer" of the Gospel 

The doctrine in question has been called "the free offer," "the well-meant offer," and "the sincere offer" of the gospel.25 My position is that it makes God into a schizophrenic fool. It is unbiblical and irrational, and thus must be rejected and opposed. 

First, we do not know beforehand who are numbered among the elect and who are numbered among the non-elect, and Scripture commands us to preach to every person. Therefore, we must not try to determine for ourselves who are the elect and the non-elect, and then preach the gospel only to those whom we consider the elect. Rather, we must indiscriminately preach the gospel to all men. 

On the other hand, it is wrong and sinful to preach the gospel as if there is a chance for even the non-elect to obtain faith and be saved, as if God is sincerely telling them that he desires their salvation and that they could be saved (Luke 10:21; John 6:65). We do not know the precise content of God's decree in election (as in who are the elect and who are the non-elect), and so we must not act as if we know. However, it does not follow that we should speak as if election is false when we preach the gospel. 

Instead, in our message, we must make it clear that God seriously commands every person, whether elect or non-elect, to believe the gospel, thus making it every person's moral obligation to believe ­ - those who do will be saved, and those who do not will be damned. But we must not present this as a "sincere offer" of salvation from God to even the non-elect. 

Faith comes only as God's sovereign gift, and God has immutably decided to withhold this gift from the non-elect, but rather to actively harden them; therefore, to sincerely offer salvation to the non-elect as if God desires them to be saved and as if it is possible for them to be saved would be to lie to them in God's name. There is no real or sincere offer of salvation to the non-elect, but only a real and serious command that they can never obey, and one that God will enforce against them with hellfire. 

Again, this does not prevent us from indiscriminately preaching the gospel to all men, since it is neither our right nor duty to pick out the elect and preach only to them, or to pick out the non-elect and exclude them. The point is that we must not present the gospel as a sincere offer to all, as if God's "desire" can differ from his decree, as if God could or would decree against his "desire,"26 and as if it is possible for even the non-elect to be saved. Rather, we must present the gospel as a serious command to all, as if it is required of all to believe (Acts 17:30), and as if God intends to summon the elect and harden the non-elect by the same preaching of the gospel (2 Corinthians 2:15-16). 

In other words, the content and the preaching of the gospel could be and should be completely consistent with the doctrines of election and reprobation, as well as all other related doctrines. For many people, to affirm the "sincere offer" is merely an excuse to believe like a Calvinist, but preach like an Arminian. 

It follows that, when preaching the gospel (when we are dealing with the grace that saves), we should not tell our hearers that God loves all of them, but we should boldly declare that God loves only the elect and desires (and thus has decreed) their salvation, and that he hates the reprobates and desires (and thus has decreed) their damnation (Romans 9:13). 

In the light of this, let us now summarize the biblical understanding and approach of evangelism. 

We are duty-bound to indiscriminately preach the gospel to all men for at least three reasons: 1. God commands us to preach the gospel to every person, 2. We do not know and should not try to discover beforehand who are the elect and who are the reprobates, and 3. The purpose of preaching the gospel is not only to summon the elect, but also to harden the reprobates. 

It is right and proper to announce that God desires to save only the elect and has chosen only them for salvation, and that he will grant faith only to them, so that only they can believe. And it is right and proper to announce that God desires to damn the reprobates and has chosen them for damnation, and that he will not only withhold faith from them, but that he will also actively harden their minds against the gospel, making it impossible for them to believe. 

Just as we should not and could not discover beforehand who are the elect and who are the reprobates, neither must our hearers try to determine for themselves whether they are among the elect or the reprobates, and then make that the basis as to whether they should call on God for salvation. In other words, upon hearing the gospel, one should not say to himself, "God saves only the elect, and I am probably among the reprobates anyway, so I should not even try to seek God for salvation." In fact, one who stubbornly thinks this way even when confronted with a clear explanation of the gospel of sovereign grace might indeed be one of the reprobates, and God has chosen to confirm this person in his damnation by means of this persistent deception. 

Rather than concealing or misrepresenting the eternal decree of God to our hearers, when preaching the gospel, we should explain to them the truths that has immediate relevance to sin and grace, and to election and reprobation. But more than that, we should present to them the whole system of biblical doctrines, as clearly and comprehensively as we can manage and as time allows (Acts 17:23-31; Matthew 28:19-20; Luke 14:27-33). Then, we must admonish our hearers to sincerely and earnestly seek God for salvation through Christ by the means of grace, such as prayer, listening to sermons, and reading the Bible. 

Since it would be impossible to sincerely seek or call upon God unless his power is already at work within a person's heart, those who indeed sincerely obey and call out to God to save them through Christ are surely among the elect, in whom God has already started his sovereign work of conversion. But those who insincerely or superficially obey, and who after a while fall away, or those who refuse to obey at all, are among the non-elect, whose minds God has hardened even more by the preaching of the gospel (2 Corinthians 2:15-16; 2 Thessalonians 1:8). 

Therefore, in rejecting the so-called "sincere offer" of the gospel, the preaching of the gospel is neither diminished nor rendered narrow and selective. Instead, the above is a consistent and necessary application of the explicit and implicit teachings of Scripture concerning the sovereignty of God, election and reprobation, and the preaching of the gospel. It is a biblical and coherent view that values the preaching of the gospel, and indeed the propagation of the whole system of biblical doctrines, to all men everywhere. Moreover, it acknowledges what Scripture explicitly teaches about the purpose and the effect of the indiscriminate preaching of the gospel, that is, to summon the elect and to harden the reprobates.27

10. "Forced to Believe" 

I have talked much about "inconsistent" Calvinism in various places and from various perspectives. Here I would like to use A. A. Hodge to give you an example of what inconsistent Calvinism can make a person say. 

But we will first get something out of the way. In using Hodge as an example, I am not challenging his orthodoxy, or his dedication to Scripture, Christianity, and Calvinism. In fact, it is precisely because his orthodoxy is generally unchallenged that I prefer to use him as an example, so you will see that the problem is not found only in crazy heretics or bumbling idiots. 

Now let us begin. 

In the context of discussing creation ex nihilo, Hodge writes: 

Although the absolute origination of any new existence out of nothing is to us confessedly inconceivable, it is not one whit more so than the relation of the infinite foreknowledge, or foreordination, or providential control of God to the free agency of men, nor than many other truths which we are all forced to believe.28 

In other words, the biblical doctrine of creation is "inconceivable," but that's all right because "many other" biblical doctrines are also inconceivable ­ - and that makes it all better! 

Are we expected to swallow this? The better question would be whether the Bible talks about its own doctrines this way. Does the Bible say that its own doctrines are rationally inconceivable?29 Does the Bible say that its own doctrines are rationally so difficult to accept, that we must be "forced to believe" them?30 

If we answer in the negative ­ - if the Bible does not call its own doctrines "inconceivable" and that we must be "forced to believe" them ­ - then in this instance, and in all other instances when Hodge writes this way, he is not representing what the Bible really teaches. Rather, he is measuring biblical doctrines against some anti-biblical standard. Since what is biblical is incompatible with what is anti-biblical, then if he insists on affirming both, then of course the biblical doctrines all of a sudden become "inconceivable," and of course one would feel as if he is being "forced to believe" them. But the problem is in Hodge's own mind, and not in the biblical system of doctrines. 

Many Calvinists talk like Hodge does ­ - STOP IT! It is not a sign of faith and reverence to sound like a lunatic and then drag God into it. 

What? You are trying to defend Christian doctrine, and you are calling your own worldview "inconceivable," and that you are "forced to believe" it? It is this kind of unbiblical and irrational statements that non-Christians often exploit. Now, what do you think I should do if someone were to bring this quote up in a debate? For the proper defense of the gospel, I must renounce Hodge, at least on this point. I must say that, at least on this point (but also on many other points), he neither speaks for me nor for Scripture ­ - he is wrong. 

In contrast, I say that although they might not be exhaustively grasped (since God's mind is infinitely greater than ours, and therefore we cannot exhaustively learn all its contents), all that God has revealed ­ - all biblical doctrines ­ - are conceivable, understandable, reasonable, defensible, and undeniable. 

Because unbelievers are sinful and irrational, it is impossible for them to affirm that which is holy and rational, and therefore unless God directly acts upon their minds and changes them, they will never believe. However, all the biblical doctrines are easy for the elect to believe because God has granted them the gift of faith and made them rational by enlightening their minds. 

Biblical doctrines are inconceivable only if measured against some irrational premise or standard. What we need to do is to cast aside these false principles and assumptions that are not part of the biblical worldview in the first place. But if you are going to take principles and assumptions from two contradictory worldviews and try to jam them together, then, yes, you are going to end up with something inconceivable. Just don't call that Christianity or Calvinism. 

Hodge's errors and inconsistencies are widespread, and common to most Calvinists that I have read, although I try to read only the best. So this is a serious problem, and I would like to give more examples so that you will know what to look out for when studying theological works. Nevertheless, since in my own writings I have already addressed all the problems that are present in Hodge,31 I will offer only very brief comments for each example, and sometimes I will just state my position and move on, lest this articles become too long. 

The permission of sin, in its relation both to the righteousness and goodness of God, is an insolvable mystery, and all attempts to solve it only darken counsel with words without knowledge. It is, however, the privilege of our faith to know, though not of our philosophy to comprehend, that it is assuredly a most wise, righteous, and merciful permission; and that it shall rebound to the glory of God and to the good of his chosen.32 

Sin occurs not just by bare permission. Sin is not "an insolvable mystery," since Scripture explains it to us. Hodge makes the issue "dark" enough already without help. 

God possessing infinite foreknowledge and power, existed alone from eternity; and in time, self-prompted, began to create in an absolute vacuum. Whatever limiting causes or conditions afterwards exist were first intentionally brought into being by himself, with perfect foreknowledge of their nature, relations, and results. If God then foreseeing that if he created a certain free agent and placed him in certain relations he would freely act in a certain way, and yet with that knowledge proceeded to create that very free agent and put him in precisely those positions, God would, in so doing, obviously predetermine the certain futurition of the act foreseen....33 

Yet God's permissive decree does truly determine the certain futurition of the act; because God knowing certainly that the man in question would in the given circumstances so act, did place that very man in precisely those circumstances that he should so act.34 

This is exactly how many Arminians and Open Theists explain God's sovereignty, that God exercises his "sovereignty" over men merely by placing them in certain situations in which God foreknows how they would think and act, rather than directly acting upon their minds to determine their thoughts and actions. What Hodge says here is not just inconsistent Calvinism ­ - it is not Calvinism or Christianity at all. 

We have the fact distinctly revealed that God has decreed the free acts of men, and yet that the actors were none the less responsible, and consequently none the less free in their acts. ­ Acts 2:23; 3:18; 4:27, 28; Gen. 50:20, etc.35 

He talks like this throughout his book, but whereas some of these passages explicitly state that the acts were predetermined by God, none of them say that those acts were free. In fact, it is rather obvious that these passages explicitly prove the very opposite of what Hodge claims, that all those acts were predetermined by God in a way that the men were not free. The "freedom" thus revealed is purely in Hodge's question-begging imagination. 

Moreover, Hodge never proves that responsibility presupposes freedom, which is an unbiblical premise that has tainted most Calvinistic writings and crippled many of their arguments, and it is a premise that I have repeatedly challenged and conclusively refuted. 

The admission of sin into the creation of an infinitely wise, powerful, and holy God is a great mystery, of which no explanation can be given. But that God can not be the author of sin is proved ­ 

1st. From the nature of sin, which is, as to its essence, want of conformity to law, and disobedience to the Lawgiver. 

2d. From the nature of God, who is as to essence holy, and in the administration of his kingdom always forbids and punishes sin. 

3d. From the nature of man, who is a responsible free agent who originates his own acts. The Scriptures always attribute to divine grace the good actions, and to the evil heart the sinful actions of men.36 

Just because Hodge is puzzled about something does not mean that it is a "great mystery, of which no explanation can be given." It is not a mystery if the Scripture clearly explains it, and it does. 

Then, none of the three points prove that God cannot be the author of sin. 

The first point does not show that God cannot be the author of sin; rather, if God is the author of sin, the first point just shows us what he has authored. 

The second point also fails. It does not even begin to tell us why God cannot be the author of sin; rather, if God is the author of sin, it tells us that his act of authoring sin is a holy act. To "author" sin is not the same thing as to sin. 

The third point begs the question, because in the previous pages of the book, he has tried but fail to show that man is a "free agent who originates his own acts." Then, the second part of this third point, although commonly assumed, is outright false. Yes, Scripture blames sinful actions on men, and says that God will judge them, but it does attribute them to the sovereign decree and active power of God. 

In the best Calvinists, you will usually find at least one major blunder like those above every several pages; in the average Calvinists, you will sometimes find several on every page; and the worst Calvinists are really Arminians. This is no exaggeration. 

If we are going to be Christians, then let's discard all non-Christian premises, and if we are going to be Calvinists, then let's renounce all Arminian assumptions. Hodge is so severely crippled in his reasoning because he is dragging all the weight of Arminianism and humanism with him while he tries to be a Calvinist. Most Calvinists are doing the same thing. 

The doctrine of unconditional decrees presents no special difficulty. It represents God as decreeing that the sin shall eventuate as the free act of the sinner, and not as by any form of co-action causing, nor by any form of temptation inducing, him to sin.37 

This is against both the Scripture and the Reformers.38 In fact, even the term "co-action" would be too weak to describe God's active determination of the sinful acts of men. 

It is a frightful but undeniable truth that multitudes, even in Christian countries, are born and brought up in such circumstances as afford them no probable, even no possible, chance of obtaining a knowledge of religious truth, or a habit of moral conduct, but are even trained from infancy in superstitious error and gross depravity. Why this should be permitted neither Calvinist nor Arminian can explain; nay, why the Almighty does not cause to die in the cradle every infant whose future wickedness and misery, if suffered to grow up, he foresees, is what no system of religion, natural or revealed, will enable us satisfactorily to account for.39 

Hodge did not write this paragraph, but he is quoting Archbishop Whately with approval. But then Whately must have never heard of a "system of religion" called Christianity, and what it says in Romans 9 and other places. 

The question assumes that God's sole purpose for a person is his holiness and happiness, but this is not true. It is as if this person is completely oblivious to what Scripture teaches, and what Calvinism affirms. 

The decree of election only makes the repentance and faith of the elect certain. But the antecedent certainty of a free act is not inconsistent with its freedom, otherwise the certain foreknowledge of a free act would be impossible. The decree of election does not cause the faith, and it does not interfere with the agent in acting, and certainly it does not supersede the absolute necessity of it.40 

This paragraph made me laugh out loud, and I couldn't help but smile even looking at it again just now ­ - it so badly begs the question. 

He says that divine foreknowledge must be compatible with human freedom, or else divine foreknowledge would be impossible. That is, he first insists that there is human freedom, and if this contradicts divine foreknowledge, then divine foreknowledge would be impossible (and not that human freedom is false). However, since divine foreknowledge is also true, then human freedom must be compatible with divine foreknowledge.

But how about saying that since divine foreknowledge is true, then human freedom is false?41 With Hodge, the compatibility of the two are not logically or biblically demonstrated, but asserted by force because he is unwilling to let go of either divine foreknowledge or human freedom, and especially human freedom, at least in this paragraph.

As for "The decree of election does not cause the faith," either he has something very peculiar in mind that he fails to explain (I can't imagine what), or it is an outright denial of Calvinism and Christianity.

There is just as great an apparent difficulty in reconciling God's certain foreknowledge of the final impenitence of the great majority of those to whom he offers and upon whom he presses, by every argument, his love with the fact of that offer; especially when we reflect that he foresees that his offers will certainly increase their guilt and misery.42

This is just a convoluted way of admitting that the unbiblical doctrine of the "sincere offer" is incoherent. Since Hodge falsely thinks that it is taught in Scripture, he is compelled to swallow it. But it is not an "apparent difficulty" – the problem is called schizophrenia. For Hodge, the difficulty is compounded when he considers that God foresees that the non-elect's rejection of the gospel will increase their guilt. 

But the biblical doctrine is straightforward and coherent. There is no "sincere offer." God commands men everywhere to repent ­ - the elect will obey and be saved, but the reprobates will disobey and be damned. Moreover, by God's active decree and providence, the reprobates are already sinful and destined for hell, and the hearing and rejection of the gospel increases that guilt, and this is exactly what God wants to happen (2 Corinthians 2:14-16). There is no "apparent difficulty." 

[Continuous creation] is inconsistent with our original and necessary intuitions of truth of all kinds, physical, intellectual, and moral. Our original intuitions assure us of the real and permanent existence of spiritual and material substances exercising powers, and of our own spirits as real, self-determining causes of action, and consequently as responsible moral agents. But if this doctrine is true these primary, constitutional intuitions of our nature deceive us, and if these deceive us, the whole universe is an illusion, our own natures a delusion, and absolute skepticism inevitable.43

Hodge is trying to refute continuous creation. Right now, the issue is not whether continuous creation is correct, but the issue is that his refutation is terrible. 

Among other things, this is a spectacular display of begging the question. He says that continuous creation contradicts our intuition, so that if continuous creation is right, then our intuition is wrong, and if our intuition is right, then continuous creation is wrong. 

So what? First, he fails to show that our intuition is universal. My own intuition certainly does not tell me all that he is claiming here. Second, he fails to show that our intuition is infallible; we have no idea whether it is right or wrong. Third, he fails to show that our intuition is necessary. He claims that if we deny our intuition, then "absolute skepticism" is inevitable, but he fails to show that we must reject absolute skepticism in the first place, or that there are no other ways to avoid skepticism other than to trust our intuition. 

Then, when he attempts a positive construction on the subject, he writes: 

The properties or active powers have a real, and not merely apparent, efficiency as second causes in producing the effects proper to them; and the phenomena alike of consciousness and of the outward world are really produced by the efficient agency of second causes, as we are informed by our native and necessary intuitions.44 

But he fails to show that our intuition really tells us all of this (mine doesn't), nor does he establish that it is "native and necessary"; yet, he is trying to establish the biblical doctrine of providence on this flimsy basis. 

Even we, if we thoroughly understand a friend's character, and all the present circumstances under which he acts, are often absolutely certain how he will freely act, though absent from us.45 

This also begs the question. Hodge is addressing the topic, "Prove that the certainty of a volition is in no degree inconsistent with the liberty of the agent in that act." But he fails to prove anything here. Just because he inserts the word "freely" does not mean that it belongs there. I can just as easily say, "Even we, if we thoroughly understand a friend's character, and all the present circumstances under which he acts, are often absolutely certain how he will act, though absent from us; therefore, his action is not free but determined." 

Again, my purpose is not to show how bad Hodge is; in fact, he is already better than many people. Rather, my purpose is to encourage you to abandon the false assumptions and poor habits exhibited by many Christian theologians, including many respected Reformed and Calvinistic authors. 

Instead, we must adopt a thoroughly biblical, coherent, and defensible theology. Such a theology will edify the elect, silence the reprobates, and glorify the God whose written revelation exhibits perfect rationality, without any "inconceivable" nonsense that we are "forced to believe."  

11. Few are Chosen 

Does the doctrine of election imply that only a chosen few will end up in heaven, and thus, the majority will go to hell? Does Matthew 7:13-14 conclusively support this notion? 

Let us read what those verses say. Since Matthew 22:14 is also often mentioned in connection with this question, we will include it in our discussion.

Matthew 7:13-14 (NASB) Enter by the narrow gate; for the gate is wide, and the way is broad that leads to destruction, and many are those who enter by it. For the gate is small, and the way is narrow that leads to life, and few are those who find it.

Matthew 22:14 (NASB) For many are called, but few are chosen. 

The doctrine of election indeed teaches that only the chosen ones will end up in heaven, but the concept of election in itself does not necessarily imply whether that number will be great or small, or whether it will be greater than the number of the reprobates. 

When it comes to the number of those who have been chosen for salvation, Scripture promises that there will be many saved. For example, God said to Abraham, "Look up at the heavens and count the stars ­ - if indeed you can count them....So shall your offspring be" (Genesis 15:5). Scripture teaches that God is mainly referring to his spiritual offspring, and not his natural descendants. 

Then, Revelation 7:9-10 reads: 

After this I looked and there before me was a great multitude that no one could count, from every nation, tribe, people and language, standing before the throne and in front of the Lamb. They were wearing white robes and were holding palm branches in their hands. And they cried out in a loud voice: "Salvation belongs to our God, who sits on the throne, and to the Lamb." 

So we know that many will be saved in absolute terms, or relative to zero. But this does not tell us whether the number of people saved will be greater relative to the number of people damned. Some people have failed to note this point and thus have mistakenly inferred from these two passages that the number of those saved will be greater than those damned in the end. 

The question is how many will be saved relative to the unsaved, not relative to zero. The two verses from Matthew appear very relevant. One says "few are those who find it" and the other says, "few are chosen." If these two verses are broadly addressing the question, then here is our answer ­ - not only will the number of the saved be smaller than the number of the unsaved, but it will be much smaller, since Jesus is contrasting between the "many" and the "few." 

There are those who assert that these two passages cannot function as a broad answer to our question, because the contexts suggest that they are addressing only the first century situation. At this time, I am unconvinced that this is correct, but I am willing to examine additional exegetical arguments in favor of this position. 

In considering our question, it is important to dismiss right away some of the popular but empty arguments. 

For example, it is popular to argue that the number of the saved will certainly be much greater than the unsaved because God will surely seize the "victory" in the end; that is, he will never "lose" to Satan in the battle between good and evil, and over human souls. Some of the most prominent Reformed theologians of the past and the present have argued this way. 

But this argument is silly ­ - it is arbitrary and self-defeating. It is arbitrary because it assumes that "victory" in this situation is defined by numbers, but they fail to produce biblical evidence or any kind of rational support for using this premise or standard. Then, the argument is self-defeating because if we were to define "victory" by sheer numbers, then even if one person ends up in hell, it would necessarily mean that God has failed to obtain total victory over Satan and evil. But many people are already in hell. 

Although it is used by more than a few Reformed theologians, this argument carries a certain dualistic flavor. It implies that Satan is a powerful evil force with whom even God himself must contend, that God will win some and lose some, even if he will win more than he loses in the end. What a pathetic view of God! What an anti-scriptural understanding of redemptive history! When a Calvinist is using this argument (or any other like it on any other topic), he is being inconsistent with his own otherwise sound and biblical beliefs. 

Now, those who end up in heaven are saved because God has predetermined their salvation, and those who end up in hell are damned because God has predetermined their damnation. So how could God "lose" when all those who will end up in hell will be there only because God himself has predetermined to send them there? 

God could only "lose" if what he has predetermined fails to happen, or if what he has not predetermined still happens anyway. For example, if some of those whom God has chosen for salvation fail to be saved and end up in hell, then we could say that God loses; or, if some of those whom God has chosen for damnation somehow end up in heaven, then God also loses. But it is plainly stupid to say that God loses if more people end up in hell than in heaven even if this is exactly what he wants, and even if this is what he has predetermined to happen. In fact, if God had decided that every sinner should end up in hell, then we could say that he loses even if one person manages to enter heaven. 

So, whether more people will end up in heaven than in hell in itself has no direct relevance to whether God "wins" or "loses"; rather, if what happens is exactly what God has predetermined to happen, then he wins. 

There are other arguments that people use to show that the number of the saved will be greater than the number of the unsaved, but almost all of them are ineffective, if not entirely absurd. 

I say almost all of them are ineffective, because there is one doctrine that, if shown to be biblical and relevant, could establish that the number of the saved will indeed be greater than the unsaved. I am referring to postmillennialism. The doctrine teaches that, according to numerous prophecies in both the Old and New Testaments, before the return of Christ, the gospel will increasingly become successful and influential, not only in the social and political spheres, but especially in the hearts of men, so that it will dominate the world for an extended period of time. The most biblical and coherent version of postmillennialism affirms that the "millennium" began in the first century, and will terminate at the return of Christ. Meanwhile, although the influence of the gospel will fluctuate, it will eventually overcome all oppositions to become the dominating spiritual force in the hearts of men, and thus also in society in general. 

Now, if postmillennialism is correct, then it is indeed possible that more people will be saved than unsaved, that more will end up in heaven than in hell. But I say that this is merely possible, because we must still establish two things to make way for such a conclusion. 

First, we must still establish that the two passages from Matthew (and all other similar passages) are indeed referring to the first century situation, and not for all time. 

Second, we must establish, if at all possible, that the period of time during which the gospel will dominate the hearts of men, and during which more people will become Christians than those who will remain non-Christians, will be very long. In fact, this period must be long enough to compensate for all the previous centuries in which more people remained non-Christians (including false converts) than those who became Christians. 

This is why I said that postmillennialism must be both biblical and relevant to our question for it to be an effective argument in favor of more people ending up in heaven than in hell. If the period in which the gospel will dominate the world is not long enough to compensate for all the previous centuries of relative darkness, then the number of unsaved people could still be greater than the number of those who will be saved. 

Of course, if it is impossible to satisfy the first condition above, then the second one is also excluded. In other words, if the two passages from Matthew are indeed saying that, as a general rule for all time, more people will remain unsaved than those who are saved, then by necessary implication, the period during which the gospel will dominate the world in the hearts of men will not be long enough to put more people in heaven than in hell. 

We can be certain about one thing, that all things will happen exactly as God has predetermined, and therefore he "wins" even if more people will end up in hell than in heaven.  

12. Revelation of Grace 

I am reading your Systematic Theology right now, and I must say that my entire thinking has been shaken. 

In the past month, I have come to accept the Calvinistic doctrines, and your written materials have taught me so much more from Scripture in the past few days. 

It is incredibly refreshing to hear a pastor preach from just the Bible and make strong cases from it.

I am so grateful to God that He has chosen me, and your teachings on election and reprobation prove to me more and more just how blessed I am that God has had mercy on me, not because of anything in me, but so that He may glorify himself. 

I still have much of your work to read, but I just wanted to say thank you and let you know how God has used you to change my thinking. 

Thanks for your comments. 

What we call Calvinism, of course, is the Bible's own teachings concerning the nature of God, man, redemption, and salvation. It teaches that God is sovereign, just, and gracious, that man is depraved, helpless, and hopeless, that Christ has surely but only redeemed the elect, and that the only way for sinful man to be saved is for the sovereign God to save him, actively and powerfully, and then also permanently. 

If not for the numerous deviations from these biblical teachings, there would be no need to identify it with any person's name, except that of Jesus Christ. But as it is, Calvinism is nothing more than a systematic expression of the biblical revelation of grace. It is the gospel, and it is what we must believe and preach. The elect will respond with gratitude and reverence; the reprobate will respond with disgust and scorn. 

The Bible also teaches us about God's power, wrath, and justice in reprobation. But even the reprobates can do nothing except by God's active power, as Luther says, energizing and even compelling them to sin, in accordance with the evil nature that God has also placed in them after the pattern of Adam. Thus nothing is free in any sense from God's active power and control. 

Just as the potteries for noble purposes cannot make themselves out of a lump of clay, neither can the potteries for common purposes make themselves, but it is God who actively and sovereignly creates and arranges both to be what they are. This is what Scripture consistently teaches.  

13. The Doctrine of Hell 

Below is a summary of my position regarding the doctrine of hell. Some of the points (or the specific details within those points) are unpopular and controversial. I am aware of the objections. I have carefully considered them, and I possess biblically and rationally definitive answers against them. Some of these I have already provided in my books and articles, and I plan to address the remaining ones in future writings. Thus until undeniable biblical arguments are offered to refute any of the following points, or any of the details in the following points, I shall continue to insist that all of them are biblical and coherent, and thus necessary and unnegotiable. 

I am so strongly stating my position on these points because some of my beliefs on the subject are passionately opposed by many people, including those who call themselves Reformed and Calvinistic Christians. However, the truth is that if we were to remove all the unbiblical, unnecessary, and unjustified assumptions that they affirm, it would become clear that the following points represent the only biblical and coherent position. 

That said, I present to you the following ten points: 

1. Hell is a place created for reprobate spirits, both angels and men. 

2. Hell is a place whose inhabitants are sovereignly and unconditionally chosen and created by God for damnation.46 

3. Hell is a place in which God exacts non-redemptive but vindictive punishments upon its inhabitants. 

4. Hell is a place in which God actively causes endless, conscious, and extreme torment for its inhabitants. 

5. Hell is a place in which God displays his justice, righteousness, wrath, and power, and through which he glorifies himself. 

6. Hell is a place that God has sovereignly created, and everything that God does is right and good by definition; therefore, it is right and good that God has created hell.47 

7. Hell is a place that God has sovereignly created, and through which he glorifies himself; therefore, it is sinful to disapprove of or be repulsed by its existence or purpose in any way.48 

8. Hell is a place that God has sovereignly created, and through which he glorifies himself; therefore, it is right and good to offer reverent and exuberant praise and thanksgiving to God for its creation, existence, and purpose. 

9. Hell is a place that God warns about in Scripture, and that Christ preached about in his ministry on earth; therefore, it is right and good for believers to preach about hell, and to preach about the only way to avoid it, which is faith in Jesus Christ, sovereignly granted by God to those whom he has chosen for salvation. 

10. Hell is a place that God has predestined for the reprobates; therefore, although it is right and good to indiscriminately preach the gospel to all men, so as to summon the elect and harden the reprobates, it is wrong and sinful to preach as if God sincerely desires the salvation of the reprobates or as if it is possible for the reprobates to receive faith and be saved.49

14. Evil and Privation 

We talked a while back about God being the author of evil in the sense that God is the cause of all things. Yet evil is a privation and not really an essence, is it not? I ask because I heard someone on a radio program say, "Evil is not an ontological essence in and of itself. It is a deprivation, or lack of good." 

We must first clearly define the problem or question. Let me see if I understand what you are getting at. You seem to imply that since evil is a privation, that since it is not a "thing" in itself, then this is inconsistent with God being the cause or author of all things. I am not certain that this is your point, but it appears to be, so I will proceed with the assumption that this is your point. If it is not, you can reply to clarify. 

Now, we might say that evil does not have an ontological status like good, since God himself is Goodness, and there is no counterpart Evil. If this is what we mean, then it is biblical and true; otherwise, we would be affirming dualism, or the view that Good and Evil are two equal or almost equal self-existent eternal powers that fight against each other. From this perspective, it is correct to deny evil an ontological status in itself. 

However, this is not inconsistent with my position. In fact, it is consistent only with mine. That only Good has ontological status means that Good must be the cause of all things, and therefore it must be "good" that there is evil (although evil is not good in itself). This is just another way of saying that God was good and righteous when he actively decreed that there should be evil, and then proceeded to actively carry out this decree. 

As I have shown in my books and articles, there is no biblical or rational problem with this; on the other hand, any other view would have a hard time explaining evil, and thus must relegate it to "mystery," or end in dualism.  

15. Arguing by Intuition

Gregory E. Ganssle recently published a book entitled Thinking about God.50 In one chapter, he explains freedom and determinism, and concludes by stating that he favors "libertarian free will." Note how he argues: 

Now, why should you agree with me about the nature of human freedom? Let me give you two reasons. First, it seems strange to hold someone morally responsible for an action if that action is not up to him. If determinism is true, then no action is up to the one who does it. At least no action is up to the one who does it to a high enough degree to make it reasonable to hold the person responsible. Yet we do hold each other morally responsible. The best explanation is that some actions are up to us and we are responsible for them. 

Second, libertarian free will makes the most sense of our deliberation. We often find ourselves deliberating between alternatives, and we are convinced that our deliberation has a real effect on the outcome. The decision we come to, upon deliberating, seems to be up to us. If freedom is not of the libertarian kind, then deliberation does not make as much sense. Thus, libertarian freedom is the better concept of freedom, and compatibilist freedom is no freedom at all.51 

This is terrible, terrible! I feel dirty just for typing it. There are numerous falsehoods and fallacies in these two paragraphs,52 but I will first focus on only those words that are relevant to our topic, which is intuition. 

Note the words that I have put in italics above. If we were to debate the issue of human freedom, or Calvinism vs. Arminianism, is Ganssle going to come at me with "seems strange," "we are convinced," and "seems to be"? I can just as readily say it "seems right," "I am not convinced, and "seems not to be"! Well, he is convinced of the premises that seems to him as true, but I can be just as convinced of the opposite. 

Once you mix "seems like" as an essential part of your argument (instead of a non- essential part of your presentation, such as in a mere illustration), you have departed from the realm of strict rational argumentation. Also, you have just lost the right to forbid your opponent from using exactly the type of same arguments, and to him it "seems like" that you are wrong. 

When it comes to Calvinism vs. Arminianism, you may have heard something like, "If God is absolutely sovereign, then he controls even our decisions, and in this sense we do not have freedom or free will, but we sense (we are convinced, we feel, we think, it seems like, etc.) that we do have freedom or free will in our daily activities; therefore, Calvinism must be wrong." My response is that I sense or intuit, or it seems to me, that this person is an idiot; therefore, he is an idiot.53 

If he disagrees with my intuition, then why do I have to agree with his? If he tells me that I do not really sense or intuit that he is an idiot, then I can just as readily tell him that he does not really sense or intuit freedom. That is, if he can claim to know what is really going on in my mind, then I can just as readily claim to know what is really going on in his mind. 

Ganssle is claiming to know what we all intuit. Among other things, he asserts: 

1. I intuitively affirm a standard of ethics such that "it seems strange to hold someone morally responsible for an action if that action is not up to him." 

2. I am "convinced that our deliberation has a real effect on the outcome." 

3. The decision that I come to, upon deliberating, "seems [to me] to be" up to me. 

However, unless he constructs his claims upon an objective and infallible foundation, then if he can claim to know what I intuitively affirm in my own mind, why can't I also claim to know what he intuitively affirms in his mind? In fact, I deny that I intuit any of the three items above. Thus I affirm that "we are convinced" that he is wrong, and that he "seems to be" quite confused and arbitrary. Unless he stops arguing by intuition as he does, he cannot with consistency reject my claims. 

So the whole thing amounts to purely subjective nonsense. 

When debating Arminians, or when reading their literature, you will notice that many of them base many of their crucial premises on intuition, and often on intuition alone. Ganssle's pattern of argument is very common with them ­ - they just assume that their needed premises are true because to them they seem to be true. They say that they are convinced that these premises are true (often they say that we are all convinced), and then they proceed on that basis. One of these premises is that we all seem to have free will; another is that it would seem unjust to hold someone morally accountable who does not have free will. At least in these instances, their ultimate standard of truth and morality is not God's revelation but their own intuition. Their "seems like" seems unquestionable to them. 

However, all the "seems like" could be wrong. To paraphrase Clark, it might be that we think we have free will not because we know something (that we have free will), but because we don't know something (that we really don't have free will).54 It might be that some people intuitively think certain things are true because they are ignorant. Luther puts it stronger, saying that we think we have free will because we have been deceived by Satan.55 In any case, the debate cannot be settled by intuition alone.

Many atheists also argue this way. For example, since they reject revelation, they cannot appeal to it as a foundation for ethics. Then, when they turn to sensation, those who are less stupid realize that they cannot derive anything from sensation. Thus some of them turn to intuition, and claim that by it they know certain ethical principles. But other than the problems already mentioned (that intuition is subjective, non-universal, fallible, etc.), why must we obey intuition?

It is most unfortunate that many Reformed/Calvinistic writers also appeal to intuition to construct their arguments and their systems. When they do this, it is often because they are trying to assert some of the very same ideas and premises that the Arminians and the atheists affirm, such as unbiblical concepts of freedom and justice. But since these false premises cannot re