M  O  R  E      W  O  R  K

FOR

Mr. JOHN WESLEY:

OR, A VINDICATION OF

THE DECREES AND PROVIDENCE OF GOD,

From the Defamations of a late printed Paper,

ENTITLED

"THE CONSEQUENCE PROVED."

by Augustus Toplady

[from the electronic version of The Works of Augustus Toplady, A.B. (London: 1794) Vol. V. pgs. 354-448. This edition is available via Google Book Search.]

ADVERTISEMENT

Expect, that this publication will, as usual, be followed by a succession of penny and two-penny squibs. Probably, I shall take no notice of them. Mr. Wesley, it seems, has between two and three hundred lay-preachers in his connection. Their name is legion, for they are many. It is impossible, therefore, from their multitude, that they and their leader should not have the last word, if they are so determined. The latter has lately declared, in print, that he has been "fighting about words, for almost these thirty years." Doubtless, therefore, the last word must, in his estimation, be particulary worth fighting for. And (unless he should publish anything at all to the purpose) the last word he is welcome to have. A man would have an hopeful task of it, who should waste his free-time in play at see-saw with almost three hundred such wise and genteel antagonists,

"Who then talk most, when least they have to say:"

And some of whom have already shewn themselves not worthy of even being pilloried in a preface, or gagged at a pamphlet's end.

To those who know me not, it may seem needful to declare, that as much as I disapprove of Wesley's distinguishing principles, and the new cunning with which he circulates them; I will bear not the least ill-will to his person. As an individual, I wish him well, both here and after. As a reviler, he lies (in a way of argument) in the mercy of those he defames. I make, however, no scruple to acknowledge, that the manuscript of the following sheets has lain by me, some weeks, merely with a view of striking out, from time to time, whatever might favour of undue asperity and intemperate warmth. If I any where, however, express myself strongly, it is owing to the necessity I was under of exposing Mr. Wesley's unmanly and dishonest methods of attack.

Broad Hembury,
Nov. 28, 1771.

M  O  R  E     W  O  R  K
FOR
Mr. John Wesley, &c.

If  it be possible, says the apostle, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably with all men: plainly intimating, that, in some cases, this is not possible. For, what if other men will not live peaceably with us? what if some, like the troubled sea which cannot rest, are perpetually casting up mire and dirt against the gospel of God,  and against all that embrace it? Are such indefatigable slanderers to be let alone? The apostle's own conduct says, No. His unavoidable contest, with false teachers of that age, are demonstrative of the necessity, which, occasionally, even the meek and the pacific are under, of sharply rebuking such: to the end that, if God so please, they may become sound in the faith; or, at least, learn not to blaspheme, nor to increase unto more ungodliness.

Our civil constitution is not more the envy of neighboring nations, than our religious establishment is the eye-sore of Papists, Pelagians, and Arminians:¹ a triplicate, who too well agree in one. From the first settlement of our national Church, quite down to the present hour, it has been the ambition and the labour of those²factions, to destroy her, either by sap, or by storm: and, when both these methods have miscarried, to adulterate and discolour the pure and undefiled system which they found themselves unable to overthrow.

Common justice commands me to acknowledge, that no man has strove more to distingush himself in this illaudable warfare, than Mr. John Wesley: and, at the same time, stubborn fact constrains me to add, that few warriors have acquitted themselves more contemptibly. This gentleman, in his plenitude of ardour for the cause, has made long, ample, and repeated trial of all the three methods above mentioned: the silent sap, the vigorous assault, and the artful adulteration. but all with success. The mine will not spring. The assault cannot be carried. The adulteration is too gross to incorporate. What must he do? Prevail he cannot: to fly, he is ashamed. In such an exigence, all that remains for him is, to flourish his reed, to throw an occasional squib, and scorn to confess either the impiety or the impracticability of his enterprize. - But reeds are still unable to batter Churches: and squibs (such as "The Consequence proved") are only calculated to amuse children, and terrify old women. Yet he goes on, to throw the one, and to brandish the other: why? because his hatred of the heavenly doctrines is total; and he resolves, that its perseverance shall be final. May divine grace, in mercy to his soul, supersede the former, and forbid the latter!

The adventurer, who embarks on such an expedition, as that which has, hitherto, engrossed the attention of Mr. Wesley, should be prudent, as well as daring. He has, I acknowledge, as much of the insidious in his composition, as he has of the acid: and it would be difficult to say, which predominates. But cunning is one thing: discretion is another. A few seeming grains of certain virtues, called humility and moderation, would have conducted, in some measure, to promote his views, by screening them. The example of Arminius might have taught him this piece of theological policy, so needful in the ring-leader of a sect. To give that erroneous Dutch-man [Arminius] his due, he either had, or appeared to have, some remains of modesty and candour: which, more than all his arguments, contributed to his acquision of disciples. But Mr. Wesley is for adding the lion to the fox. He wishes, not only to wheedle, but to thunder the Church out of her Calvinism. Partly, perhaps, in resentment for his having been (very deservedly) thundered out of the Church. A deliverance, by the by, on which I most heartily congratulate our sacred mother. And, I believe, her genuine sons may be safely confident (notwithstanding the late transactions at the Feathers Tavern), that she will not dispense with subscriptions to her Calvinism, quite so complacently, as she resigned Mr. John Wesley.

The complacency, however, is far from reciprocal. This discarded divine, like some discarded soldiers, cannot wholly divest himself of that military air, which, under such circumstances, can, at best, but excite pity, instead of commanding respect. He is still, like Mahomet, for propagating his religion by the sword. Peals of anathemas are issued, and torrents of the lowest calumny are thrown out, against all who abide by the doctrines of the xxxix articles. The gentleman's own

Sic volo, sic jubeo; stet, pro ratione, voluntas!

is expected to carry all the efficacy of demonstration, on penalty of his utmost malediction. But, let me tell him, that the thinking part of mankind, especially those of them whose eyes are spiritually opened, will pay no more regard to his empty fulminations, though launched, quafi à tripode, with all the assumed importance of oracular infallibility; than our magnanimous Elizabeth paid to the bloated menaces of pope Pius V. He continued to roar; and she continued to reign. Pope John's authority may have some weight with such men as Messieurs Walter Sellon, Haddon Smith, and Thomas Olivers: but not an inch beyond the purlieus of ignorance, prejudice, and superstition, will his dictatorship extend.

Such of the public, as have condescended to peruse a pamphlet, entitled, A Letter to the Rev. Mr. John Wesley, relative to his pretended Abridgement of Zanchius on Predestination; must be sufficiently apprized of the nature and occasion of my contest with this veteran. Another edition of that letter having been called for, and published last winter; the veteran aforesaid, by way (or rather, in lieu) of reprisal, prints, in the month of August, 1771, another paper, folded and priced as usual, twelve pages for a penny: though a saint, who, surely, ought to be most scrupulously just in all his dealing, might rather have been expected to have fixed the price at only three fourths of a penny; seeing, of the twelve pages, no more than nine are filled: which every reader, competently skilled in arithmetic, will grant, are but three fourths of the dozen. Besides: it was piously and disinterestedly written, as a therapeutic, to retrive the erroneous; and as a prophylactic, to preserve the orthodox. Of course, the cheaper the antidote, the more extensive: and the more extensive, the more useful. But Mr. Wesley feels the force of the argumentum ad crumenam too deeply, to vend his remedies at a rate so nicely conscientious. He had, last year, if we may take his own word for it, near 30,000 followers. And supposing each follower (as, to be sure, each is in duty bound) to buy one, at least, of these penny papers: the farthing extraordinary amounts, in the whole, to thirty pounds, fourteen shillings. A sum, of whose value, saints, of his complection, are as devoutly sensible as other men. - Poor Robin's Almanack, alas! though twice as valuable, goes but for half the price of The Consequence proved.

Let us now bring these nine pages to the test. Their title claims our first attention: "The Consequence proved." What consequence? even this! that, upon the scriptural and Church of England principle of predestination to life, it "naturally and necessarily follows, that one in twenty, suppose, of mankind, are elected; nineteen in twenty are reprobated: that the elect shall be saved, do what they will; the reprobate shall be damned, do what they can." These diabolical positions, enough to chill every reasonable and religious man with horror, are Mr. Wesley's own offspring, both as to sentiment and language. He had, indeed, the matchless effrontery to publish them, originally, as mine: and to render the audacious forgery complete, closed all with these words, "Reader, believe this, or be damned: witness my hand, A. T." Now, whence came it, that this concluding clause was omitted in The Consequence proved? Was it, because Mr. W. found himself ashamed to repeat so unparalleled a falsehood? I apprehend, not. For ought appears, he is still as dead to feelings of shame, as he is blind to the doctrine of God. The reason, probably, was, his utter despair of being able to torture a line of Zanchius into any thing like proof of my obtruding the doctrine of election upon pain of damnation. And he might well despair of this. Whom do I condemn? whom do I impiously consign to future punishment? I condemn no man. I dare not pronounce concerning any man's eternal state. Herein, I judge not even Mr. Wesley himself. Though I must tell him, that, if it be (as I most sincerely wish it may) the divine will to save him; he has an exceeding strait gate to pass through, before he gets to heaven. In the mean while, I return to "The Consequence proved."

The very title is inaccurate. The inferences, which this writer pretends to deduce, are not a consequence, but a chain of consequences. Let us see, whether this mighty consequence-drawer is able to support the consequences drawn.

The proof opens thus. "Mr. Toplady, a young bold man, lately" [i. e. very nigh two years ago] "published a pamphlet, and extract from which was soon after" [i. e. about four months after] "printed, concluding with these words; the sum of all is this: one in twenty (suppose) of mankind, &c."

Mr. W's present mode of phraseolog is as pregnant with craft, as his conduct is destitute of honour. Observe: "an extract from which," i. e. from which pamphlet: "concluding with these words--." Now, would not any indifferent reader still imagine, that "those concluding words" were actually "extracted" from the "pamphlet" itself? And yet, nothing can be wider from fact. The "words," which he insinuates to have been "extracted," were not extracted from the pamphlet, but spun from his own daring invention. What shall we say of a man, who first hatches blasphemy, and then fathers it on others? Nay, who adds crime to crime, by indirectly persisting in the falsehood, even after the falsehood has been detected and publicly exposed? His forehead must be petrified, and quite impervious to a blush.

The person who, in private conversation, utters a designed untruth, is deservedly branded with disgrace. But the man, who sits down, and deliberately writes a known, wilful, palpable lie to the public, may, it seems, still be "a saint," and a "precious labourer in the Lord's vineyard! away with such "saintship;" away with such "precious labours." - Again: the man, who forges my name, in order to obtain a trifling sum of money, is deemed guilty of a capital offense. But the man, who subjoins my name to³ blasphemous propositions of his own coining; is to be treated as "an ancient, venerable servant of Christ, whose whole life has been devoted to the glory of God and the good of souls!" If all his "ancient services" were of a similar cast, even Arminianism itself must expunge them from the list of those good works, which it supposes to be meritorious of salvation. Unless Mr. Wesley's Arminianism coincide with the Popish maxim, that bad works, if done to heretics, are transubstantiated into good ones. 

But there are two charges, alledged against me, to which I shall assign a moment's attention: because, though pitiably frivolous, they are nevertheless, somewhat curious and uncommon. I am, it seems, "young," and "bold." To the first, I in part plead guilty. I have been but between nine and ten years in orders, though ordained as soon as my age would permit. - The merits of the second allegation, I leave to the decision of others. However, let me be as "bold" as I will, I cannot be bold in a better cause. Was I even as bold as a lion, it would, according to the maxim of a very wise writer, be a mark, not of perverseness, but of righteousness.⁴ The apostle tacitly commends a prophet for being not only bold, but very bold in asserting the sovereignty, efficacy, and freeness of divine grace in opposition to the merits and free-will of man: Isaiah is very bold, and faith, concerning God, I was found of them that sought me not, I was made manifest to them that asked not after me.⁵ When the opposers of the Christian system are shameless, why should its defenders be spiritless? As to my inconsiderable self, I blush not to tread in the steps of one, to whose faith I subscribe from the utmost of my heart. If the apostle Paul, with his whole assemblage of gifts and graces (such as, probably, never shone before, nor will shine again, in any mere man, while the world endures,) could request the prayers fo God's people; much more may I, the weakest of the weak, and the unworthiest of the unworthy, supplicate the intercession of those who love the truth, and intreat them to pray, on my behalf, that utterance may be given to me, that I may open my mouth boldly to make known the mystery of the gospel; that therein I may speak (and why not write?) boldly, as I ought to speak.⁶

After all, the charge of boldness (in the sense Mr. Wesley uses the term) comes more than a little out of character from his pen. I could never have dreamed of such an indictment, from such a plaintiff. Had I publicly distorted and defamed the decrees of God; had I, moreover, advanced so many miles beyond boldness, as to lay those distortion and defamations at the door of another; bold as I am affirmed to be, I could never have looked up afterwards. I should have thought every miscreant I met, and honester man than myself. But Mr. John seems a perfect stranger to these feelings. His murus abenëus has been too long transferred from his conscience to his forehead. On the whole, could I descend so exceeding low as to retaliate on this writer, in his own way; I should thus return the compliment in kind: Mr. John Wesley, an old, audacious man, lately published. - But I neither will, nor can, adopt his scurrility. I had rather let the ancient offender pass unchastised, than soil my hands in the operation. I proceed, therefore, to his next paragraph.

"A great outcry has been raised on that account" [viz. on account of the lying extract from Zanchy; and on account of the blasphemous inferences, and the forgery, thereto annexed]: " A great outcry has been raised on that account" [it should have ran, on those accounts], "as though this was not a fair state of the case; and it has been vehemently affirmed, taht no such consequence follows from the doctrine of absolute predestination. I calmly affirm, it is a fair state of the case. This consequence" [a mistake again for these consequences] "does" [another mistake for do] "naturally and necessarily follow from the doctrine of absolute predestination, as here" [it should be, there] "stated and defended by bold Mr. Augustus Toplady." Thus far the honest and accurate Mr. Wesley. On the other hand, bold Mr. Augustus no less "calmly affirms", that the "great outcry," at which bold Mr. John cries out, was most justly raised against the said John; who, by his deep-laid, but soon detected cunning, and by his avowed vacuity of candour, truth, and shame, hath, in the general estimation of all unprejudiced people, whether serious or prophane (the most respectable of the Arminian party themselves not excepted), gotten a wound and dishonour, and a reproach which all his whining and winding sophistry will never be able to wipe away.

With the same determine calmness, I do also affirm, that his mode of stating the important controversy concerning predestination, is so far from "fair," that it has nothing at all to do with the subject: but was invented, and adopted, merely to discolour the true state of the question, and to spread a mist before the eyes of such superficial readers, as might be disposed to take matter on the word of Mr. John. Which sort of readers, by the way, have, to that gentleman's no small disappointment and mortification, proved abundantly fewer than he wished and expected.

He goes on: "Indeed, I have not leisure to consider the matter at large." Then, why did he dabble in it at all? A chain of principles, like those termed Calvinistic, each successive link of which depends on the foregoing, till you arrive at the first; indispensably requires a consideration "at large." A partial view of the subject is equivalent to none. A disjointed, unconnected heap of doctrines, like that espoused by this man of no leisure; a farrago of opinions, made up of incoherent shreds; may, indeed, be considered by scraps, without any injury to the whole. It is just the same, where you begin, and which you take. But there is a harmony, there is a correlative dependency, in the system of grace: and not to advert to these, resembles transposing the notes in some capital piece of music. Mr. Wesley, therefore, must either find "leisure to consider the matter at large;" or they, who have so considered it, will, with equal certainty and justice, set him down for a pitiful nibbler at the file he cannot bite.

The truth is, he has jumped, hand over head, into the engagement, the progress of which does not answer his expectation. hence his willingness to quit the field - for want of leisure: but, in fact, for want of success. And who must cover his retreat, but the heroic Thomas Oliver, alias Olivers? And who is this redoubtable Thomas? Truly, neither more nor less than a journeyman shoemaker, now retained by Mr. Wesley, as a lay-preacher, at the rate of ten pounds per annum: which, I suppose, Thomas prefers to earning double the sum by working at his proper trade.

Pharaoh's remark, though malicious and untrue in its original application, is not always unjust: Ye are idle, ye are idle; therefore ye say, Let us go from our honest employs, and pretend to serve the Lord. But, the rougher the foal, the sleeker the ass. The idle shoemake is, to give him his due, a very laborious Arminian. Though revolted, in some respect, from the gentle craft of St. Crispin; his genius hath constant employ, and very ample scope for exertion, in following the boisterous craft of Mr. John Wesley; to whom he, moreover, stands related, as bully in chief; in chief, did I say? I had forgot the Rev. Mr. Walter Sellon. Prunella claims precedency of leather. Thomas is only second in commission.

But seems it not rather strange, that Mr. Wesley, a man of eduction, and who has given proof upon proof, that he is indued with a very competent portion of assurance; should not be ashamed to skulk, for shelter, under a cobler's apron? The Jews will by no means work on the sabbath; but they set Gentiles to work, without scruple. Mr. John affects to decline undertaking the argument in form: and the cobler (still doomed to be an under-strapper) is delegated to supply Mr. John's lack of leisure, as well as of leather. Already has the journeyman made an effort (with some of Mr. John's own assistance) to white-wash the said Mr. John. He might as well have laboured to blanch the Æthiop, or to emaculate the leopard. but how can Robin Hood be better employed, than in standing up for Little John? It must be granted, that Little John appears something taller on the shoulders of his man. I acknowledge, too, that there is, upon the whole, some proportionable congruity between the pedestal and the image. Yet this mode of exhibition is not without it's danger. I once saw, when a boy, a rope-dancer parading round May-fair, on the shoulders of a booth-keeper. Bor some time, the carrier and the carried engrossed the acclamations of the wondering populace. When, alas! either by a stumble of the elevator, or through defect of equilibrium in the elevatee, down came the latter; who, after such dishonour, was glad to trudge it back on foot, instead of venturing to re-ascend the living pedestal. Should the above illustration be deemed not sufficiently sublime for so towering a subject; take another, from the pen of a late nobleman. "I remember," says his lordship, "to have seen a" [Popish] "procession at Aix la Chapelle, wherein an image of Charlemagne is carried on the shoulders of a man who is hid by the long robe of the imperial saint. Follow him in the vestry, you see the bearer slip from under the robe, and the gigantic figure dwindles into an image of the ordinary size, and is set by among other lumber."⁷

The case, in reality, stands thus. The master does me an injury, but subjoining my name to what I never wrote. On which, I publicly call the aggressor himself to account. The aggressor slinks behind one of his drudges, who says, "Fight me in my master's stead." I answer, No. Ne futor ultra crepidam. What hast thou to do with controversy? Away to thy stall, and leave Little John to fight his own battles. My business is not with the man, but with the master. I most certainly (at least in my present view of things) shall never descend to uncase that hog in armour. This Mr. Wesley could not but foresee. He therefore did shrewdly, to slip his own neck out of the collar, and thrust in that of a man who must strut, with the collar on his neck, unnoticed and unmolested, till his dying day.

After all, let us see whether Mr. Wesley has extricated his own neck with any degree of dexterity. In order to this, we must examine, whether the consequences, which he labours to squeeze from the doctrine of predestination, as stated by me, will stand.

I. The first pretended consequence was, that "one in twenty, suppose, of mankind is elected; nineteen in twenty are reprobated." Mr. W. seems, at present, to give up this abominable inference. He does not so much as attempt to prove it, in the paper now under examination. Which paper, therefore, does not, even in appearance, answer it's title. This  consequence, at least, is not proved. Nay, it is thrown by, and smothered in silence. Nor do I wonder at it. I should, indeed, be surprized to find even Mr. Wesley's own writings (and, surely, if they cannot, nothing can) put him out of countenance. But he had a motive, not at all related to shame, for flipping that infamous paragraph out of sight. The credit of his perspicacity, as a reasoner, absolutely required it. For, could any thing be more palpably absurd, than to charge us with peremptory consequence, affirmed to be drawn from absolute premises, which said peremptory consequence was (even in terminis) consessedly hypothetic, and founded on a mere vague supposition? The word "suppose" is the basis of the whole conclusion. But we never did, nor can, "suppose" that no more than "one in twenty" is elected. Therefore the basis melts, and the entire consequential fabric (like the rope-dancer at May-fair) tumbles to the ground.

Observe, reader, for it is worth thy while, how suddenly Mr. Wesley's polemical weather-glass rises and falls. In his printed letter to the late truly reverend and amiable Mr. Hervey, he charged that incomparable man, and the Calvinistic party in general, with holding the reprobation of "nine out of ten."⁸ In March, 1770, we were charge with holding, as above, that "nineteen in twenty are reprobated."⁹ In February in 1771, we were charged with holding the reprobation of "forty-nine out of fifty."¹⁰ And now, about five months after, the glass is suck 30 degrees lower, and, in "The Consequence proved," stands again at "nineteen out of twenty." Next spring, I suppose, it will rise to ninety-nine out of an hundred. A very capable gentleman this, to ascertain the number of the elect and reprobate, who reprobates his own calculations almost as often as the clock strikes! - So much for the first consequence. Now for the second:

II. "The elect shall be saved, do what they will." By doing "what they will," is evidently meant, be they finally, ever so unholy, and be their lives ever so immoral. The expression must signify this, or it can signify nothing. It is either a paltry, sophistical quibble upon the word will, and so evaporates into a term without a fixed idea; or it imports, that, upon the footing of absolute election, the personal sanctification and practical obedience are unnecessary to salvation.

The point of enquiry, then, is, Whether the elect themselves can be ultimately saved, without being previously sanctified by inherent grace, and (if adult) without evidencing that sanctification (according as ability and opportunity are given), by walking in the way of God's commandments? I affirm, with Scripture, that they cannot be saved without sanctification and obedience, Yet is not their salvation at all precarious: for, that very decree of election, by which they were nominated and ordained to eternal life, ordained their intermediate renewal after the image of God, in righteousness and true holiness. Nay, that renewal is, itself, the dawn and beginning of actual salvation: This is life eternal, to know thee the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent.¹¹ Whence the apostle; By grace ye are saved, through faith.¹² And again, Who hath saved us, and called us with an holy calling.¹³ Sanctify, therefor, of heart and life, is, not barely a prelude to, but even a part and initiatory anticipation of, the glory which shall be revealed.

The elect could no more be saved, without personal holiness, than they could be saved without personal existence. And why? because God's own decree secures the means as well as the end, and accomplishes the end by the means. The same gratuitous predestination, which ordained the existence of the elect, as men; ordained the purification, as saints: and they were ordained to both, in order to their being finally and completely saved in Jesus Christ with eternal glory.

The doctrine of election is a doctrine of mere revelation. Though human reason, when defecated from prejudice, and sanctified by grace, cannot but assent to it, as a scripture truth: yet, reason would probably, never have discovered it with certainty and clearness, had not God expressly made it known in his written word. Consequently, from that written word we are to learn the true nature and effects of electing grace: since God himself must be best acquainted with his own decrees.

The Holy Spirit, making the apostle's pen the channel of unerring inspiration, thus inspired him to write: according as he [God the Father] hath chosen us in him [in Christ] before the foundation of the world, that we should [not, "be saved do what we will;" but] be hoy and without blame before him in love. Eph. i. 4. - Election is always followed by regeneration: and regeneration is the source of all good works: whence the apostle adds; in the very next chapter; v. 10. We [the elect] are his [subsequent] workmanship, created [anew] in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath foreordained that we should walk in them. Consequently, it does not follow, from the doctrine of absolute predestination, that "the elect shall be saved, do what they will." On the contrary, they are chosen as much to holiness, as to heaven; and are fore-ordained to walk in good works, by virtue of their election from eternity, and of their conversion in time. Yet again: God hath, from the beginning [i. e. from everlasting; see Prov. viii. 23. John i. 1, 2.] chosen you to salvation through sanctification of the spirit and belief of the truth: 2 Thess. ii. 13. All, therefore, who are chosen to salvation, are no less unalterably destined to holiness and faith in the mean while. And, if so, it is giving God himself the lie, to say, that "the elect shall be saved, do what they will." For, the elect, like the blessed person who redeemed them, come into the world not to do their own will, but the will of him that sent them: and this is the will of God concerning them, even their sanctification: 1 Thess. iv. 3. Hence they are expressly said to be elect - unto obedience:¹⁴ not, indeed, chosen because of obedience, but chosen unto it: for works are not the fountain of grace, but streams flowing from it. Election does not depend upon holiness, but holiness depends upon election. So far, therefore, is predestination from being subversive of good works; that predestination isthe primary cause of all the good works which have been and shall be wrought, from the beginning to the end of time. It is only the peculiar people, that are truly zealous of good works, Tit. ii. 14. the rest may profess that they know God, but, even amidst all their noise about works, in their own works they deny him; being abominable, and disobedient, and, to every good work, reprobate: Tit. i. 16. As I have elsewhere observed, they trust in good works, without doing them; while the peculiar people do good works, without trusting in them.

Reason also joins with Scripture, in asserting the indispensible necessity of sanctification, upon the footing of the most absolute, and irrespective election: or, in other words, that the certainty fo the end does not supersede, but ensure, the intervention of the means. It was decreed, that Abraham should be a father of many nations. According to Mr. Wesley's mode of argumentation, Abraham might have been so, though he died in infancy. I say, No. For, the same purpose of God, which appointed him to be a father of nations, appointed also (as a means to the end) that he should live to a competent age. - St. Paul was decreed to preach the gospel before the Gentiles, and kings, and the children of Israel.¹⁵ Ergò, says an Arminian, Paul might have preached in various nations, without travelling a step, and without so much as opening his lips. I deny the consequence. Paul's travelling, and Paul's utterance, were as certainly and as necessarily included in the decree of the means, as his preaching was determined by the decree of the end. - God resolved, that Hezekiah should live fifteen years longer than Hezekiah expected. Hezekiah might, therefore, according to Mr. Wesley's plan, have argued thus: "God has promised me fifteen years of life to come. Ergò, Live I shall, do what I will: die I shall not, do what I can. I will therefore neither eat, drink, nor sleep. Nay, I will tie a millstone round my neck, and throw myself headlong into the sea, from the highest precipice I can find." I answer, No. For it was as much comprised, in God's decree, that Hezekiah should eat, drink, and sleep, during those fifteen years; and that he should not jump into the sea, with a millstone about his neck; as that fifteen years should be added to his life. - Cyrus was decreed to be the captor of Babylon, and an instrument of good to the Jewish people.16 Did that decree render it needless for Cyrus to be conceived and born? Surely, no: for the birth of Cyrus was no less infallibly secured by the decree itself, than were the laurels he should reap, and the good he was to do. 

To multiply instances, would be endless. Let us apply the few that have been given. If the Scriptures are true, God did, from all eternity, chuse an innumerable multitude of Adam's posterity, to the certain attainment of grace and glory. This choice of them was in his Son: being pre-considered as fallen, they were chosen under that character, and federally given to him, to be redeemed by his blood, and cloathed with his righteousness. But this alone would not have sufficed. It was necessary, that, as sinner, they should not only be redeemed from punishment, and entitled to heaven; but endued, moreover, with and internal meetness for that inheritance to which they should be entitled and redeemed. This internal meetness for heaven, can only be wrought by the restoring agency of God the Holy Ghost, who graciously engaged and took upon himself, in the covenant of peace, to renew and "sanctify all the elect people of God;" saying, I will put my law in their minds, and write it upon their hearts. This, most certainly, was the view, in which the decree of predestination was considered by the apostle Peter, when he thus wrote: Elect, according to the fore-knowledge of God the Father, [according to his fore-knowledge of the human fall; which fore-knowledge made it necessary that election should be decreed to take effect, not independently on God the Son and God the Holy Ghost, but] through sanctification of the spirit, unto obedience, and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ.¹⁷ It appears, from this golden passage, 1. That all the three divine persons are equally concerned in the salvation of sinners: the Father elected them; the Son shed his blood for them; the Spirit sanctifies them. 2. That the objects of election were considered, in that eternal decree, as fallen: else, I cannot see, how they could be chosen unto the sprinkling of the Messiah's blood, and unto the sanctification of the Spirit. 3. That election, though productive of good works, is not founded upon them: on the contrary, they are one of the glorious ends, to which the elect are chosen. Saints do not bear the root, but the root them. "Elect - unto obedience." 4. That they, who have been elected by God the Father, shall be sprinkled by the Son, or legally purified by his atonement, in a way of pardon; and experience the Holy Spirit's sanctification, in beginning, advancing, and perfecting, the good work of grace on their souls. Whence, 5. the elect, the sprinkled, and the sanctified, are made to obey the commandments of God, and to imitate Christ as a pattern, at the same time that they trust in him as their propitiation. I said, made to obey. Here perhaps, the unblushing Mr. Wesley may ask, "Are the elect, then, mere machines?" I answer, No. They are made¹⁸ willing to obey, in the day of God's power. And, I believe, no body ever yet heard of a willing machine.

It appears, from the passage of Scripture now alledged, that God decreed to bring his elect to glory, in a way of sanctification, and in no other way but that. If so, cries Mr. Wesley, "They will be saved, whether they are sanctified, or no." What, notwithstanding their sanctification, is, itself, and essential branch of the decree concerning them? The man may as well affirm, that Abraham might have been the progenitor of nations, though he died in infancy: that Paul might have preached the gospel, vivâ voce, in fifty different regions, without travelling a step: that Hezekiah might have lived his fifteen years, without food or sleep: that Cyrus would have fulfilled the prophecies concerning him, if he had never been born: and that the Church of God might have been redeemed by the blood of Christ, even if Christ had never assumed human nature.

Prior to the taking of Jericho, it was revealed to Joshua that he should certainly be master of the place. Nay, so peremptory was the decree, and so express the revelation of it, that it was predicted as if it had already taken effect: I have given into thy hand Jericho, and the king thereof, and the mighty men of valour.¹⁹ This assurance, than which nothing could be more absolute, did not tie up Joshua's hands from action, and make him sit down without using the means, which were no less appointed than the end. On the contrary, he took care to regulate the procession pursuant to God's command; and the event was accomplished accordingly. - From fact, let us ascend to speculation. The doctrine, which stands this united test, is and must be true. Suppose it was infallibly revealed, to an army, or to any single individual, that the former should certainly gain such a battle, and the latter certainly win such a race. Would not the army be mad, to say, "Then we will not fight a stroke?" Would not the racer be insane to add, "Nor will I move so much as one of my feet?" Now it is no less irrational, to insinuate, that the elect shall be saved, without being spiritually and morally conformed to the image of Christ, than it would be, to dream of gaining a battle, without fighting, or of winning a prize, without contending. - Would it not be absurd, to affirm, that Adam might have tilled and dressed the garden of Eden, whether he had been created or not? Equally illogical is Mr. Wesley's impudent slander, that "the elect shall be saved do what they will," i. e. whether they are holy, or not.

This writer passes with some, for a man of profound learning. But, surely, either his head is not so well furnished, as these good people suppose; or his heart must be totally void of justice, candour, and truth. Either he is absolutely unacquainted with the first principles of reasoning; or he offers up the knowledge he has, as an whole burnt-sacrifice, on the altar of malice, calumny, and falsehood.²⁰

The consequence-drawer makes several appeals to my translation of Zanchius; from some parts of which, he labours to cull premises, whereof to make a basis for his consequences. Like some wretched divines, who first patch up a system of their own, and then rummage the Bible for such texts, as, by the help of "a little convenient straining," may seem to prop the pre-constructed Babel. I shall attend, however, to such passages in my pamphlet, as Mr. Wesley alludes to. Only I must premise, that I shall give them, not as they are mis-quoted by the calumniator, but as they stand in the pamphlet itself.

I have said, that love, when predicated of God, signifies his eternal benevolence: i. e. his everlasting will, purpose, and determination, to deliver, bless, and save his people. Whereon Mr. Wesley thus descants: "I appeal to all men, whether it is not a natural consequence even of this, that all these shall be saved, do what they will." I also appeal to every person of common honestly, and common sense, whether the man, who would wish to distil such an infamous consequence from so innocent a paragraph, be not defective either in sense or honesty? Does not God's determination to deliver his people, include and ensure their deliverance (among other evils) from the reigning power and dominion of sin? Is it not his will to bless them, by turning away every one of them from their iniquities? Acts iii. 26. Does not the Son of God condescend to bear the gracious name of Jesus, because he saves and shall save his people from their sins, both as to guilt, dominion and punishment? Mat. i. 21. Is it possible that a man who has read, and who believes, such texts as these, should still date to persist in bawling, without end, "The elect shall be saved, do what they will?" That the elect shall infallibly be saved, is a truth as certain as the word and the²¹ oath of God can make it. But then it is equally true, that, in order to the eventual accomplishment of that salvation in the next world, grace is given them in this, to preserve them (and preserve them it does) from doing the evil they otherwise would. Whom God did foreknow (or forelove), he also did predestinate: to what? To be "saved, do what they will?" No, surely; but to be conformed to the spiritual and moral image of his Son, Rom. viii. 29. And this is all the election which Calvinism (or, to speak more properly, Scripturism) contends for: even a predestination to holiness and heaven. It may here, perhaps, be objected, that "the doctrine of predestination even to holiness itself may tend to relax the nerves of human diligence in the pursuit of that holiness to which men may suppose themselves predestinated." I utterly deny the doctrine to have any such tendency. And I deny it, on Scripture warrant. The same apostle Peter, who declares that the people of God were elected unto obedience, exhorts those very people to give all diligence to make their calling and election undoubted; or to render it evidently sure, by advancing in sanctification, and working the works of God: a direction this, which the apostle (or, rather, the holy spirit by him) would never have given, had the doctrine of absolute election been subversive of industry and endeavours on the part of man.

Mr. Wesley himself, amidst all his pretension to the contrary, sees through the shameless fallacy of his own consequence. Witness the following passage: "All these," i. e. all God's people, "shall be saved, do what they will. You may say, Oh, but they will do only what is good. Be it so. Yet the consequence stands." In opposition to every part of this puerile paragraph, I should, 1. Be glad to know, what Calvinist ever asserted, that God's people "will do only what is good ?" A giddy perfectionist, indeed, might express himself in that manner: but none who have been led into the knowledge of God, of his law, or of themselves. Though we are asserters of real, we are nevertheless deniers of perfect, sanctification on earth. But, 2. Supposing that we even believe that true saints will "do only what is good;" would it still follow, that they shall be saved without sanctification? I should rather imagine, that (so far from being sanctified) the men who were to "do only what is good," must have been first completely sanctified; else, the effect would rise higher than the cause. According, therefore, to Mr. Wesley's logic, perfect sanctification evidenced by doing only that which is good, is but another phrase for no sanctification at all, and for trampling all God's commandments under foot! A reciprocation this, which, by the way , falls very heavy on such of his own followers as set up for sinless perfection: who, Mr. Wesley himself being judge, are necessarily a pack of arrant Antinomians This, however, is a consequence from his premises which the short-sighted Arminian did not discern. It now meets him full in the face. See it he must and he may jostle by it as well as he can. Dost thou not think, reader, that the logician, who thus reciprocates the most contrary and inconvertible ideas; who calls evil good, and good evil, putting light for darkness, and darkness for light; must be most exquisitely qualified to set up for a distiller of consequences?

Sensible of having, hitherto, produced nothing to his purpose, the Arminian is for pressing a fresh paragraph of mine into the service of his consequence But, before it would even seem to countenance the idea he meant it should convey, he found it expedient to give the passage a little needful pruning and more than a little alteration. To judge of this let us contrast my paragraph with his quotation.

The substituting of “men" absolute, for Adam's degenerate offspring; and the changing of sinful and miserable estate into “hell," may, at first view, seem unimportant alterations. But Mr. Wesley has long since declared himself averse to “altering for altering sake." And, herein, I believe him. He had an end to serve, in thus shaping my words to his purpose. For, though men, and the degenerate offspring of Adam, are convertible terms; yet, in the present argument, the terms require some distinction. Election, as stated and defined in Zanchius, considers Adam's offspring, not merely as men; but complexly, as degenerate. It was therefore dishonestly artful in the Pelagian, to omit an epithet, which is of such consequence, as to give the specific tinge to the whole definition. Zanchy was a Sub-lapsarian; and so is his translator. Let the Pelagian, with whom I am contending, learn, at least in his old age, to represent men and things as they are. If his fingers tingle to fall foul on the Supra-lapsarians, let him indulge his fingers, as soon as he pleases. There are worthies, in that sentiment, who are able to make Mr. Wesley look about him, and to bid the tingling shift from his fingers to his head.

Perversion and falsification are essential figures in this man's rhetoric. Just representation will not square with his views. Whence, in order to support his outrageous slander, that “the elect shall be saved, do what they will;" he varies and castrates the definition he pretends to quote, and only affirms me to have declared, that predestination is God's determining will “to deliver a certain number of men from hell." Predestination includes a great deal more. Let us have no shifting of the terms. My expression was, To deliver them from their sinful and miserable estate: i. e. to make them inchoatively holy, in order to their being inchoatively and finally happy. Now, can any reasonable man suppose, that deliverance from sin is but another name for continuance in sin? yet this must be not only supposed, but proved, ere it can be fairly alledged, that upon the principle of absolute predestination, "I the elect shall be saved, do what they will."

Nor is that monstrous conclusion at all more inferrible from the following passage, cited also by this forger of consequences: not one of the elect can perish; but they must all, necessarily, be saved.²² Here, the Pelagian lashes himself into rage, and asks, with no small emotion, “Can any assert this, and yet deny the consequence?" I answer, Yes. Christ himself asserted it, without so much as entering a caveat against any such detestable inferences: and a caveat Christ would have entered, had the inference been deducible. This is the Father's will, who hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me I shall lose nothing: John vi. 39. I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish: John x. 28. - Father, I will that they also, whom thou hast given me, be with me where I am, that they may behold my glory: John xvii. 24. Well, therefore, might the apostle throw a gauntlet of universal defiance, and ask, if God be for us, who can be against us? who shall lay any thing to the charge of God's elect? who is he that condemns? who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Rom viii. 31-35. Now, if it be the Father's will, that Christ should lose none of his elect; if Christ, himself, in consequence of their covenant-donation to him, does actually give them eternal life, and solemnly avers that they shall never perish; if God be so for them, that none can hinder their salvation; if nothing can be laid to their charge; if they cannot, be condemned, and nought shall separate them from the love of Christ; it clearly and inevitably follows, that not one of the elect can perish, but they must all, necessarily, be saved. Which salvation consists as much in the recovery of moral rectitude below, as in the enjoyment of eternal blessedness above.

I have followed Mr. John through his first pair of consequences; which (together with their fabricator) I have shewn to be utterly void of judgment, strength, and truth. Let me now advert to the third pretended consequence:

III. “The reprobate shall be damned, do what they can."

One would almost imagine, that none but a reprobate could be capable of advancing a position so execrably shocking. Surely, it must have cost even Mr. Wesley much, both of time and pains, to invent the idea, and to find suitable language for its clothing! This, however, I make no scruple to declare, that be his inventions easy or laborious, few men's invention ever sunk deeper into the despicable, launched wider into the horrid, or went farther in the prophane. The satanic guilt of the person, who could excogitate, and publish to the world, a position like that; baffles all power of description, and is only to be exceeded (if exceedable) by the satanic shamelessness which dares to lay the black position at the door of other men. - Let us examine, whether any thing, occurring in Zanchius, could justly furnish this wretched defamer with materials for a deduction so truly infernal.

I am aware, indeed, that a perverse mind, like a depraved constitution, is capable of corrupting (so far as itself is concerned) even cordials into poison. The very things which should have been for their health, are, to such persons, an occasion of falling. Instances of this kind (if final) are the most awful comment on that tremendous decree of preterition, whereof the Scriptures so largely and so strongly speak. God Almighty grant, that Mr. Wesley may not, himself, be a seal to the truth of this remark.

In rummaging the treatise he pretends to quote, he, no doubt, fixed his claw on those passages, which, he imagined, were most capable of mis-interpretation. Before I introduce them here, I beg the reader's permission to premise a few general observations, which have a close connection with the subject.

The two capital ojections (to which, perhaps, all other are reducible) against the decree of non-election, are drawn, one from the justice, the other from the mercy, of God. Both these objections I shall endeavour to consider, in their utmost force.

1. Justice consists in rendering to every man his due. The supposed injustice, therefore, of preterition, turns on this question, “Whether God is, or is not, a debtor to man?” I more than imagine, that he is not a debtor to any man. He owes no man the least of all this favours: and, indeed, his blessings could not be called favours, if man could claim them in a way of debt. - Who hath prevented me, [i. e. been before-hand with me in any good thing] that I should repay him.²¹ Even those whom he had made righteous, are unable to earn or merit the smallest temporal, or eternal benefit of his hands: If thou be righteous, what givest thou him? Or what receiveth he of thy hand? Job xxxv. 11. Much less can the wicked (with whom alone reprobation has any thing to do) lay their Maker under obligation to save them. If it be proved, that he owes salvation to every rational being he has made; then, and then only, it will follow, that God is unjust in not paying this debt of salvation to each of his reasonable creatures. But, on the contrary, if God, instead of being an universal debtor (as Arminianism supposes him to be), is, himself, the universal creditor, who beneficently lends every earthly, and munificently bestows every celestial happiness, according to the riches of his own free, sovereign, unmerited bounty; what shadow of injustice can be fastened on his conduct, for, in some cases, withholding what he does not owe? The objection, therefore (if it may be dignified by that name), being founded on a mistaken principle, evaporates into air.

Besides; the cavil will conclude as strongly against limited salvation (let its limitation be supposed to arise from what cause it will), as against the limiting decree. For I defy any man to shew, in what single respect the actual limitation of happiness itself is a jot more just and equitable (in a being possessed with power), than the decretive limitation of the persons who shall enjoy that happiness. Until Mr. Wesley can demonstrate, that every man is happy in this life; and that every man shall be so in the life to come; the argument, resulting from the plausible topic of divine justice, will never reach the merits of the case. If God is indebted to some men, why not to all? And if he owe salvation to all men, why will he condemn any man at last? Should it be said, that “some men will not permit God to pay them their debt of salvation, and, by their own misbehaviour, disqualify themselves from receiving it;” I answer, That, to talk of man's not permitting God to be just, is assuming a principle that cannot be allowed. God can never be over-ruled by man, until man is superior to God. Not to add, that the Arminian hypothesis of men being God's creditors, rests (if it has any thing to rest upon) on the natural claim to happiness, wherewith man is supposed to invested, in right of involuntary creatureship: he derives his existence from God, and therefore (says Arminianism) God is bound to make that existence happy. Admit but this, and universal salvation comes in with a full tide. There can be none, no, not one, to whom the Judge will or can say at the final audit, Depart from me, I know you not, ye workers of iniquity. For, even those, who live and die in their sins, are certainly God's creatures: and if God owe salvation to all his creatures as such, even the workers of iniquity will and must be saved, or God must cease to be just. Who sees not, that the Arminian scheme, if probed to the bottom, opens, by necessary consequence, the flood-gates of practical licentiousness; and, with all its pretences to good works, is, in reality, but varnished Antinomianism? It says, in effect, “Every man shall be saved, do what he will: no man shall be condemned, do what he can. Let narrow-spirited Calvinists cease to do evil and learn to do well. Let gloomy predestinarians insist, that without holiness no man shall see the Lord; and fondly dream, that sanctity and salvation are indissolubly connected. But let us, the liberal disciples of Arminius, act on a more expanded plan. Every son of Adam is God's creature: and every creature of God is good. We are all indued with independent free-will. Our Maker loves every man alike. His justice will not suffer him to reject any of us. Especially, seeing we are all redeemed, one as well as another. Let us, therefore, take our ease, eat, drink, and be merry: and to-morrow shall be as this day, and much more abundant.”

This is the true language of Arminianism, though not of all Arminians. It is the natural consequence of the scheme itself, though many, who embrace the scheme, are not aware of the consequence. - You may say, “Oh, but no man shall actually be saved, though salvation is his due, except he perform certain conditions.” This is no better than a very thin evasion: a mere barrel, thrown out for the amusement of the whale, to keep him in play, and make him lose sight of the ship. - Permit me to ask, Is salvation due to a man who does not perform those conditions? If you say, yes; you jump, hand over head, into what you yourself call Antinomianism. - If you say, that “salvation is not due to a man, unless he fulfil the conditions;” it will follow, 1. That man's own performances are meritorious of salvation, and bring God himself into debt: 2. That man, as a creature of God, is not entitled to salvation; and that God as the creator of man, is not therefore bound to save the men he has created.

There is not possible alternative. Either God is obliged, in justice, to save mankind; or, he is not. If he be, it must be the works of men that lay him under the obligation. If he be not, then neither is he unjust in passing by some men: nay, he might, had he so pleased, have passed by the whole of mankind, without electing any one individual of the fallen race; and yet have continued inviolably holy, just, and good.

Let us pursue the argument a little farther; and descent to instances, rather more familiar: even to God's providential dealings with men in the present life. If eternal felicity be due to every man without exception; surely, temporal felicity must be their due likewise: if they have right to the greater, their claim to the less can hardly be doubted. If the Omnipotent is tied and bound, on penalty of becoming unjust, to do all he can to make every individual happy in the next life; he must be equally bound to render every individual happy in this. But are all men happy? Look round the world, and say yes if you can. - Is the Creator, therefore, unjust? None but Satan would suggest it: none but his echoes will affirm it. The Lord is a God of truth, and without iniquity: just and right is he. Yet is it in the power of Omnipotence to banish misery from the universe. He could even have totally hindered its access. But as the even demonstrates (and what speaks louder than fact?) it was not his will. He allows, and resolved to allow (for infinite wisdom does nothing ignorantly and undesignedly) its entrance, progress, and continuance. Sift the point ever so closely, and canvas the argument ever so nicely, you will find it extremely difficult, (may I not say, impossible?) to point out the difference between permission and design, in a being possessed (as God must certainly is) of unlimited wisdom and unlimited power. I am far from affirming, that there is no difference between them: I only say, that it would non-plus all the sagacity of man, should we attempt clearly to shew, wherein the difference lies.

Is the constituted order of things mysterious? Impenetrably so. Ye the mysteriousness of God's dispensations evinces, no the injustice of the sovereign dispenser; but the shallowness of human comprehension, and the shortness of human sight. Let us, the, by embracing and revering the Scripture doctrines of predestination and providence, give God credit for being infinitely wise, just, and good; though, for the present, his way is in deep, and his paths in the great waters, and his footsteps are not known.

I should imagine, that very few, even of the Arminians themselves, will venture to deny the real inequality of providential distributions below: since, to deny that, would be to contravene the first principles of reason, and the indisputable voice of fact of observation. Will the Arminians therefore pronounce the great Father of all, unjust, because he does not make all his offspring equally rich, good, and happy? It is impossible to stave back the horrid consequence, if he is bound (and he certainly has power) to prevent every evil, both natural and moral; which yet he does not. Sin, pain, affliction, grief, disease, and death, in twice ten thousand forms, lay waste mankind. Nay, there is a whole world of apostate angels, who are banished form God, and suffer without respite and without hope.²⁴ Yet the Deity could have put a negative upon all this. The same effectual grace, which preserved the elect angels from falling, could have preserved the rest, and have presented the whole choir faultless before the presence of his glory with exceeding joy. It could, likewise, have precluded the transgression of Adam, and all its (seemingly dismal) consequences. Or, man being fallen, the same converting energy, which retrieves some sinners to God, is able to retrieve all. What shall we say, then, to these things? They can only be accounted for on the grand principle of God's absolute sovereignty, who doth according to his will in the armies of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth, i. e. who is the uncontrolable disposer of angels and of men; and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, what dost thou? Dan. iv. 35. Our Lord also teaches us this important lesson: even so, Father, for so it seemeth good in they sight: Matth. xi. 26.

The of Great Britain has an unlimited right of peerage. He might, if such was his pleasure, ennoble every family in his dominions. Will any so weak and perverse, as to charge him with tyranny and injustice, only because it is not hi will, though it is in his power, to make all his subjects noblemen?

But I shall be told, perhaps, that, “allowing God to act as a sovereign, in his disposal of earthly benefits: this will not prove his acting on the same principle, in his distribution of heavenly blessings since between things temporal, and things eternal the proportion will not hold.” I answer, (1.) Things eternal are as much at his disposal, as things temporal. God is either sovereign of all things, or of nothing. His empire is undivided: and from his dominion nothing is excepted. Nor, indeed, if things spiritual and everlasting were not his, could he be said to give them to his people: which he has every where in Scripture, affirmed to do. (2.) I grant, that time and eternity are, in themselves, by no means, parallel, or commensurate. Yet, if God were unjust, in not ordaining one man as well as another to eternal happiness; the old Consequences (already mentioned) would follow too, viz. That must be proportionably unjust, in not ordaining men to absolute happiness here on eart. For misery, though endured but for a year, or for a life time, is, in its own nature, and for the time being as truly misery, as it would be, if protracted ever so long. The to quale is the same, however as the to quante may vary. And God can no more cease to be just for a year, or for a man's life-time; than he can cease to be just for a century, or for ever. By the same rule that he can, and does, without any impeachment of his moral attributes, permit any being to be miserable for a moment; he may permit that being to be miserable for a much longer time: and so on, ad infinitum: since, as was observed but now he can no more be unjust for a single moment, than he can be unjust for ever.

Will Mr. Wesley deny that there is such a thing as temporal evil, so called? He must first renounce his senses – or, admitting the existence of it, will he exempt it from the providence of God? will he say, that it happens (as Cicero affirms Milo's servants to have slain Clodius, “neque imperante, neque sciente, neque presente Domino”), God neither ordaing it, nor knowing it, nor being so much as present? This would be atheism. For, if any thing can come to pass, in contrariety either to God's knowledge, or his will; it must arise from a defect of wisdom, or power, or of goodness: and to suppose God deficient in these, would be tantamount to supposing, that there is no God at all.

I conclude, then, that the quality of what is called secular evil, is considerably great; and that every man comes in for his allotted share of it, more or less, and in one kind or other:²⁵ That this, however, does not arise from defect of wisdom in God; for he could have so drawn the plan, and have so conducted its execution, as to have effectually precluded all evil whatever. Nor from defect of vigilance; for not an hair can fall from our heads, without his appointment, leave, and notice. Nor from defect of power; for all second causes are totally and constantly dependent on him, both for existence, activity, and effectuosity. Nor from defect of justice; for he is “holy in all his ways, and righteous in all his works.” Yet, though all wise, all-vigilant, all-powerful, and all-just; he permits, and has for near six thousand years permitted, the reign of natural evil. Upon the same principle, might he not extend its reign to a still greater, yea, to an inconceivable length? might he not even draw it out to a never-ending duration? He might: or this blasphemous and contradictory consequence (a consequence, which I wonder Mr. Wesley never added to his others) must and will be indemolishable, that infinite justice has acted unjustly ever since the fall of Satan and his angels, and of Adam and his sons.

Should it be urged, that “moral evil, or the transgression of angels and of man, was the producing cause of all the natural evil to which they have been liable ever since;” this will be urging no more than what every Calvinist admits. But still the old difficulty (a difficulty which Arminianism will never solve while heaven and earth remain) – the old difficulty still survives: how came moral evil to be permitted, when it might as easily have been hindered, by a being of infinite goodness, power, and wisdom? Natural evil is but the fruit of moral: and, had God not permitted the latter, the former could not have existed. “Oh, but he indued Adam with free-will.” True. But did he, whose understanding is infinite,²⁶ pre-discern all the consequences of that endowment, and fore-know whither Adam's free-will would lead him, and what use he would make of it? And could not God have indued him with such holy strength of will, as would have infallibly secured his perseverance in rectitude and happiness? “Oh, but then Adm would not have been a free-agent.” Indeed but he would. God himself is a free-agent, though his will is necessarily, unchangeably, and singly determined to good, and to good only. So are the elect angels. So are the glorified souls of saints departed. And so will both angels and saints be, when time is over. And so might Adm have been, had God pleased to have so created him. He might have been made invariably holy, and his agency have continued free.

God is, and cannot but be, inviolably just, amidst all the sufferings of fallen angels and fallen men, involuntary beings as they are. And, if his justice is unviolated, amidst all they have suffered, and many of the latter do suffer (though God could have prevented the whole, both root and branch); consequently, he will continue to be just, in all they are yet to suffer. And, if so, what becomes of the objection, to God's decree of preterition, drawn from the article of injustice?

2. "And what becomes of mercy?" This I shall next enquire.

Mercy in considerable under a two-fold view: as it is an attribute in God; and, as it is exercised toward men. - As an attribute in God, mercy is infinite; as all his attributes are and must be: because they necessarily con-incide with his essence. - But mercy, considered in the exercise of it, is neither necessarily nor actually infinite. As God's forbearing to create more worlds than he has, is not impeachment of his omnipotence; so, his forbearing to save as many as he might, is no impeachment of his infinite mercy. I have touched this subject elsewhere. Let me for once quote myself. “Goodness, considered as it is in God, would have been just the same infinite and glorious attribute, supposing no rational beings had been created at all, or saved when created. To which may be added, that the goodness of the Deity does not cease to be infinite in itself, only because it is more extended to some objects than it is to others. The infinity of this perfection, as residing in God and coinciding with his essence, is sufficiently secured, without supposing it to reach, indiscriminately, to all the creatures he has made. For, was that way of reasoning to be admitted, it would lead us too far, and prove too much: since, if the infinity of his goodness is to be estimated, by the number of objects, upon which it terminates; there must be an absolute, proper infinity of reasonable beings to terminate that goodness upon. Consequently, it would follow, from such premises, either, that the creation, is as truly infinite to enrich him, and do it not, am I the author of that man's poverty, only for resolving to permit him, and for actually permitting him, to continue poor? Am I blameable for his poverty, because I do not give him the utmost I am able? Similar is the case now in debate. Ever since the fall of Adam mankind are, by nature, spiritually poor. Was God obliged either to keep them from becoming so; or is he obliged to re-enrich them afterwards, with the blessings of grace and glory? I have proved already that God is not a debtor to his creatures. Who, then, and what art thou, O man, that repliest agaist God? Shall the thing formed say unto him that formed it, why hast thou made me thus? hath not the potter power over the clay, to make, of the same lump, one vessel unto honour, and another unto dishonour? What if God, will to shew his wrath and to make his power known, endured, with much long suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction; even that he might make known the riches of his glory on the vessel of mercy whom he had afore prepared unto glory?²⁷

Now, are these the words of Scripture, or are they not? If not, prove the forgery. If they be you cannot fight against reprobation, without fighting against God. - “Oh, but God has no right to make any vessels unto dishonour: no right to shew his wrath and make his power known. It is tyranny cruelty, injustice, partiality. He is bound to make every man a saint. He ought to make every man happy.” Stop, friend. Your argument, if it hold at all, leads farther than you seem aware of. If God, in order to prove himself impartial, ought to make all men vessels unto honour; he ought to do more. He ought to have made us all arch-angels, and greater still, if greater can be. He ought to go even ad ultimum fui posse, and to make us all as honourable, glorious, and happy, as omnipotence itself can. Where will you be able to draw the line of limitation? Either, therefore, you must plunge into prophaneness and absurdity, without measure and without end; or you must submit to the good old doctrine of Christ and his apostles: the former of whom expressly asserts, that it is lawful for God to do what he will with his own; and the latter, with one voice, declare, that he hath mercy on whom he will have mercy, and whom he will he hardeneth.

3. Another very innocent definition (though wretchedly mutilated, according to custom, in Mr. Wesley's citation) stands thus: Predestination, as it regards the reprobate, is that eternal, most holy, sovereign, and immutable act of God's will, whereby he hath determined to leave some men to perish in their sins, and to be justly punished for the.²⁸ – Against this, John offers a query: “Can they avoid it” [i. e. can the reprobate avoid punishment] “by any thing they do?” Let me also put a query to the querist: Can you prove, that any one of them ever did what he could to avoid it? If this cannot be proved, it does not follow that “the reprobate shall be damned do what they can.”

Let us, moreover, (with all the respect and caution, due to a subject so awful) enquire whether it be not, according to the Scripture account, plain, positive matter of fact, that God hath left some men in their sins, to be justly punished for them. What is the reason assigned by the spirit of God, why the profligate sons of Eli were deaf to their father's expostulations? They hearkened not to the voice of their father, because the Lord would slay them (1 Sam. ii. 25). In other words, 'God had determined to leave them to perish in their sins, and to be justly punished for them.' Many other instances might be produced from the Old Testament. I shall, however, carry my appeal to the New. And my following proofs of that proposition shall be taken, not from the epistles, but from the gospels.²⁹

Thou, Capernaum, which art exalted unto heaven, shalt be brought down to hell: for if the mighty works, which have been done in thee, had been done in Sodom, it would have remained unto this day. Matth. xi. 23. It follows from hence, that, though God knew the citizens of Sodom would have reformed their conduct, had his providence made use of effectual means to that end; still these effectual means were no vouchsafed. What is the, but saying, that god had determined to leave those criminals to perish in their sins, and to be justly punished for them? - “But, if the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah were left to perish; how cam the Capernaites, who enjoyed “such superior means of grace, to continue impenitent?” Our Lord himself answers this question, V. 25-27. Thou hast hid these things [the great things of conversion and salvation] from the wise and prudent; even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight: - No man knoweth the Father, but the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son [boulhtai] may will to reveal him.

What shall we say, of the words that follow? Ye be witnesses unto yourselves, that ye are the children of them who killed the prophets: wherefore fill ye up the measure of your fathers. Matth. xxiii. 31, 32. Surely, these were 'left to perish in their sins, and to be punished for them!'

Unto you it is given to know the mystery of the kingdom of God. But unto them that are without [i. e. who were not within the pale of election], all these things are done in parables; that, seeing, they may see, and not perceive, and, hearing, the may hear, and not understand: lest at any time they should be converted, and their sins should be forgiven them. Mark iv. 11, 12. St. Matthew, if possible, expresses it still more strongly: It is given unto you to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven; but to them it is not given. Matth. xi. 13.

Why do ye not understand my speech? even because ye cannot hear my word. John viii. 43.

Jesus said, for judgment I am come into this world; that they, who see not, might see; and that they who see, might be made blind. John ix. 39.

Ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep, as I said unto you. John x. 26.

Once more. Though he had done so many miracles before them, yet they believed not on him: That the saying of Esaias the prophet might be fulfilled, which he spake, Lord, who hath believed our report? and to whom hath the arm of the Lord been revealed? Therefore they could not believe, because that Esaias said again, he hath blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart; that they should not see with their eyes, nor understand with their heart, and be converted that I should heal them. John xii. 37-40.

Now, I leave to the decision of any unprejudiced, capable man upon earth, whether it be not evident, from these passage (among a multitude of others), that 'God hath determined to leave some men to perish in their sins, and to be justly punished for them? ' In affirming which, I only gave the Scripture, as I found it. Nay, I never expressed my sentiments concerning reprobation, half so strongly as the word of God does. It follows, that I had,

4. Very ample ground for asserting, that there is a predestination of some particular persons to death (2 Cor. iv. 3. 1 Pet. ii. 8 2 Pet. ii. 12. Jude iv. Rev. xvii. 8.), which death they shall inevitably undergo, justly, and on account of their sins.³⁰ “That is,” says my Pelagian expositor, “they shall be damned do what they can.” I totally deny the explication: unless, by their doing what they can, he means, their committing all the evil they can. For, as it follows in the very page from whence part of the above extract was taken, sin is the meritorious and immediate cause of any man's damnation: God condemns and punishes the non-elect, not merely as men, but as sinners. To which I even ventured to add, that, had it pleased the great Governor of the universe to have entirely prevented sin from having any entrance into the world; it should seem as if God could not, consistently with his own attributes, have condemned any man at all. So infinitely remote am I from either thinking or asserting, directly or implicitly, that “the reprobate shall be damned, do what they can!” The Pelagian should rather have declared this to be his resolution, 'I am determined to contradict and blaspheme, say what you will.'

5. He represents me as affirming, in so many words, that “the non-elect were predestined to eternal death:” for which words, he refers, by an asterism, to my second chapter. I call upon him to tell me, in what part of that chapter, I make use of those words. Be they ever so expressive of my real belief, the words themselves are his. They occur not even in the fourth chapter, which treats professedly of reprobation. Will no length of years, nor infamy of detection, restrain this man from forgery?

If Mr. Wesley, instead of acknowledging his guilt, and promising reformation for the future; should be hardened and mean enough to say, "Oh, but though you have not made use of the words, either in those chapters, or in the whole book, yet the sense of those words is inferrible from many passages incurring from both.” I answer, be it so: yet this consequence stands, that the assailant, who coins words for his adversaries, which they never spoke, is not an honest man. When propositions are attacked, it is not enough to give the supposed sense of those propositions. The very phraseology, in which they are expressed, should be cited, without variation, just as they came from the pen of the defendant. Words are the dress of thought. And an alteration of dress may so far disguise the wearer, as to make him appear quite a different person.

But, supposing I had even syllabically expressed my opinion in those very terms; still, the consequence alledged would have lagged far behind the premises. For the old question would again have recurred, viz. Can Mr. Wesley produce a single instance of any one man, who did all he could to be saved, and yet was lost? If he can, let him tell us who that man was, where he lived, when he died, what he did, and how it came to pass he laboured in vain. If he cannot, let him either retract his consequences, or continue to be posted for a shameless traducer.

The condemnation of the reprobate is necessary and inevitable. This I have both said, and persist to say. It is a position, which unavoidably follows even from the foreknowledge of God, putting all decrees quite out of the question. Only allow, that some sinners actually will be condemned in the last day; and that God always knew, and knows at this moment, who those persons will be; and (not Mr. Wesley's, but) my consequence stands unshaken, that the condemnation of the reprobate is necessary and inevitable. Should it be said, that “the fore-knowledge of God has no effective influence on event;” I answer, that, whether is has or not (which, however, would admit of some debate), still every event must and certainly will correspond to his foreknowledge of it: else, the divine fore-knowledge would be mere guess, and evaporate into empty, fallible, uncertain conjecture: i. e. the knowledge of God would be inferior to the knowledge which even man, in many cases, is possessed of. It was the consideration of this, which induced the great Dr. South to renounce Arminian novelties, and fall in with doctrinal Calvinism. I wish it may (for his own sake) have as good effect on little Mr. Wesley. I say, for his own sake: since himself would be the principal gainer by his submission to grace. We should acquire very little honour by the acquisition of such a proselyte.

“Surely,” cries Mr. Wesley, “ I need add no more on this head.” You need not: unless, with all your diving, you could fetch up something to the purpose. “You see,” continues the repetitionist, “that the reprobate shall be damned, do what they can, is the whole burden of the song.” I have proved, and the reader has seen, that it makes no part of the song. But this I see, that, unless God give Mr. Wesley repentance to the acknowledging of the truth; the unparalleled perverseness, with which he labours to blacken some doctrines of Christianity, will be the burden of his soul in the hour of death and in the day of judgment.

7. That the number of the elect, and also of the reprobate, is so fixed and determinate, that neither can be augmented or diminished; is affirmed in Zanchius,³¹ and rests on clear, positive, repeated testimonies of Holy Scripture. - I would not scruple to hinge the whole weight of this proposition, likewise, on the certain and immutable knowledge of God. I know, says Christ, whom I have chosen (John xiii. 18.); but, was the number fluctuating and precarious, susceptible of addition and diminution, Christ could not be said to know them, but only to guess at them. Absolute certainty is the alone ground of positive knowledge. Whatever is unfixed and unsure, can at the very highest, be the basis of no more than probable supposition.

So again, I know my sheep, John x. 14. But, if their number was indeterminate, they could not be known; the sheep of to-day might degenerate into goats to-morrow; and the goats of yesterday might become sheep to-day, and be goats again before night. Nay, it might so happen, that all his sheep might cease to remain such; and the great shepherd might, at the long run, not have a single sheep to know. - On the contrary, if Christ actually knows his sheep, and whom [ou]j, the very individual persons] he hath chosen; if follows, that he must also know who are not his sheep, and whom he hath no chosen. I assert, therefore, again, that, if omniscience itself knows any thing of the matter, the number of both is so fixed and determinate, that neither can be augmented or diminished. The apostle: the foundation [or purpose] of the Lord standeth sure, having this seal, the Lord knoweth them that are his. 2 Tim. ii. 19.

Let me recommend one or two passages more to the reader's consideration. The election hath obtained, and the rest were blinded [evpwrw,qhsaj, were hardened]; according as it is written, God hath given them spirit of slumber, eyes that they should not see, and ears that they should not hear, unto this day. Rom. xi. 7, 8. - Being disobedient, whereunto they were also appointed. 1 Pet. ii. 8. - Whose names were not written in the Book of Life from the foundation of the world. Rev. xvii. 8. - There is no meaning in words, if it does not follow, even from these few stubborn texts, as evidently as light flows from the sun, that the number of th elect and reprobate can neither be augmented nor diminished. The very nature whether of election, or of reprobation, makes this point manifest as to both: since, could the number of the elect (for instance) be lessened, the deduction would augment the number of the reprobate; for, what was taken from the one, would necessarily add to the other. In which case, it would not be true, that the election obtained, and the rest were blinded. Nor would Solomon's assertion be true: I know, that whatsoever God doth, it shall be for ever; nothing can be put to it, nor anything taken from it. Eccles. iii. 14. Now, this must be meant, either of God's immanent acts, in a way of decree; or, of his transient acts, in a way of providence. But it cannot be meant of his providential acts: for they are not always the same: they are not for ever. It must, therefore, be meant of his immanent acts, i. e. of his decrees, purposes, and determinations, which cannot vary, but are for ever; to which nothing can be put, or added; and fro which nothing can be taken away. The counsel of the Lord standeth for ever, and the thoughts of his heart to all generations, Psal. xxxiii. 11. - He is one mind; who can turn him? and what his soul desireth, even that he doth: for he performeth the thing that is appointed for me, and many such things are with him. Job. xxiii. 14.

8. The decrees of election and reprobation are immutable and irreversible.³² Mr. Wesley cites the sentence, but takes care to omit touching upon (or even producing) any one of the seven arguments brought by Zanchy in support of it. Let the Arminian refute these, or he will never succeed in his attack upon that. But he found it easier to spin a IVth Consequence; namely, That, on the hypothesis of an absolute decree, there can be no such thing as sin: “It cannot,” says this wonderful discoverer, “be a sin in a spark to rise, or in a stone to fall.”

If Mr. Wesley's illustration have any meaning at all, the meaning must be this: "Sparks and stones are incapable of moral agency; therefore, men are so too. Sparks and stones are neither rewardable or punishable: Ergò, men are not responsible for the sins they commit.” The Arminian might as well have said, “Sparks and stones have no legs: Ergò, men have none. Sparks and stones are not endued with any of the five senses: Ergò, men can neither hear, see, feel, taste, nor smell.” One would think, that that levity of a spark, and the dullness of a stone, were, by a strange kind of association, united in Mr. John Wesley, before he could dream of illustrating his point by such an extraordinary brace of similes, which are no more related to the subject, than a dwarf to an archangel, - “Oh, but you do not touch the main string. A spark rises, and a stone falls, necessarily. It is the necessity, but which rise and fall, that renders stones and sparks incapable of sinning.” As if mere matter (supposing it could be even exempted from the laws of necessity) could therefore be capable of virtue and vice!

Mr. Wesley is singularly unhappy in the choice of his comparisons; and as singularly awkward in his application of them. The point he wishes to prove, is evidently this: that, “absolute decrees, prescience, and providence, are inconsistent with human free-agency; and, of course, that the finally wicked are not justly punishable for the evil they commit.” I have purposely stated this objection in the clearest and strongest terms: lest I should even deem them desirous of eluding, instead of answering. - Now, if I can evince, from the express doctrine of Scripture, and from express facts recorded in Scripture, that eventually necessity, or infallible certainty an event, is not incompatible with so much free-agency in man, as may suffice to render him punishable for breaking the law of God; the objection will at once vanish into its native nothing.

1. For the doctrine of Scripture. - Woe to the world, because of offences: for it must needs be that offences come; but woe to that man by whom the offence cometh (Matth. xviii. 7.) Anagkh, there is a necessity that offences should come. Then surely, may an Arminian say, “There can be no woe due to the introducers of that whole introduction is necessary!” our Lord says, Yes, there is. I conclude, then, that necessity of even does not render sin excusable, nor the sinner impunible. - Again. when ye shall hear of wars &c. be ye not troubled; for such things must needs be: dei genesqai, they must come to pass. Mark xiii. 7. And yet, though there is a must be for these events, that necessity does not supersede either the moral or the natural volitions of the parties concerned. - So 1 Cor. xi. 19. There must be heresies among you. But if this necessity for heresies did not absolutely coincide with the wills of the heretics, how could any heretics be blameable? - Once more. He [i. e. Christ] must reign, until he hath put all his enemies under his feet. 1 Cor. xv. 25. There is, therefore, a necessity for Christ's reigning: yet, I fancy, even Arminians themselves will hardly venture to affirm that Christ reigns against his own eill. Absolute necessity then, is perfectly consistent with willingness and freedom in good agency, no less than in bad. For it is a true maxim, ubi voluntas, ibi libertas: all action is sufficiently free, wherein a person's will is engaged: be his will engaged ever so necessarily.

2. Next, for Scripture facts.

Joseph's brethren acted freely, i. e. with the full bent of their wills, when they sold him to the Midianites who carried him into Egypt. But, in truth though they sold him to gratify their own malice and had no higher view in what they did; they undesignedly fulfilled the decree of God. Whence Joseph's pious and just remark afterwards: Be not grieved nor angry with yourselves that ye sold me hither; for God did send me before you, to preserve life. So now, it was not you that sent me hither, but God. Gen xlv. 5,8. As for you, ye thought evil against me: but God meant it for good, to bring to pass, as it is this day, to save much people alive. Chap. l. 20. So the Psalmist: He [i. e. God] sent a man before them, even Joseph, who was sold for a servant. Psalm cv. 17. It was God that sent him, though his brethren sold him.

Pharaoh acted freely (i. e. willingly), in his refusal to dismiss the Israelites: or, in their words, he refused to send them away, because his will was against their going. And yet he could will no otherwise than he did, Exod. vii. 3,4. - So, when Saul went home to Gibeah, it is said there went with him a band of men, whose hearts God had touched: i. e. whose will God had effectually inclined. 1 Sam. x. 26. Yet it cannot be inferred from hence, that they did not go freely. In like manner, God is said to have stirred up the spirit of Cyrus, or powerfully to have influenced his will, to issue an edict for the re-building of the temple. Yet this, though a necessary, was a free, act of that monarch. Ezra. i. 1. The effects of that edict are also to be noted: Then rose up the chief of the fathers of Judah and Benjamin, and the priests and the levites, with all them whose spirit God³³had raised to go up. v. 5. Will any man say, that these did not will freely, only because they willed necessarily? - It was from the acrimony of his own heart, that Shimei cursed David: consequently his will was in it. And yet, the Lord had said unto him, curse David: i. e. he did it by God's own efficacious permission. 2 Sam. xvi. 10. - Absalom, and the men of Israel who were with him, acted with perfect freedom, and with the full exercise of their reason, when the agreed in preferring the counsel of Hushai to that of Ahitophel: and yet, in so doing, their wills acted in absolute subserviency to the will and decree of God, who had appointed to defeat the good counsel of Ahitophel, to the intent that the Lord might bring evil upon Absalom. 2 Sam. xvii. 14. - Thus also, God foretold, That he would turn the Assyrian king loose upon Israel, who should take them for his prey, and tread them down as mire in the street: in all which, when it came to pass, the king of Assyria acted merely on principles of ambition, cruelty, and pride; and, consequently, acted freely; proposing no other end to himself, than the gratification of his own savage will and tyrannic disposition. Whereas in reality, he was appointed of God to avenge his righteous quarrel with an hypocritical people, and to be the instrument, not merely of human, but chiefly of divine resentment. Howbeit, says God, he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart think so: but it is in his heart to destroy, and to cut off nations not a few. Isai. x. 6, 7. - Thus it is said, concerning the ten kings, who shall hate the mystic harlot, and destroy her, and burn her with fire, that God hath put into their hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree, and to give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of god shall be fulfilled. Rev. xvii. 17. Does it follow, that these kings must be stript of all free-agency, and cease to be accountable for their actions, and commence mere machines, only because God will bring their wills into subjection to his own?

Thanks be to God, says the apostle, who put the same earnest care into the heart of Titus for you: for indeed he accepted the exhortation; but, being more forward, of his own accord he went unto you. 2 Cor. viii. 16, 17. Here is it said, that God himself put that earnest care into the heart of Titus, which induced him to visit the Corinthians. And yet, Titus visited them of his own accord, or without any sensible compulsion. God, therefore, may work efficaciously on the human will, and the will (though it necessarily follows that efficacious direction) remain quite unforced. This is farther evident, from the account which St. Paul gives of his own case, as a preacher: though I preach the gospel, I have nothing to glory of; for necessity is laid upon me [anagkh moi epikeitai], yea, woe is me, if I preach not the gospel. 1 Cor. ix. 16. Yet he preached the gospel freely and willingly. Necessity, therefore, and freedom, are very good friends, notwithstanding all the efforts of Arminianism to set them at variance. - I have already observed, that the great and awful transaction of Christ's crucifixion was, from all eternity, positively decree and infallibly fore-known of God: yet neither did that decree nor that fore-knowledge, abate the guilt of those who accomplished both: for they were, at once, necessary and voluntary agents. Let me, as the subject so directly falls in with the point in hand, bestow a few moments upon it here.

The death of Jesus Christ was both the most important event that ever came to pass, and the most sinful act (in his murders) that ever was committed. So wonderful are the ways of God! - This great event was predestinated, in all its circumstances. It was not a matter of chance, but a matter of decree. - Thinkest thou that I cannot pray to my Father, and he shall presently give me more than twelve legions of angels? but how then shall the Scriptures be fulfilled, that thus it must be? Matth. xxvi. 53, 54. - And he began to teach them, that the Son of man must suffer many things. Mark viii. 31. - I say unto you, that this that is written must yet be accomplished in me, and he was numbered with the transgressors. Luke xxii. 37. - The Son of man must be delivered into the hands of sinful men, and be crucified. Luke xxiv. 7. - Concerning Judas in particular thus speaks the oracles of God; Men and brethren, this Scripture must needs have been fulfilled, which the Holy Ghost, by the mouth of David, spake before concerning Judas, who was guide to them that took Jesus. Acts. i. 16. - And concerning all the other accomplices in this tremendous deed, it is expressly declared, that they were gathered together, to do whatsoever God's hand and God's counsel prowrisen genesqai, had predestinated to be done. Acts iv. 27, 28. Yet throughout the whole, they acted freely. The Jews delivered him to Pilate dia fqonon, from a principle of envy and hatred. As the prophet says in another case, They knew not the thoughts of the Lord, neither understood they his counsel. No thanks to them, that the decree of God was fulfilled, and the salvation of the Church effected, by their putting Christ to death. They were as free and unforced in willing his crucifixion, and in bringing it about, as if there had been no decree in the case. The Saviour was, indeed, delivered up to their rage, th w`rismenh boulh kai prognwsei tou qeou, by the determinate decree and foreknowledge of God; and his death was, therefor, in the utmost sense of the word, necessary, being inevitably pre-ordained: and yet they took and slew him dia ceirov anomwn, with lawless, wicked hands, Acts ii. 23. The wickedness they were guilty of, in perpetuating this crime, was not excusable, nor the lawlessness of it mitigated, by the necessity of its coming to pass: since they only sought to satiate the rancour of their own wills, and to glut their own sanguinary malice.

From all which, and from many other scriptural examples which might be given, I infer, that God's decrees, and the necessity of event flowing from thence, neither destroy the true free-agency of men, nor render the commission of sin a jot less heinous. They neither fore the human will, nor extenuate the evil of human actions. Predestination, fore-knowledge, and providence, only secure the event and render it certainly future, in a way and manner (incomprehensible, indeed, by us; but) perfectly consistent with the nature of second causes. The freedom of intelligent beings does by no means stand opposed to simple necessity; but only to violence and compulsive force. Thus the Son of man went kata to w`rismenon, according to what was decreed concerning him, and yet a woe was denounced, against Judas who betrayed him, Luke xxii. 22. which woe could not have been denounced, much less inflicted, if Judas, notwithstanding the decree of God, had not betrayed him freely, and with the full consent of his own depraved will. These two, therefore, are, in fact, quite reconcileable: viz. Absolute determination on the part of God; and lubentia, or freedom in action, on the part of man.³⁴ Sinners are as much responsible to God for their offences, as if God had never passed any decree at all. So that, the mock objection, drawn from "sparks and stones," is totally unparallel; and, therefore, totally inconclusive.

I mean, unparallel, as an objection; and as applied to that particular purpose for which Mr. Wesley introduces it. Otherwise, there are passages of Scripture, wherein even the rational creature an is, under certain circumstances, and in certain respects, actually and expressly compared to the sparks that fly upward (see Job v. 7, and Isai. i. 3f.), and to stones which necessarily descend downward. The holy baptist, without any ceremony, or scruple, compared some of his unregenerate hearers to stones; saying, God is able, even of these stones, to raise up children unto Abraham: Matth. iii. 9. intimating, that nothing short of divine ability, can savingly convert the soul; and that unrenewed sinners can no more change themselves into saints, than stones can transform themselves into men. Nay, even the regenerate are (though with some diversity of modification) exhibited under a similar image: Ye, therefore, as lively stones, are built up, a spiritual house. 1 Pet. ii. 5. Teaching us, that although, by virtue of grace received, men are subsequently active and diligent in every good word and work; yet that, in their first reception of saving grace, poor free-will has no employ: but that the receivers of grace are as absolutely passive, and that conversion is as totally the operation of God, as the severing of stones from their native quarry, and the erecting of them into and elegant building, are the effects of human agency. Nay, God the Father himself condescends (at least, as we render the passage) to speak of his elect people under a simile nearly allied to the foregoing: They shall be mine, saith the Lord of hosts, i. e. I will publicly own them as such, in that day when I make up my jewels. Mal. iii. 17. Now, unless I am vehemently mistaken, jewels are but another name for precious stones. On the whole, Mr. Wesley's daring to hammer out, on the very anvil of Scripture, a cavil against the decrees of God; a cavil, partly made up of Scripture metaphors; looks so like a wish to turn the Bible's own artillery against itself, as leaves too much room to fear that it is as natural to him to pervert and gainsay, as it is for a spark to ascend, a feather to float, or a stone to sink.

He brings to my mind, however, and anecdote, equally instructive in itself, and pertinent to he case in hand. Two very eminent clergymen, who are, and have long been, distinguished ornaments of the Church of England, were conversing together, some years ago, concerning predestination and invincible grace. One of these excellent persons (who was, at that time, an Arminian) said to the other, in the warmth of free debate, “Pray, sir, do not make me an absolute machine. Allow me to have a little more power of self-determination, than a stock or a stone!” To which his learned friend replied, “Indeed, sir, a stone has the advantage of you. Man's rebellious heart is, by nature, an so far as spiritual things are concerned, more untractable and unyielding, than a stone itself. I may take up a stone, and throw it, this way or that, in what direction I please; and it obeys the impulse of my arm. Whereas, in the sinner's heart, there is every species of hatred and opposition to God; nor can any thing, but omnipotent power, slay its enmity, and supersede its resistance.” Hence, God's gracious promise, to renew his people, runs in this remarkable style: I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh. Ezek. xxxvi. 26.

Still Mr. Wesley asserts, with a “positively” (which, to be sure, is demonstration), that, on the theme of pre-ordination, the reprobate “can have no sin at all.” Indeed? They are quite sinless, are they? As perfect as Mr. Wesley himself? O excellent reprobation! Let not Mr. John, who is so fiery an advocate for sinless perfection, ever open his mouth against such a preterition as this! It is one of his own consequences (a consequence which, however, like the rest, remains unproved), that God's decree makes the reprobate themselves free from sin. What, then, must the elect be? And how does it ensue, from those premises, that the former shall perish, “do what they can;” and the latter be saved, be they ever so wicked? - Besides; if reprobates be sinless; if they be, no merely nominal, but real perfectionists; nay, immutably perfect, so that they can have “no sin at all;” will it not follow, that Mr. Wesley's own perfectionists are reprobates? For, surely, if reprobates may be sinless, the sinless may be reprobates. Did not Mr. John's malice out-run his craft, when he advanced an objection so extremely unguarded, and so easily retortible?

But on what is the sinlessness of reprobates supposed to depend? on two assertions of mine: which, fairly quoted, are very unfavourable both to the consequence and to the consequence-drawer.

1. I have said, in Zanchius,³⁵ that predestination (taken in its most comprehensive import) may be defined, that eternal, most wise, and immutable decree of God, whereby he did, from before all time, determine and ordain to create, dispose of, and direct to some particular end, every person and thing, to which he has given, or is yet to give, being: and to make the whole creation subservient to, and declarative of, his own glory. Said I this of myself? says not Scripture the same, also? The Lord hath made all things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil. Prov. vi. 14. But do the righteous, likewise, fall under and unalterable decree? Yes: for it is written, being predestined according to the purpose of him who worketh all things according to the counsel of his own will. Eph. i. 11. And, indeed, either this is true, or there is no governor of the world. Unless God does actually work all tings according to the council of his own will, i. e. “dispose of, and direct to some particular end, every person and thing to which he hath given being;” Providence is no more than an empty name. Upon the plan of Mr. Wesley's Consequence, the wretch was not a fool, but wise, who said in his heart, there is no God. I defy the Pelagian to strike out a middle way between providence and chance. If God does not dispose of every being, and of every event, so as to “make the whole creation subservient to and declarative of his own glory;” chance, not providence, reigns. Prove but this, that chance is paramount; and maintain the existence of God if you can. Why did the heathens themselves justly deem Epicurus and atheist? Not because he denied the being of God (for he asserted that); but because he denied the agency of God's universal providence. Yet predestination and providence do by no means annihilate sin. The doctrine only affirms, that through the unsearchable wisdom of the great superintending mind, even the efficacious permission of evil shall, in the end, be over-ruled to good. I cannot, moreover, but observe, how wretchedly Mr. Wesley's Consequences clash together, and destroy each other. In this very paper, he revives the old, impudent cavil, that predestination makes God the author of sin. “Whose fault was it,” says he, that “Judas betrayed Christ? you plainly say, it was not his fault but God's.” Without the least heat or emotion, I plainly say, Mr. Wesley lies. I never even thought, nor intimated, much less said (least of all, said plainly) that it was “God's fault, and not the fault of Judas.” But, if God's decree and providence are incompatible with sin, insomuch, that the very reprobates themselves “can have no sin at all;” I should be glad to know how God's decree and providence can make him the author of sin? One or other, therefore, of these cavils must fall; they can never both be true, because they are flat contradictions. On one hand, God cannot be the author of evil, if there is no evil for him to be the author of: and, on the other hand, even upon the horrid supposition of his being the author of sin, it would necessarily follow, that sin and the decree were perfectly consistent. But the truth is, the consistency of God's decree with the voluntary nature of sin, is evident from the many Scripture examples already alledged. I have proved, by those, that absolute predestination, on the part of God, does not make sin involuntary, on the part of man. Consequently, God is not the author of moral evil. I have affirmed before, and I affirm again, that God is the creator of the wicked, but not of their wickedness: he is the author of their being, but no the infuser of their sin. It is most certainly his will (for adorable and unsearchable reasons) to permit sin: but with all possible reverence be it spoken, it should seem that he cannot, consistently with purity of his nature, the glory of his attributes, and the truth of his declarations, be himself the author of it. Sin, says the apostle, entered into the world by one man: meaning, by Adam. Consequently, it was not introduced by the Deity himself. Though, without the permission of his will, and the concurrence of his providence, its introduction had been impossible. Yet is he not hereby the author of sin so introduced.³⁶

2. I am charged with simply and nakedly affirming, that God himself did “predestinate them” [the reprobate] “to fill up the measure of their iniquities.” Either Mr. Wesley is a very superficial peruser of the pamphlet on which he animadverts, or a very malicious and dishonest one. For, it not my true meaning expressly declared, vol. v. p. 215? where I speak thus: God not only works efficaciously on his elect, that they may will and do that which is well pleasing in his sight; but does, likewise, frequently and powerfully suffer the wicked to fill up the measure of their iniquities, by committing fresh sins. In proof of which latter part of the paragraph, I there refer to no fewer than sixteen passages of Scripture: all which are very prudently passed over without notice by the Pelagian methodist.

Can any thing be more certain, than, (1.) that God actually does work in his own people that which is well-pleasing in his sight (Heb. xiii. 21.)? And is it not, equally, matter of fact, (2.) that he likewise suffers the wicked to fill up the measure of their iniquities? Is not the very phraseology, in which both these propositions are expressed, that positive, repeated language of God himself? what was the reason, which the Almighty condescended to give to Abraham, why the posterity of the latter should reside for several ages in Egypt, prior to their settlement in the promised land? Because, says God, the iniquity of the Amorites is not yet full. Gen. xv. 16. Divine sovereignty had determined to permit the Canaanites to arrive at a certain measure of wickedness; not could they be dispossessed of their country, until that measure was filled up. Many centuries after, it was revealed to Daniel, that the Romans should not be master of the Grecian empire, and thereby be at full liberty to turn their arms against Judea, until the transgressors are come to the full, i. e. until the sinfulness of the latter was consummated, and they full ripe for destruction: Dan. viii. 23, 24. If we descend to the age of the Messiah's incarnation, we shall find the Son of God himself speaking in the same awful terms: Fill ye up the measure of your fathers, was his tremendous language to the reprobate Jews, Matth. xxiii. 32. Of the same people, St. Paul has the same expression, where he observes, that the Jews did all they could to obstruct the ministry of Christ's faithful messengers: forbidding us to speak to the Gentiles that they might be saved; to fill up their sins always, for wrath is come upon them to the uttermost. 1 Thess. ii. 16. As long as my humble efforts in behalf of truth speak the sense and bear the stamp of Scripture, I matter not, though ten thousand Wesleys were to rave and rail.

The Arminian had still one more desperate push to make, in favour of his sinking Consequence. To this end, I am introduced as saying, “That God decreed the Jews to be the crucifiers of Christ, and Judas to betray him.” How! the Jews the crucifiers of Christ! They were not: nor do I any where call them so. Every body knows, that the Romans were the murderers of the Lord of glory, though they became such at Jewish instigation. I am, once more, under a necessity of quoting myself. God efficaciously permitted (having so decree), i. e. having decreed to permit, the Jews to be in effect the crucifiers of Christ, and Judas to betray him.³⁷ Christ could not have been betrayed and crucified, had not his prodition and crucifixion been permitted. And, if permitted, that permission must have been decreed. For, it were impiety, equivalent to atheism, to suppose that God permits any thing against his will: and the will of an all-wise, unchangeable being is and must be eternal. If any new design (be it a design of efficiency, or of permission) can have place in God, God is no longer unchangeable. Nay, God would be no longer immortal: for, as the learned and judicious Mr. Polhill³⁸ observes, “every change is a kind of death.” Whoever undergoes any alteration, dies to that he was before, and which he changes from. “In such a case,” says that eminent master in Israel, “must there not fall a changes upon the very being of God himself? and must not the Deity suffer, and, as it were, die in this mutation? which astonishing catastrophes being forever to be abhorred, I conclude, that God's decrees must needs be immutable, as long as there is any stability in his eternity, infallibility in his prescience, sureness in his grace and truth, and immortality in his life or essence.”

Mr. Wesley may possibly object, that the betraying and death of Christ might be decreed as events, without positively fixing on the particular instruments by whom those events should be brought about. As if God would fix the end, without any effectual regard to the means! would even a wise man act in this manner? Much less he, who is wisdom itself. Judas was expressly pointed out as the traitor, by Christ himself: He that dippeth his hand with me in the dish, the fame shall betray me. Matth. xxvi. 23. And this unhappy person, though chosen to the apostleship (John vi. 70.), was never chosen to salvation: whence that of our Lord, I speak not of you all; I know whom I have chosen; but, that the Scripture may be fulfilled, he that eateth bread with me hath lifted up his heel against me. John xiii. 18. Nor was Judas ever endued with saving faith: Jesus knew from the beginning who they were that believed not, and who should betray him: and he said, Therefore said I unto you, that no man can come unto me (i. e. no man savingly believe in me), unless it were given unto him of my Father. John vi. 64, 65. Hence, Judas is termed the Son of Perdition; and when he died, is said to have gone to his own place. Should such awful passages as these, excite us to blaspheme and reply against God? Should they not rather make us fall prostrated at his footstool, and cry, each for himself, in the dust of penitential abasement, God be merciful to me a sinner? - The Son of Man, said Incarnate Wisdom, goeth (i. e. dieth the death of the cross) as it was written of him, kaqwj gegraptai peri autou, as it was decreed concerning him; but woe to that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed: it were good for that man if he had never been born. Matth. xxvi. 24. - Now, notwithstanding the absolute decree, and notwithstanding Judas undesignedly fulfilled it, had he not been, in the midst of all, an accountable agent, a woe could not possibly have been denounced against him: much less such a woe, as should render even non-existence a privilege. I infer, therefore, from Christ's own words, that men are, at once, subject to God's disposal, as a predestinator; and amenable to his tribunal as a law-giver.

When St. Peter declared, that Christ was delivered up to death by the determinate counsel and fore-knowledge of God (Acts ii. 23.), it is worthy of observation, that he declared this, on the very day of Pentecost, immediately after the miraculous descent of the Holy Ghost. The apostle, therefore, was under the absolute impulse of that blessed person. Nay, he was filled with the holy spirit, and spake as that spirit gave him utterance. Consequently, in the judgment of the Holy Spirit himself, there is no real incompatibility between God's determinate counsel, and the wickedness of their hands who bring that counsel to pass. Mr. Wesley's frequent repetitions of the same threadbare objections, oblige me, oftener than I could wish, to repeat my answers.

Be it so, then, that mortals are, at present, too short-sighted, entirely to comprehend, and fully to discern, how the efficacious purposes of heaven are perfectly consistent with the moral responsibility of man. It is plain, from meridian evidence of Scripture, that they are so: and this ought to satisfy those, who believe that the Scriptures are of God. Woe unto him the striveth with his Maker: let the potsherd strive with the potsherd of the earth; but shall the clay say to him that fashioned it, what makest thou? Isai. xlv. 9. shall we, with Mr. Wesley, labour to quench the light we have? and fly in the face of Scripture? and give God himself the lie, by way of desperate revenge for his not having made us omniscient? Nay; but may we, with fear and trembling, adore that deep things of God, until death takes off the veil. May divine grace make us believers on earth; of what, in heaven, we trust to be comprehenders: nor suffer us to be carried away with that strong delusion, that monstrous system of Arminianism, which (in open defiance of all Scripture, reason, and fact) represents God as accountable to man, under pretence of making man accountable to God.

“God determined,” says the Pelagian, “that the reprobate should live and die in their sins, that he might afterwards damn them!” Say rather, that some men are permitted to live and die in their sins, the consequence of which is condemnation. - As to the horrid parallel, which Mr. W. labours to run, between the Most High God, and one of the most abandoned emperors that ever disgraced the Roman diadem; I have only this to remark: 1. That the writer, who is capable of taking such blasphemous liberties with the adorable Sovereign of heaven and earth, must have drank deep indeed into that satanic spirit which opposeth and exalteth itself above all that is called God. 2. The whole parallel is copied almost verbatim, from an old book, first published in the reign of Charles I. A. D. 1633, by one Samuel Hoord, alias Hoard, alias Hord (for I find him bearing all these names in print). He was a clergyman of the Laudean faction; and, by way of cover for his apostacy (having been, originally, a zealous maintainer of the xxxix Articles), printed the above-mentioned treatise, commonly known by the title of “God's Love to Mankind.” From which treatise, Mr. Wesley borrowed his whole paragraph concerning God and Tiberius; but without giving it as a quotation, or dropping the least hint to his readers that the comparison was none of his own. Nothing comes amiss to this gentleman. Not content with assaulting the living, he even rifles the dead: and, rather than not rifle at all, robs them of their very blasphemies. Unless he goes upon the old fanatic principle, that brethren should have all things in common. 3. I am saved from the trouble of canvassing Mr. Hoord's simile: it having been effectually done to my hands by no less persons than the renowned Dr. Davenant, bishop of Salisbury, and that prodigy of metaphysical learning, the ever memorable Dr. Twisse: who condescended to immortalize Hoord's name, by their candid, solid, and learned answers. For the refutation of that particular calumny against God, which Mr. Wesley's plagiarism has adopted for his own, I shall content myself with referring the reader to the treatises of those great and eminent champions of grace.³⁹ It may be worth a moment's while, however, to trace the pedigree of the impious comparison. Bertius⁴⁰ (as Dr. Twisse observes) objected it, long before, to the celebrated Piscator, by whom it was amply refuted. Hoord copied it from Bertius; and Mr. Wesley cribbed ti from Hoord.

I congratulate the reader on his sight of land. We are come now to the

Vth and last Consequence, viz. that, on the principle of absolute predestination, there can be “no future judgment.” Here, again, the Consequence is false. For, absolute predestination is the very thing that renders the future judgment certain: God hath appointed [esthsei, hath fixed] a day in which he will judge the world in righteousness, by that man whom he had ordained [w`risen, decreed:] Acts xvii. 31. - Nay, says Mr. John; “It requires more pains than all the men upon earth and all the devils in hell will ever be able to take:” viz. to reconcile the doctrine of reprobation, with the doctrine of a judgment day. Be not quite so fiery, meek Mr. John. It might, perhaps, be for your interest (and it certainly would for that of “the devils in hell”), to find that reprobates cannot be judged. But feed not yourself with such delusive hope. I have already shewn, that even the most flagrant sinners, sin voluntarily, notwithstanding the inevitable accomplishment of God's effective and permissive decrees. Not, they, who sin voluntarily, are accountable: and, if judicable, they are punishable. Be content, therefore, with conjuring back the ghosts of Peter Bertius, Samuel Hoord, Gregory Lopez, John Goodwin, and Thomas Grantham. The second-hand arguments, which you so industriously cull from these and such like heroes, are quite sufficient (though not to prove you doctrines, yet) to convince us both of your zeal and your abilities, without your calling up “all the devils in hell” to augment your train. Besides, the testimony of the latter would do you no good: for they were liars from the beginning. I wish, your own future regard to truth may give us reason to hope, that they have nothing to do with you, nor you with them.

God “had determined,” says the objector, that the reprobated “should continue impenitent. Their ignorance of God, and things of God, was not wilful, but owing to the sovereign will of God. God had absolutely decreed, before they were born, that they should live and die in unbelief. God himself unalterably decreed, that they should not love either God or man. Their repeated iniquities and transgressions were in effect his own act and deed.” - Flagrant misrepresentation throughout. The utmost our doctrine amounts to, is that the omniscient mind (to whom all things are, and ever were, present at once) considering the human race as fallen, was pleased to ordain the recover of an innumerable multitude, and to leave the rest unrestored. So that, with regard to the former, mercy is glorified in their election, redemption, sanctification, and eternal happiness: as justice is in the condemnation of the latter, for the impenitence, unbelief, and disobedience. “Oh, but could they ever repent, believe, and obey?” I am not afraid to answer, with the word of God, that repentance, faith, and sanctification, are God's own gifts, which he is not bound to bestow on any man, and might have withheld from all men. Where these graces are given, rectitude and happiness follow: where they are not given, sin and misery continue to reign. Given they are to some: or none would have them. Given they are not, to all; else none would be without them. The regenerate work the works of God with consent, freedom, and desire; in consequence of grace bestowed: the unregenerate commit evil, with no less desire, freedom, and consent, in consequence of that original depravation which God (for unfathomable reasons) was pleased to permit, and which nothing but his own grace can effectually supersede. Which grace he vouchsafes to, and withholds, from whom he pleases.

Neither election, on one hand, nor reprobation on the other, will be found to clash with the process of the final judgment. Not election: for Christ himself will preach election form the judgment-seat. Come ye blessed of my Father (why blessed of his Father, in particular? because election was God the Father's act), inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. Matt. xxv. 34. - Nor reprobation: for God's decree of preterition evinced by the voluntary transgressions of the persons passed by), will be solemnly appealed to, in that great and terrible day. Whosoever was not found written in the Book of Life, was cast into the lake of fire. Rev. xx. 15.

So much for Mr. Wesley and his Consequences. A few words, in my turn, concerning Calvinism and Arminianism in general; and then, for the present, manum de tabula.

It might naturally enough be expected, that a man who is so liberally lamentable in his outcries against the doctrine of predestination, and carries to such horrid length his invectives against the purposes and providence of God; should himself adopt, and be fairly able to propose, a scheme of salvation, exempt even from the appearance of that unmercifulness, which he effects to find, in the scheme of those, from whom he so violently dissents. But what if the reverse be true? What if that very Arminian doctrine, asserted by Mr. Wesley, should, on a near inspection, be fairly convicted of, not only apparent, but real unmercifulness? even of more, and greater, than malice itself can charge on the most distorted portrait of Calvinism? This I, some pages back, engage to make good. All passion and prejudice apart, let us coolly, and candidly, address ourselves to the enquiry.

According to Mr. Wesley's own fundamental principle of universal grace; grace itself, or the saving influence of the holy spirit on the hearts of men, does and must become the ministration of eternal death to thousands and millions. That I do not wrong Mr. Wesley, in asserting this, shall be proved from his own words: or, rather, from the words of Mr. Robert Barclay, the celebrated quaker; from whose apology for that people, Mr. Wesley (without mentioning the name of his author) hath pirated a little Tractate, price 2d. and to which he hath given the title of Serious Considerations on Absolute Predestination. In this Tractate, pirated as aforesaid,